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FOREWORD
 
This report ends a project which for the past four years has ex­
plored aspects of technology and social change. Predominantly supported
and encouraged by the Ames Research Center, National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, the work reported here was one of several efforts 
focusing on the relationship of technological development to individual 
and community response These studies began partially in response to
 
the interest of Dr Hans Mark, Director of Ames Research Center, in the 
potential impact upon community life of a particular technology--the 
short-take-off-and-landing aircraft (STOL). Convinced that complex ad­
vanced technologies trigger both social and political changes which are 
as 
yet only vaguely understood, Dr. Mark initiated conversations with us
 
which have culminated in the present report and several complementary
 
studies. Since those first discussions in the spring of 1971, several
 
increasingly more refined studies have been completed which attempt to
 
provide a general conceptual, as well as empirical basis, for a better
 
understanding of the impact of advanced technologies upon social life. 
In addition to research on public attitudes toward technology, these
 
efforts included an exploratory field study on the impact of improved
 
airtransportation systems upon rural communities *
 
Our earliest probe of public attitudes toward technology was in the
 
winter of 1971, when several questions were included in Field Research
 
Corporation's CaZiforia Poll. This initial and tentative foray warned
 
us of potential difficulties in seeking out attitudes toward technology-­
a matter that could well have been of only modest interest to a public

already swamped with information about a host of social problems and
 
events The Field Research Corporation assisted us in questionnaire de­
sign and data collection for both the 1972 and 1974 surveys Support
from NASA for the 1972 survey was supplemented by funds from the Inter­
national Technology Assessment Program of the Institute of International
 
Studies, University of California, Berkeley That assistance enabled us
 
to broaden the scope of the survey In 1974, supplementary funds from
 
the National Science Foundation's Office of the Public Understanding of 
TSee Todd La Porte, Stephen Rosenthal, Stuart Ross, K.N. Lee, and Edith 
Levine, Interactions of Technology andSociety: Impacts of Improved Air­
transport--A Study of Airports at the Grass Roots, Report to Anes Research 
Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Institute of Gov­
ernmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, December, 1974).
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Science assisted us in maintaining that broader perspective
 
The two authors of this monograph have worked together from the be­
ginning of this study. Each of us has contributed somewhat different 
interests and skills, and these are reflected in the final form of the 
report. Its overall structure was developed jointly, with different 
chapters being drafted by one author and then critically reviewed and
 
revised by the other. La Porte had initial responsibility for Chapters
 
I, VI, VII, VIII, and X, and Metlay for Chapters II, III, IV, V, and IX. 
Of course, we bear together the responsibility for the character of the 
analysis and interpretation. 
In addition to our appreciation of Dr. Mark's continued foresight 
and support, we are pleased to acknowledge the encouragement and guidance 
of Professor Ernst Haas of the Institute of International Studies and the 
Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, of 
Richard Stephens of theNational Science Foundation; of Eugene Lyman, Di­
rector of NASA's Aeronautical Life Sciences Division in Washington, D C
 
and of Mr Robert Heyer of the Field Research Corporation who gave gener­
ously of his expert skills. In their various roles as colleagues, inter­
ested grant administrators, and technical experts, they have made this
 
project both more extensive and more effective. Additional technical as­
sistance has come from our colleagues in the Department of Political Sci­
ence on the Berkeley campus Professors William Bicker, Director of the
 
State Data Program, Merrill Shanks, Director of the Survey Research Center,
 
and Peter Sperlich, of the Department of Political Science, have gracious­
ly assisted us in various aspects of questionnaire construction or data
 
analysis. Greg Streeter, also of the State Data Program, provided impor­
tant programming assistance And Donald Chisholm has worked mightily and 
over time to extract reams of data for analysis from the computer The 
staff of the Institute of Governmental Studies greatly facilitated our 
labors in administering the grant and in the preparation of this and other 
reports Our thanks to Joan Barulich, Kathy Gura, Catherine Winter and
 
Sidney Dong. But our most grateful acknowledgements are reserved for Dr
 
Trieve Tanner, the Ames Research Center representative who supervised the
 
grant, and for Mary Fenneman, who has labored with us in the preparation
 
of this report. For quite different reasons they both have made this
 
effort more interesting for us and for our readers. - Trieve Tanner has 
followed with sympathetic involvement our several efforts over the past 
several years His fine sense of the research process and his adminis­
trative abilities have enhanced and facilitated the cooperative relation­
ship between Ames and our research group. From our view, and we hope it 
is shared by Ames, this relationship has been close to optimum. Mary 
Fenneman, for her part, has greatly improved the flow and coherence of 
our presentation Her editorial skill, insistence on clear language and 
*For reports of preliminary analyses of survey data reported within, see 
Todd R. La Porte and Daniel Metlay, "Technology Observed: Attitudes of a 
Wary Public," Science 188 (11 April 1975) , 121-127, and "Public Attitudes 
Toward Present and Future Technologies: Satisfactions and Apprehensions," 
Social Studzes of Science (November, 1975). 
vi 
precise explication, and her professional spirit have been of great help 
to us and will assist readers beyond their knowing. 
Finally, a word of appreciation must be given to the many anony­
mous people who patiently answered questions put to them by interviewers 
from Field Research. These are the unsung heroes of the piece. Their
 
cooperation after all was necessary for any study to be done at all 
From them we have gained a heightened appreciation of the subtleties of
 
the public mind. Midway through this project, one member of the public 
voiced what ultimately became its predominant finding. In a letter to 
the editors of Sczence (26 January, 1973), Anne Elizabeth Holmes pro­
tested the "technological imperative" position taken by some scientific
 
elitists In the immediate context of a debate over the impact of the 
computer on society, this citizen from the Northwest noted that while 
many still subscribe to the traditional ideology of "progress through 
technology," many others have "wondered, worried, and tried to under­
stand " We believe the findings of this study to be at best quite en­
couraging Many in the public do wonder and seek to comprehend the sig­
nificance of technology's effects on their lives. Their concern and 
judgments are a measure of the promise for a more responsible politics
 
of technology
 
Todd R La Porte
 
Principal Investigator
 
Berkeley, California
 
October, 1975
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PART ONE
 
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES
 
It is a commonplace to assert that advanced technology is 
the hallmark of our age Everywhere, its processes and artifacts 
pervade our lives, proclaiming that ours is indeed a "technologi­
cal society " Since the Second World War technological develop­
ment has increasingly become a function of government as well as 
industry In our enthusiasm to use technology's awesome capaci­
ties for the support of our political system and the pursuit of 
international stature--whether by venturing into outer space or 
by assisting underdeveloped nations--the public purse has been 
opened often Vast sums from our national treasure have been 
poured into basic science and applied technology Over the past 
two decades, public and private funds allocated for research 
and development have increased from some $5 1 billion in 1953 to 
an estimated $34 3 billion in 1975 The National Science Found­
ation figures for the total amount of funds devoted to research
 
and development from 1953 to 1975 is $404 4 billion 1 This pub­
lic support has been accompanied by a strong sense of optimism,
 
seemingly justified by past rewards of technological development
 
which solved the puzzles of agricultural and industrial produc­
tion and ushered in the wonders of the space age What was once
 
impossible now seems commonplace.
 
There are signs, however, that this optimism is being temp­
ered by uneasiness and wariness The assumption that technology's 
blessings are so many and its disturbing consequences so few as to 
be unworthy of concern no longer draws near-unanimous agreement 
Having thrown technology's bread upon the waters, things both 
blessed and foul come back to us. Traditional concern for mili­
tary might and national prestige is now being supplanted in some 
circles by concern over polluted air, limited energy resources, 
and shrinking food supplies Still, the citizen/consumer is be­
ing asked from many quarters to give both his monies and his as­
sent to stimulate the engines of technology even more The world 
is breaking down, and technology might have "the fix ,,2 
Through the years when technology was virtually deemed a
 
public good, the public absorbed large technological programs
 
1
 
2 
mainly as passive consumer/citizens--subsidizing them, cheering,
 
fearing them Only recently has there been much evidence of any
 
other pattern3 indications of disquiet are sprinkled through­
out the media and have entered the public forum in debates rang­
ing from concerns about environmental damage to the pros and cons
 
of fluoridating water supplies. At once sponsor and debtor,
 
"doer and done-to,",4 the consumer/citizen seems no longer to wait
 
patiently for the next series of technology-induced surprises.
 
This report is concerned with how the public views technology and
 
the institutions conducting its development. What is the shape
 
of public perceptions of and attitudes toward this most character­
istic aspect of our time9
 
Those perceptions and attitudes are in part both the object
 
of and the boundaries around government's stimulation of techno­
logical development. Insofar as government supports that develop­
ment and attempts to regulate its effects in the name of service 
to "the people," it is intrinsically important that citizen atti­
tudes be made known Also, public attitudes toward technology and
 
programs established in pursuit of technical virtuosity often form
 
permeable boundaries within which decisions are made. Certainly 
in the rhetoric of policy advocates who seek political approval,
 
citizen attitudes become the benchmarks for their proposals.
 
Claims about such attitudes cannot be too wide of the mark for very
 
long before public sentiment congeals and the outcry reduces al­
ternatives for policy action and limits the direction of legis­
lative response.
 
Though many claim to speak for the public, either in the
 
name of technological advocacy or dissent, no sound basis exists
 
for judging the accuracy of their interpretations of the public
 
mind--one way or the other. Few sources are available to the
 
search for answers to questions about public attitudes toward
 
technology. Our study has attempted to assemble materials needed
 
for a deeper appreciation of the range of attitudes on this
 
subject. An initial charting of the parameters of the internal
 
structure of individual perceptions of technology, it establishes
 
a base-line against which to gauge future studies, in whichthe
 
degree of change or stability discernible in public attitudes
 
could be related both to political events and to technological
 
developments
 
Part One recapitulates the underlying conceptual organi­
zation of the study and presents the initial methodological con
 
siderations which governed sample selection and data collection.
 
Part Two explores public attitudes toward technology and science,
 
probing for evidence of perceived distinction between them, public
 
evaluations of presently implemented technologies are reported
 
3 
along with the profile of value preferences held by the public in 
their judgments about technological decision making. Part Three 
reports attitudes toward a range of future-oriented technologies 
and some apparent social correlates of these attitudes--with special 
attention to energy producing technologies and the issues surround­
ing the "energy crisis" of 1973-74. Part Four presents dominant
 
opposed views on future control of technological development and 
attempts to marshall evidence bearing on the validity of the cen­
tral hypotheses of each, that is, evidence concerned specifically
 
with the alleged uncritical acceptance of technology by the pub­
lic. The book concludes with a summary of the findings reported
 
and a discussion of the implications they hold .for present and 
future policy and for further research
 
See National Science Foundation, National Patternsof Resources 
for Research and Development: Funds and Manpower in the United
 
States, 1953-1975, NSF 75-307 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975),
 
esp. p. 26.
 
2See the optimistic discussion by the thoroughgoing technologist 
Alvin Weinberg, "Can Technology Replace Social Engineering," Bul­
letin of Atomic Scientists 22 (Dec., 1966), 4-8, reprinted in A.
 
Teich, Ed., Technology and Man's Future (New York: St. Martin's,
 
1972), 27-35. See also, Hyman Rlickover, "A Humanistic Technolo­
gy," Nature 208 (Nov. 20, 1965), 721-726, and Amtai Etzioni and 
Richard Remp, "Technological ' Short-cuts ' to Social Change," Sci
ence 175 (Jan. 7, 1972), 31-38. For less optimistic views, see 
Jack D. Douglas, Ed., The Technological Threat (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971) and Eugene S. Schwartz, Overskill, The
 
Decline of Technology an Modern Civilization (Chicago: Quadrangle,
 
1971). It is in part the business of the present report to con­
tribute information on public impressions of the social role of
 
science and technology which might lean toward either the "opti­
mistic" or "pessimistic" outlook advanced by the aforementioned 
spokesmen. see especially Chapters I, III, IV, and IX. 
3For an interesting attempt to document this shift, based on the
 
historical analysis of non-technical commentary on technology,
 
see Thomas Parke Hughes, Changing Attitudes Toward Aerican Tech­
nology (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), esp. Part I.
 
Coined by Geoffrey Vickers, Freedom an a Rocking Boat: Changing
 
Values in an Unstable Society (New York- Basic Books, 1971).
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CHAPTER I
 
TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS: AN ORGANIZING PERSPECTIVE
 
Much in popular literature and the media seems to suggest a public
 
enamored with technical virtuosity, trusting of scientists and technolo­
gists, and docile as it is led to support technological solutions to many
 
current problems.1 Perhaps in response to the over-enthusiastic images
 
presented there, literature critical of unrestrained technical develop­
ment exhorts the public to beware of technology's consequences and not
 
to trust scientists and technologists, especially those supported by
 
government funds, whose ranks include the inventors of the fearful engines 
of destruction and human control This literature suggests that the pub­
lic makes, or ought to make, qualitative judgments about such developments
 
as nuclear power plants, biological engineering, mass rapid transit,
 
personal information storage, space exploration, and so on 2 It follows,
 
given the plural nature of our society, that these judgments would reflect 
variant, even contradictory, attitudes toward technology, But when, for 
clarification, we seek out professional literature based on opinion survey
 
research, we reach something of an impasse We are told that the public's
 
attitudes, if indeed they have any at all on this subject, are likely at
 
3 
best to be ephemeral This assessment of the public as uninformed and
 
inattentive to complex matters, including technology, implicitly runs
 
counter to the critical literature There, observers suggest that techno­
logy issaliently perceived--as being ingrained in social experience, not
 
simply as isolated machines or systems
 
In our attempts to explore public attitudes about technology's ef­
fects on experience, we have been open to both interpretations Certainly
 
"technology" is complex, and issues surrounding its development are akin
 
to those which up until now have not held particularly great salience for
 
the public-at-large. Forewarned by the possibility of this low salience,
 
we have weighed indications, noted by some observers, that technology is
 
experienced by people as a part of the wider social context of their
 
N 
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everyday lives. Recently the technological character of our society 
has become obvious to greater numbers of people than in the past and the 
source of growing concern and commentary. It is plausible, therefore, to 
suppose that the public perceives of and responds to various technologies 
in a more sophisticated way than what it is often credited with. 4 The 
first step in investigating this possibility is to conceptualize "tech­
nology" in a way that will allow us to discern the more salient vari­
ations in public response to the phenomenon, to the extent they exist.
 
In this chapter we outline a conception of technology-as-social­
experience, attempting to distinguish it from public perception of sci­
ence. We then discuss the relationship between technological development
 
and social change. The chapter ends with a description of two prevail­
ing, diametrically opposed theories on the political future of techno­
logical development. The social control of technology, or lack of it,
 
envisioned in these perspectives projects provocatively divergent public
 
attitudes The material in this chapter has informed our perspective as
 
we developed those probes of public attitudes toward technology Its
 
sweep has carried us beyond both the methodology and resources available
 
to enable us to develop a theory relating those public perceptions to
 
the various aspects of social experience we are about to discuss. Hence,
 
our major attention in this chapter is directed to a series of informal 
hypotheses summarizing certain theoretical arguments. Instances where
 
these hypotheses bear on our own data and analysis are noted and the lo­
cation of their further treatment in the present book indicated
 
TECHNOLOGY AS SOCIAL EXPERIENCE
 
As the term is used in this study, "technology" refers to those
 
applications of scientific knowledge in the service of particular social­
5 
ly defined purposes. The primary emphasis is upon the activities associ­
ated with the use of scientific knowledge for the purposes of solving 
technical problems which are, in large part, defined in terms of socially 
desirable objectives Technology or technological developments are sets
 
of activities which result in generally quite predictable changes in
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the physical world. Technologists base their activities on more or 
less agreed upon premises about the nature and dynamics of the physical 
and biological world; this largely implicit consensus assists them in 
working together to develop the processes, machines, and structures we 
associate with advanced technology 6 People other than technologists, 
however, determine what economic or political problems are to be "solved"
 
through the use of technology. The financial resources required to carry 
on technological activities almost invariably must be obtained from pub­
lic or private organizations having a vested interest in the outcome of
 
those activities Thus, technological development is nearly always
 
shaped by a search for solutions to problems or for satisfactions of
 
needs defined by the "donor," its employers, or clients 7 
The increasingly sophisticated science-based requirements of tech­
nology make it impossible for technical problem solving to be done by 
broadly versatile technicians working as generalists Ever more special­
ized training has been necessary for coping with the complexities of ad­
vanced technical knowledge. Specialization in turn requires that the 
men and women in command of particular understandings of the physical 
and biological world work in interdependent cooperation Thus, a strong 
imperative exists for technology-based organizations in both the private 
and public sectors to expand and to become increasingly interdependent 
As this process is carried forward, technologists--engineers, chemists, 
architects, physicians, operations researchers, and industrial managers-­
are brought together in large or moderately sized complex organizations 
which attempt to control and coordinate their activities. This remark­
able achievement of social organization has provided us with enormous 
capacities for directly altering the physical world and for indirectly
 
shaping the social world as well.
 
The web of interpersonal relationships implicit in the organized 
activities of these technologists, their managers, sponsors and clients, 
reveals the social texture of technology Participating organizations 
touch the lives of countless citizens--by employing them, taxing them, 
and approaching them as consumers Hence, carried on through the medium 
of cooperating technologists and their organizations of development, 
8 
production, and distribution, "technology" is an identifiable aggregation 
of people--people joined by roughly similar premises and expectations 
about technological processes and enabled thereby to relate to one an­
other in certain predictable ways. In sum, technology can be seen as a 
techno-sociaZ system, one which over the past century has been the agent
 
of ever-increasing growth in society's sheer ability to alter economic
 
and political conditions and the personal opportunities of its members.
8
 
As the people who animate the social infra-structure of technology 
interact--technologists, managers, suppliers, promoters, customers, regu­
lators, citizens--the number of those who can be considered to be "out­
side" the system, as opposed to "insiders," diminishes. "Technology" be­
comes the source of unexpected and often quite surprising changes in the 
social experiences of all concerned. These changes may be associated 
with new, unforeseen physical capabilities, with improved economic pro­
duction or dislocation, with military victory or defeat, with freedom of 
movement or incarceration, with improved health or attenuated death. In 
countless such examples, technical developments have sustained or altered 
the capacities of people to act, and "technology" has entered the circle 
of individual relationships that shape the character of personal experi­
ence for all members of society In this sense, then, technology is not 
mere machines, remote and disembodied, not abstract analytical processes 
or mute structures, technology is social experience Through networks
 
of individual relationships technologies translate scientific knowledge
 
into devices, institutions, and tangible experience for all people A
 
long series of links joins all members of the "technological soclety"-­
from "science" through "technology" to the large organizations of pro­
duction and distribution to organizations administering the rules which 
govern citizen relations among the former And within this series of 
links it is "technology," not "science," which in our view is the engine 
of change This reasoning leads us to our initial informal hypothesis 
that 
technology is perceived by the public as part of social ex­
perience, instrumental in triggering changes in society and 
stimulating conditions that account in part for experiences
 
which some people value and others seek to avoid. 
9 
Implicit in this hypothesis is an assumed distinction between science
 
and technology. In the next section we argue for such a distinction.
 
TECHNOLOGY IS NOT SCIENCE
 
The terms "science" and "technology"--science-and-technology--are 
so frequently linked in the parlance of the popular media, in the in­
formal language of both the technical and industrial communities, and in
 
the reports and pronouncements issuing from official bodies such as the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Academies of Science
 
and of Engineering (NAS, NAE) that they suggest a tight--nearly insepa­
rable--bond. That two different terms persist indicates certainly that
 
in some time past there were two distinct concepts and sets of activi­
ties, but the present frequency of their combination implies that "science"
 
and "technology" have become so closely unted that the distinction serves
 
no useful purpose. 
Contemporary science and technology indeed share a large intricately
 
woven common web of concept and logic about the character and dynamics of
 
the physical world Modern technologists are deeply indebted to scien­
tLsts for the discovery of reliable laws concerning the structure and
 
dynamics of nature These discoveries have enabled technologists to plan
 
and construct the machines and structures which so radically transform
 
materials of limited intrinsic worth into the awesome implements of andus­
try and war. In their turn, scientists clearly depend on technologists
 
for increasingly accurate scientific measurements and often for the basic
 
apparatus without which "science" would remain pure theory
 
While the degree to which scientific knowledge informs various 
technical ventures differs from field to field, there is no question 
that theoretical and experimental scientific work has contributed im­
measurably to the solution of technical problems But does that contri­
bution make the people who carry out technology and those who carry out 
9
science one and the same Are the activities so similar that the agents 
become indistinguishable ? 
We have argued that technology can be seen as a social system If 
we also conceive of science that way, does it turn out to be the same 
10 
system of social action as technology, carried on by the same people? 
If it does, then the way science-and-technology is heralded in the press, 
in science policy documents, and by the statesmen of science, as well as 
by sponsors of technological programs, serves quite adequately to identi­
fy the people and activities engaged in those startling discoveries and 
events that shape our world. If, however, it turns out that neither most 
of the people nor many of the activities are the same, then the language 
generally used to describe science-and-technology serves only to confuse 
and mislead both the public and policy makers 
The choice of one as against the other of these perspectives is
 
crucial to our strategy in exploring the public's perceptions of and atti­
tudes toward technology. Were science-and-technology to be indistinguish­
able in the social sense, then surveys such as the ones reported here
 
would be required to range across all the activities of scientists as
 
well as technologists. Questions related to the conduct of scientific re­
search and to theoretical controversies within science should be included
 
in them as well as queries about the character of technological implemen­
tation If, on the other hand, the social character of "technology" can 
be distinguished from "science," then the focus of our surveys of public 
response to technology should concentrate on those activities and-conse­
quences which are perceived to be associated with "technology" and avoid 
confusions with those associated with "science." We shall argue here 
that there is a sociological basis for distinguishing between them. In
 
Chapter III, our assertions are put to the empirical test of whether such
 
a distinction is perceived by the public.
 
Intuitively at least, it does not seem sensible to lump scientists 
and technologists, nor the activities they pursue, into the same over­
arching category. While there are many instances in which scientists 
have turned their hands to engineering and to healing, there is a dis­
tinct difference between scientists and technologists. This difference 
is apparent in the organizations they inhabit, in the professional as­
sociations they join, in the spirit in which they conduct their work, in
 
the goals they pursue, and in the character of their respective relation­
ships to the sources of their financial and political support. To typify 
11 
the differences between scientist and technologist, we shall use carica­
ture for reasons of brevity, clearly recognizing that our descriptions
 
are not so pervasive or so simplistic as we shall suggest. Nonetheless,
 
they represent tendencies, and, for the purposes of this study,, the 
differences are quite important. 
The objective of science, and of those who call themselves "scien­
tist," is the discovery of the underlying structure and dynamics of 
10 
nature Primary value is attached to increasing the power of expla­
nation, whether or not it may lead to the solution of a socially defined 
problem area. Understanding is the scientist's aim, and his rewards are 
dispensed by peers for adding significantly to increased understanding 
of a particular phenomenon. 
The technologist pursues other ends For him, practice is as cen­
tral as understanding, and his aim is the solution of problems defined 
in technical, economic, and sometimes political and social terms.1 ' In­
creasing efficiency, hopefully both technical and economic, becomes his 
goal Understanding of physical or biological phenomena becomes a means, 
not the objective of his enterprise It is true, of course, that techno­
logical ventures have for centuries uncovered "scientific" enigmas-­
questions about the physical, biological, and social world for which no
 
adequate explanation existed. Consequently, technological work has 
stimulated considerable scientific inquiry. Much more the case in centu­
ries past, this contact still occurs with enough frequency that scien­
tists and technologists share in their day-to-day activities a close re­
ciprocal energy
 
Differences in objective and style prompt one of the most salient
 
distinctions for the social understanding of science and of technology 
Scientific activities are organized in such a way that their influences 
radiate outward--away from the scientist, his work subject to little re­
ciprocal impact from the social environment. Those outside the circle 
of scientific competence would not be considered justified in specifying 
the particular problems upon which a scientist should work Technology, 
on the other hand, is significantly influenced by "outsiders." Indeed 
one prominent theme in the professional literature is the importance of 
12 
service to social and economic values Thus, in developing technologies 
which shape social experience, technologists, in addition to their own
 
enthusiasms, receive "outside" direction concerning the types of problems 
upon which they should work. 
The goals and perspectives of scientists, as contrasted to those of
 
technologists, have resulted in rather striking differences in the organ­
izations with which each group is associated.12 An extensive and sprawl­
ing literature mulls over the puzzles of organizing basic scientific re­
search activities which defy the familiar coordinating devices of mana­
gerial hierarchy Technical development, on the other hand, is much more
 
operationally shaped and the object of forceful managerial controls At 
the extremes, the structure and workways of university-based scientific 
research teams or departments differ sharply from those of industry-based 
engineers or physicians in private practice. The professional life and 
work style, for example of high energy physicists and geneticists, is 
very different from that of construction engineers and general practition­
ers. Their professional associations contrast markedly as well Compare,
 
for example, the topics addressed in any particular year at the meetings
 
of the American Physical Society with those of the American Society of
 
Mechanical Engineers Compare the American Biochemical Association with
 
the American Medical Association. Major substantive questions, policy
 
concerns, and even the style of conversations convey very different quali­
ties
 
Finally, scientific work and technological work tend to be charac­
terized by markedly different relationships to governmental agencies pro­
viding financial support. Typified in the terms "grants" as opposed to
 
"contracts," scientific support allows a much greater freedom for the re­
searcher to define and conduct his project, with little or no supervision
 
by the funder, than do contracts for technological work. These by con­
trast include quite rigorous specification of the problem to be solved,
 
a time estimate on when the solution will be forthcoming, and require­
ments for frequent reporting to the funding agency on the intermediate 
progress of the work There is little latitude for deviation in a 
contract; in a grant there is a great deal. The assumption which prompts 
13 
these differences is that in scientific work neither the questions nor
 
the answers can be rigorously specified in advance, whereas in techno­
logical work, the problem to be solved is specifiable and the answers 
presumably attainable within a particular span of time. 
To what extent is the public aware of these differences in the
 
social activities and objectives of "science" as contrasted to those of 
"technology"7 On the one hand, the evidences of scientific activity re­
main at a far remove from everyday experience On the other, involvement
 
of those members of society touched by technological activities is im­
mediate and pervasive. While technology in this sense is very much a 
part of everyday life, it is certainly plausible that the public would 
not even recognize the existence of sczence activities, though if they 
did they might very well perceive them differently from technological 
activities. Accordingly, our next informal hypothesis, following from 
the argument just presented, is that 
the public percetves a distincton between the activities of 
"science" and those of "technology" and infers a crucial differ­
ence in the degree of restraint that shouldbe imposed on each activi­
ty--less regulation for "science" than for "technology." 
Disproving the null hypothesis formed of that proposition--that the public 
recognizes no distinction between scientific and technological activities 
and assigns the same degree of expected regulation to both--complements
 
the present analytic task
 
The questions used in the surveys were designed to keep "science" 
and "technology" cleanly distinct, in order that the degree to which such 
a-perceived difference exists might be discovered. Responses to the rele­
vant questions are subjected to close scrutiny in Chapter III We turn 
now to some preliminary considerations of "technology's" most telling 
aspect for political and social experience, its relationship to social 
change 
TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
Underlying our interest in technologies and the attitudes of citizen/ 
consumers toward them is an assumption that technological development has
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been and will continue to be a prime impetus for social change Clearly,
 
any exploration of public attitudes toward "technology" should consider the 
impact of this relationship on personal experience Although there is
 
ample descriptive evidence in the literature that given cultures have 
been subject to strong and surprising impacts from the introduction of 
various technologies, a well formulated theory of technological change
 
and social change unfortunately has not been developed To be sure, con­
siderable attention has been levied on the relationship between techno­
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logical development and economic development And there continues to 
be a keen interest in the conditions stimulating technological innovation
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and the diffusion of new technical devices and processes Indeed most 
of the interest in the relationship of technological development to change 
in advanced or advancing societies has centered on the problems of under­
standing the conditions for successfully introducing new technologies 
for the sake of enhancing the economy These studies have been colored 
with a quite positive view of technology as a source of beneficial conse­
quences for the receiving society Such studies suggest another informal 
hypothesis. that 
the public perceives past and presently implemented tech­
nology to be beneficiaZ and usefuZ in the solution of
 
social problems.
 
The more extreme form of this proposition, one characterizing the as­
sertion of some critics concerned about the "seductive" effects of tech­
nology, would be that aZZ presently implemented technological development
 
is seen by the public as quite beneficial. Attitudes related to the pub­
lic's sense of the beneficence of past technological developments are ex­
plored in Chapter IV and Chapter IX below
 
Another type of interest has been piqued by the apparent challenge 
that technological development poses for the institutions of governance 
and political decision making. Here the tone has been less enthusiastic 15
 
It is alleged that technological development has produced an increasing
 
dependence of political decision makers upon technical experts, that ever 
increasing knowledge requirements have added enormously to the burden of 
already overloaded decision makers and have removed them even further 
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from contact with a citizenry which remains untutored about technology­
centered political decisions The consequences of this situation for
 
democratic forms of governance are obvious and disquieting both to the
 
public and to a worried intellectual elite committed to the ideals of
 
political participation To the degree this situation obtains we would
 
expect the following hypothesis to hold that
 
the public is susptctous of decsion makers involved in 
decisions concerning technological policies, and feels ille­
gitimately excluded from a process in which it seeks to par­
ti cip ate 
Several aspects of these concerns are discussed in Chapter V.
 
There is emerging recognition that technological developments have
 
been and are likely to remain central to the great military and economic
 
expansions of this century, and, at the same time, that these develop­
ments result in a widened gulf between the governed and the governors 
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But no closely reasoned conceptions of what it is about technological de­
velopment that prompts these changes informs that recognition Nor has 
there been much systematic examination of the various kinds of change so­
ciety undergoes as a result of technological development, of the for­
mation of attitudes and changes in attitude, or of the processes through 
which technical innovation affects the social experiences of the public. 
To be sure, stories abound about the impact of this or that technology 
upon particular groups and about the increased difficulties technical de­
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velopment makes for political figures But little attempt has been
 
made to relate these stories within an overall conception of technolo­
gy and social or political change In the absence of such a formulation,
 
we have outlined the elements of one that has informed the surveys re­
ported in this book. 
Our initial point of departure is a conception of technology, noted 
near the beginning of this chapter, as a system of social activities ex­
perienced by those both directly and indirectly associated with its pro­
duction and distribution In this sense, technical innovations (whether 
their emergence is a "scientific" breakthrough or a pragmatic one) stimu­
late social changes directly--by providing new or improved capacities to 
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be taken up by consumers--and indirectly by altering the character 
of public and private organizations in a society New or improved capaci­
ties have ranged from the familiar to the fantastic, from the accommodat­
ing to the horrifying- we have witnessed increased efficiency in pro­
ducing consumer products and improved facilities for moving goods and 
people rapidly from place to place, the ability to construct more massive
 
and higher buildings; greater precision in arriving at a particular point
 
in an earth or lunar orbit, but we also witness more efficient means for 
the wholesale destruction of people, vegetation, and structures; more
 
pervasive, quicker ways to pollute streams and induce lung cancer, in­
creased densities of automobile traffic in downtown urban areas and of
 
nuclear waste over a nation.
 
As these new capacities become widely dispersed they often open up
 
new experiences to individuals through activities which they will come
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to value as much or more than previously valued activities This may
 
be the case, for example, for the capacity to travel to formerly inac­
cessible areas, to consume new types of food in greater quantities, to 
engage in sexual activity without fear of pregnancy, to communicate face­
to-face over very long distances, to extend life through organ trans­
plants, or, depending on the society's military posture, to destroy large 
communities with little personal risk In providing capacities not previ­
ously available, technological development can increase the alternatives 
open to members of a society And, depending on how they are used, they
 
may work to increase the short term integration of the existing social
 
order or to prompt disruptions in it Accordingly, citizens may per­
ceive these technical capacities as having directly beneficial effects
 
on their social and/or political experience or as potentially erosive to
 
that experience because they provide novel challenges to cherished values
 
Which interpretation will emerge depends, in part, on individual esti­
mates of the likelihood that a new capacity will have consequences that
 
affect conditions or beliefs deemed important In hypothetical form,
 
this argument asserts that
 
the public, in considering future technological development,
 
supports or opposes a particular technology to the degree
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it is certatn of beneficial results from its implementa­
tion. As these certainties vary so varies the degree to
 
which the public is likely to support specific technologies. 
Were this hypothesis to be confirmed, it would cast in doubt assertions 
made by those who attempt to account for apparent public hostility to
 
science and technology on the grounds that the public irrationally re­
jects the results of systematic, analytical thought--i e , scientific
 
thought. 
Technological development also has less direct effects on the ex­
periences of citizen/consumers, effects stemming from the uses to which 
a new capacity may be put by commercial or public organizations New 
technical capacities may be viewed as having the potential to buttress 
the economic, social and/or political influence of those in positions of 
corporate power But they can also be a threat to that influence Many 
technical innovations increase the competitive advantages to the developer 
and/or user of the new capacity This is often the case for new technical 
capacities introduced into industry. It is presumed by the innovators 
that this advantage will enhance the firm's relative economic power If 
hopes are borne out, the firm's political power is likely to increase as
 
well. Thus, through the utilization of new technological development
 
and/or in pursuit of enhanced economic advantage in its use, industrial
 
and commercial firms become enmeshed in political affairs.19  This in­
volvement can take place on the local level, as instanced by oil compa­
nies influencing the shape of local zoning regulations regarding refinery 
siting, on the national or state level by the involvement of automobile
 
manufacturers in matters affecting everything from speed limits and auto
 
safety regulations to pollution control standards; and on the inter­
national level by the behavior of the multinational corporations in work­
ing to avoid nationally imposed constraints on their activities.
 
Technological development almost invariably expands government's
 
role in society and thereby affects the experience of its individual
 
members--whenever government itself takes on the task of producing a 
new technical possibility and whenever it is pressed to regulate exist­
ing or future technical development In the first instance, perhaps the
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most startling example of government stimulated technology has been its
 
promotion of the engineering virtuosity associated with the establish­
ment of NASA and the race toward outer space. Paralleled on a lesser
 
scale by the U S. Army Corps of Engineers' flood control work and the
 
government-sponsoied efforts in search of a cure for cancer, these ac­
tivities stimulate directly the growth of public organizations and indi­
rectly the expansion of those contracting firms almost totally dependent
 
on government funding which actually carry out the particular tasks of
 
the development. In the second instance, government's intervention as
 
regulator has sometimes taken the form of continuously monitoring oper­
ations which market technical processes, operations such as the air
 
lines industry, sometimes it has been to prohibit hazards stemming
 
from technical development. The latter function began as early as
 
the 1800's with regulation of steamship boiler manufacture 2 0  Most
 
often carried out at the national level, the scope of government's
 
regulation of technology has grown enormously, now even government's
 
own agencies are subject to it-- note, for example the recent estab­
lishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and most re­
cently the reorganization of the Atomic Energy Commission, which es­
tablished the Nuclear Regulatory Commission It seems reasonable to
 
expect this regulatory trend to intensify as the longer term negative
 
effects of technological development become more readily apparent
 
Indeed, the institutionalization of the Office of Technology Assess­
ment as an arm of the Congress and of the EPA in the Executive signals
 
the growth of this tendency Aspects of the public's perception of
 
of the regulation of "technology"--and to some extent of "science"-­
are discussed in Chapters III, VII, and VIII
 
Social change results from technological development according to
 
the extent that new capacities are dispersed. To accomplish delivery
 
of capacity, large industrial and governmental organizations are es­
sential. And as technological capacities enhance their influence in so­
ciety, this influence in turn affects the experiences between consumer/
 
citizens and the dispensers and regulators of technology How all of
 
these private and public organizations, then, absorb the technical
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capacity, gather themselves to produce, deliver and regulate it, and how 
they behave in relation to their market on the one hand and to the citizen­
ry at large on the otherhas astrong effect on the public's social andpoliti­
cal experience Insofaras the challenges andopportunities of technology 
alter the way such organizations are experiencedby thepublc, technology as 
a social system is indirectly affecting the social experiences of the public. 
Thus technology assumes a potentially enormous role, conditioning 
the social experience of us all It can alter the immediate social con­
text around citizen/consumers by directly changing the character of techni­
cal alternatives available to them and by shaping the interactions be­
tween them and the many public and private organizations participating
 
in the delivery or regulation of technology. People may experience these
 
alternatives and interactions as integrative or as alienating--as posl­
tively reinforcing their personal values or as challenging and even threat­
ening them. The public, then, can be understood to be the recipients of 
"technology" as a social activity and to experience it as a part of every­
day life. Some of the feelings expressed by the public about that ex­
perence are explored in Chapters III and V.
 
CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES AND PUBLIC RESPONSES 
While a well formulated theory of technology and social change yet
 
remains to be developed, there is no lack of commentary either about po­
tential consequences of technological development or about potential poli­
cy responses to the changes that follow in its wake. 2 1 Among these commen­
taries, two perspectives stand out as particularly cogent, consistently 
argued, and most comprehensive They differ in their prognoses for man's 
future and in their underlying assumptions about the social control of 
technology. Most crucially for our purposes here, they differ implicitly
 
in their expectations for public or mass opinion about technological de­
velopments. Each suggests a particular cast to public attitudes toward
 
technology, and from each we will draw informal hypotheses and subject 
them to empirical examination in Chapter IX
 
The first perspective, most succinctly articulated in a panel re­
port of the National Academy of Science, relies heavily upon pluralist­
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incrementalist thought; joined, curiously, by the writings of the gentle 
radical Paul Goodman, it projects a fundamental optimism about the future
 
of technological politics. 22 The second perspecti-ve is much more pessi­
mistic. Deeply rooted in the European tradition and most forcefully pre­
sented in the work of Jacques Ellul, this view holds that decision makers
 
and the masses have become so conditioned by faith in technology's "one
 
best way" that it has become a self-moving, autonomous force, condemning
 
society to a headlong rush into technical developments inevitably fraught
 
with frequent unpleasant surprises. Any amelioration of past efforts
 
will be bought at the price of further unpleasant surprises and technical
 
domination. The two perspectives are virtually diametrically opposed in
 
their assertions about the possibilities and outcomes of public or mass
 
attitudes
 
Optimistic incrementalism Fueled by pluralist conceptions of
 
American politics, the case has been made for incremental approaches
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to policy making concerning technology The report on technology as­
sessment prepared by a panel from the National Academy of Science for
 
the House of Representatives states that case very strongly It is con­
cerned with the deficiences of existing processes of decision making and
 
explores how the present process might be altered "so that private and
 
public choices bearing on the ways in which technologies develop and fit
 
into society will reflect a greater sensitivity to the total systems ef­
fects of such choice " (p. 1Sf) Reflecting a basic confidence in our 
political system, the panel opts for more finely tuning the processes we 
presently employ Their emphasis is not on technologies per se, but 
rather on the human behavibr and institutions engaged in our political 
decision process. They stress the need for decision makers to broaden
 
their perceptions about the problems and opportunities inherent in techno­
logical development "at sufficiently early stages to make a difference
 
and in terms of sufficiently broad.. criteria to overcome the bias to­
ward technologies .that promises immediate utility to those for whom
 
they are designed" (p 18)
 
To accomplish these conditions the panel proposes that in consider­
ing technology-centered policies, "technological changes. ought not to
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be made in ways that subordinate every other consideration to the domi­
nant purpose of the immediate project ." (p. 31), that "a basic princi­
pie of decision making should be to maintain the greatest practicable 
latitude for future action". "reversibility of an action [being]
 
counted as a major benefit, its irreversibility a major cost" (p 32),
 
that the negative side effects or second-order consequences of techno­
logical development ("externalities" to the economist) be included in
 
any analysis and pressed upon the producer of the technology (p 33ff),
 
and, most startling among the report's proposals, that decision making
 
about technology be brought more directly into the political process
 
through the creation of constituencies and "conflict inspiration" (p 39f).
 
Paul Goodman, whose political philosophy often seems at odds with
 
that of the members of the NAS Panel, reaches many of the same conclu­
sions in his prescriptions for a more humane technology. In addition to 
endorsing the same reversibility criterion, Goodman calls for prudence
 
and humility on the part of the technologist (and, by extension, on the
 
part of decision makers engaged in technology policy as well) He
 
cautions them not to oversell technology and to resist the temptation
 
to apply every new technical device without serious second thoughts.
 
Announcing that his "bias is pluralistic," Goodman holds-that increased
 
knowledge, coupled with active participation on the part of affected
 
groups, offers the best hope of taming the technological beast and rend­
ering it more humane 
While neither of the sources just described deals directly with
 
the public attitudes implied by their views, we can derive them quite
 
straightforwardly.
 
Several dicta in the NAS report--that decision makers should ad­
here to the criterion of reversibility and to heed concerns other than
 
immediate technical utility by including "externalities" into their de­
cision calculus--imply that its authors see decision makers as capable 
of becoming responsible enough to warrant public confidence. By the
 
same token, confidence that the public is sufficiently discriminating
 
about technology to respond sensitively to issues raised by its second­
ary effects is strongly suggested by the report's encouragement of
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broader public participation in technology-centered decision processes.
 
Pessimistic predictions of "The Technical Phenomenon." Running 
counter to the views of the "optimistic incrementalists" are those typi­
24 
fied in the writings of Jacques Ellul He claims that man's absorp­
tion with technical advances inexorably extends technology into every
 
realm of human existence. Once begun, this spread of technique is moved 
by an internal logic no longer amenable to human control, it simply 
pushes aside critical human values such as spontaneity and freedom. 
'Finding "widespread, if not universal, acceptance among intellectuals, 5 
Ellul's thesis weaves an apparently consistent logic, reinforced by a 
barrage of historical and contemporary illustrations. 2 6 His argument 
is complex, and our summary of it here will be limited to a series of 
claims directly informing his interpretation of mass perceptions of 
technology 
The key assertion of Ellul's perspective is that humankind is sub­
ject to "the technical phenomenon"--an acceptance, based on reason and
 
self consciousness, of the "quest of the one best means in every field 
[of human endeavor] And this 'one best means' is, in fact, the techni­
cal means. The technical phenomenon is the preoccupation of our time,
 
in every field men seek to find the most efficient method the-best
 
means in the absolute sense, on the basis of numerical calculation ,,27 
His argument continues* once established as a decision criterion, techni­
cal efficiency produces decisions by men about human affairs that sweep
 
away other values and tend to standardize social preferences. Based on
 
the short term effectiveness of technical methods, technological enthusi­
asm grows and technology becomes dominant, an end in itself, first chal­
lenging, then subordinating other social ends In effect, the means be­
comes the end--the search for the one-best-way becomes a universally
 
valued activity As this attitude spreads, technique, in Ellul's words,
 
"becomes self directing, self augmenting," without decisive intervention
 
of man (p; 80). No human choice can really exist when society is over­
whelmed by the fundamental belief in the primacy of the most efficient
 
(one best) way.
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An important element in this perspective is the assertion of a
 
general preference for the "technological fix." Technique increases the 
efficiency of a technology or process, it also results in major diffi­
culties, for a society or organization, which can consequently be re­
solved only by additional doses of technical virtuosLty. Thus, in auto­
mating housework for the sake of convenience and efficiency, garbage dLs­
posal units are invented whose products pollute rivers This pollution 
necessitates new means of purifying water, often with the use of bacteria 
But the bacteria consume oxygen, with the result that the indigenous popu­
lation of the ecosystem is killed off So we try to reoxygenate the 
rivers And so the process goes, perpetually compounding technologi­
cally induced problems in the attempt to find technological solutions. 
In the Ellulian world, man does not choose; he calculates And 
man does not forego the immediate benefits of technologies--their primary 
capacities, he inevitably "takes advantage" of them In so doing he acti­
vates successive generations of technological developments which call for
 
more technological solutions to the secondary problems occasioned by
 
prior development The result, in Ellul's judgment, is a hopeless morass
 
of "technique " To the degree such "self augmentation" occurs, "autonomy 
of technique" inevitably leads to the "complete separation of the goals 
from the mechanism, the limitation of the problem to the means, and the
 
refusal to interfere in any way with efficiency" (p 33). 
Several properties of the "technical phenomenon" convey an implicit 
profile of public attitudes in necessary consonance with its advent and 
persistence. The emphasis on efficient means defined in calculable terms 
implies a rationality of numerical calculation reducing everything to 
quantities. Input and output factors subsume even human elements in a 
technical situation. Quantitatively predictable elements only are con­
sidered, which relieve men of the problems of choice and with it the 
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obligations of responsibility The notion of the one-best-way implies
 
that the public, given the analytical limitations of most of its members, 
is not likely to know what means is most efficient, nor to imagine new
 
ends attainable through technological development. It follows that the
 
public would come to have total, unquestioning faith in the expert, in
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the skilled purveyor of technical devices and procedures The wonders
 
of increasingly efficient techniques and technologies implicitly reduce
 
the public to wide-eyed, faithful believers in those most technically
 
skilled Add as corollaries an acceptance of efficiency as the over­
riding criterion for justifying technical programs, meriting higher pri­
ority than any other social values, and a general inclination to accept
 
with little question all innovative technical programs, and a logical
 
hypothesis emerges portraying the kind of public attitudes undergirding
 
Ellul's "technical phenomenon " A comparison of that ethos with what we 
have actually discovered about the public's attitudes toward technology 
is discussed in Chapter IX 
For now contrast the perspective of "optimistic incrementalism"
 
with the pessimistic predictions about the "technological phenomenon " 
Ao sharply opposed theories emerge, which, nevertheless, agree on some 
things They both focus on the impossibility of fully anticipating tech­
nology's consequences, they both see that today's technical magic may, 
like the albatross, change from good omen to a force exacting retribu­
tion But the two theories arrive at dramatically different, mutually 
contradictory predictions about the possibilities for "taming" technolo­
gy The NAS/Goodman theory augurs generally continuous progress predi­
cated on thoughtful action and constant monitoring by a body of officials 
and a public increasingly sensitive to the value consequences of public 
policies and able, when necessary, to retrench, mitigate, and ameliorate 
technical development Ellul's conception, in contrast, posits a dy­
namics immune to any of these error-correcting mechanisms The "techni­
cal phenomenon," inexorably sweeping over the populace and political 
leaders, opens the floodgates to rapid, ever more pervasive technologi­
cal development, soon propelled by technical efficiency as its own end 
In effect, both perspectives agree that public trust is to be
 
placed in society's technical political experts--but for vastly differ­
ent contributions In the NAS/Goodman perspective, such leadership is
 
confidently expected to be able to include social values and estimates
 
of "externalities" into their decision processes For Ellul, the experts
 
are the technological phenomenon personified, the masses turn to them on
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blind faith, in dumb wonder at their skill in their ability to translate
 
the predominant value of efficiency into technique. Thus the two views 
differ sharply in their understanding of the public. The NAS/Goodman
 
view holds that the public should be and, by inference, is able to con­
tribute effectively to the multifaceted process of review of technologi­
cal programs. Ellul gloomily believes that the masses have been seduced
 
by the glories of the immediate capacities of itechnology and that there
 
is little likelihood of escaping the headlong plummet into the horrors
 
of a technological society He allows only three conditions which would
 
upset his prediction. an Act of God, a general war which would elimi­
nate most modern technique, and a change in human consciousness. In a
 
very real sense the business of this book is to explore the character of
 
human consciousness of technology.
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Loth and Morris Ernst, The Taming of Technology (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1972) and Sanford A. Lakoff, Ed., Knowledge and Power: Essays
 
in Science and Government (New York: Free Press, 1966).
 
1 6Chandler Stevens, "Citizen Feedback and Societal Systems," Tech­
nology Review73 3 (January, 1971), 38-45; compare R.L. Chapman, "Congress 
and Science Policy. The Organizational Dilemma," Bulletin of Atomic
 
Scientists 25:3 (March, 1969), 4-7, 28.
 
17Richard S. Lewis, The Nuclear Power Rebellion: Citizen vs. the 
Atomic Industrial Establishment (New York: Viking, 1972); compare Dorothy 
Nelkins, Nuclear Power and Its Critics: The Cayuga Lake Controversy 
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(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971). See also, S. Zwerling, 
Mass Transit and the Politics of Technology: A Study of BART and the 
San Francisco Bay Area (New York: Praeger, 1974); Richard Rettig, et al., 
Ohio State University, School of Public Administration, "Kidney Therapy 
anid Public Policy- A Study of Medical Innovation," (research pro3ect 
proposal to National Science Foundation, 1973); D. Nelkins, Jetport: The 
Boston Airport Controversy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974); 
and J.D. Starling, Prometheus Unbound: A Study of the Dallas/FortWorth 
Regional Airport, Center for Urban and Environmental Studies, Southern
 
Methodist University (October, 1974).
 
18For a revealing discussion of the relationship of novel experi­
ence to emerging values, see Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, "Lead­
ership in Organized Anarchy The Technology of Foolishness," in Leader­
ship and Ambguity- The American College President (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1974). For particular emphasis on the part technical innovation 
plays in this matter, see Melvin Kranzberg, "Technology and Human Values," 
Virginia Quarterly Review 40.4 (Autumn, 1964), 578-592, Emmanuel C. Mesthene, 
"Technology and Human Values," Science Journal5A-4 (October, 1969) , 45-50; 
and Robert Nisbet, "The Impact of Technology on Ethical Decision-making" 
in Tradition and Revolt: Historical and Sociological Essays (New York 
Vantage Press, 1970), Chapter 10. 
1 9There are numerous authors who make this point; perhaps the most
 
trenchant observations are to be found in John K. Galbraith, The New In­
dustrial State (New York: Signet, 1968) and Economics and the Public 
Purpose (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1973).
 
2 0John Burke, Ed., The New Technology and Human Values (Belmont, 
Ca.: Wadsworth, 1972).
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For a representative representative sample of it, see Victor
 
Ferkiss, "Man's Tools and Man's Choices the Confrontation of Technology 
and Political Science," American Political Science Review 67:3 (Septem­
ber, 1973), 973-980. See also Galbraith, The New Industrial State; and 
Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate. For more recent comments, see 
Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1974)
 
2 2National Academy of Sciences, Technology: Processes of Assess­
ment and Choice, Report to U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
 
Science and Astronautics (July, 1969); Paul Goodman, "Can Technology Be
 
Humane " New York Review of Books, 13:9 (November 20, 1969), 27-34.
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See the major efforts by Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Poli­
tics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953) ; David
 
'Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free
 
Press, 1963) ; and Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1956).
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24Especially The Technological Society, tr. J. Wilkinson, (New
 
York: Knopf, 1956).
 
25Ferkiss, 973.
 
26Among those testifying to the force of Ellul's vision is William
 
Kuhns, Post-IndustrialProphets: Interpretationsof Technology (New York: 
Weybrlght and Talley, 1971), 111; see also Langdon Winner, Autonomous
 
Technology and Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1973).
 
2 7Ellul, 21.
 
2 8Ellul puts it this way: "The combination of man and technique 
is a happy one only if man has no responsibility. Otherwise he is cease­
lessly tempted to make unpredictable choices and is susceptible to 
emotional motivations which invalidate the mathematical precision of 
this machinery... and the techniques of prediction." (Ibid., 136). 
CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN BASIC PARAMETERS AND METHODOLOGY 
A major hope of this research is to begin closing the gap in infor­
mation about how the public regards technological development The vehi­
cle for this effort has been two extensive surveys of public attitudes,
 
the first (TECH I) conducted in 1972, the second (TECH II) in 1974 
Originating as part of a larger study of technology and social change, 
TECH I was designed and pretested between January and May, 1972, in co­
operation with the Field Research Corporation Its sequel, TECH II, was 
designed and pretested between January and May of 1974, again in cooper­
ation with the Field Research Corporation
 
It is well known that there are inherent limitations to all types
 
of attitude surveys. The data gathered are based on "opinions" which may
 
be transiently held, particularly when they relate to concerns not highly
 
central to the person being questioned; such may often have been the case 
with opinions gathered here Also, opinions may be founded on misinfor­
mation and thus subject to alteration by new facts acquired by respond­
ents from educational efforts or other sources Measurement problems,
 
moreover, are always formidable Throughout every stage of instrument
 
construction and data analysis, we were acutely mindful of the limitations
 
that accompany them Nevertheless, the survey technique with all its 
shortcomings was the best one available to us in our pursuit of knowledge 
about how the public-at-large views technology We believe that in this
 
particular instance enough internal consistency is suggested by the data
 
to warrant its being taken seriously. At various points in our discussion,
 
we will present evidence that supports our confidence in its intrinsic 
validity 
We had hoped, from the outset, to provide at least a partial base­
line for future study of the effects of technical development upon social
 
and political change. Such a record of changes in perceptions of tech­
nology over time could be a basis for examing the character of shifts in
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public values--specifically, of the responsiveness to political and social
 
events of the public's attitudes toward various types of technological de­
velopment TECH I, undertaken in 1972, polled 980 adult Californians se­
lected by means of a multi-stage sampling design which approximates a
 1 
random sample During the first three weeks of June of that year these
 
respondents were interviewed in their own homes for about 70 minutes.2
 
The "energy crisis" of the winter of 1973-74 offered us a logical oppor­
tunity for a second look We expected that some very interesting shifts 
in the public's attitudes were taking place With events so sharply 
focused on people's dependency upon the energy technologies, we reasoned
 
that at the very least the salience of the general issue area was bound 
to increase Were attitudes ersta~lizing? Could significant changes 
in attitudes be monitored?
 
TECH II was designed to explore these questions Employing the 
same sampling and administration techniques as were used in the 1972 
survey, this second one was administered to both another, smaller cross­
section sample of the California population--316 people--and to 472 people 
from among the original sample interviewed two years earlier This group 
of reinterviewed subjects provides the crucial panel of responses neces­
sary in any attempt to monitor individual attitudes over time. As re­
sources allowed, attempts were made to recontact aZZ persons who had par­
ticipated in TECH I Approximately 66% of them were recontacted, but only 
48% agreed to be reinterviewed.3 This reinterview rate of 48% is somewhat 
less than the 65% obtained for the three-wave panel study which has become 
the model for subsequent comparative research of this kind, the election 
study undertaken by the Michigan Survey Research Center (MSRC) in 1956­
1960. But whereas MSRC had the resources to trace most persons who had
 
moved from a former address, ours allowed us to do so only if they had
 
moved to another residence within the same city 
Overall representativeness of California data Because the scope
 
of most policies related to developments in science and technology is
 
clearly national, California data will do little to inform decision makers
 
of the public's mood if its residents differ very markedly from their
 
national counterparts. Tables C-1 through C-6 in Appendix C present
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comparative U.S. Census data for the United States, California, TECH I
 
respondents and TECH II respondents, these tables, respectively, show
 
distributions of the demographic characteristics of race, sex, age,
 
education, occupation, and income for these four groups. A fifth group
 
is added for purposes of further comparison respondents in a national
 
4 
survey undertaken by MSRC in 1972 In the main, these demographic
 
tables denote the striking representativeness of California to the,
 
nation as a whole. California profiles deviate no more than 4% (and
 
usually somewhat less) from nationwide distributions of race, age, sex,
 
occupation, and income. On only one important characteristic, education,
 
does California's population differ significantly from the national aver­
age The percentage of Californians with at least one year of college
 
eddcation is about 35% greater 31 4% compared to 23.3% nationally.
 
This skewing of educational level distributions suggests that Californi­
ans in general may be more likely than respondents in a national sample
 
to be informed about science and technology and therefore to bias the
 
results of the poll When appropriate, we shall point out how a par­
ticular variable or relationship is affected by education level. For
 
now, suffice it to say that although this effect does occur, it does not 
distort findings sufficiently to prevent their applicability to the
 
national population.
 
While only a replication on the national level of the surveys re­
ported here could absolutely prove that claim, we believe that if one
 
were undertaken it would not produce results greatly different from our
 
own. Indeed, the claim is strongly reinforced by comparison of our re­
sults with those of a recent national survey sponsored by the National
 
5 
Science Foundation (NSF) 5 listribution of responses to several items
 
common to both surveys shows a reasonably high degree of correspondence, 
these responses will be discussed at length in Chapter V We do not
 
claim that California mirrors the rest of the nation perfectly, but we
 
are confident that attitudes of its residents can be reasonably extended 
to their national counterparts. 
Representativeness of TECH I and TECH II samples The basic socio­
political characteristics of our two samples are summarized in Table 2-1" 
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TABLE 2-1
 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF POPULATION CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES:
 
TECH I (1972) AND TECH II (1974) 
Race Sex
 
TECH White Non-white N Male Female N 
1 82.1 17.9 966 47.4 52.6 976
 
II 86.1 13.9 312 48.5 51.5 312
 
Age
 
18-20 21-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60+ N
 
1 5.8 12.3 15.6 8.2 6.1 8.2 10.1 7.7 6.4 19.5 976 
II 6.0 12.2 15.1 10.9 5.8 5.8 8.9 9.1 6.7 19.3 313 
Education
 
8th Grade 9th-llth 12th 1-2 Yrs. 3 Yrs. Completed Advanced 
or Less Grade Grade College College College Degree N
 
I 9.6 13.8 29.6 22.6 6.6 10.2 7.6 974
 
II 5.4 9.7 33.0 24.9 6.2 14.5 6.3 314
 
Occupation
 
Profession- Clern- Skilled Farm & 
al & Tech- cal & Workers Opera- Service Unskilled 
nical Managers Sales Craftsmen tives Workers Workers N 
I 25.4 12.2 19.1 25.6 5.7 8.6 3.3 774 
I 32.4 10.9 14.6 18.7 11.9 6.8 4.7 248 
Income (of Chief Earner) 
Less than $3,000- $5,000- $7,000- $10,000- $15,000- $20,000
 
$3,000 4,999 6,999 9,999 14,999 19,999 and over N
 
I 10.9 10.4 12.4 18.8 28.2 11.5 7.7 912 
II 7.5 8.2 6.1 12.4 35.5 14.8 15.5 291 
Partisan Identification
 
Republican Decline to State Democrat N
 
I 33.0 10.9 56.1 929
 
II 22.0 23.4 54.6 312
 
Ideological Identification
 
Strongly Moderately Neither, Middle Moderately Strongly
 
Liberal Liberal of the Road Conservative Conservative N
 
I 9.9 27.5 17.5 34.5 10.7 894 
II 11.7 30.0 17.7 30.6 10.0 301 
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Comparing the demographic make-up of our two samples with the
 
populations from which they were drawn (see Tables C-i - C-6, Appen­
dix C) admittedly reveals some apparent over-sampling of certain groups 
females, non-whites, the highly educated, the affluent, and those with
 
higher socioeconomic occupations. These groups are only moderately
 
disproportionate in number, however, and such over-representation,
 
especially of the first group, is not unusual. Additional support for
 
our claim that our samples are representative is evident in compari­
sons of the distribution of their political party and ideological make­
up with that of the national sample surveyed by MSRC Tables C-7 and 
C-8 in Appendix C present these data
 
Because TECH II conducted in 1974 surveyed two groups, one of
 
which, the "panel" as it will be referred to hereafter, had comprised 
almost half of the original cross section sample surveyed in 1972 for
 
TECH I, an internal comparative question about sampling outcomes is 
posed. How representative is this reinterviewed panel, both of the
 
overall 1972 cross-section ('72 XSEC) from which it was drawn and of 
the subsequent cross-section ('74 XSEC) comprising the other part of
 
the 1974 sample ? To what degree, if any, was the reinterviewed group 
different demographically from the people who were questioned only 
once, either in 1972 or in 19749 The question is an important one
 
because it bears on the generalizability of findings related to sta­
bility and chcmge of attitudes on certain crucial issues--matters to 
be dealt with at length in subsequent chapters.
 
As Table 2-2 shows, some minor differences were discovered when
 
an "F-Test" was used to determine whether any statistically signifa­
cant differences obtain among the groups; "tau-b" is used to measure
 
the extent of the difference 6 The panel is significantly older than
 
both the '72 and '74 cross sections, compared to the '72 cross section 
it contains more females and is also wealthier, and, compared to the 
'74 cross section, the panel is more Republican
 
36 
TABLE 2-2 
COMPARISON OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS-

INDEPENDENT CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES, '72 &
 
'74, AND REINTERVIEWED PANEL SAMPLE 
'72 X-Sec/Panel '74 X-Sec/Panel 
Characteristic F-Test Tau-b F-Test Tau-b
 
* * 
Age 5.78 .107 4.45 .096
 
Sex 5.89 .100 .25 -.087
 
Education .22 .002 .67 .011
 
Occupation .16 .034 1.17 .033
 
Race .25 -.016 .00 .000
 
* 
Income 4.17 .124 2.10 .092 
* 
Party .51 -.027 10.41 .077
 
Pol. Ideology 3.09 -.060 2.47 .098
 
* 
Significant at p < .05. 
SUBGROUPS WITHIN OUR SAMPLES* ISOLATION OF THE
 
"POTENTIAL PUBLIC" FOR TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS
 
Various sub-samples of our respondents, selected on the basis 
of one or more key criteria, will serve as focal points in much of 
the discussion to follow on concrete issues Preliminary factors in 
organizing and differentiating our gross samples were the type of 
occuation engaged in by the respondent (or the chief earner) and 
the type of professional/industrial settt&ng in which the occupation 
was carried out. From a scale constructed on the basis of those two 
factors issued our first important differentiation: "technicians" 
from "non-technicians " A person holding a quasi-technical job in 
a highly technical setting was categorized as a technician, while a
 
person doing the same job in a non-technical environment was, for 
our purposes, a non-technician. Subsequent differentiation was
 
carried out using a scale combining education level with past politi­
cal activity, i e., voting in previous primary elections 7 The people 
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on the upper half of this second scale were assigned to the "high
 
education/politically active" classification, those on the lower
 
half to the "low education/not politically active" classification.
 
The final and most important group was isolated by combining 
the educated, politically active technicians and non-technicians. 
We call this group the "potential public for technological politics." 
It is analogous to the group which Philip Converse has termed the
 
"issue public" and similar to the one Donald Devine has labelled the 
"attentive public." 8 For whatever the public's attitudes toward 
technological development, they are not likely to become the basis 
for public policy unless crystallized into articulate demands for 
change. Efforts to voice demands, to organize pressure for or against
 
policies and political candidates come only from those portions of
 
the general population motivated to social action Certain social
 
factors seem a prori to provide a basis upon which to isolate that 
set of people Education, occupation, and past electoral behavior
 
are among such plausible indicators, these were the variables used
 
to isolate the potential public
 
The method used to partition our sample into the groups just
 
described is illustrated in Figure 2-1 How different are these 
groups from each other? Along what, if any, demographic variables 
are they skewed9 Table C-9 in Appendix C presents comparisons among
 
the various groups and reveals that most of the demographic differ­
ences are expected on the basis of two of the variables providing 
the criteria for the partitionings--occupation and education Dif­
ferences in income are also seen when highly educated groups are 
contrasted with those having less education. (This is typical and 
expected ) Differences on five other demographic variables--age,
 
sex, race, party identlfication, and ideology--are generally not 
statistically significant; when they are, they are not substantively
 
great. Thus, the various sub-samples considered are quite repre­
sentative of the whole sample on some important variables
 
FIGURE 2-1
 
PARTITIONING INTO SUBGROUPS OF ALL RESPONDENTS IN TECH I AND II SURVEYS
 
LOW EDUCATION 
NOT POLITICALLY 
HIGH EDUCATION 
POLITICALLY 
HIGH EDUCATION 
POLITICALLY 
LOW EDUCATI 
NOT POLITICALLY 
119 54 43 127 72 57 [176 97 65 594 247 141 
POTENTIAL PUBLIC 
NOTE: N's may not always sum 
303 
perfectly 
169 
because of 
122 
missing data on different components. 
39 
INTERPRETING RELATIONSHIPS
 
At numerous points in the forthcoming analysis, associations be­
tween findings will be considered Efforts were made to control for
 
other plausible relationships--intervening or spurious--and any reported
 
association will, in general, have passed those tests.
 
A more difficult task, however, is the interpretation of statisti­
cal associations which occur between variables at two points in time,
 
i.e., those associations appearing when data from TECH I is compared to
 
data from TECH II Perhaps the most important point to be made here is
 
that the conceptual background of this study rests on relatively unre­
9
fined theory and almost no prior data. While we had strong intuition 
about some of the relationships between public experience and attitudes 
toward advanced technologies, this study in essence is mainly an explora­
tory attempt to provide a basis for more refined understanding of that 
relationship. Before we collected a substantial body of data in 1972, 
few hypotheses were available to prepare our expectations, and, as we an­
ticipated, some associations turned up on their own as surprises--"post 
hoc," so to speak, after the fact 
Thus the problem arises of interpreting the meaning of significant 
correlations for which there was no prior prediction, the problem of what 
we are to make of the surprising results of a "fishing expedition," as 
one author has put it.1 0 Moreover, do correlations which appear in one
 
year between two variables but not in the other indicate a random re­
sponse? a chance association resulting from the many individual calcu­
lations between variables7 And how are we to understand a correlation
 
between two variables which appears in both TECH I and TECH II data?
 
The strongest case for a ign-tficant fvndvng occurs when a corre­
lation exists between two variables in data derived from both surveys. 
More tentatively, we have treated correlations in 1972 data as evidence 
for a potential relationship, that is, as evidence for a speculative hy­
pothesis that two factors are related The second survey we have treated 
as a replication of the first and as a test of emergent hypotheses The 
probability of a genuine relationship between data from 1972 and 1974 is 
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the product of probability of significance in 1972 and in 1974 Simi­
larly, an absence of correlation for two variables in 1972 data and 1974
 
firmly establishes an independent relationship Figure 2-2 summarizes
 
in schematic form these four inferential situations
 
FIGURE 2-2 
ATTRIBUTED MEANING OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES 
OVER TECH I AND TECH II 
TECH 11-1974 
Correlation Significant Correlation Not Significant 
Stzt ftcant Ftndtng Basis for Speculative 
Corre lation
Sirenicn consistent relation- Hypothesbs of waningSigni ficant 
ship over time relationships
 
TECH 1-1972
 
Stqnt fecant FindtngCorrelation Basis for Speculattve 
Not Hypothesis of emerg- of absent relation-

Significant ing relationship ship over time
 
The most difficult cases are those for which a correlation appears
 
in the data for one year but not for both We shall treat such cases as
 
bases for speculative hypotheses, that is, as if the relationship is
 
genuine but subject to doubt due to a lack of replication In the event
 
of a correlation in 1972 but not in 1974 we shall suspect a waning influ­
ence of one factor upon the other. If, however, the correlation only
 
appears in 1974, we shall interpret this as the possible emergence of
 
growing importance of one factor upon the other The reader will do
 
well to keep in mind this distinction, it differentiates the strength of
 
our convictions about the conclusiveness of various data Further
 
opinion survey data yielding a significant relation would be required
 
for any speculative hypothesis to become a sign--ficant find-nq.
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SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
 
In seeking answers to how the public has reacted to and evaluated
 
technological development, two surveys were undertaken- TECH I in 1972
 
and TECH II in 1974. In the initial study, 980 adult Californians--a
 
cross-section of the State--were interviewed, in the second survey, an­
other and smaller cross-section of 314 people were questioned along with
 
approximately half of the first cross-section sample
 
We have discussed evidence that suggests the similarity of our
 
findings for California to those which might be uncovered nationally
 
This evidence is documented in Appendix C, where demographic tables show,
 
in particular, that California's characteristics rarely deviate much from
 
those found in the rest of the country Other, more indirect evidence
 
of the generalizability of our findings was noted. We were also concerned
 
in this chapter with showing that, with some exceptions, our sampling of
 
Californians adequately reflects the demographic character of the popu­
lation. Neither the '72 cross-section nor the '74 cross-section deviated
 
to any great degree from its population parameters The panel of reinter­
viewed subjects in turn is generally representative both of the 1972
 
cross-section from which it was drawn and the one along with which it was
 
questioned for a second time in 1974
 
We have identified a potential public for technological politics as
 
well as other subgroups and noted their demographic differences. Patterns
 
of opinion visible within these groups will be analyzed in subsequent
 
chapters Finally, we have clarified our analytic procedure in regard to
 
attributing significance to statistical associations found in the data
 
presented throughout
 
Having considered these points of research design and methodology,
 
we turn to a discussion of our substantive findings.
 
42 
NOTES
 
iThe details of the sampling design and the procedure for adminis­
tration is presented in Appendix A.
 
2See Appendix B for a synopsis of the questionnaires used in the 
interviews.
 
32% refused on the grounds of their dislike for the first inter­
view, 5% because they had insufficient time, 4% because of illness, and
 
7% for a variety of other reasons.
 
4Center for Political Studies, Inter-University Consortium for
 
Political Research, 1972 Election Study, Volumes I-III (Ann Arbor, Michi­
gan, 1975). 
5National Science Foundation, Science Indicators (Washington, D.C.. 
GPO, 1973). 
6See Herbert Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1974), 418-426. 
7The method used to construct this scale is given in Appendix D.
 
8See P. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,"
 
in Ideology and Discontent, Ed. D. Apter (London Free Press of Glencoe, 
1964) and D. Devine, The Attentive Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970). 
We have risked adding to terminological confusion here because matters 
dealing with technology have not yet become-broadly "political" issues. 
Both the "issue public" and the "attentive public" refer to groups al­
ready focusing on public issues. But we are arguing that in an area not 
yet fully "politicized" in this sense, there are some groups with higher 
potential for becoming "attentive" as the area increases in political
 
visibility.
 
9Very little has been published in this area so far. Among the few
 
materials available, the following should be noted: G.R. Funkhouser, "Pub­
lic Understanding of Science: The Data We Have," a paper prepared for the 
Workshop on the Goals and Methods of Assessing the Public's Understanding 
of Science, Pennsylvania State University, Materials Research Laboratory
 
(September, 1972) ; Irene Taviss, "A Survey of Popular Attitudes Toward 
Technology," Technology and Culture 13 (1972) , 606-621. See also R.C. 
Davis, The Public Impact of Science in the Mass Media (Survey Research
 
Center, University of Michigan, 1958); Amitai Etzioni and Clyde Nunn, 
"The Public Appreciation of Science in Contemporary America," Daedalus 
103 : 3 (Summer, 1974) , 191-205; and Science Indicators (see note 5). For 
an international view, see "Research on Public Opinion Concerning Scien­
tific Research," mimeo., Center for the Study of French Contemporary Po­
litical Life (Paris, 1973). Unfortunately, these previous studies are 
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flawed because of sampling problems (Taviss), dependence on secondary 
analysis of data designed for other purposes (Etzioni, Funkhouser), or 
conceptual primitiveness (National Science Board). In all but one case, 
no analysis beyond a listing of marginals or perhaps a few cross-tabula­
tions is attempted.
 
10James L. Payne, "Fishing Expedition Probability: The Statistics 
of Post Hoc Hypothesizing" Polity 7-1 (Fall, 1974), 130-138. 
PART TWO
 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PAST DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 
In Part Two we begin our analysis of data collected for 
this exploration of public attitudes toward technology Spell­
ing out specific questions asked survey respondents, we will 
submit evidence that by and large responses to them were not 
merely random or capricious, but viable lndications of public
 
sentiment. This claim is supported by the stability of re­
sponses found both at the individual level in data derived from
 
the responses of the reinterviewed panel of respondents and at
 
the aggregate level in mean scores computed from responses made
 
by the respective cross-section samples, 1972 and 1974. We 
also commence here our analysis of the "potential public for 
technological politics," whose responses, predictably, we found 
to display greater coherence and restraint in attitude set than
 
the samples at large The implications of such differences are
 
first considered here and will be amplified in other chapters
 
The three chapters which make up Part Two focus on sever­
al distinct but overlapping substantive areas related to the 
public's attitudes toward technology and its implementation 
In Chapter III we explore the question of whether the public 
mind perceives the activities of science differently from those 
of technology and consider the possible ramifications of that 
difference as it bears on the vaZue accorded each activity and 
on the issue of their controZ 
In Chapter IV we turn from generalized attitudes toward
 
science and technology to opinions about spe sfic presently 
available technologies Our samples' evaluations of a repre­
sentative range of them are analyzed and ordered in terms of 
apparent public preference. Also in this chapter we attempt to 
assess perceptions of the relative significance of the role
 
played by technology as a source of societal change over the
 
last quarter century Finally in Chapter IV, opinions about the
 
social utility of further technological development are explored.
 
Chapter V concludes Part Two by considering the important
 
question of decision making for policies bearing on technologi­
cal development. Here the different values which the public
 
wishes to see used as criteria in that decision process are dis­
cussed, along with its attitudes toward the public and private
 
institutions influencing decisions on technology policy.
 
45
 
PRECE WOPAGE BLANK l 
CHAPTER III
 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE MERGED OR DISTINCT?
 
In our introductory discussion, we argued that although a single
 
web of logic and theory undergirds both scientific knowledge and its 
technological applications, the activities of the two pursuits are con­
ceptually and sociologically distinct But the force of this distinction
 
is not universally accepted by scholars or by practitioners. Historian
 
of technology Melvin Kranzberg, for example, has argued that these two
 
fields, while perhaps once distinct, can no longer be seen so. Invoking
 
the argument that although science and technology may be different theo­
retically, for all practical purposes--and particularly -n the public's 
mtnd--the two are inseparable, Kranzberg claims, 
The public makes no distinction between science
 
and technology. To them, science and technology
 
are the same, the scientist and technologist
 
indistinguishable--any white coated man in a TV
 
commercial represents the combined power of both.
 
There is a ring of truth to such a claim Certainly the statesmen
 
of science have not gone out of their way to separate the two in their
 
pubzlc statements 2 Nor has the mass media been particularly careful to 
observe a distinction But we in this study wished to subject the easy 
assumption of public consensus on the merger of science with technology 
to systematic inquiry thus a number of questions were included in the 
surveys which would test whether any significant difference exists in 
the public mind Of course, it is impossible in a general study to ex­
plore all the ramifications of this matter, our efforts here were con­
fined to probing (1) how the public evaluates the results of science as
 
contrasted to those of technology and (2) public perceptions related to
 
control of the two activities
 
If, we reasoned, the public does distinguish science from technolo­
gy, then concepts like "investigation," "study," and "knowledge" would 
lie at the core of popular notions of scientific activity, and at the
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core of such perceptions of technological activity, notions of "use,"
 
"production," and "invention " That is, if It could be demonstrated 
that those two conceptual cores exist separately in the col-lective
 
cognitive structure of the general public, then we must reject the as­
sumption that the public makes no distinction in the activities desig­
nated by the two sets 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
One appropriate way of examining whether people make the distinc­
tions 3ust described is to probe the dimensions along which their re­
sponses to statements in the questionnaire about science and technology 
are ordered If the two activities are not conceptually distinct in the 
minds of the respondents, only a single dimension should be evident If, 
however, two or more dimensions appear, greater cognitive sophistication 
is implied (Moreover, if the same multiple dimensions appear across 
time, then even greater confidence is justified that they are valid indi­
cators of respondents' apparent differentiations of science from tech­
nology, not simply artifacts of statistical method.)
 
Figure 3-1 lists the statements made about science and technology

3 
with which respondents were asked to agree or disagree, and groups them
 
within the broad attitudinal dimensions along which responses to them clus­
4 
tered when factor analyzed These dimensions reflect the underlying.
 
issues related to the various statements--issues of the social benefits
 
and costs of the two enterprises, of the degree of autonomy or control 
they should have and of their intrinsic value as a social activity The
 
results of factor analysis strongly suggest that the public views scien­
tific activity differently from technological activity responses imply­
ing that technology should be controlled clustered apart from responses
 
implying confidence in the intrinsic value of scientific activity To
 
be considered in close conjunction with Figure 3-1 is the further infor­
mation, presented in Table 3-1, which resulted from factor analysis of re­
sponses to the statements about science and technology As arrayed in Table
 
3-1, the extrapolated distinctions are not cleanly made in all instan­
ces Some ambiguity is suggested by the presence of item 3, which reads
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FIGURE 3-1 
ITEMS USED TO DIFFERENTIATE PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY--
GROUPED BY ATTITUDE DIMENSIONS DENOTING SOCIAL VIEWS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES 
I CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 
(1) 	Any attempt to control which inventions are widely produced or made
 
available will make our lives worse.
 
(2) 	Basically, all scientific discoveries are good; it is just how some
 
people use them that causes all the trouble.
 
(3) 	If they are given money and left alone, scientists can be counted on
 
to discover things that will make our lives better.
 
(4) 	No one should attempt to regulate which inventions are produced be­
cause it interferes with the individual's right to decide what he 
wants to buy. 
(5)* No one should attempt to regulate which inventions are produced be­
cause they do not know how to do it. 
(6)* We could solve more of society's problems if we did not place so 
many controls on the way inventions are used and produced. 
(7) 	We ought to increase our control over how inventions and other tech­
nologies are used. or
 
The way we control how inventions and other technologies are used
 
is just about right.
 
II VALUE OF SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY
 
(8) 	The only way to make sure that what scientists learn will not cause
 
a lot of harm is to stop them from studying things unless they are 
clearly important and beneficial. 
(9) 	 Unless scientists are allowed to study things that don't appear im­
portant or beneficial now, a lot of heneficial things probably 
won't ever be discovered. 
(10) 	 We must make certain that scientists are not allowed to study cer­
tain things in the first place because they may cause a lot of harm. 
(11)* People who try to think in a scientific manner cannot appreciate
 
most of life's beauties.
 
(12)* Relying only on scientific and logical thinking to solve society's
 
problems can only make things more complicated. 
III 	OUTCOMES OF TECHNOLOGY
 
(13) Technology has made life too complicated.
 
(14) 	People have become too dependent on machines.
 
(15) It would be nice if we would stop building so many machines and go
 
back to nature.
 
(16)*The material things that technology has provided have freed us to
 
find more satisfying lives, or
 
The material things that technology has produced trap us and pre­
vent us from finding satisfying lives.
 
IV OUTCOMES OF SCIENCE (Potential Public Only)
 
(2) 	Basically, all scientific discoveries are good; it is just how some 
people use them that causes all the trouble. 
(3) 	If they are given money and left alone, scientists can be counted
 
on to discover things that will make all our lives better.
 
Used in TECH II (1974) only.
 
50 
TABLE 3-1
 
CLUSTERS OBTAINED USING FACTOR ANALYSIS ON RESPONSES
 
TO GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
(cross sections and potential publics, '72; '74) 
ITEMS IN:
 
ATTITUDE DIMENSION 	 TECH 1(72) TECH 11(74)
 
a
Control of Technology 	 1,2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
 
1,4,5 1,4,5,6,7
 
Value of Scientific Activity 	 8,9,10 8,9,10,11,12
 
8,9,10 8,9,10,11,12
 
Outcome of Technology 	 13,14,15 13,14,15,16
 
13,14,15 13,14,15,16
 
Outcomes of Science 	 2,3 2,3
 
aThroughout this book top line figures record responses from or data 
relevant to total cross-section samples; lower figures relate to po­
tential publics.
 
as science-specific in Figure 3-1, in the "control technology" cluster
 
of responses from both the 1972 and 1974 cross-section samples. But that
 
equivocation is not evident in responses from the potential publics The
 
cluster made up of items 2 and 3 sharply emerges, and can be interpreted 
in the case of the potential public as a tapping of attitudes toward perceived 
outcomes of scientific activity Finally, attitudes about the general­
ized outcomes of technological activity appear in a cluster distinct from
 
5
 
all others.

Table 3-1 also shows that although some differences occur in spe­
cific items within a given dimension, cluster formations among the four 
groups of respondents and across time are fundamentally consistent In 
the remaining sections of this chapter, we will examine the composition 
of the four attitudinal dimensions along which responses clustered 
feelings about (I) the control of technology, (II)the value of scien­
tific activity, (III) outcomes of technology, and (IV) outcomes of scien­
tific activity. Throughout, inferences will be drawn about the way the 
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public perceives science and technology, these will be based on (1) the
 
marginal distributions of the four attitudinal dimensions, (2) the sta­
bility of these distributions over time, and (3) their association with
 
various demographic variables
 
CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY
 
Modern industrialized countries accept the premise that technology
 
ought to be regulated, but major political battles continue to be waged
 
over the content of such regulation. How clean should automotive emis­
sions be9 How safe is safe enough when nuclear power plants and new
 
?
drugs are licensed How can individual privacy be maintained in the
 
face of increased use of computerized data banks7 These questions, of
 
course, relate to specific issues. And while they may be important, we
 
are more interested here with making an overall assessment of public
 
attitudes concerning how and why technology should or should not be con­
trolled.
 
Data summarized in Table 3-2 show that majorities disagree that 
controls on technology will make life worse (l)*, and that the sample is 
almost evenly split as to whether the advantages of regulating technology 
outweigh the benefits of a laissez faire approach to control (4). Inter­
estingly, this split was also evident with respect to people's judgments 
about whether or not there was "sufficient knowledge" to regulate technolo­
gy Two questions, asked only in 1974, clarify this picture somewhat.
 
Majorties disagreed that there were too many present controls on technology,
 
but agreed, when confronted with a forced-choice situation, that we ought 
to increase our controls over the way technologies are used. Generally,
 
the potential publics were somewhat more intense about their feelings, and 
their responses fell more clearly within the indicated dimensions than 
those of the cross-section sample of which they were part 
Comparison of those group distributions over 1972 and 1974 suggests
 
that the attitudes are relatively stable But can anything be said about 
the degree of stability in terms of the tndtbvidua_ attitudes7 Measurement 
Indicates item number in Figure 3-1
 
TABLE 3-2 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO ITEMS COMPRISING CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY DIMENSION 
C) (cross-section sample and potential publics, '72, '74)
 
STRONGLY STRONGLY 
ITEM TECH* 'AGREE AGREE AGREE-DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE (N) 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
(1) Control of in- I 1 5.5%a 24.2% 12.0% 27.1% 21.2% 903
 
ventions will make 17.4 22.4 9 9 26.4 23.9 
 293
 
life worse
 
11 14.1 19.6 16 6 28.7 21.0 297
 
11.5 14.4 12.2 36 4 25.5 120
 
(4) The right to buy I 19.4 26.9 9.0 25.5 19.1 933
 
what is invented 19.9 21.0 8.6 32.3 18.3 299
 
should not be inter­
fered with 11 27.1 25.3 10.0 21.5 16.1 298
 
25.0 22 6 7.0 20.8 24.7 112
 
(5) Insufficient
 
knowledge for I 21.5 25 4 12.0 27.3 13.9 921
 
regulating inventions 17 2 25 0 8.0 29 3 19.7 289
 
II 16.3 36.2 10.0 24.4 13.1 288
 
15.6 26.5 12.0 29.1 16.8 116
 
(6) Too many controls II 8.4 22.6 15.9 37.5 15.6 285
 
on inventions prevent 3.6 23.2 12.6 41.7 18.9 114
 
solutions to social
 
problems
 
(7) Increase control II 21.0 25.8 3.0 41.6 8.7 313
 
over technology 20.8 29.3 3.0 42.6 4.3 
 122
 
aTop row figures for cross-section samples, lower row for potential publics.
 
bAgreement is with first part of forced-choice question.
 
*I = TECH I, 1972, II = TECH II, 1974.
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of actual attitude change is, of course, fraught with many methodologi­
cal problems Observed differences in responses between 1972 and 1974,
 
for instance, may be due to an actual shift in respondents' underlying
 
beliefs, or, equally plausibly, they may be due to a measurement error 
A measurement error can, in turn, be due to the unreliabilLty of the 
particular question or to the unreliability of the individual respondent 
At minimum, three data points are required to say definitely whether an 
observed change is due to actual attitude shift or to measurement error.6 
However, by making a few simplifying assumptions, we can make some esti­
mates of stability with the data at hand. 
We will assume that at the individual level, a response range ex­
ists such that a person may maintain the same underlying attitudes but 
yet respond differently to the same question on two separate occasions 
The magnitude of that range will for analytic purposes obviously deter­
mine the degree of stability: a range which extends to include the en­
tire scale will yield perfect stability; a range consisting of a single
 
point allows the least flexibility in responses and therefore imposes
 
the most stringent requirements on determinations of stability Here,
 
we shall assume "stability" when response to a query in 1974 was within
 
one opinion-category of what it had been in 1972 That is, stable re­
ponses are those rendered by people who maintained their identical position, 
or, if they altered it at all, moved it (analytically speaking) only into
 
a contiguous category within the agree-disagree range, or moved it from 
a neutral point Thus, a stable attitude would not be attributed to 
people who shifted from agreement to disagreement or vice versa. The 
first numerical column in Table 3-3 presents data on responses made in 
the control-of-technology dimension by the panel of persons interviewed 
both in 1972 and in 1974. The other columns display the means and stand­
ard deviations for the two separate cross-section samples polled in those 
years Also included are data on the respective potential publics within 
the panel sample and the two cross-section samples. 
It is clear from Table 3-3 that considerable stability is evident
 
in responses along the control-of-technology dimension about two­
thirds of the panel sample maintained stable attitudes over the two-year
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TABLE 3-3 
STABILITY OF RESPONSES ALONG CONTROL-OF-TECHNOLOGY DIMENSION 
b 
PANEL: CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES: 
(Percentage of Re­
spondents within ± 
One Category of STANDARD 
ITEM Original Response) MEAN DEVIATION N 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 
(1) Control of 64 .6%a 2.86 2.77 1.40 1.36 903 297
 
technology will 71.1 2.83 2.50 1.46 1.32 293 120
 
make life
 
worse
 
(4) No inter- 63.9 3.02 3.26 1.44 1.46 933 298
 
ference with 68.6 2.93 3.02 1.44 1.56 299 112 
right to buy is 
3us tifiable 
(5) Insufficient 67.0 3.13 3.18 1.39 1.32 921 288
 
knowledge for regu- 74.7 2.91 2.95 1.42 1.37 289 116
 
lation of technology 
aTop line for total samples; lower for potential publics.
 
bpanel sample were those respondents in TECH I reinterviewed for TECH II,
 
1974.
 
period And, when certain assumptions about measurement error are made,
 
stable responses at the aggregate level are evident also In particular,
 
we shall assume that either the mean of the error is zero, or, if it is 
not, that it is constant over time This assumption does not seem un­
warranted; if important shifts in attitude occurred, they would be re­
flected in significantly different mean scores, yet, when comparison is
 
made between the mean scores for these variables, no statistically sig­
nificant differences (at the 5% level) are observed (See columns 2
 
through 5 on Table 3-3 ) 
Attempts were made to determine whether stable attitudes were as­
sociated disproportionately with any particular demographic character­
istics Using the responses from the sample panel, a dichotomous vari­
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able was createdto indicate their stability or instability over the two­
year interval between interviews; another variable was used to measure
 
the differences between the first and second responses. Both variables 
were arrayed against seven demographic variables: age, race, sex, income, 
education, political party identification, and ideological identifica­
tion. No correlations resulted which show them having much influence on
 
either stability or instability in responses from the entire panel sample 
In the potential public drawn from the panel, some slight association 
was found between education and change in agreement that there is insuf­
ficient knowledge to warrant regulation (r = - 15); the more highly edu­
cated were less certain the second time around that there was adequate
 
knowledge to do so. Also, younger respondents from the panel's potential
 
public were more likely than their elders to maintain a constant response
 
to the question asking whether control of technology would worsen life
 
(r =- 13). 
In order to summarize data on the stability of attitudes within
 
the larger samples on the control of technology dimension, items which 
cluster within it were aggregated to form a scale. Responses to items 
1, 4, and 5 (see Figure 3-1) comprised the scale for determining the 1972
 
sample's degree of consistent agreement on this attitudinal dimension, 
items 6 and 7 were added to the scale for measuring agreement within the
 
1974 cross-section sample The scales in Figure 3-2 are bell-shaped
 
about the mean and show somewhat more stability than is found in re­
sponses to the individual items from which they were constructed Rough­
ly as many people approve of current levels of regulation or want more
 
of it as agree that less regulation is in order These feelings, as we
 
might expect, were quite stable over time. The fraction of responses from 
the panel which fell into the same opinion category plus or minus one in
 
1974 as in 1972 is 75% for the entire panel and 78% for its potential 
public. The over-time correlations are .37 and 45 respectively. The 
difference in mean score was not significant at the 5% level. 
Attempts to associate attitudes toward regulating technology with 
demographic characteristics were generally unsuccessful There was some 
indication that those in the upper income brackets within the potential
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FIGURE 3-2
 
CONTROL TECHNOLOGY SCALE: DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES
 
a CROSS SECTIONS 
Percentage MEAN S D N, 
34.5 - 1972 502 143 966 
/7 \ --- 1974 286 131 310 
30 l3 
20 8o. . 8
 
16
 
1-22 2 
1o
 
I 2 3 4 5 
technology no control 
ought to be is needed 
controlled 
1972 N 137 184 304 211 131
 
1974 N 56 59 107 51 37
 
b. POTENTIAL PUBLICS 
Percentage
 
MEAN SD N 
1972 293 140 303 
--- 1974 279 122 12230 
237'2 
20 
I0 -­
-C I I 
1 2 3 4 5 
technology no control 
ought to be is needed 
controlled 
1972 N 42 47 93 69 52
 
1974 N 21 29 42 17 14
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public of the 1972 cross section were somewhat more in favor of regula­
tion (r = .20). These relationships are small, however It would be 
safe to say that neither demographic nor political variables are good 
indicators of generalized attitudes toward the regulation of technology 
One's income, political beliefs, age or education level do not seem par­
ticularly to influence his or her attitudes toward the control of tech­
nology. Rather, variant views are distributed quite broadly in the popu­
lation and have not yet become associated with particular socioeconomic
 
positions or political ideologies
 
From these data, it seems clear that among the public generally 
and among those of its members who are more likely to be involved in the 
politics of technology there is considerable ambivalence about the suita­
bility of existing levels of regulation of the uses of technologies 
There is some evidence, however, to support the conclusion that, if 
pressed, the public would opt for more rather than for less control of 
technological development. The indications, though not strong, seem to 
suggest a deepening sense of uneasiness about the present patterns of
 
control and regulation But do these indications of uneasiness extend
 
to attitudes toward scientific activities as well7
 
VALUE OF SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY 
We argued in Chapter I that the public perceives scientific activi­
ty differently from technological activity The results of the factor 
analyses reported in this chapter lend some support to that argument 
What are some of the characteristics of this difference in perception? 
Implicit in the concept of scientific enterprise is the notion of
 
unrestricted freedom to pursue research in any direction which may seem 
fruitful. Recent attempts by scientists themselves to limit voluntarily
 
research on plasmids has attracted much attention precisely because the
 
move is so exceptional Clearly, scientists would be likely to consider
 
attempts by persons outside the scientific community to control the di­
rection of research extremely threatening to the effectiveness of scien­
tLfic activity. We have seen that, while no strong consensus exists, a
 
substantial fraction of the public accepts control of technological
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activities as legitimate and that many wish it to be increased By con­
trast, there is a very strong consensus that scientific activities are
 
intrinsically beneficial (9, Figure 3-1) and should not be controlled (8,
 
10) The data summarized in Table 3-4 show that these sentiments are
 
quite strong and consistent over time and that in each case the potential
 
public is considerably more intense in these feelings than are the total
 
cross-section samples. Additionally, we find considerable confidence in
 
scientific thinking as a means for solving social problems (12) Finally, 
TABLE 3-4 
DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSES TO ITEMS COMPRISING 
VALUE-OF-SCIENTIFIC-ACTIVITY DIMENSION
 
(cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74)
 
STRONGLY AGREE- STRONGLY 
ITEM TECH* AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE (N) 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
(8) Stop sci- I 1 2 .1%a 11.5% 5.6% 22.4% 48.4% 946 
entific study 9.8 4.8 3.5 19.0 62.8 299 
unless bene­
ficial II 8.0 11.8 6.0 20.2 54.0 310 
4.1 5.5 4.6 9.8 75.9 121 
(9) Allow I 51.8 33.5 4.6 6.2 3.9 948 
scientific 57.7 29.7 4.0 4.8 3.8 301 
study for 
beneficial II 54.0 37.7 3.0 3.7 1.6 308
 
discoveries 62.0 32.1 2.2 1.7 2.0 121
 
(10) Stop I 5.4 10.7 5.8 29.8 48.3 945 
scientific 3.1 4.9 4.2 30.0 57.8 298 
study of 
harmful II 5.1 6.6 6.0 29.9 52.4 306
 
things 2.7 3.3 1.3 21.8 70.8 120 
(11) Scien- II 11.5 18.9 6.6 22.2 40.8 306 
tific thinking 6.5 14.6 1.5 19.5 58.0 119 
cannot appre­
ciate beauties
 
(12) Scien- II 14.4 32.2 3 5 32.6 17.3 301 
tific thinking 11.8 31.9 4.1 31.4 20.8 120 
cannot solve so­
ciety's problems
 
aTop figure for total cross-section samples; lower for potential public. 
I = TECH I, 1972; II = TECH II, 1974. 
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both the public-at-large and the potential public reject the stereotype 
of the scientific man so wrapped up in his equations and paraphernalia 
that he is oblivious to the world around him. Strong majorities disagree 
that thinking in a scientific manner precludes one's appreciation of 
"most of life's beauties" (11). 
These attitudes stand in sharp contrast to those expressed about 
technological activities. Respondents' attitudes about "science" suggest
 
strong support for the scientific enterprise, acknowledge its potential
 
for social benefit, and exhibit a modest vote of confidence in both the
 
men and women of science and their way of thinking. Now is there evi­
dence that these attitudes are continuing and stable ones ?
 
As was the case with the attitude dimension encompassing responses
 
about the control of technology, the distributions of percentages for re­
sponses to items clustering as "value of scientific activity" indications
 
also suggest stability over time. At the level of individual change, we
 
find an astonishing level of consistency As indicated in Table 3-5, we
 
see that on the average for the three items making up the scientific ac­
tivity scale (8, 9, 10, Figure 3-1), the percentage of responses within
 
one category of what they had been in 1972 was 82% for the entire panel
 
and 89% for its potential public On the aggregate cross-section level,
 
for both the two whole cross sections and their respective potential pub­
lics, an even greater degree of stability is evident here than was seen
 
to obtain for attitudes about technological activities No statistically
 
significant differences (at the 5% level) emerge in the mean scores of
 
responses.
 
In attempting to discover if demographic characteristics accounted
 
for an individual's stable or unstable attitudes or for the degree of
 
attitude change, the results, again, were generally fruitless. Only edu­
cation level in the entire cross-section sample was much of a predictor-­
and that in the expected direction consistency inresponses to the "harm
 
from studying" (10) and "stop studying" (8) variations. (r = 19 and
 
.21 for the cross section and the potential public, respectively)
 
In order to summarize the data relating to attitudes about thevalue 
of scientific activity, a scale was constructed combining distributions 
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TABLE 3-5
 
STABILITY OF RESPONSES ALONG VALUE-OF-SCIENTIFIC--ACTIVITY DIMENSION 
PANEL: CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES:
 
(Percentage of Re­
spondents within ±
 
One Category of STANDARD
 
ITEM Original Response) MEAN DEVIATION N
 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74
 
(8) Stop scien- 77 .5%a 2.26 2.00 1.44 1.34 946 310
 
tific study un­les b ec 86.9 1.80 1.52 1.31 1.09 299 121less beneficial
 
(9) Allow scien- 86 9 4.23 4.39 1.06 0.84 948 308
 
tific study for
 
4.33 1.02 301 121
beneficial dis- 90.0 4.50 0.80 
coveries
 
(10) Harm re- 80.4 1.95 1.82 1.20 1.13 945 306
 
sults from
scetific 
 89 1 1 65 1.45 0.99 0.90 298
scientific study 120
 
aTop figure for cross-section sample; lower for potential public.
 
of responses to items (8), (9), and (10) for the 1972 sample and adds
 
items (11) and (12) for the 1974 sample. As expected, the scale is high­
ly skewed in the positive direction The distributions of the index for 
the two whole cross-sections and for their potential publics appear in 
Figure 3-3, it shows somewhat more stable responses over time than the 
scale's component items and reveals that the percentage of responses from
 
the entire cross section which did not shift more than one category was
 
82%, 88% from the potential-public The cross time correlations were 32
 
and 35 respectively No significant differences at the 5% level were
 
found in mean score comparisons.
 
Demographically, the scale scores were associated with education
 
(r = .26 for the 1972 cross section and r = .33 for the 1974 cross sec­
tion), race (r = 20 for both years), and income (r = .17 and 27).
 
Higher income, more education, and being white all were associated with
 
enthusiasm for scientific activities. Since these three characteristics
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a CROSS-SECTIONS 
Percentage 
40. 9 8 4 0 " -
-- -
MEAN S.D. N 
1972 199 106 966 
--19 7 4 2 0 6 0 9 9 3 13 
30 
20_ 
10 
22 .9 
o 
I 
high value 
1972 N 384 
1974 N 114 
2 
333 
91 
3 
148 
88 
4 
76 
16 
-- SI1 IS 
5 
low value 
25 
5 
b. POTENTIAL PUBLICS 
Percentage 
54 7 
532 
50 
--
MEAN SD N 
1972 170 096 303 
1974 167 084 122 
40 
30 
\315 
" 
20 16 
10 0lb 
I 
high value 
1972 N 161 
1974 N 67 
2 
95 
32 
3 
25 
21 
4 
18 
3 
5 
low value 
4 
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are highly intercorrelated, regressions were run to determine the inde­
pendent effects of each. Education accounts for the greatest amount of 
variation, but both race and income respectively also produce statisti­
cally independent, significant effects Table 3-6 summarizes both 1972 
and 1974 data on these matters 
TABLE 3-6 
STANDARDIZED REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR EDUCATION, INCOME, AND RACE IN 
PREDICTING SCORE ON VALUE-OF-SCIENTIFIC-ACTIVITY SCALE 
(cross section, '72; '74)
 
1972 1974
 
+
Education 0.21 (0.03) 0.27 (0.06)
 
Race 0.17 (0 03) 0.16 (0.05)
 
Income 0.09 (0.03) 0.15 (0.06)
 
R .32 .41
 
+ Sigma beta 
To convey a feeling for the degree ofcovariation between education 
and the Value-of-Scientific-Activity Scale of 1974 responses, cross tabu­
lations are presented in Table 3-7
 
TABLE 3-7
 
EDUCATION VS. VALUE OF SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY SCALE
 
(1974 cross section--vertical percentage)
 
VALUE EDUCATION
 
>8th 9-11th 12th 1-2 yrs Col. 3 yrs Col. 4 yrs Col. Col.+
 
Low 0% 9.2% 0.9% 1.3% 0% 0% 0%
 
19.0 11.9 5.0 3.1 4.1 1.4 
Med 38.3 26.2 38.6 27.8 6.6 18.6 11.7 
35.7 18.4 32.8 30.7 25.2 29 0 18.5
 
High 7.7 34.3 22.7 37.2 64.2 51.0 69.7
 
(N) (17) (30) (103) (78) (10) (46) (20)
 
0 
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What do the data on responses to the ideas of control of technology 
and control of science allow us to say about the nature of public atti­
tudes toward these issues? First, a strong consensus exists in favor of 
scientific activities. This enthusiasm is stable over time and repre­
sents a deep-seated confidence in scientific enterprise. Second, when 
compared to the relatively uneasy responses to technological activity, 
positive attitudes toward science may imply that the public-at-large does 
not view its activities as threatening, that, rather, the outcomes of 
technologicaZ activity are the source of concern. This interpretation 
is reinforced in the typology of data presented in Table 3-8, a cross­
tabulation of attitudes along the control-of-technology and control-of­
science dimensions.
 
TABLE 3-8
 
TYPOLOGY OF RESPONSES ACROSS TWO DIMENSIONS. 
CONTROL OF SCIENCE AND CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 
(cross-secton sample and potential public, '72; '74)
 
CONTROL 
DON'T CONTROL CONTROL TECH., SCIENCE, CONTROL 
EITHER NOT SCIENCE NOT TECH. BOTH N 
TECH I, 1972: 
Cross section 43.6% 44.6% 7.1% 4.8% 736 
Potential public 43.6 50.4 3.2 2.8 250
 
TECH II, 1974:
 
Cross section 49.4 41.7 5.8 3.2 156
 
Potential public 60.3 35.6 1.4 2.8 73
 
* 
Excludes neutral responses to items from either or both dimensions.
 
It is quite clear that our total samples and their respective po­
tential publics were broadly in favor of unrestrained scientific actlvi­
ties, equally clear is the strong proportion of people who were not so 
generous toward technological activities It is notable that both the 
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1972 and 1974 potential publics were somewhat more prone than the larger
 
group to seek control of technology, this tendency was detectable in a
 
8 
little over half of the total respondents to both surveys A plausible
 
corollary to these findings is that if the public comes to see "science 
and technology" as indistinguishable on the practical level, the very 
large consensus favoring unregulated scientific activities could diminish
 
rapidly
 
OUTCOME OF TECHNOLOGY
 
The third attitudinal dimension we probed encompasses perceptions
 
of technology's outcomes. Writers like Charles Reich and Theodore Rosack 
have painted a picture of public disenchantment with the fruits of techno­
9 
logical development Uneasiness about technology has often seemed to 
take on a nearly Luddite character--the belief that further techno­
industrial advance will result in a net social loss Expressions of
 
longing for a return to nature or to a more simple life unemcumbered by
 
machines typify that troubled attitude as, to a lesser extent, does re­
duced confidence in technology's power to solve man's problems People
 
most disenchanted with technology tend to accept such notions.
 
We hoped to discover how prevalent in fact such disenchantment with
 
the outcomes of technology might be The results of responses clustering
 
in the outcome-of-technology dimension appear in Table 3-9 It is evident
 
that the more extreme forms of disenchantment, the urge to go back to
 
nature (15, Figure 3-1) and a belief that technology makes life too compli­
cated (13), are held by only about one-third of the total population The
 
notion that technology induces a debilitating materialism is subscribed
 
to-by only about a quarter of the sample (16) Yet, over two-thirds of
 
those interviewed agreed with the somewhat less extreme statement that we 
have become too dependent on machines (14) These results hold for both
 
the cross-section samples and their respective potential publics 10
 
A great deal of stability is evident in responses comprising the
 
outcome-of-technology dimension Table 3-10 reports that in 1974 on the
 
average the percentage of those responses within one category of what
 
they had been in 1972 was about 70% for both the entire panel and for 
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TABLE 3-9
 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO ITEMS COMPRISING
 
OUTCOME-OF-TECHNOLOGY DIMENSION
 
(cross-section sample, potential public, '72; '74)
 
STRONGLY AGREE- STRONGLY 
*ITEM TECH* AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE (N) 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
aTechnology 1 10.1% 26.4% 8.7% 31.4% 23.3% 947 
makes life 9.2 23.8 7.8 32.1 27.1 298 
too compli- II 11.7 23.7 6.5 32.0 26.2 306 
cated 9.3 24.1 4.4 29.9 32.3 122
 
Overdepend- I 39.4 33.5 6.3 13.3 7.5 959 
ence on 32.9 35.3 7.1 16.8 8.0 299 
machines II 35.9 33.9 4.1 15.7 10.3 310 
32.5 35.1 4.4 15.4 12.6 122
 
Go back to I 11.9 21.1 10.2 25.0 31.8 948
 
nature 8.9 20.2 5.9 29.8 35.3 297
 
II 14.7 23.7 9.8 25.3 26.5 304
 
11.5 21.4 8.8 25.3 33.0 116 
Technology II 11.0 16.3 3.2 41.0 28.5 313 
leads to ma- 11.5 15.4 4.7 45.2 23.0 122 
terialism; is 
debilitatlngb 
71 = TECH I, 1972; II = TECH II, 1974. 
aupper figure for cross-section sample; lower for potential public.
 
bone half of a forced-choice question; see Figure 3-1 for exact wording.
 
TABLE 3-10
 
STABILITY OF RESPONSES ALONG OUTCOME-OF-TECHNOLOGY DIMENSION
 
PANEL: CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES: 
(Percentage of Re­
spondents within ± 
One Category of STANDARD 
ITEM Original Response) MEAN DEVIATION N 
'72 '74 '72 '74 ''72 '74 
(13) Technology 6 7 .5%a 2.69 2.63 1.35 1.39 947 306
 
makes life too 68.1 2.56 2.48 1.35 1.40 298 122
 
complicated
 
(14) Too depend- 75.6 3.84 3.70 1.28 1.39 959 310
 
ent on machines 73.9 3.68 3.60 1.30 1.40 299 122
 
(15) Go back to 72.6 2.56 2.75 1.42 1.49 948 304
 
nature 72.9 2.38 2.53 1.37 1.43 297 116
 
aupper figure for cross-section samples; lower for potential publics. 
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its potential public Similarly, there were no statistically significant
 
changes at the 5% level in the mean scores of the responses to constitu­
ent items along this dimension from the (four) other groups. 
In attempting to enrich interpretation of these data, we found that
 
responses regarding too great a dependence on machines were disproportion­
ately more consistent among the young and among Democrats in the potential
 
public than among older and Republican respondents within that group (r =
 
21 for age and .16 for party). Continued agreement over time that tech­
nology makes life too complicated was found disproportionately among lib­
erals (r = .17). Stable responses about going back to nature were found 
disproportionately among the young (r = 15) and among the poor (r = 16) 
A scale was constructed aggregating the items just discussed which
 
comprise the attitudinal dimension encompassing perceptions of technologyt's
 
outcomes. For 1972, it included items (13), (14) and (15); in 1974 item
 
(16) was added Figure 3-4 presents the results The distribution in 
1972 was slightly skewed in the negative direction, while in 1974, it was 
somewhat skewed in the positive direction This shift Is statistically 
significant at the 5% level The panel data, not shown in Figure 3-4, 
revealed a great degree of stability on this index. The percentage of 
respondents in 1974 falling within one category of their 1972 response 
was about 79% for both the entire panel and for its potential public 
The over-time correlations were 47 and 51 respectively
 
Two demographic correlates to responses along the outcome-of-tech­
nology dimension were detected In the cross-section samples, the young
 
were somewhat more negative toward technological outcomes than their
 
elders (r = 15 in 1972 and 16 in 1974), and the poor were more nega­
tive than the rich (r = . 17 and .30) In the potential public, this re­
lationship intensified for age ( 29 and 25 respectively for the two 
years) ,yfor income the relationship remained virtually the same ( 12 and 
.29 for-the two years) A significant relationship between party/ideology 
and attitudes about outcomes of technology emerged from the 1972 sample 
liberal Democrats were more negative about them than conservative Republi­
cans (r = 19 for the cross section and r = 35 for its potential public) 
Inexplicably, this relationship disappeared in the 1974 sample, with a
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OUTCOME OF TECHNOLOGY SCALE: DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES 
a 	CROSS;SECTIONS 
Percentage 
$36 
314 
" 30 	 28 2- - \ 
/ 	 4 
/ 	 4'3 
I 	 \1Z 
15.81 
12 8 
10 - MEAN S D N 
78 - 1972 320 116 964 \73 
--- 1974 272 114 314 
I 2 3 4 5 
positive 	 negative 
evaluation evaluation
 
1972 N 75 226 215 324 123
 
1974 N 50 89 99 54 23
 
b. 	POTENTIAL PUBLICS 
Percentage 
30030 - 306 -" "" 
20 / \
 
/

/
 
0\
/
26174 	 N 
N 
I06 MEAN S D N 
- 1972 302 120 302 " 
---- 1974 2.61 112 122 64 
I 2 3 4 5 
positive 	 negati ve
evaluation evaluation
 
1972 N 34 78 68 91 31
 
1974 N 21 37 39 17 8
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correlation for the cross section of only 0.08 and for the potential 
public a mere 0 04.
 
Thus overall a pattern of mildly positive response to technologi­
cal outcomes appears, within which one sees a public that feels much too
 
dependent upon machines, with members believing "technology makes life
 
too complicated"; but it is a public neither ready to forsake urban in­
dustrialized life and "go back to nature," nor to consent to the indict­
ment of technology as leading to debilitating materialism There are
 
hints that more often than not younger people, the poor and liberal Demo­
crats have greater sympathy with these attitudes of technological disen­
chantment. But these signs, though they may be recent, are not strong.
 
THE OUTCOME OF SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY 
It seems evident now that our respondents' attitudes toward the in­
trinsic value of technological activity differed distinctly from their 
attitudes about the intrinsic value of scientific activity. The dis­
tinction is most clearly seen in their responses about the social con­
trol or regulation of the two enterprises. Comparing data implicitly 
relating the potential public's perceptions of technological activity to 
their perceptions of the outcomes of scientific activity further sub­
stantiates this difference 
Table 3-11 reports distributions of responses to the two items 
which fell along the outcome-of-science dimension They show strong 
agreement that scientific discoveries are good and only their use is 
problematical (2, Figure 3-1). On the other hand, we see that our 
samples were nearly evenly divided about whether or not scientists, when 
left alone, can be counted on to discover things which will make our 
lives better (3)11 
Expectedly now, responses about outcomes of science show a high 
degree of stability over time. Table 3-12 reports that between two­
thirds and three-quarters of both the panel and the panel's potential 
public differed no more than one opinion category in their responses to 
the items in question over the two-year period. This indication of sta­
bility is reinforced by the fact that no significant differences in mean 
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TABLE 3-11 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO ITEMS COMPRISING
 
OUTCOME-OF-SCIENCE DIMENSION
 
(cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74)
 
ITEM TECH* 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
(5) 
AGREE 
(4) 
AGREE-
DISAGREE 
(3) 
DISAGREE 
(2) 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
(1) 
(N) 
(2) Discoveries 
good, use bad I 49.0% a 
50.1 
28.2% 
24.2 
5.4% 
5.6 
11.1% 
13.5 
6.3% 
6.3 
957 
300 
II 47.8 
53.9 
29.8 
23.0 
3.7 
2.6 
10.5 
8.6 
8.3 
11.9 
302 
118 
(3) Leave sci- I 13.8 27.9 12.3 28.3 17.6 943
 
entists alone; 11.2 25.1 11.3 32.1 20.3 297
 
life made II 15.5 31.0 10.8 27.8 14.9 302 
better 12.1 29.8 10.8 26.3 21.0 118 
aupper figure for cross-section sample; lower for potential public.
 
TABLE 3-12 
STABILITY OF RESPONSES ALONG OUTCOME-OF-SCIENCE DIMENSION 
PANEL: CROSS-SECTION SAMPLE: 
(Percentage of Re­
spondents within ± 
One Category of STANDARD 
ITEM Original Response) MEAN DEVIATION N 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 
a
(2) Discoveries 75.5% 4.03 3.98 1.25 1.30 957 302
 
good; use bad 75.3 3.99 3.93 1.29 1.37 300 133
 
(3) Leave scien- 66.7 2.92 3.04 1.35 1.34 943 302
 
tists alone; 69.1 2.75 2.86 1.33 1.37 297 118
 
life made better
 
aupper figure for cross section; lower for potential public.
 
scores at the 5% level emerged for the independent cross-section samples
 
or for the potential publics. Party/ideological identification was the
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only demographic correlate associated with consistency, Republican
 
conservatives were more likely to be consistent in their views of
 
scient-kfic outcomes than Democratic liberals (r = .18)
 
Distributions of the responses to the two items tapping under­
lying attitudes about the outcome of science combine to form an index
 
which is positively skewed See Figure 3-5 That there is no sta­
tistically significant difference in the mean scores at the 5% level
 
is indicative of the index's stability Moreover, about 66.9% of
 
the entire panel changed their response by no more than one category,
 
the corresponding percentage for the panel's potential public was 
66 3% The over-time correlations for the entire panel and the
 
panel's potential public were 32 and 31 respectively. No demo­
graphic variables were observed to be associated with a respondent's
 
score on this index
 
Technological imperative A question was included in the 1972 
survey which attempted to measure whether there was widespread agree­
ment on the efficacy of a technological fix. This concept has at its 
core the notion that unanticipated problems arising out of techno­
logical development can always be, and ought to be, solved by ad- ­
ditional doses of technology This notion is one and the same with the 
"technological imperative" pessimistically foreseen by Jacques Ellul.12 
To test whether people accepted this notion, the respondents were 
asked to agree or disagree with this statement "People shouldn't 
worry about harmful effects of technology because new inventions 
will always come along to solve the problems " We found that an 
overwhelming majority rejected this statement The data bearing 
on this appear in Table 3-13 In the entire cross section, we found 
that those who agreed with this question also tended to favor de­
creased regulation of technology (r = 27) and to evaluate more 
positively the outcome of scientific activity (r = 30) Finally, 
those who disagreed were disproportionately younger (r = 25) and 
had more education (r = 21) than those who agreed 
FIGURE 3-5 
OUTCOE-OF-SCIENCE SCALE: DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES 71 
a 	 CROSS-SECTIONS
 
Percentage
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1972 271 I 29 966
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2 3 4 5 
posih ve negative 
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1972 N 114 312 328 133 79 
1974 N 43 69 /10 47 40 
b 	 POTENTIAL PUBLICS 
Percentage 
34 2 
3040 
/ 3
 
20 	 .30 
to MEAN S D N 	 9 
-1972 289 1.31 303 
--- 1974 284 124 121 
I 2 3 4 5 
positive negative
evaluation evaluation 
1972 N 28 92 /01 54 28 
1974 N- 22 25 41 18 15 
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TABLE 3-13 
BELIEF IN A 'TECHNOLOGICAL FIX'
 
(cross-section sample and potential public; 1972)
 
STRONGLY AGREE- STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE N 
Cxoss Section 6.4% 12.2% 6.5% 29.9% 45.1% 945
 
Potential Public 5.1 6.4 3.5 28.1 56.9 297
 
SUMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
The major finding of this chapter is that the public does make 
a distinction between activities which can be characterized as scien­
tific and those which are considered technological This distinction 
is maintained despite the continual blurring which appears in the
 
popular media and in the statements of scientific notables Sepa­
rate cognitive structures can be identified with the value of scien­
tific activity, the control of technology, and the outcomes of sci­
ence and of technology These cognitive dimensions are stable over 
time and appear, for the most part, in the entire cross section as 
well as in the potential public 
The distinctions between technological activities and scien­
tific activities were characterized by considerable confidence in 
the intrinsic value of the outcomes of scientific activities and the 
belief that the work of scientists should not be controlled Per­
ceptions of the outcomes of technological activities were not so 
generous, goodly portions of the public were wary of technological 
activities and a substantial fraction accepted control of techno­
logical activities as legitimate, many respondents wishing it to be 
increased As we noted earlier, public tolerance of relatively un­
regulated scientific activity might change to a demand for greater 
73 
control if science and technology come to be seen as indistinguish­
able on the practical level. Such a caveat runs somewhat counter
 
to other survey research.
 
A second major finding is that the value the public places on
 
scientific activities is very much a function of their education.
 
Less than 1% of the sample that has completed college place a nega­
tive value on scientific activity compared to 21% of those who 
failed to graduate from high school. Clearly, the degree to which 
a person has been exposed to scientific knowledge does affect his
 
evaluation of the activity The implications of this finding for
 
NSF and AAAS Public Understanding of Science Programs are obvious 
A third major finding, one which will be reinforced in the
 
following chapter, was the increased cleavage between rich and poor 
This cleavage appeared both in respect to the value-of-scientific­
activity indicator and the generalized outcome-of-technology indi­
cator In each case, the differences of opinion between the rich 
and the poor in 1972 were increased by 1974 Perhaps attitudes to­
ward technology and science are becoming more akin to attitudes to­
ward traditional social welfare issues 
In the next chapter we will begin to consider that question
 
as we move to inquire into attitudes toward specific present tech­
nologies.
 
NOTES
 
From United States Information Agency, Seminar on Technology 
and Social Change, mimeo., (March, 1975). Kranzberg's assertion is 
essentially the null hypothesis of our own argument. 
2 
See Herbert Simon, "Relevance: There and Here," Science 181: 
4100 (August 17, 1973), 613. 
74 
3Items 7 and 16, however, depart somewhat from the agree-disagree
 
format, in that they are from "forced choice" questions. The numbering
 
of the questionnaire items listed in Figure 3-1 does not, of course,
 
represent the sequence--purely random--in which they were presented to
 
respondents, but an analytically derived grouping.
 
4The definitive work on factor analysis is H. Harmon, Modern Factor
 
Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). See also Johannes 
Van de Geer, Introduction to MultivariateAnalysis for the Social Sciences 
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1971), 128-155. 
5 
In an article based on the 1972 data--"Technology Observed. Atti­
tudes of a Wary Public," Science 188:4184 (April 11, 1975), 121-127--we argued 
that items (13) and (15) clustered apart from item (14) when a fourth
 
question dealing with the sensibleness of a "technological fix" was in­
cluded. Due to an oversight on our part, that question was not included
 
in the 1974 survey. Therefore, we left it out here in doing the factor
 
analysis. Items (13), (14), and (15) then clustered together in both
 
1972 and 1974. Interestingly, even when the fourth item was included,
 
the 1972 potential public yielded a response cluster containing (13),
 
(14) , and (15). The excluded question is discussed in the final section
 
of this chapter. Another deviation of the present analysis from that
 
presented in the Science article should be noted: marginals given there
 
were unwezghted; in this monograph, all analysis is based on weighted
 
variables. (See Appendix D, part 4.)
 
6See David Heise, "Separating Reliability and Stability in Test-
Retest Correlation," American Sociological Review Volume 34:1 (February, 
1969) 93-101; David Wiley and James Wiley, "The Estimation of Measurement 
Error in Panel Data," American Sociological Review Volume 35:1 (February, 
1970), 112-117; M. Hannan et al., "The Causal Approach to Measurement Error 
in Panel Analysis: Some Further Contingencies," in Measurement in the 
Social Sciences, H.M. Blalock, Jr., Ed. (Chicago: Aldine, 1974), 293-323. 
7These claims are supported in other writings. See Appendix F,
 
Section I.
 
8Excepting education and income, no demographic variables were 
found to be associated with the issue of controls. 
9Especially trenchant is Charles Reich's The Greening of America 
(New York: Bantam, 1971).
 
1 0These findings are consistent with other studies on the effects of 
technology. See Appendix F, Sections II and III. 
ii 
In general, our findings about the public's attitudes toward the 
outcome of scientific activity are consistent with materials published 
elsewhere. See Appendix F, Section III. 
12See The Technological Society, tr. J. Wilkinson (New York: 1956).
 
CHAPTER IV
 
ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES
 
In the first chapter we argued that technology is socially experi­
enced Data were presented in Chapter III which delineated, in a gener­
al way, the public's perception of an aspect of that experience In 
order to confirm our understanding of technology as social experience, 
this chapter will explore attitudes toward widely implemented and well 
known technologies. Three major propositions are examined that techno­
logical change is perceived by the public to be central in contrast to 
other types of changes in society, that the public has a positive over­
all evaluation of presently available technologies with regard to their
 
social benefits, and that technology is perceived to have substantial 
utility for solving social problems
 
PERCEPTIONS OF TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
 
Those who think and write about the relationship between technolo­
gy and society hold in common the belief that technical developments are
 
central to many of the social and political changes evident over the past
 
half century But to what degree does the general public share this as­
sumption7 In the 1972 survey 980 respondents were asked an open-ended
 
question about their perceptions of major changes in society since 1945
 
specifically, "What are some of the things that have changed the most in
 
the life of the average citizen of this country--things such as social
 
and political movements, our way of life, science and technology, or de­
velopments in business and industry t'M Almost everyone questioned cited
 
at least one change, 18% noting one, 42% two and 35% three or more. In 
all respondents mentioned forty kinds of change, ranging from deteriora­
tion of the environment and increased leisure time to space exploration
 
and the increased cost of living Nearly one quarter of all the changes
 
cited had to do with technology or science More significantly, almost
 
half of the people questioned named at least one technological change,
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over 10% mentioned two or more.
 
Some of the changes mentioned by respondents are duplicates.
 
For ease of presentation, we have combined responses into twenty­
five types of change, organized within the four comprehensive areas 
listed in Table 4-1. In overall emphasis, the frequency of mention
 
of technological changes challenges various social changes, with 
economic and political changes drawing less attention then either.
 
Many of the responses listed in Table 4-1 are to be expected; changed 
life styles and moral standards, increased cost of living, and new 
forms of political behavior are experienced first hand Technologi­
cal advances, too, appear to be quite directly experienced by many 
people Changes linked to science and technology in general and to 
increased industrialization combine for 25% of the total responses 
for the whole sample and 38% for the potential public A number of 
specific technologies elicited special comment the space program,
 
medicine, transportation, and communications (including television)
 
The degree to which our sample associated science and tech­
nology, in a more or less spontaneous manner, with important social 
changes marks the relative centrality of the topic to them We found 
that no demographic or social characteristics relate systematically 
to people mentioning changes in the science/technology category or 
to those who did not Neither does party identification appear to 
have any bearing on the number of mentions of science/technology in 
the context of social change 
Our analysis suggests, then, that the public perceives general 
technological advance as an aspect of overall social change occur­
ring since 1945. But this is not to say that the benefits of techno­
logical advance are necessarily perceived as being delivered equally 
to all people nor that the implicit beliefs of our statesmen of sci­
ence about technology's beneficence and social promise are shared by 
the public-at-large We turn now to a consideration of the extent 
to which it does perceive that promise to have been realized 
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TABLE 4-1
 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEIVED IMPORTANT CHANGES IN SOCIETY SINCE 1945 
(cross-section sample and potential public, 1972)
 
CROSS POTENTIAL 
I. 	 SOCIAL CHANGES SECTION PUBLIC 
(n=556; 	165)a (5 6 . 9 %)f0 (5 3 . 6 %)1y 
1. 	 Changes in life style generally and among 
the young 21.7%0 21.3% 
2. 	Improvements in education, interpersonal
 
relations, leisure time 10.9 14.0
 
3. 	Life less settled; more pressures 8.9 8.6
 
4. 	Breakdown in education, family life and
 
interpersonal relations 12.5 13.8
 
5. 	Change, or decline, in moral standards,
 
more crime 19.3 16.2
 
6. 	Population explosion and environmental
 
deterioration 4.7 4.1
 
II. 	 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES b 
(n=475; 172) (47.8) (56.8) 
1. 	General scientific and technological change 14.9% 15.8%
 
2. 	Increased industrialization and mechanization 9.2 12.4
 
3. 	New Products and inventions 5.4 6.7
 
4. 	Medical advances 9.2 9.9
 
5. 	Space program 10.0 14.0
 
6. 	Advances in TV and communications 6.7 10.2
 
7. 	Advances in transportation 8.3 12.6
 
8. 	Increased pollution 4.1 5.0
 
III. 	ECONOMIC CHANGES b
 
(n=377; 108) (38.6) (35.6)
 
1. 	Improved standard of living, more employment 15.1% 18.0%
 
2. 	Increased cost of living, more unemployment 23.4 15.1
 
3. 	Increased taxes 7.2 5.5
 
4. 	Growth of large business enterprises 3.8 6.9
 
IV. 	POLITICAL CHANGES b
 
(n=310; 113) (31.8) (37.4)
 
1. 	General social and political change 5.7% 6.8%
 
2. 	More radical politics 4.9 6.2
 
3. 	Increased political involvement 8.3 9.8
 
4. 	Increased governmental control 4.2 4.1
 
5. 	Politics dirtier, less trustworthy 4.3 5.1
 
6. 	Improved race relations 4.8 7.8
 
7. More liberal court and prison systems 5.0 5.1
 
aIndicates sample size for cross section and potential public.
 
bPercent indicates the fraction of the sample mentioning one or more of 
the items in designated area of change. 
cFraction of the sample mentioning particular change. 
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PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES EVALUATED
 
One series of questions used in both surveys probes individual per­
cqaptions of benefits associated with several actual technological de­
velopments Respondents were asked to indicate "how much of a change
 
for the better or worse in life in general" each of five different techno­
logical developments has made. These five were household appliances,
 
automotive vehicles, automated factories, atomic weapons, and the space
 
program They were selected as representative of a wide range of
 
presently employed highly visible technologies that are widely imple­
mented and therefore familiar to the public. Three more technologies
 
were added to this list in the 1974 survey birth control pills, com­
puters, and television Table 4-2 shows that both the 1972 and 1974
 
samples varied considerably in their estimation of these technologies
 
for good or ill. Overall, however, results of both surveys indicate
 
that the public judges most of these technologies quite positively
 
The one clear exception is in attitudes toward the atomic bomb The
 
data show that less than half of the 1972 sample believed the atomic
 
bomb to have resulted in better social conditions; in 1974 this pro­
portion declined sharply to only 26% of the sample
 
Of particular interest is the stability of the responses evalu­
ating the technologies. Table 4-3 presents evidence that the attitudes 
recorded in Table 4-2 are not transient Consider first the responses 
from the panel of respondents who were reinterviewed in 1974 (see the 
first column of Table 4-3) At least two-thirds of the responses to 
four of the questions remained stable, i e., were within one opinion 
category of their 1972 response. Even in the case with the greatest 
change, attitudes toward the atomic bomb, over half of the reinter­
viewed sample did not stray far from their original position Not
 
only did individual beliefs hold firmly, but in aggregate the popula­
tion has maintained fairly steady attitudes. This constancy is borne
 
out by comparison of the means and standard deviations computed for
 
1974 cross-section responses with those from the 1972 sample
 
TABLE 4-2 
PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES EVALUATED 
(cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74) 
Technology 
As Making Life Very 
Much Worse to 
Slightly Worse 
'72 '74 
(1-3) (1-3) 
"In Between" 
'72 '74 
(4) (4) 
As Making Life Slight­
ly Better to Very 
Much Better 
'72 '74 
(5-7) (5-7) 
'72 
N 
'74 
Appliances 3.5%a 
3.0 
8.5% 
5.9 
3.4% 
4.5 
5.0% 
6.0 
93.2% 
92.5 
86.5% 
88.1 
974 
302 
314 
122 
Automobiles 15.9 
19.1 
16.4 
17.6 
11.4 
10.5 
12.0 
17.6 
72.9 
70.4 
71.6 
64.7 
974 
302 
314 
121 
Automation 19.2 
11.0 
18.5 
20.2 
17.7 
17.0 
14 1 
6.7 
64.2 
72.0 
67.4 
73.0 
969 
301 
306 
118 
Space 
Program 
19.6 
15 4 
16.2 
7.7 
19.6 
16.8 
18.5 
15.7 
60.8 
67.8 
65.2 
76.6 
972 
301 
314 
122 
Atomic 
Weapons 
45.7 
48.1 
55.8 
58.7 
5.4 
23.0 
21.7 
17.3 
48.9 
28.9 
25.6 
24.1 
966 
299 
306 
120 
Computersb ---
---
14.5 
12.2 
---
---
12.1 
6.2 
---
---
73.3 
81.6 
---
---
314 
122 
Birth Con-
trol Pills 
---
---
11.8 
5.6 
---
---
12.6 
6.0 
---
---
75.5 
88.4 
---
---
311 
120 
Televisionb ---
---
12.9 
15.9 
---
---
12.6 
11.1 
---
---
74.6 
72.8 
---
---
314 
122 
aTop figures for total samples; lower for respective potential publics.
 
bin 1974 survey only.
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TABLE 4-3 
THE STABILITY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES 
(cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74) 
Technology 
PANEL:b 
(Percentage of Re­
spondents within ± 
One Category of 
Original Response) 
'72 
MEAN 
'74 
CROSS-SECTION SAMPLES: 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
'72 '74 '72 
N 
'74 
Appliances 8 1 .1%a 
80.5 
6.15 
6.01 
6.05 
6.02 
1.14 
1.08 
1.37 
1 28 
974 
302 
314 
120 
Automobiles 64.0 
63.3 
5.26 
5.08 
5.27 
5.00 
1.61 
1.67 
1 71 
1.79 
974 
302 
313 
121 
Automation 65 6 
71.3 
5.01 
5.19 
5.04 
5 16 
1.61 
1.54 
1.72 
1.77 
969 
301 
302 
118 
Space 
Program 
66.3 
65.7 
4 91 
5.09 
5.16 
5.55 
1.87 
1.79 
1.74 
1.50 
972 
301 
308 
122 
Atomiq 
Weapons 
56.6 
61.6 
3.57 
3.47 
3 12 
3 01 
2.02 
2.14 
2.01 
1.93 
966 
299 
314 
122 
aTop row indicates figures for cross-section sample; lower for potential public 
bPanel sample were those respondents in TECH I reinterviewed for TECH I1, 1974. 
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Are any demographic or political characteristics associated with
 
evaluations of particular present technologies? Findings related to this
 
question, summarized in Table 4-4, are rather spotty and fail to conform
 
to any systematic pattern. Consider first the entire cross section.
 
TABLE 4-4
 
THE EFFECT OF INCOME AND IDEOLOGY ON 
ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public, 1972; 1974)
 
INCOME IDEOLOGY 
'72 '74 '72 '74 
Appliances .06a 
.08 
.21 
.09 
-.11 
-.23 
-.12 
-.22 
Automobiles .01 
.11 
.04 
-.10 
-.10 
-.23 
-.21 
-.19 
Automation .19 
.19 
.17 
.13 
-. 12 
-.20 
-.19 
-.31 
Space Program .22 
.24 
.24 
.12 
-.09 
-.26 
-.07 
-.22 
Atomic Weapons .06 
.10 
.00 
.02 
-.25 
-.42 
-.21 
-.23 
Computersb --- .18 
.05 
---
---
-.01 
-.19 
Birth Control Pillsb ---
---
.19 
.22 
--- .08 
.08 
Televisionb --- .07 
.11---
--- - .06 
-.05 
arigures in top row for cross-section sample; lower for potential public.
 
bin 1974 survey only.
 
Income had a somewhat greater relationship to differential evaluation in
 
1974 than it had in 1972. In the first survey only evaluations of auto­
mated factories and of the space program were even modestly associated
 
with income level In 1974, in addition to those two technologies, ap­
pliances and two technologies added to our list in 1974--birth control
 
pills and computers--all were associated with differences in income In
 
much the same way, political differences have slightly increased over
 
time Whereas in 1972 only the evaluations of atomic weapons were related
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to political ideology, in 1974 evaluations of automobiles, industrial 
automation, and atomic weapons were, in part, associated with political
 
ideology In each case, the more "liberal" the respondent, the less
 
likely he/she was to evaluate the technology in question positively.
 
Younger respondents had disproportionately more positive evaluations of
 
contraceptive pills and of computers. Males tended to favor computers
 
more than females did. Finally, the more highly educated respondents in
 
the 1974 survey seemed to favor the space program more than did less edu­
cated respondents. The only difference between demographic associations
 
in the entire cross section and those in the potential public exists in
 
the political indicators. While increased differences in ideological
 
associations appeared between the two cross sections, differential lib­
eral and conservative associations did not increase in the 1974 potential
 
public Indeed, in two instances, attitudes toward atomic weapons and
 
the space program, such differences had been greater in 1972
 
How do the more general attitudes toward technology and science
 
discussed in Chapter III relate to evaluations of specific present tech­
nologies? Several attitudes toward the outcomes of technology consist­
ently combined with a nunber of specific evaluations--the more disen­
chanted with technology, the less positive the particular evaluation.
 
These relationships were generally stable over time Table 4-5 presents
 
the various associations for the two years The only other general atti­
tude toward technology or science appearing to be consistently associated
 
with specific evaluations was that measured by the value-of-scientific­
activity index Those less positive toward scientific research tended to
 
make more negative assessment of the space program This correlation re­
mained stable over the two years between surveys. Moreover, the degree
 
of association was roughly the same for both the entire cross section
 
and the potential public (r = -.23). 
In an effort to determine whether an underlying attitude toward 
current technology in general rather than toward particular technologies 
was present in evaluations of those technologies, we applied a scalogram
 
program to the individual evaluations Because these formed a Guttman
 
scale, we are confident that general underlying evaluative attitudes exist
 
TABLE 4-5
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUTCOME-OF-TECHNOLOGY SCALE AND COMPONENTS
 
AND EVALUATIONS OF PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES
 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public; '72, '74)
 
OUTCOME OF TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY COMPLICATES TOO DEPENDENT GO BACK TO 
EVALUATION OF SCALE LIFE ON MACHINES NATURE 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 
Appliances -.1 8a -.21 * * * * * * 
-.31 -.20 * * * * -.34 -.23 
*---
Automobiles 	 -.23 * * * 
-.28 * -.26 --- .36 --­
-.38 * 
.-. 22 -.28 -.21
 Automation -.26 -.28 * * 
-.38 -.33 -.31 -.23 -.20 -.25 -.42 -.34 
Space Program -.26 -.23 * -.20 * * * -. 27 
- 36 -.32 -.27 -.26 -.25 -.19 -.34 -.28 
* * 	 ---. * * Atomic Weapons 	 * * 
-.24 * -.25 *--- -.23 -.23 
Computers b .-. 23 --- -. 19 --- * * 
--- -. 34 --. 20 .-. 34 --- * 
* 	 *Birth Control Pills 	 * --- * -- ---
* 	 -- -- * 
...... 
_ 
_ 
Televisionb --­
aTop figure for cross-section 
bAsked only in 1974. 
*Not significant at p < .05. 
sample; lower for potential public. 
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in the data from both the 1972 and 1974 surveys.2 In addition, a Likert
 
scale--formed by assigning scores to various responses on the question­
naire and adding them--was highly correlated with the Guttman scale (r = 
87 for 1972 and r = .88 for 1974) Because the Likert scale technique 
produced distributions with better statistical properties, it has been 
used exclusively for this phase of the analysis It is referred to 
throughout as the "present technology evaluation index " 
Figure 4-1 presents the distributions measured by that index of 
evaluative responses from the cross sections and potential publics. For 
ease of presentation, the continuous scale was collapsed at six equal 
intervals. Favorable attitudes toward existing technologies predominate 
in the whole samples and the potential publics of both 1972 and 1974.3 
The average values of the distributions for the two cross sections and 
the potential publics are remarkably close Data from the panel of re­
interviewed respondents complement that finding. Over 86% of the panel's
 
responses were within one opinion category of what they had been in 1972. 
The over-time correlation was a healthy 35 for the entire panel and 42 
for the potential public within the panel 
When the present technology evaluation index is analyzed in terms 
of demographic and political characteristics, very few systematic differ­
ences are found to be associated with occupation, education, sex, or 
race Political orientation and income seem to make some difference, 
however. Figure 4-2 indicates that a minority of strongly liberal citi­
zens form the core of those who question the overall benefit of the 
technological developments they were asked to evaluate. Figure 4-3 shows 
that the more affluent Californians find greater benefits in present 
technologies than do the State's poorer citizens In each case, despite
 
some dips and bumps in the graphs, the general monotonic relationship
 
stands 
Not surprisingly, evaluations of present technologies are highly 
correlated with attitudes about technology's social outcomes Again,
 
the more disenchanted a respondent is with those outcomes, the more
 
generally negative his evaluation of present technologies. Table 4-6
 
presents data on this relationship derived from associations found
 
FIGURE 4-1
 
-EVALUATIONS OF PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES AS MAKING LIFE BETTER OR WORSE 85 
a CROSS-SECTIONS 
Percentage Agreeing 
40-
MEAN SD N 358 
1--972 438 III 975 34 9, 
--- 1974 428 106314 3--a 315 
20-­
44
 
/2 
2 ..,' L -30 
6 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
life much neutral life much 
worse better 
1972 N II 40 142 315 307 160
 
1974 N 9 /0 44 106 112 33
 
B POTENTIAL PUBLICS 
Percentage Agreeing 
40 
MEAN SD N \ 375 
-1972 4-35 120 302- 7, 
1974 4,31 111 122 2,3 293
--- ~~~ 
99I2  
20- a 
~\1o 9 
I0I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
fife much neutral life much 
worse better 
1972 N 5 /8 44 90 88 56 
1974 N 3 5 17 39 46 13 
FIGURE 4-2 
86 POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND PERCEPTIONS OF TECHNOLOGY'S BENEFIT/HARM 
a CROSS-SECTIONS 
Present Technology Index 
6 00 -(very beneficial) 
- 1972 
- -- 1974 
500 
460 4 554 744 
4F- 44 44-4 
400 
-(some benefit, some harm) 3 47 
30 I I I
 
I 2 3 4 5
 
strongly strongly
conservative liberal 
1972 N 96 307 156 245 88 
SD 097 109 114 I1/0 113 
3553 901974 N 30 92 SD 092 095 /16 099 141 
b POTENTIAL PUBLICS 
600 - (very beneficial) 
-1972 
-- - 1974 
500 4 73 4 76 1 

... 456 
400, 414 
(som 351 bef1 t, some harm) 
0I0 I II 2 35 4 5 
strongly strongly 
conservative liberal 
1972 N 27 98 52 72 46 
SID 079 /,10 125 124 /03 
1974 N II 33 15 39 20 
SID 105 0.93 090 085 148 
---
FIGURE 4-3
 
INCOME AND PERCEPTIONS OF TECHNOLOGY'S BENEFIT/HARM 87 
a CROSS-SECTIONS
 
Present Technology Index
 
600 -(very beneficial)
 
-- f972 
-- - 1974 
500 
-64 ,458 4 50 
431 10 	 444.9 

4004001 -40 	 40541 
/ (some benefit, some harm) 
36 
300 	 I I I I I I I
I 2 3 4 5 6 7Income Level less than 3,000- 5,000- 7,000- /0,000- 15,000- 20,000+(US Dollars) 3,000 4,999 6,999 9,999 14,999 19,999 
1972 N 99 95 113 17/ 257 104 70 
S D 103 /08 117 119 (10 102 099 
1974 N 22 24 /8 36 104 43 45 
SD 140 /07 138 093 095 132 093 
b POTENTIAL PUBLICS 
60 - (very behneficiol) 
-1972 
1974
 
500
 
4 69 4 62 
4001
 
3 59 564 (some benefit, same harm) 
300 	 I I I I I I19721
 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
Income Level less than 3,000- 5,000- 7,000- 10,000- 15,000- 20,0004(U aDollars) 3,000 4,999 6,999 9,999 14,999 19,999
 
72N I 16 27 46 90 4" 45
 
SD 098 131 125 145 10 107 /02
 
N 3 2 	 II 46 23 35 
1 0 09 23 os1974 SN 	 25 6S D. 1 30 166 057 too 090 1.53 097 
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between the present ;technology evaluation index and the outcome-of-tech­
nology scale--overall and with respect to responses to particular items 
collated on it. A definite change in the strength of the relationship 
is evident For 1974 respondents, the present technology evaluation
 
index is less related to the outcomes scale than for respondents in the
 
1974 survey. It may be that the change is a result of the same factors
 
which attenuated the relationship between party-ideology associations
 
with evaluations and the outcomes index Those causative factors, un­
fortunately, are not understood
 
TABLE 4-6
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN pRESENT TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION INDEX 
AND OUTCOMES-OF-TECHNOLOGY SCALE AND COMPONENTS 
(Pearson's r, cross-section sample and potential public; 1972, 1974)
 
Outcomes of Technology Over-
Technology Complicates dependence Go Back to 
Scale Life on Machines Nature 
1972 Cross Section -.33 - 26 -.19 -.31 
1972 Potential Public -.45 -.37 -.27 -.45 
1974 Cross Section -. 28 -. 17 -. 14 -. 29 
1974 Potential Public -.31 -.25 -.08 -.36
 
ATTITUDES ABOUT THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
In the 1974 survey a series of questions was asked to determine 
how helpful people thought increased technological development would be 
in solving a range of important social problems A list of ten areas of 
public concern was presented to the respondent who was then asked to 
indicate which of them he thought or talked about often. In addition, 
the respondent was asked to give his opinion as to whether additional 
uses of technology would improve, aggravate, or have no effect on chances 
of solving the particular problem Table 4-7 presents the results of 
this inquiry Solid majorities saw technology aiding in half of theprob­
lem areas presented--the development of mass rapid transit, solving 
TABLE 4- 7 
HOW USEFUL IS FURTHER TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOLVING SOCIAL PROBLEMS 9 
(cross-section sample and potential public, 1974)
 
% ACTIVELY DEGREE OF USEFULNESS 
CONCERNED OF TECHNOLOGY STANDARD 
PROBLEM AREA WITH IT POSITIVE NEUTRAL NEGATIVE MEAN DEVIATION N
 
Mass Rapid 3 6.5%a 84.2% 11.6% 4.2% 1.20 0.50 262
 
Transit 44.5 57.1 8.6 4.3 1.17 0.48 ill
 
Energy Crisis 72.5 78.4 15.1 6.6 1.28 0.55 286
 
79.1 84.1 8.8 7.0 1.23 0.57 114 
Environment 66.8 71.9 16.2 12.0 1.40 0.69 284
 
76.1 74.4 8.7 16.9 1.45 0.77 116
 
Population 40.7 59.3 37.0 3.7 1.44 0.57 280
 
Growth 47.8 62.4 36.8 0.9 1.38 0.51 113
 
Education 59.6 66.3 21.9 11.7 1.45 0.65 280
 
67.1 64.4 19.9 15.7 1.51 0.75 ill
 
Crime Rate 67.3 49.6 42.6 7.8 1.58 0.63 283
 
62 3 47.1 44.7 8.2 1.61 0.64 ill
 
Providing Jobs 41.6 48.7 26.9 24.4 1.76 0.83 281
 
44.0 43.8 25.5 30.8 1.87 0.86 113 
Drug Abuse 58.9 30.2 60.2 9.7 1.80 0.60 286 
54.6 21.4 65.6 13.1 1.92 0.58 112 
Cost of Living 92.7 33.6 42.9 23.5 1.87 0.75 288
 
91.4 32.5 41.6 25.9 1.93 0.77 112
 
Privacy of 39.9 32.0 25.8 42.2 2.10 0.86 278
 
Personal Records 49.9 18.5 24.7 56.9 2.38 0.78 115
 
aUpper row is cross section based on n of 312; lower row is potential public based on n of 122.
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the energy crisis, protecting the environment, curbing population growth,
 
and education But this belief in technology's social usefulness did not 
extend to a number of other areas of public concern On both pocketbook 
issues--employment and the cost of living--almost one quarter of the
 
sample expressed the opinion that further use of technology would only
 
aggravate the problems. Significantly, reducing the cost of living was
 
important to virtually all of the people interviewed that year It is
 
interesting that in only three of the six issue areas drawing expressions
 
of greatest concern from over 50% of the sample--the energy crisis, the
 
environment, and education--was technology believed to be of considerable
 
assistance. Concern about maintaining the privacy of individual personal 
records led to the sharpest dissent against the uses of technology. Over
 
40% of the whole sample and 55% of the potential public felt that here
 
technology poses a definite threat to an essential civil liberty The
 
"invasion of privacy" issue was the only one asked about which generated
 
such heavy public consensus that technology's potential usefulness
 
is definitely outweighed by its possible adverse effects. No relation­
ship was discovered between how important an individual believed a prob­
lem to be and how useful he thought technology would be in solving it
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The data examined above lead to several conclusions. First, the 
public considers technological developments to be among the most signifi­
cant aspects of social change This view runs through all segments of 
the California population People consider technology to have played a 
key role in shaping the texture of the society they live in While we
 
did not seek to measure affect with regard to technology-induced change,
 
it is notable that the examples of change mentioned in response to an
 
open-ended question eliciting them are neutral or positive in tone.
 
The public's positive evaluation of technology is seen even more
 
clearly when it is measured directly Assessments of particular techno­
logical innovations, as well as an index measuring more general evalu­
ations, are highly skewed in the positive direction Within this over­
all positive bias, differences do emerge between liberals and conservatives
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and rich and poor. 
Finally, the data suggest that the California sample retains a high
 
degree of confidence in the utility of technology for dealing with social
 
problems In seven out of ten areas, the fraction of people believing
 
that additional doses of technology would be beneficial ranged from near­
ly 85% to just under 50%. In only one case, the issue of maintaining the 
privacy of personal records, did more people feel that increased techno­
logical development boded ill than well
 
Yet these enthusiastic assessments of technology must be more fine­
ly scrutinized. For in a democratic society technological development
 
presupposes an end and a set of values to be achieved. To place tech­
nology's high marks in a context of the public interest, we need to
 
look at the values to be sought and who will have a say in seeking them
 
Chapter V offers just such a look 
NOTES
 
See Chapter III, pp. 51-53 for explication of the use of the panel
 
responses as a gauge of attitude stability.
 
2In 1972 the coefficient of reproducibility was .93; in 1974 it was 
.94. Menzel's coefficient of stability was .67 in 1972 and .66 in 1974. 
3This finding is quite similar to that presented in the National
 
Science Board Study. See Appendix F, Section 4 for details.
 
4Nor, on a scale constructed by aggregating the individual problem 
areas, could any systematic differences be detected by cross tabulating
 
them with a host of demographic and political variables. A relationship
 
(r = .28) was found between perceptions of technology's utility and 
evaluation (summarized in Table 4-2) of presently available technologies.
 
CHAPTER V 
TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
The particular ways in which the consequences of technology's imple­
mentation are distributed most often result from political decisions
 
Generally, a range of options is available to decision makers, some of
 
which would spread the costs and benefits widely, others of which would 
narrow their dispersion A rapid transit system may speed suburbanites 
into downtown distrcts quickly and inexpensively but produce high levels 
of noise and congestion for inner city residents as trains roar through 
their neighborhoods. The same transit system can be built underground 
at greater expense so that such negative effects will be reduced. A
 
choice between values is always part and parcel of decisions about how a
 
technology is to be implemented This chapter will address two questions
 
first, what important values do people hold with respect to the implemen­
tation of technology ? Second, what groups do people perceive as legiti­
mately partLcLpating in decisions affecting those values, particularly
 
when one value conflicts with another?
 
SOCIAL VALUES AND TECHNOLOGICAL DECISIONS 
In both the 1972 and 1974 surveys, a series of questions was asked 
which probed the structure of values held by California citizens. Re­
spondents were asked to consider a number of social values--ranging from 
highly utilitarian to more humanistic and egalitarian concerns--and to 
indicate the importance they should be given in evaluating technology's
 
impact Nor surprisingly, there was no strong consensus on what values 
should be given priority. Yet a relatively high degree of support was
 
expressed for a wider range of priorities than simply the economic values 
of employment and taxes which are often the basis for decisions on tech­
nology-related public policy. These data are presented in Table 5-1. 
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TABLE 5-1 
IMPORTANT VALUES IN ASSESSING TECHNOLOGY 
(cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74) 
1972 1974 
Very Somewhat Slightly Not at all Very Somewhat Slightly Not atall 
Effect On Import. Import. Import Import. N Import. Import. Import. Import. N 
Employment 60.6%a 27.6% 8.6% 3.2% 934 59.5% 29.2% 9.5% 1.8% 302
 
51.5 34.9 9.2 4.3 298 
 53.9 31.0 12.2 2.9 121
 
The environ- 72.3 19.8 6.8 1.0 940 61.6 29.5 7.4 1.5 308
 
ment 72.4 20.2 6.6 
 0.8 299 64.7 25.8 8.7 0.7 121
 
Making life 47.0 39.3 12.2 
 1.4 944 46 7 37.9 13.3 2.1 308
 
more enjoy- 47.4 42.2 10.1 
 0.3 299 43.1 42.1 13.3 1.5 122
 
able
 
Taxes 56.3 31.0 
 9.4 3.3 934 53.0 28.9 13.5 4.6 297
 
52.7 30.3 12.3 4.7 297 47.8 38.0 
 13.0 1.3 117
 
Condition of 59.7 26.6 9.2 4.5 941 60.7 
 31.3 6.0 2.0 299
 
poor people 56.8 27.7 11.0 4.4 299 60.9 31.5 
 6.1 1.5 118
 
U.S. inter- 32.8 30.4 21.8 
 15.0 926 32.1 27.6 21.6 18.7 304

national 20.2 28.6 27.1 24.1 292 24.9 28.3 30.1 16.7 121
 
prestige
 
Leisure time 17.8 34.4 30.7 17.1 927
 
17.6 33.2 29.4 19.7 297 Not Asked
 
The individu- 66.3 23.6 6.6 3.5 299 
al's right to CN o t A s k e d 69.8 24.2 4.4 1.6 119
 
privacy
 
aTop figure for cross-section sample; lower figure for potential public.
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Perhaps the most significant finding from these data is that over 
half the respondents believed a multiplicity of values to be extremely
 
important criteria for evaluating the consequences of technical develop­
ment. Only two values which respondents were asked to rate failed to
 
strike a responsive chord in the public--in both years the importance of
 
the U.S international image (often used by policy makers as a rationale
 
for large scale projects) and in 1972 the importance of increasing leisure 
time. The wide ranging combination of public values complicates both the 
activities of technologists and the task of policy makers, for some values 
seem clearly to be in tension. 
In general, the structure of values in the potential public is simi­
lar to that present in the entire sample Some intriguing exceptions are
 
evident, however. In both 1972 and 1974, about 7% fewer of the potential
 
public considered the effect of technology on employment as "extremely 
important" in assessing technology Moreover, in 1974 the potential pub­
lic evinced less concern for the impact of technological implementation 
on tax rates than dad the entire cross section What accounts for these 
indications of greater economic sanguinity on the part of the potential
 
public is unclear. Indications of value preferences remained generally 
stable across time. The only exception here is the drop in the cross­
section sample's concern for the environment from 70% assessing it as
 
"extremely important" in 1972 to about 62% in 1974.
 
Because values are often somewhat contradictory, an individual may 
experience conflict when he must choose between them To explore this 
response, we asked respondents to rank the values, thus making trade-offs 
explicit. While it is methodologically impossible for us to measure pre­
cisely the intensity of respondents' commitment to the various values,
 
an approximate estimation can be made by examining the distributions of 
the responses. Data bearing on trade-offs made are presented in Table
 
5-2 (for 1972) and in Table 5-3 (for 1974).
 
According to the 1972 data the most highly valued condition was em­
ployment, followed very closely by environmental protection and by enjoy­
ment of life. Although relegated to fourth and fifth place, the beliefs 
that taxes ought to be reduced and that the poor ought not to be
 
TABLE 5-2 
VALUE TRADE-OFFS--1972 
(cross-section sample and potential public) 
Most Importance Moderate Importance Least Importance Standard' 
Effect On: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean Deviation N 
Employment 1 7.7%a 27.4% 19.9% 16.2% 11.5% 5.6% 1.8% 3.00 (1 )b 1.55 933
 
3.09 ( 3 )  16.0 27.3 17.8 18.7 13.1 5.2 2.0 1.55 299 
Environment 20.9 21.5 19.6 12.8 13.4 7.8 4.1 3.16(2) 1.74 931 
23.8 21.1 20.5 11.2 12.1 7.1 4.3 3.05(2) 1.76 299 
Making life 28.7 13.1 11.8 13.4 14.0 13.6 5.3 . 1.99 929 
7.7 1.83 295 more enjoy- 33.7 12.9 14.8 13.5 14.5 3.0 
able 
Taxes 13.3 13.8 18.0 20.4 17.2 13.0 4.4 3.71 ( ) 1.71 933 
13.4 11.0 15.0 22.1 15.8 17.3 5.5 3.905) 1.77 299
 
3.76 (5 )  
Poor 10.6 14.6 21.2 19.1 17.0 11.5 6.0 1 69 929
 
9.2 17.6 22.7 17.4 16.3 11.1 5.7 3.70 (4 ) 1.67 297
 
U.S. prestige 7.6 7.3 6.9 10.1 16.2 23.1 28.8 5.05 1.91 931
 
3.3 6.4 5.6 8 7 13.5 25.7 36.7 5.47(6) 1.71 298
 
Leisure time 1.4 2.8 2.8 8.1 10.7 25.1 49.2 5.96 (7 )  1.41 929
 
5.76 ( 7 )  1.1 4.1 3.9 8.8 14.8 25 2 42.1 1.47 296
 
aTop figure for cross-section samples; 
lower for potential public.
 
bFigure in parenthesis indicates relative priority rank of the particular value.
 
TABLE 5-3
 
VALUE TRADE-OFFS--1974
 
(cross-section sample and potential public)
 
Most Importance Moderate Importance Least Importance Standard 
Effect On: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean Deviation N 
a ,,(i)b 
a
Employment 15.4% 23.3% 18.1% 17.9% 18.1% 4.9% 2.3% 3.24 1.58 307 
3.46 (3 )  
12.6 17.0 17.7 24.1 23.5 3.8 1.4 1.49 120
 
Making life 30.3 14.5 8.9 13 8 10.6 13.1 8.6 3.34(2) 1.09 307 
3.22 (1 )  
more enjoy- 30.3 12.4 11.4 17.2 14.6 8.5 5.7 1.94 120
 
able
 
Privacy 15 8 16.2 15.8 16.8 10 8 14.0 10.4 3.74(3) 1.95 307
 
3.60 ( 4 )  17.6 19.2 15.0 14.8 9.5 14.5 9.3 1.97 121
 
3.85 (4 )  
Environment 14.0 16 4 15.7 12.5 18.6 11.8 11.0 1.93 308
 
3.31 (2 )  
20.2 20.5 18.3 12.1 10.8 14.2 4.0 1.85 121
 
Poor 10.7 12.0 22.0 17.6 17.0 13.8 6.4 3.85 (5) 1.72 308
 
8.0 13.6 22.0 18.7 16.4 13.3 8.1 3.94 1.71 121 
Taxes 7.3 13.2 12.7 15.5 15.2 25.3 10.7 4.37 1.82 306
0
(6) 18 
6.8 13.0 12.3 9.7 17.6 30.2 10.4 4.51 1.83 120
 
50.7 5.57( 1.92 307U.S. prestige 6.8 4.7 6.6 5.7 9.4 16.7 

4 8 4.5 3.5 3.2 7.5 15.4 61.0 5.95 1.75 120 
aTop figure for cross-section samples; lower for potential public.
 
bpigure in parenthesis indicates relative priority rank of the particular value.
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disadvantaged were still close to the three highest ranked values in
 
terms of mean scores. Concern for U.S. prestige and for leisure time
 
dragged a good deal behind in terms of mean scores The cross section
 
and the potential public agreed closely with each other on values, al­
though the potential public expressed more preference for an enjoyable
 
life than for high employment levels
 
The two most important values ranked in 1974 were employment and 
enjoyment of life. Behind them, in close approximation, were concerns 
for privacy, the environment, and the poor. Trailing a considerable way 
behind that second group were concerns over taxes and U.S. international 
prestige The potential public in both 1972 and 1974 mirrored the value
 
concerns of the cross-section sample quite well. Only one major depart­
ure was observed- whereas the cross section lost a great deal of its
 
formerly expressed enthusiasm for protecting the environment, that goal 
remained highly important to the potential public (See the analysis in 
Chapter VIII) 
How stable were these value priorities over time7 In order to 
answer that question, we had to control the data to eliminate the influ­
ence of the values of leisure time and privacy which were asked about in 
only one year. By assuming that the presence of an alternative given in 
only one year will not affect preferences among alternatives present
 
in both years, we can calculate what the ranking would be if the leisure
 
time and privacy values were excluded from our calculations These data
 
appear in Table 5-4 Although some moderate shifts in ordering occur, 
no substantively or even statistically significant changes are observed 
in the mean scores This evidence of stability is reinforced by thehigh 
percentage of 1974 responses matching, or within one opinion category of, 
the rankings made in 1972 
The choice of a ranking for a given value criteria may have no 
systematic effect on the ranking of any other one, or it may systemati­
cally indicate what the ranking of the second choice will be. The corre­
lation between two value rankings is the measure of how systematic those 
trade-offs may be considered to be The higher the correlation, the great­
er the systematic relationship between a score on one value and the score
 
TABLE 5-4 
THE STABILITY OF THE VALUE TRADE-OFFS 
EFFECT ON 
PANEL: 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONSES WITHIN ± 
ONE OPINION CATEGORY 
OF ORIGINAL RESPONSE '72 
MEAN 
CROSS-SECTION SAMPLE: 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
'74 '72 '74 '72 
N 
'74 
Employment 61.4%a 
64.8 
2.89(l)b 
2.97(2) 
2.79(1) 
2.95(3) 
1.30 
1.28 
1.19 
1.22 
929 
295 
305 
120 
Environment 58.1 
55.9 
3.03(2) 
2.94(1) 
3.37(4) 
2.87(2) 
1.51 
1.55 
1.52 
1.59 
928 
294 
308 
121 
Making life more 
en3oyable 
53.9 
62.8 
3.23(3) 
2.98(3) 
2.86(2) 
2.73(1) 
1.72 
1.62 
1.46 
1.65 
928 
295 
306 
120 
Taxes 63.0 
63.6 
3.56(4) 
4.01(5) 
3.78(5) 
3.87(5) 
1.45 
1.40 
1.30 
1.50 
929 
295 
306 
120 
Condition of 
poor people 
56.3 
56.9 
3.62(5) 
3.53(4) 
3.36(3) 
3.39(4) 
1.42 
1.43 
1.41 
1.51 
926 
294 
307 
121 
U.S. prestige 
abroad 
64.6 
71.5 
4.67(6) 
5.00(6) 
4.85(6) 
5.17(6) 
1.35 
1.12 
1.28 
1.45 
928 
295 
306 
120 
aTop figure for cross section; lower for potential public. 
bFigure in parenthesis indicates relative priority rank of the particular value. 
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on the other. Such correlation behaves somewhat differently from other 
correlations. A perfect negative correlation (r = -1.0) may exist, in 
which case a top score on one value would imply a bottom score for the 
other. A perfect positive relationship (r = 1 0), however, cannot exist 
because a top score for one value cannot imply a top score for another. 
Smaller positive correlations may exist whereby a high score on one value 
implies a high score on the other 
Not surprisingly, we found both systematic and non-systematic trade­
offs to be present in responses. The correlations are shown in Table 5-5. 
Many of the trade-off patterns are not particularly stable over time, 
and it is difficult to infer anything from them. Some general state­
ments, however, can be made First, no systematic trade-off exists be­
tween
 
(1) concern about the environment and concern about
 
the poor,
 
(2) concern about taxes and concern about U.S. 
prestige
 
(3) concern about employment and concern about U.S 
prestige
 
Second, a moderately systematic trade-off exists between
 
(1) concern about an enjoyable life and concern about 
i] pollution; ii] U S. prestige; iii] taxes, and 
iv] employment 
(2) concern about taxes and concern about the poor
 
The data indicate that in every instance but one a trade-off was in 
fact made. That is, the correlations between values, regardless of magni­
tude, are negative, except that holding in the 1972 data between taxes and 
employment For those values, a small poszttve relationship was observed
 
which remained positive and grew in size in 1974 Thus, for that case, 
a high ranking of the one value implies a high ranking for the other. 
In examining the relationship between these values and the demo­
graphic and attitudinal variables considered previously, the most sig­
nificant associations were found among the potential public. In general,
 
relationships existing in 1972 grew stronger in 1974 Moreover, some ad­
ditional associations which had not been present in 1972 appeared in 1974
 
TABLE 5-5
 
SYSTEMATIC TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN PREFERENCE FOR VARIOUS VALUES
 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public, 1972; 1974)
 
Enjoyment of 
EFFECT ON: Life Employment Taxes U.S. Prestige Environment Poor People 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 
Enjoyment - ­
of Life - -
Employment -.24 -. 24 ­
-.19 -.25 - -
Taxes -. 37 -.23 .08 .22 - ­
-. 37 -.19 .00 .36 - -
U.S. 	 -.20 -.21 -.14 -.05 -.04 -.12 -
Prestige -.08 -.21 -.11 -.03 -.02 -.07 - -
Environment -.20 -.18 -.19 -.27 -.19 -.29 -.26 -.19 ­
-.27 -.13 -.16 -.42 -.16 -.42 -.32 -.10 - -
Poor People -.16 -.32 -.11 -.12 -.25 -.18 -.28 -.12 -.04 -.05 ­
-.21 -.30 -.21 -.14 -.21 -.26 -.23 -.20 -.05 -.01 ­
b
Leisure Time .02 - -.27 -.15 -.20 - -.10 - -.11 ­
- -.27 - -.06 - -.09 ­
.06 - -.24 - -.25 
Right to - .00 - -.33 - -.30 - -.31 - -.06 - -.09 
Privacyc - -.05 - -.37 - -.33 - -.38 - -.00 - -.03 
*A negative correlation indicates that a high ranking of one value is associated with a low ranking
 
of the other value.
 
atop figures for cross section, lower for potential public.
 
bNot asked in 1974.
 
CNot asked in 1972. 
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Relationships between value rankings and generalized attitudes to­
ward science and technology appeared to have crystallized. For example, 
people who discounted the value of scientific activity and tended to be 
concerned about taxes did so to a greater degree in 1974 than in 1972 
(r = - 18 for 1972, r = -. 25 for 1974). Respondents who in 1972 ques­
tioned the outcomes of technology and were concerned with maintaining a 
clean environment were moreso in 1974 (r = 13 in 1972 and .20 in 1974) 
Similarly, the relationship between concern about a number of values and 
particular evaluations of present technologies grew over time. For in­
stance, the correlation between concern about the environment and the 
index of evaluations of present technology grew from - 19 in 1972 to
 
-. 24 in 1974. Concern about the U S international prestige and the 
evaluative index was correlated 16 in 1972 but rose to .26 in 1974
 
The relationship between some value rankings and evaluations of ape­
cifte technologies increased even more dramatically These data appear 
in Table 5-6.
 
TABLE 5-6
 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VALUE RANKINGS AND 
EVALUATIONS OF PARTICULAR PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES 
(Pearson's r; potential public, 1972; 1974)
 
EFFECT ON: AUTOMOBILES ATOMIC WEAPONS SPACE PROGRAM 
1972 1974 1972 1974 1972 1974 
Employment .18 .27 .24 .24 * * 
Environment -. 17 -. 25 -. 19 -. 30 * * 
U.S. Prestige * * * .32 * .25 
Not significant at p > .05. 
These correlations form a definite pattern which suggests that 
value priorities have increasingly become associated with 3udgments about 
technology Whereas in the past a person's value framework provided no 
information about such attitudes, it now seems apparent that those values 
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have become determinants of evaluation and opinion vis-a-vis technologi­
cal development. Cleavages have emerged in which opposition and support,
 
enthusiasm and disenchantment, are predicated on value concerns. Such
 
differences in the importance given social values have often developed
 
into political disagreements Can we find any evidence that such a
 
trend looms in this case?
 
We discovered that the same crystallization of relationships that
 
occurred between value rankings and attitudes toward technology also
 
took place between the value rankings and political ideology Conserva­
tives and liberals have come to disagree more over what values should be
 
given priority in the implementation of technology. While the increase
 
in associations may simply be due to sampling variability, the system­
atic increases in the correlations 	summarized in Table 5-7 would sug­
gest otherwise In short, we believe that over the period 1972-1974,
 
the previous consensus over what values were considered important broke
 
down Such an emerging discensus provides further evidence that atti­
tudes toward technology have taken 	on an increasing political coloration
 
over the last few years 
TABLE 5-7 
CORFELATIONS BETWEEN VALUE RANKINGS AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
(Pearson's r; potential public, 1972; 1974)
 
EFFECT ON: 	 POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
 
1972 1974
 
Employment 	 * -. 22 
Making life more enjoyable * -. 22 
Taxes 	 * * 
Environment 	 * .36 
U.S. Prestige 	 -.26 * 
*
 
Not significant at p < .05.
 
Ideology is scored "high" for liberal. 
104 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF DECISION MAKERS
 
IN TECHNOLOGY-POLICY PROCESSES
 
The values which the public holds can be incorporated into the 
implementation of technology, or they can be ignored A number of groups 
and institutions hold the power to choose which way to go How does the
 
public-at-large perceive this influence to be apportioned among decision 
makers, and how satisfied are they that the apportionment is legitimate? 
To probe these questions, respondents were asked which of eight actors
 
participating in decision making about technology actua Zy has the most
 
and which the least say--technical experts, business leaders, government 
officials (executive branch), Congressmen, the courts, organized consumer 
groups, and the individual himself (i e , the public-at-large), or no one 
Additionally, respondents were asked which of those groups ought to exert 
the most and which of them the least influence These questions probing 
perceptions of the degree and legz&timacy of decision makers' influence 
were asked in six specific contexts, described as follows to respondents
 
(1) Our demands for power such as electricity are growing so fast 
that we may not be able to produce as much of it as we want In deciding 
how this limited power is to be used . 
(2) Too great a use of automobiles may cause congestion in the
 
cities and increase pollution In terms of deciding how a public system
 
of mass transit which would reduce problems caused by cars would be put
 
into use
 
(3) Medical science has given us the ability to predict the sex,
 
some of the physical characteristics, and to alter the genes of infants 
before their birth In terms of deciding if such information is to be 
put to use. 
(4) Space stations manned by military personnel who can aim
 
rockets andmissiles at targets on earth can be designed. In deciding
 
whether they should be built.
 
(5) Large amounts of information about the characteristics of the 
public can be collected, stored and analyzed by computers. In deciding 
how this information should be used 
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(6) Rockets to take astronauts and scientists to other planets 
such as Mars can be designed. In deciding whether we should build 
those space ships.... 
From responses to those sets of questions, two indices were 
constructed- the first assigned a ranking for each actor on the 
basis of the perceived degree of his actual influence; the second, 
a ranking for each on the basis of opinions as to how mucf influ­
ence that actor ought to have. By substracting the first "score" 
from the second, it is possible to estimate the degree to which 
the respondent felt that those actors whom they saw as actually 
making the decisions were, in their opinion, entitled to do so
 
The degree to which respondents saw illegitimate exertion of influ­
ence in these decision processes can similarly be estimated.
 
The data presented in Table 5-8 provide estimates of how 
much power each decision maker is perceived actually to exercise 
in each of the six decision situations, the lower the numbers, the 
higher the perceived actual influence of the particular decision 
maker. In the areas of the military use of space and of the pro­
gramming of future manned interplanetary space travel, for example, 
executive branch officials are seen to be exercising maximum de­
cision making power. It is extremely provocative, from a politi­
cal point of view, that in none of the six policy areas is the
 
individual and/or the public-at-large believed to exert any sig­
nificant influence over decisions Table 5-9 presents estimates
 
of public perceptions of who ought to exercise power in technology­
centered decisions. Again, the lower the particular decision mak­
ing group's score, the more power the public believes it ought to 
have. Significantly, respondents' desires did not in this instance 
color their view of the world, no relation was generally found be­
tween the amount of power which they thought a group rightfully 
should hold and the amount which they saw it actually exerting
 
0 
TABLE 5-8 
ESTIMATES OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF DEGREE OF DECISION MAKING POWER
 
ACTUALLY EXERTED BY VARIOUS GROUPS
 
(mean scores; cross-section sample and potential public, 1972; 1974)
 
N~~~IDE C IS IO NS C ON C ERN ING.C. V 
Power Genetic Military Uses 
Rationing Mass Transit Engineering of Space Data Banks Space Travel 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 172 '74 
Technical 8.057 . 0 2 a 7.87 7.64 6.04 6.27 7.49 7.88 7.92 8.16 7.13 6.82Experts 7.03 8.35 7.18 8.11 5.60 6.31 7.45 7.70 7.89 8.20 6.75 6.91 
Business 7.68 7.01 7.64 7.86 
 9.62 9.96 9.03 9.03 7.91 7.72 8.88 8.87
 
Leaders 6.97 6.29 6.98 7.37 
 9.91 10.03 8.91 8.93 7.37 7.06 8.82 8.79
 
Executive 7.12 6.10 7.10 6.44 8.87 8.62 
 4.27 3.52 6.20 5.88 4.56 4.11
Branch Of­ficials 6.95 6.11 6.67 5.69 9.09 9.01 3.72 3.50 5.79 6.06 4.36 4.28 
Congressmen 8.70 8.61 8.47 8.36 9.06 9.23 8.08 
 8.17 8.65 8.99 8.06 8.29
 
8.62 8.68 8.50 8.08 9.17 9.15 7.82 7.91 8.12 8.99 6.72 7.91 
Courts 9.38 9.32 9.46 9.63 8.73 
 8.38 9.56 9.28 8.72 8.34 9.58, 9.48
 
9.37 9.56 9.77 9.95 8.65 8.30 9.72 9.27 8.71 8.12 9.98 9.67 
Consumer Groups 9.27 9.44 9.19 9.25 9.56 9.35 9.80 9.62 9.19 9.04 9.72 9.50 
9.75 9.33 9.51 
 9.30 9.78 9.50 10.31 9.95 9.84 9.11 9.72 9.58
 
Individual/ 12.77 13.69 11.84 13.10 10.42 10.88 13.36 14.34 13.35 14.49 13.32 
14.22 
Public 13.35 13.92 12.11 13 34 10.02 10.70 13.61 14.57 13.45 14.93 
13.33 14.21
 
aTop figures for cross section; lower for potential public. 
TABLE 5-9 
ESTIMATES OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF DEGREE OF DECISION MAKING POWER 
RIGHTFULLY EXERTED BY VARIOUS GROUPS 
(mean scores, cross-section sample and potential public, 1972; 1974) 
Power 
Rationing 
'72 '74 
IN DECISIONS 
Genetic 
Mass Transit Engineering 
'72 '74 '72 '74 
CONCERNING: 
Military Uses 
of Space 
'72 '74 
Data 
'72 
Banks 
'74 
Space 
'72 
Travel 
'74 
Technical 
Experts 
6.70 a 
6.58 
6.64 
6.85 
6.93 
6.31 
6.86 
6.79 
7.73 
7.48 
8.12 
10.04 
7.84 
7.75 
7.41 
7.90 
8.49 
8.54 
9.08 
8.99 
7.47 
7.21 
7.05 
6.56 
Business 
Leaders 
10.26 
10.50 
10.65 
10.89 
10.25 
10.62 
10.43 
10.88 
10.20 
10.55 
10.67 
12.45 
10.65 
11.11 
10.92 
10.87 
10.12 
10.45 
10.55 
11.19 
10.52 
10.70 
10.72 
11.63 
Executive 
Branch Of-
ficials 
9.12 
9.40 
9.63 
10.50 
9.29 
9.39 
9.31 
10.02 
10.41 
10.69 
11.16 
13.75 
7.92 
8.16 
7.98 
9.57 
9.93 
10.40 
11.04 
11.48 
8.32 
8.87 
8.70 
8.98 
Congressmen 8.18 
9.04 
9.19 
9.56 
9.16 
9.29 
9.17 
9.23 
9.38 
9.38 
9.30 
11.37 
8.55 
8.63 
8.14 
8.15 
8.95 
8.72 
9.03 
9.07 
8.82 
8.71 
8.55 
8.37 
Courts 10.03 
10.06 
9.44 
9.57 
10.19 
10.33 
9.98 
10.40 
9.44 
9.38 
9.01 
10.88 
9.72 
10.05 
9.38 
9.39 
8.92 
8.86 
8.26 
8.14 
9.80 
9.99 
9.70 
9.90 
Consumer Groups 8.87 
8.57 
8.14 
7.77 
8.92 
8.71 
9.02 
9.12 
9.35 
9.44 
9.07 
11.05 
9.60 
9.71 
9.63 
9.75 
8.96 
9.16 
9.04 
8.70 
9.45 
9.48 
9.51 
9.56 
Individual/ 
Public 
atop figures for 
6.58 
6.33 
cross 
7.09 6.18 
6.66 6.23 
section; lower 
6.48 
5.26 
figure 
5.30 4.59 6.84 7.25 
5.17 6.55 6.15 6.27 
for potential public. 
6.15 
5.67 
5.17 
5.34 
6.49 
6.33 
7.32 
6.98 C 
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We also sought to measure the disjuncture between perceptions of 
actual and of legitimate decision making power. As noted above, one way 
to do so would be simply to subtract the estimate of the decisionmaker's 
perceived power from the estimate of his perceived rightful influence 
However, because of the methodological problems associated with quanti­
fying such data, we elected to present the disjunctures by an alterna­
tive means Accordingly, we trichotomized the range of scores for both 
estimates of decision makers' perceived actual power (Table 5-8) and for
 
estimates of the perceived legitimacy of that power, i.e , of their 
"normative" influence (Table 5-9) a score of 0 00 to 7 99 on either 
range gave the decision maker a "high" ranking (he is perceived as exer­
cising considerable influence in decisions about technology, as entitled 
to exercise it, or as both); a score of 8.00 to 9 99 accorded him a 
"neutral" position (he is perceived as not exercising much influence, as 
not entitled to, or as both), finally, a score between 10.00 and 14 00 
assigns "low" ranking to the decision maker (he is believed to be with­
out influence, to be rightfully excluded from influence, or both) A 
typology constructed from those ordinal relationships serves to illus­
trate the instances of accord and of disjuncture between our sample's 
perceptions of actual and of normative decision making power Groups 
which fall along the main diagonal in Figure 5-1 (high-high, neutral­
neutral, low-low) were thought to be exercising roughly the appropriate 
amount of decision making power Groups lying an the three squares be­
low the main diagonal were believed to be exercising more power than 
they shouZd, conversely, those lying in the three squares above the main 
diagonal were felt by our respondents to be exercising less power thcr 
they ought to have, that is, to be illegitimately excluded from decision 
making about various issues related to technological development. 
Findings related to the public's view of the influence wielded by
 
the different decision makers varied somewhat from one technical area to
 
another, but several consistent patterns emerged
 
(1) Techntcal experts rated quite highly, they were seen 
as legitimately exercising a great deal of influence over de­
cisions in each of the technical areas
 
FIGURE 5-1
 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEIVED ACTUAL AND NORMATIVE INFLUENCE
 
IN TECHNOLOGY-RELATED DECISION MAKING
 
------------------------ACTUAL DECISION MAKING POWER- ----------------------------
Power Rationing Mass Transit Genetic Engineering
 
High Neutral Low High Neutral Low High Neutral Low
 
Techni- Public Tech Public Tech Public 
H cal 
experts 
0 16Execu- Congress m Exec Congress Congress 
4' tive Courts Consumer Courts 
branch Consumer Consumer 
Business Business Courts Business
 
leaders Exec.
 
0 
H 
Military Uses of Spaces Data Banks Space Travel
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W 
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o H H Tech.H 
z Exec. Congress Cd Exec Courts 
Courts 1-44J Courts 4ne Congress
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I _________ C~~onsumer Z___________ 
Business Business Business
 
0 0 Exec. 
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(2) Executive branch leaders drew considerably less sup­
port. Those interviewed perceived government leaders to be in­
volved in all six areas, but in only two, space travel and
 
military uses of space, was their presence seen as warranted
 
(3) Business leaders received little or no expression of 
confidence from our sample While they were perceived to be influ­
ence in four of the six areas, they were not welcomed in any of them 
(4) The public saw itself as the "actor" most entitled to be 
involved in all decision areas in question At the same time it 
saw itself as accorded least access to them, again in all areas. 
(5) Congress, the courts, and organized consumer groups 
were generally viewed as not playing any significant role, nor 
does the public desire them to. 
These data are consistent with a number of recent findings Cer­
tain Harris Poll results have shown that the public places "a great deal 
of confidence" in scientists and engineers; the NSF-sponsored study ind­
cates that a substantial minority feels that "the degree of control which 
society has over technology should be increased " And many polls show a 
significant increase in the public's distrust of all public and private 
institutions Apparently the institutions established to represent the
 
values which people want used as criteria in decisions to be made about
 
technology's use do not draw public confidence that they will do so. At
 
least thus far technical experts, scientists and engineers, havebeen able 
to maintain public confidence, even in the face of apparently substantial
 
mistrust of decision making processes related to policies governing tech­
nical development
 
That confidence seems a signal accomplishment for the scientific 
and technological communities It may rest on the public's perception 
of the technical expert's role as a man of knowledge, he is viewed as 
competent Likewise , people's distrust of business and government 
could be a reaction to what they perceive as the inability of these 
groups to get things done correctly, what they consider failure on the
 
part of business and politicians to meet public commitments they may
 
attribute simply to incompetence
 
III 
A complementary explanation can be found in noting the distinctions
 
that may be made between factuaZ and vaZuationaZ components of decision 
1 
making. The ability to render a competent decision requires factual 
knowledge A person's knowledge about a decision situation legitimizes 
his involvement in it; hence, the trusted stature of technical experts 
in the public's mind. But valuational elements also are an integral part 
of any decision process Political and business leaders claim the right 
to participate in decisions on technological issues by their advocacy of 
certain social values By so doing--by setting goals and establishing 
priorities--they are expected to reflect the public's value interests 
If they do not, they lose that right and their involvement in technologi­
cal decision making can then be seen as invalid Respondents in our
 
survey evinced just such a mistrust of business leaders and government
 
officials--open doubt that these decision makers were really represent­
ing the public's value preferences At the same time the public clearly
 
accorded itself legitimacy to participate in decisions on technological
 
matters, while feeling far removed from any access to that decision mak­
ing process.
 
As indicated on Tables 5-8 and 9 by the mean scores of responses 
from the two independent cross sections, these assessments of decision 
makers have remained remarkably stable over time However, two substan­
tiveZy significant changes did take place during the two-year interval 
between surveys First, the public saw technologists as losing authority 
in decision making with respect to rationing power in times of shortages (see 
Table 5-8). Given the nature of the "energy crisis" in early 1974 that 
shift is not at all surprising More unexpected was the growing feeling 
among the potential public in 1974 that none of the institutional de­
cision makers ought to be involved in the implementation of any genetic 
engineering scheme (see Table 5-9) Technicians, hitherto accorded re­
spect and confidence, suffered a drop from perceived legitimacy as de­
cision makers in this area to perceived illegitimacy, Congress and the 
courts dropped similarly in public esteem in this regard Clearly, the 
potential public has become increasingly sensitive to the implications
 
of genetic engineering for their personal lives They are saying, in no
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uncertain terms, that such decisions are theirs alone to make
 
To provide further information on the character of public attitudes 
toward decision making about technology, attitudinal, demographic, and 
political correlates of our measures of perceived legitimate decision 
making power held by business, government officials, and the public were 
examined The associations among the three indices remained stable over 
time. Those who saw the public as being illegitimately excluded from de­
cision making tended to regard business and government influence as ex­
cessive The correlations for the potential public were -.28 in 1972 
and - 23 in 1974 for the first relationship and -.54 and - 58 for the 
second 
The political correlates of the indices evident in 1972 dropped
 
sharply in 1974 Among the potential public, the significant differences
 
which had existed between liberals and conservatives and between Demo­
crats and Republicans in 1972 virtually disappeared by 1974 That at­
tenuation was paralleled by a reduction in the association between the
 
measures of perceived legitimacy in the decision making power exercised
 
by government officials and the public's evaluations of present technolo­
gies Tables 5-10 and 5-11 display those sets of correlations
 
TABLE 5-10 
CORRELATION BETWEEN PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF DECISION MAKING 
ROLES OF SELECTED ACTORS AND POLITICAL VARIABLES 
(Pearson's r; potential public, 1972; 1974)
 
LEGITIMATE DECISION MAKING ROLE OF:
 
Business Government Public/ 
Leaders Officials Individuals
 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74t 
Party * * -. 21 * .29 * 
Ideology - 28 * -. 30 * .27 * 
Party/ideology -.20 * -. 28 * .33 * 
Not significant at p < .05.
 
Democrat, liberal, and liberal-Democrat scored high.
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TABLE 5-11 
CORRELATION BETWEEN PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF DECISION MAKING ROLES
 
OF SELECTED ACTORS AND EVALUATIONS OF PRESENT TECHNOLOGIES
 
(Pearson's r; potential public, 1972; 1974)
 
LEGITIMATE DECISION MAKING ROLE OF:
 
Government Officials Public/Individuals 
'72 '74 '72 '74 
Appliances .31 * * * 
Automobiles .24 * -. 23 * 
Automated Factories .28 .20 -.25 * 
Atomic Weapons .28 .29 -.24 * 
Space Program .28 * -. 26 * 
Present Technology Index .38 .25 -. 32 * 
* 
Not significant at p < .05. 
Such findings stand in sharp contrast to the political and social 
cleavages which grew in size along other dimensions over this period 
The public's reaction to the Watergate scandals and the energy shortage 
may provide one possible explanation of that difference Those occur­
rences could have so massively eroded public confidence in the decision 
making institutions of the country that traditional political indicators 
no longer provide the dimension along which variation takes place It 
is uncertain, of course, whether the impact of those two events which 
took place in early 1974 will be a permanent one We may simply be 
measuring a transient phenomenon which will disappear in the short term. 
One final point needs to be made We were unable to discover any
 
demographic, attitudinal, or political correlates to our measure of le­
gitimate influence for technicians. That we could not may suggest that
 
the confidence accorded those experts pervades the entire public, no 
group appears to trust or distrust them significantly more than any
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other group does. 
The findings of this chapter can be summarized quite succinctly 
First, the public believes that a wide range of values ought to be ac­
corded weight in decision making with respect to the implementation of
 
technology. Those values and the trade-offs which they imply have re­
mained stable over the two years for which we have data. We found, how­
ever, emerging political cleavages separating liberal from conservative 
with respect to the importance accorded some of the values probed 
Second, the public expresses a great deal of dissatisfaction with the 
institutions which hold decision making power over the implementation of
 
technology While technical experts are held in high regard, public 
bodies such as executive branch offices, Congress, and the courts are 
either dismissed or distrusted The public perceives itself as a sig­
nificant actor whose role has been wrongfully ignored. Those attitudes, 
extant before the Watergate and energy "crisis," have remained strong in 
their aftermath 
This concludes the foundations of the study We now turn to the
 
future and to public attitudes toward technologies which are yet to be
 
implemented. In the next part of this report we shall see how the
 
attitudes considered in this part inform evaluations of those advanced
 
technological systems
 
1Herbert Simon, Adnunastratlve Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1957), 
45-60. 
PART THREE 
PATTERNS OF PUBLIC RESPONSE TO FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
An individual's judgments about future-oriented technologies 
are undoubtedly influenced by his attitudes toward science and tech­
nology in general and by his attitudes toward particular current 
technologies and the conditions apparently affected by them Col­
lectively, these judgments are important because a good deal of the 
stimulus for technological development in the future is likely to 
come from the federal government in effect, "the people" will be 
asked through their representatives to support a wade variety of 
technical innovations Citizen perceptions of and support for such 
ventures are part of the political milieu within which decisions 
will be made to commit public funds for implementing new technical 
capacities 
Chapter VI reports the public's respective estimates of the
 
potential impact of twelve technological developments which could
 
become increasingly consequential in the near future and the over­
all pattern of implied public support for them
 
Chapter VII presents a provisional model predicting public
 
responses to new technological development, it discusses the vari­
ous social correlates of support or opposition, and takes special
 
notice of the anomaly apparent in responses to space technology
 
Attitudes toward the energy technologies and the recent "energy 
crisis" of 1973-74 are taken up in Chapter VIII 
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CHAPTER VI
 
SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES
 
Shifting our attention from attitudes toward past and present ex­
perience to attitudes about future experience raises the interesting
 
question of the future as an object of subjective judgment Individuals
 
confront a high degree of uncertainty when they consider what iZZ happen 
and what meaning unfolding events hold in store for them Unlike past
 
events, future ones do not have the property of having been experienced,
 
so anyone asked to treat them as objects of personal sentiment becomes
 
engaged in a much more ambiguous cognitive operation The more familiar
 
grounds for attitude formation--direct encounter with events or vicarious
 
witnessing of them--cannot be invoked as they are for the evaluations
 
people impose on experience on, for example, the performance of the
 
President, the consequences of a particular public works project or in­
dustrial development, the aftermath of a military action, a municipal
 
election, or a family decision Attitudes about such events are focused
 
on their consequences By contrast, future actions have not yet trig­
gered any consequences, so, judgments about projected public worksprojects, 
about the success or failure of newly elected officials or of newly an­
nounced public policies can be based only on estimates of probable conse­
quences, of outcomes yet to hcppen. Accordingly, the reasoning underly­
ing those portions of the two surveys which deal with future technologi­
cal development had to take into account both cognitive/phenomenological 
problems inherent in people's feelings about the future as well as the 
more specific problems associated with future technology as an object of 
those feelings 
PROJECTED TECHNOLOGIES AND QUESTION STRATEGY
 
In neither survey were we interested in determining the adequacy
 
of our samples' knowledge about technological matters Rather, we wished 
to determine whether, whatever their level of information or ignorance, 
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people would make systematic distinctions and assert preferences with re­
gard to future technical development Specifically, would our samples
 
display systematic preferences for particular future technologies, prefer­
ences based on distinctions they have made in terms of those technologies' 
probable consequences? If, as past studies in the public opinion litera­
ture have intimated, the public-at-large is not able to deal very well 
with complex matters, it would not be very useful for their collective
 
opinion on technology to be taken seriously into account any pattern
 
we might discern would be a weak one, reflecting nearly random responses, 
subject to fickle change, from people not certain enough of their own 
minds to make systematic judgments about technology's future effects.
 
If, however, we should find that opinions about future technological de­
velopments are systematically distributed across a population and are
 
fairly stable over time as well, it would be hazardous for policy makers
 
to proceed as if public opinion on the future of technology were disorgan­
ized and incoherent How seriously such collective expression of opinion
 
should be taken, then, would depend on its substantive character Any
 
examination of the substantive character of public attitudes toward future 
technologies must of course take into consideration the particular tech­
nologies which people have been asked to consider and the type of ques­
tions asked about them
 
Technologies of interest In selecting the specific technologies
 
about which questions were to be asked, we sought a set which had proper­
ties which would be "representative" of technologies of political inter­
est. The twelve technologies listed in Figure 6-1 are likely, first,
 
to pose problems of public policy Second, they vary in the degree to 
which the public sector would be likely to be involved in their promotion 
or production The government itself may be the main sponsor and pro­
ducer of a technical development, particularly a large scale one, and 
even where a development is financed entirely by private interests, the 
government at the very least may be involved in its regulation Finally,
 
since people use analogous experience as a basis for forming opinions, 
the technologies chosen accordingly offer a range extending from more or 
less familiar operations to potential capacities quite remote in concept
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FIGURE 6-1
 
TWELVE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITIES 
TRANSPORT 
1. High speed trains or monorails covering metropolitan areas to trans­
port large numbers of people quickly from one part of the area to an­
other. (Urban Rails)
 
2. Passenger airplanes that travel at high speeds and which can also
 
land and take off in very short spaces so that they can transport people 
closer to the places they want to go. (STOL)
 
ENERGY
 
3 Power plants that use atomic energy to produce electricity. (Nuclear 
Power) 
4. Power produced from satellites orbiting the earth which collect 
energy from the Sun and send it back to Earth where it is converted into
 
electrical power. (Solar Energy)
 
BIOMEDICINE
 
5 Surgical procedures to transplant different body organs from one
 
human being to another so that people's diseased or injured organs could 
be replaced. (Organ Transplants)
 
6. Altering people's inherited genes to change certain of their charac­
teristics which they will pass on to their children so that the mental
 
and physical capabilities of future generations can be improved 
(Genetic Engineering)
 
7 Altering brain responses with special drugs so that the behavior of
 
people who have mental disorders can be improved or controlled. (Brain
 
Drugs)
 
INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION
 
S. An expanded number of television channels carried into the home by
 
cable so that in addition to regular TV shows from networks, more pro­
grams for special interest groups could be made available. (Cable TV) 
9. Storing large masses of information about the characteristics and 
behavior of the public on computers so that government and business ad­
ministrators can quickly get up-to-date, factual information on which 
to base their decisions. (Data Banks) 
NATIONAL DEFENSE
 
10. Missiles which can intercept and destroy enemy rockets launched 
against this country before they get near enough to cause serious 
damage. (AM) NATIONAL PRESTIGE 
11. Large passenger airplanes travelling at very high speeds (several 
times the speed of sound) to transport people across the country or to 
other parts of the world in a few hours. (SST; also Transport)
 
12. Space ships which can take people to other planets in the Solar 
System, such as Mars or Venus. (Space Travel)
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The selection criteria for the technologies to be studied en­
sured a representative mix of future-oriented technologies, with­
out necessarily implying social properties which would systemati­
cally affect the character of public attitudes about them The
 
twelve technologies are listed according to functional type
 
transport, energy, biomedical innovation, information/communica­
tions, national defense, and developments calculated, among things,
 
to enhance national prestige The language used in Figure 6-1 to
 
describe the twelve technologies is the same as was used to de­
scribe them to the respondents in our survey. We had to be very
 
careful to delineate them in a way that made sense to those asked
 
to answer questions about them We reasoned that the social mean­
ing of a technology inheres not in its machinery or system as such,

1 
but in the functional capacity it makes available to people The
 
related survey questions, therefore, focus directly on that capaci­
ty on what the technology is designed to do The significance
 
of an urban rail transit system, for example, is not its automated
 
trains, but the fact that it can transport large numbers of people
 
rapidly from one part of a metropolitan area to another. Similar­
ly, the significance of a nuclear generating plant is that it can
 
produce electricity to be used by people and industry Each of
 
the twelve specific technological potentials, then, was described,
 
to both 1972 and 1974 respondents, in terms of its promised func­
tional capacity. Implicit in each description are consequences of
 
implementing the technology which might be a matter of policy inter­
est.
 
Our estimations of how the twelve technologies fit the other
 
two criteria guiding selection--the proportion of public to private
 
sources behind the particular technical innovation, and its rela­
tive familiarity or remoteness--is presented in Figure 6-2 2
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FIGURE 6-2 
DEGREES OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT AND OF 
FAMILIARITY OF TWELVE TECHNOLOGIES 
DEGREE OF FAMILIARITY 
Familiar Unfamiliar Exotic 
Private Cable TV STOL Brain Drugs 
PData Banks Nuclear Energy Genetic Eng.PUBLIC/PRIVATE MieST 
SPONSORSHIP 
Organ Transplant
 
Public Urban Rail- ABM Solar Energy 
Space Travel
 
Question formats Several types of interview questions were used to
 
probe various aspects of the publics attitudes toward future technologi­
cal development. Here we believed that an individual's sense of certain­
ty--or, if you will, the subjective probabttity of future consequences-­
was important in determining his preferences or objections to the tech­
nology Thus, for each potential technical development listed in Figure
 
6-1, questions were asked concerning the degree to which the respondent
 
was certain about its potential consequences--first its beneficial ef­
fects; then its harmful ones Also, we reasoned that when people are
 
questioned about their support or opposition to a projected technology,
 
their responses would be linked to their perceptions of whether or not
 
that technology would affect their own lives or those of people around
 
them. Therefore, respondents were first asked to indicate the degree of
 
change they thought would occur in their own lives if each of the future
 
technologies were implemented Then they were asked to estimate the de­
gree of change "most people" would experience. Finally, each respondent
 
was asked about the degree to which he/she would support or oppose the
 
3 
development of various technologies This "support" variable became a
 
major dependent variable in our analysis of survey results, the "certain­
ty" and "impact" factors noted above were treated mainly as independent 
variables--antecedent conditions to degrees of support or opposition 
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These variables make up five of six elements in a "causal model" of pre­
dicted support/opposition, to be elaborated and discussed in the next
 
chapter
 
VARIATIONS IN RESPONSE- AN OVERVIEW
 
Even at the first stages of analysis, using measures of central
 
tendency, the data concerning attitudes voiced toward future-oriented
 
technologies quickly reveal a partial answer to questions about the pub­
lic's willingness to make estimates of the impact of particular technolo­
gies upon experience--both individual and general Had our samples been
 
confused or very uncertain about these technologies, their responses would
 
be nearly random, with little systematic variation overall or among par­
ticular component social groups This was not the case, clear patterns
 
emerged, as can be seen in the data arrayed in Table 6-1, which ranks the
 
twelve technologies in terms of mean levels of support indicated by 1972
 
sample, that is, in descending order, from the technology most favorably
 
drawing the most opposition 4 received to the one 

Patterns of support Considerable variation is evident in the de­
gree to which the total samples, both in 1972 and in 1974, and the re­
spective potential publics within them supported some technologies, such 
as urban rail transit and solar energy, and opposed others, such as ge­
netic engineering and large data banks Responses for the cross-section 
varied 49 5% within the six point maximum range, with responses from the 
potential publics showing more variation (over 60%) than responses from 
the whole samples And, as we have come to expect from data already pre­
sented in earlier chapters, these attitudes remained remarkably stable 
over the two years bracketed by the surveys Both the relative magni­
tudes of support and opposition as well as the relative standings of the 
technologies remained more or less intact, although some apparent drift 
toward less overall support for the technologies is evident (In the 
eight instances of significantly different means reported between the 
two sets in Table 6-1, for 1972 and 1974 only two showed significantly 
tncreased support--the 1974 potential public's enthusiasm for space 
5 )travel technology and for solar energy. 
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TABLE 6-1 
PATTERNS OF EVALUATION AND PERCEIVED IMPACT OF 
FUTURE-ORIENTED TECHNOLOGIES 
(mean scores; cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74) 
IMPACT ONb
 
EVALUATIONa Self Others
 
TECHNOLOGY '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 
Urban rails 1.83 ** 1.60 3.10 2.77 4.09 3.87 
2.12± 1.43 3.26 3.02t 4.20t 3.99 
Solar energy 1.42 , 1.50 2.97 3.47 3.67 3.82 
1.50 1.95 3.03 3.69 3.62 3.85 
Organ 1.35 1.35 2.74 2.79 3.89 3.95 
transplants 1.13 1 34 2.55 2.96 3.45t 3.83
 
* 
Nuclear 1.23 1.37 3.16 3.38 3.51 3.83
 
energy 1.94t 1.36 3.40t 3.58 3.71t 3.84
 
Cable TV .99 .76 2.76 2.74 3.33 3.51
 
1.06 .87 2.82 2.79 3.26 3.54 
STOL .88 .87 2.51 2.60 3.58 3.68
 
.86 .76 2.68t 2.72 3.49 3.64
 
ABM .87 .67 2.94 2.87 3.31 3.34
 
.26± -.09± 2.66t 2.75 3.05t 3.14±
 
SST .50 .17 2.20 2.62 3.58 3.57 
.12t .14 2.39t 2.66 3.26 3.22 
Brain drugs .30 ** -.23 1.97 1.87 3.23 3.27 
16 -.61 2.14 1.72 3.24 3.13 
* 
Space travel -.25 , -.16 2.07 2.11 2.87 3 02
 
-.19 .69P 2.15 2.39t 2.85 3.05
 
Genetic -.70 -1.08 2 04 2.18 3.34 3.69
 
engineering -.96 -1.65t 2.08 2.07 3.62t 4.02t
 
Data banks -.79* -1 38 2.92 3.14 3.07 3.95
 
-1.12± -1.46 3.03 3.15 3.66 3.80
 
aRange from +3 to -3, a +3 indicating maximum support; top figures for
 
cross-section sample; lower for potential publics. 
bRange from 5 to 1, with a 5 indicating maximum impact; top figures for 
cross-section sample, lower for potential publics. 
*
 
Difference between means for '72 and '74 significant, p < .05.
 
**
 
Difference between means for ' 72 and '74 significant, p < . 01.
 
±Difference between potential public and sample minus the potential 
public: significant, p < .05. 
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A more detailed discussion of the social and political correlates 
to support for or opposition to future technologies occupies a good deal 
of the following chapter. For now suffice it to say that public opinion 
concerning a number of rather complicated technological capacities appears 
to be consistent and markedly discriminating This finding is an initial 
indication that we are likely to find rather more refined public attitudes 
toward these matters than past studies of the public's reactions to pub­
lic policy issues might lead us to expect 
Estimates of impact The familiar'pattern of stability between 1972 
and 1974 holds for the data concerning estimates made by our respondents
 
concerning the likely impact of these technologies on their lives Only 
a few instances of significantly different means are discernible How­
ever, the spread of variation noted between the extremes of support for 
or opposition to these technologies was not repeated in respondents' 
estimates of the tmpaet of the various technologies on their personal 
lives or the lives of most people While some variation in these esti­
mates of impact does occur, it is much less than was found in judgments
 
6
 
supporting or opposing various technologies.
Several other interesting findings are evident For one thing, 
people seem to view technology as less specific to their own experience 
than to the experience of others in society each of the tweZve tech­
noZogies was believed more likely to change the lives of "other people" 
than the respondent's own life Also, various differences between mean 
estimates show that certain technologies were seen as more likely than 
the rest to effect changes which the respondent himself would experience 
nearly as much as "others" would Table 6-2 summarizes these differences, 
both for the total samples and their respective potential publics. The 
smaller the differences in means, the more the degree of change foreseen 
for "others" experience accorded with that foreseen for the respondent 
himself, that is, the more generalized the perceived impact of the tech­
nology. 
As shown in Table 6-2, then, the potential impact of nuclear gener­
ation of power was perceived as the most "generalized " Overall, re­
spondents believed that the impact of this technology on others' lives 
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TABLE 6-2
 
COMPARISON OF IMPACT ON OTHERS; ON SELF
 
(mean differences; cross-section samples and potential publics, '72; '74)
 
Mean Difference
 
TECHNOLOGY '72 '74 
Urban rail .9 9a 1.10
 
.94 .97
 
Solar energy .70 .35
 
.59 .16
 
Organ transplants 1.15 1.16 
.90 .87
 
Nuclear energy .35 .45 
.31 .26 
Cable TV .57 .77 
.44 .75
 
STOL 1.07 1.08 
.81 .92 
ABM 
.37 .47 
.39 .39
 
SST 1.38 .95
 
.87 .58
 
Brain drugs 1.26 1.40
 
1.10 1.41 
Space travel .80 .91 
.70 .66 
Genetic engineering 1.30 1.51
 
1.51 1.95 
Data banks .15 .81 
.63 .65 
Mean estimates of impact on Self subtracted from mean estimate of impact 
on Others.
 
aTop figures for cross-section sample; lower for potential publics.
 
would match most closely the impact on their own. The mean differences 
in perceived impact derived from responses by the cross-section samples 
in both surveys were quite small-- 35 for 1972 and .45 for 1974 Genetic
 
engineering, on the other hand, although seen as having a marked potential
 
impact on the lives of "most people," was perceived to have only weak
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potential effects on the respondents' "personal" experiences. Mean dif­
ferences were high 1.30 and 1 51 for the 1972 and 1974 samples respec­
tively. Thus people differ in the degree to which they see themselves 
or only "other people" as potentially subject to the effects of certain
 
technologies. Configured schematically (Figure 6-3) data reflect con­
siderable variation in judgments about such impact potential among the
 
twelve technologies
 
FIGURE 6-3
 
ESTIMATED IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGIES UPON INDIVIDUAL AND OTHERS, 
WITH INDICATIONS PF OVERALL SUPPORT 
DEGREE IMPACT SHARED WITH OTHERS 
Strong Moderate Weak 
Nuclear power (+) Urban rail (+) 
Solar energy (4) 
So ABM (0) 
Data banks (-) 
Cable TV (0) aTransplants (+) 
Moderate STOL (0) 
SST a (0) 
a
Space travel (0) Genetic eng. (-) 
Weak IBrain 
 drugs (-) 
aFor these technologies the potential public's response shifted to the 
next higher degree of shared experience in 1974. 
+,0,- indicate most favored to most opposed categories on Table 6-1. 
The pattern suggested by Figure 6-3 is a rough correspondence between the 
degree to which respondents support the technology and the degree to which 
they perceive its potential impact as affecting both themselves personally 
and most other people It is notable that those technologies most fre­
quently judged as having the strongest potential for altering the personal 
life of the respondent himself include one--solar energy derived from
 
orbiting satellites--which, while one of the most technically exotic,
 
nevertheless drew strong public support Concerns over energy resources
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may have been sufficient even in 1972 to mitigate potential public disaf­
fection stemming from confusion over the technology's somewhat improbable 
qualities Another technology also judged to have strong effects on both
 
the respondent and on others was the most hostilely received Publicity
 
about the widespread use of data banks apparently had been such as to
 
influence respondents to view the effects of this technology as likely to 
have significant harmful consequences In any event, there is reasonable 
agreement within our sample on the intensity of the likely impacts of the 
respective technologies Estimates by the potential publics differed in 
only three instances from those of the whole sample--for organ transplants, 
the SST and space travel. That group estimated the impacts of these tech­
nologies to hold somewhat more personal consequences in store for them
 
than did the whole samples, who tended rather to foresee little effects 
upon themselves.
 
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND SUPPORT/OPPOSITION
 
FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES
 
By virtue of direct experience with analogous technologies and ex­
posure to information in the media, individuals develop either a sense that a 
new technology is likely to produce attractive conditions or a sense that it 
is likely to produce quite unwanted conditions Positing the implementation 
of a given technology, the survey questionnaire asked respondents to esti­
mate the likelihood, first, that beneficial consequences would result, 
then, that harmful consequences would result 7 Answers to these questions 
indicate the "subjective probabilities" our respondents assigned to bene­
ficial or harmful outcomes of various technological developments. Table
 
6-3 orders the resulting data first in terms of the ratio of the number 
of respondents "absolutely sure" and "quite sure" that benefits would 
result to the number of respondents equally certain of harmful results 
The second array is the ratio of mean certainty of benefit to mean cer­
tainty of harm The two measures are not exactly similar, and, when
 
taken together, add somewhat to the total sum of information about the 
"certainty" relationship The helpful to harmful ratio (H H) is based 
on a dichotomous division of the data, whereas the means ratio takes 
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TABLE 6-3
 
CERTAINTIES OF BENEFICIAL AND HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES*
 
(cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74)
 
RATIOS OFa MEAN CERTAINT h 
Helpful: Harmful Harm:Help 
TECHNOLOGY '72 '74 '72 ' 74 
Urban rail 5.66c 3.77 1.67 1.45 
7.18 3.62 1.81 1.48
 
Solar energy 6.12 6.61 1.54 1.66
 
7.25 7.00 1.55 1.99
 
Organ transplants 2.87 2.71 1.25 1.40 
2.56 2.33 1.23 1.20
 
Nuclear energy 2.69 2.83 1.35 1.35
 
2.04 2.05 1.37 1.28
 
Cable TV 3.15 2.55 1.33 1.29
 
2.36 2.15 1.34 1.24
 
STOL 2.26 2.44 1.05 1.04 
2.24 1.83 1.27 1.16
 
ABM 1.87 1.79 1.20 1.10 
1.17 .96 1.07 1.11
 
SST 1.83 1.51 1.14 1.09
 
1.19 1.13 1.02 1.02
 
Brain drugs 1.16 .84 1.01 .93 
1.12 .73 1.00 .87
 
Space travel .97 1.72 .95 1.07
 
1.28 3.25 1.01 1.26
 
Genetic engineering .71 .40 .88 .80
 
.49 .24 .83 .72
 
Data banks .55 .35 .82 .69
 
.37 .21 .72 .62
 
*Table 2.2 in Appendix D lists correlation coefficients for relation be­
tween certainty of benefit and certainty of harm 
asee Table 6-4 below for the percentages of the various samples who
 
indicated uncertainty for both helpful and harmful results.
 
bRato here is calculated Harmful divided by Helpful so magnitude of
 
nunbers will have same meaning, i.e., descending order indicates less 
support, as ratio of Helpful:Harmful. 
CTop figures for total samples, lower for respective potential publics. 
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into account varied degrees of certainty expressed by respondents Thus,
 
the H H ratio gives a rough indication of how our respondents would sum­
marize their judgments if they were to "vote" on the basis of their sub­
jective estimates of the probability of harmful or beneficial results.
 
The mean ratio of certainty, on the other hand, gives an indication of
 
the degree of aggregate certainty of beneficial compared to certainty of 
harmful results. 
Inspection of the data in Table 6-3 adds weight to other indica­
tions that the public-at-large and the potential publics have an unex­
pected propensity to express varied and systematically discriminating re­
sponses to these technologies There is quite a wide range in both the
 
degree of mean certainty they expressed about the likelihood to benefit
 
compared to harm and in the overall ratios of certainty to helpful to
 
harmful outcomes For example, a much higher proportion of respondents
 
perceived urban rail transit and solar energy produced by space satellite
 
to have certainly beneficial consequences than perceived them to be harm­
ful. In 1972, even before the public-at-large had experienced fuel short­
ages, the margin of those "absolutely sure" or "quite sure" of beneficial 
results over those equally sure of harmful results was 6 to 1 for the 
whole sample and 7 to 1 for the potential public Compared to the others 
in terms of the mean degrees of certainty expressed in 1972, future bene­
fits attributed to solar energy were seen as somewhat less certain than
 
benefits from urban rail transit. Then, in 1974, the positions of solar
 
energy and urban rails were reversed, with a clear increase in ratios of 
benefit expected by both the whole sample and the potential public for 
solar energy Even so, urban rails maintained its top spot in overall
 
support among the twelve technologies
 
At the other extreme, believed to be much more certainly harmful
 
than helpful, genetic engineering techniques and storage of personal
 
information in large data banks drew greatest opposition. About twice
 
as many people believed these technologies would be certainly harmful as
 
felt they would be helpful; and the mean certainty ratios indicate that
 
our samples were as certain of harm coming from these technologies as
 
they were certain of benefit coming from organ transplants and nuclear
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energy, two of the four most enthusiastically received technologies It 
is consistent that the patterns of certainty of benefit compared to harm 
followed almost precisely the order of overall public support for the 
various technologies even when it differed slightly between years. This 
parallel suggests that the logical association between an individual's 
subjective perception of the probability of a technology's benefit or 
harm and his or her support for or opposition to it holds fairly strong­
ly throughout. We shall return shortly in Chapter VII to the relation­
ship between support and estimate of benefit 
Attention to another aspect of "subjective probability" deepens 
its meaning. As is to be expected, we also find a wide range in the per­
centages of respondents who felt uncertain about both the likely benefit
 
and the likely harm to result from various technologies Table 6-4 sum­
marizes this dual uncertainty by order of magnitude. It ranged from a
 
low of about 12% in 1972 for urban rail transit to a high of over 40% in 
1974 for the "far out" results of space travel and of behavior altering 
drugs (brain drugs in our shorthand) Such a wide range suggests con­
siderable variation in the degree to which people felt themselves ade­
quately enough informed about some technologies to, hazard an estimate of 
their likely benefit or harm It should be noted, however, that many of 
the people who expressed this dual uncertainty about particular technolo­
gies nevertheless voiced support for or opposition to the same ones. We 
shall return to this point later. For now, simply note that both cross­
section samples of California's population and the two potential publics 
for technological politics within them expressed systematically varied 
opinions about substantively complex matters. It now remains for us to 
explore the degree of stability and change across the two years separat­
ing the surveys and between the larger samples and the lesser potentially 
more politically active publics within them
 
Stability and change in perceptions of future technologies Analy­
sis reported in earlier chapters has led us to expect considerable ds-
Versity in the public's responses to various technologies, it also mndL­
cates that these varied attitudes are likely to be continuous, to show
 
a "stable" pattern over time The data in Table 6-3 shows that, for
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TABLE 6-4 
PERCENTAGES INDICATING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT 
BENEFICIAL AND HARMFUL RESULTS OF FUTURE-ORIENTED 
(cross-section sample and potential public, 
TECHNOLOGIES * '72 
Urban rail (+) 1 1 .8 %a 
11.4 

ABM (0) 22.7 

12.9 

Nuclear energy (+) 24.5 
9.4 

Solar energy (+) 24 9 

15.5 

Organ transplants (+) 25.8 
28.6 

Cable TV (0) 26.5 

17.6 

STOL (0) 26.4 

18.5 

SST (0) 26.5 

27.6 

Data banks (-) 26.8 

19.2 

Brain drugs (-) 32.6 

28.9 

Genetic engineering (-) 36.1 

29.4 

Space travel (-) 36.9 

38.8 

BOTH 
TECHNOLOGIES 
'72; '74) 
'74
 
24.8% 
25.0
 
26.5
 
25.3
 
22.2
 
19.6
 
24.4
 
18.5
 
24.3
 
33.8
 
31.4
 
25.9
 
25.6
 
24.3
 
31.5
 
23.9
 
20.1
 
16.2
 
43.7
 
47.0
 
33.8
 
26.5
 
45.7
 
34.3
 
C+, 0, -) indicate top, middle, and lower thirds in ranked 
preferences in 1972. 
a Top line data for whole cross-sections, lower line for poten­
tial publics. 
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most of the twelve technologies, the 1972 and 1974 Helpful Harmful certain­
ty ratios are remarkably similar, as are both mean certainty ratios Evi­
dence of stability is also found in the responses of the panel of people
 
who were interviewed a second time About 90% of the responses they made
 
in 1974 to questions regarding their certainty of the technologies' bene­
ficial results remained the same or changed by only one "opinion category"
 
from their response in 1972, about 87% to questions regarding their cer­
tainty of harmful results Similarly, in comparing the percentages of
 
respondents in the two cross-section samples, reported in Table 6-4, who
 
expressed dual uncertainty about both beneficial and harmful results, we
 
find a high degree of stability from 1972 to 1974 In only a few in­
stances were the differences 10% or more In effect, the public has ex­
pressed attitudes which are neither ephemeral nor chaotic, and they show
 
considerable continuity But there is also some change within this conti­
nuity, change suggestive of a new-found awareness of technical develop­
ments and new information about their consequences
 
The most noticeable change in the pattern of support or opposition 
and certainty of helpful or harmful results is the overall softening of 
support, especially by the potential public, for most of the technologies
 
and the decreased certainty of their beneficial character Of the four 
technologies drawing the most support in 1972 (see Table 6-1)--urban rail 
transit, solar energy, organ transplants, and the nuclear generation of 
energy--urban rail transit fared least well in maintaining its high level 
of public esteem (though it still led the list), while support for the 
others and perceived certainty of their benefits (see Table 6-3) remained 
constant or increased a bit The greatest losses of support and decreases 
in certainty of benefit attached to three of the four technologies which 
had initially evoked the most opposition, the use of brain drugs, genetic 
engineering techniques, and large data banks all drew sharply increased 
opposition and increased public certainty of their harm These changes, 
we repeat, are more evident within the potential public, and they seem 
to signal a deepening fear of these technologies by the very people most 
likely to become involved in technological politics.
9
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Counter to the overall trend, the potential public in 1974 was sig­
nificantly more supportive to development of interplanetary space travel
 
than it had been in 1972 A substantial jump in the perceived certainty
 
of this technology's benefit also occurred, along with less dual uncer­
tainty about its effect It was almost as if the potential public was
 
saying, in view of decreased governmental support of the ABM and the SST,
 
that if the public sector is going to underwrite aerospace technology,
 
let it be the very scientifically advanced developments in manned space
 
flight. This recent upsurge of support for interplanetary travel, which
 
runs counter to findings from the 1972 data was still not shared, however,
 
by the broader cross-section of opinion in 1974. Findings related to
 
space technology will be discussed more fully in Chapter VII.
 
Both the overall rankings of public preferences for the twelve
 
technologies evidenced in 1972 and in 1974 and the relatively subtle
 
changes recorded by the second survey argue that much of the discussion
 
carried on in the media concerning the beneficial or harmful effects of
 
these technologies has been picked up by both the larger audience and by
 
the potential public. The technologies which our surveys show as enjoy­
ing a high level of public support--urban transit, solar and nuclear
 
energy generation, and organ transplants--have been the objects of con­
siderable expert attention as credible solutions to social problems of
 
growing proportions Such attention has been particularly focused on 
the energy technologies and on the need for changing public policies to 
ensure adequate national energy supplies Likewise, those technologies
 
which evoked the most negative public reaction are those which have
 
aroused controversies in Congress and among both scientific elites and
 
various public interest groups--the SST, the use of behavior altering
 
drugs, genetic engineering and large data banks Such reactions strong­
ly imply that people are receptive to information about controversial
 
technology-related issues and more able than many leaders suppose to
 
absorb it and make distinctions based on it. The implications for edu­
cation and persuasion are obvious
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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF TECHNOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE: 
SUMMARY AND INFERENCES 
From the reported experience of professional survey researchers 
with data from public groups similar to our samples, we coulld have ex­
pected the survey results to reflect little systematic variation in re­
sponses and thereby to convey evidence that public "attitudes" about 
technological development are too inchoate and ephemeral to be interest­
ing to policy designers Such was far from the case, the data derived 
from probing the public's attitudes toward technologies of the future 
led us to several counter inferences that when presented with choices, 
individuals can make varied judgments about the degree to which differ­
ent future-oriented technologies are likely to change their own personal 
lives and the lives of people in general and about the likelihood that 
such changes are certain to be beneficial or harmful, that they are dis­
criminating in their support for or opposition to a number of potential 
technical developments which could become the targets of public decision 
making in the future Collectively and individually, these judgments were 
characterized by consistent, systematic variation The relative conti­
nuity of these varied judgments over a two-year period suggests organized 
and relatively salient public opinion in the important policy area of 
technological development We have elaborated these inferences through­
out this chapter. 
SYNOPSIS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD TWELVE TECHNOLOGIES 
In summarizing here the patterns of opinion on which those infer­
ences are based, we can construct no neat typology, no two technologies 
have been perceived similarly Subtle differences in perceptions and in 
changes -bn percepftons emerge among the groups into which we have ana­
lytically divided our respondents the 1972 and 1974 cross-section
 
samples, the "potential publics" contained in them, and the panel of re­
interviewed persons from both groups The potential public, the group
 
most likely to be active in technological politics, takes on more defi­
nite attitudes than the public-at-large, it is more favorable to the
 
technologies generally approved and more hostile to those drawing the
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most opposition In general, the potential public is more skeptical, and
 
its members tend to envision technology's impacts as effecting nearly as
 
much change in their own personal lives as in the lives of others. The
 
broader cross-section samples, by contrast, tended to see their personal
 
experience less affected by the technology-induced changes they foresaw
 
for the lives of "most people." We have tried to capture the nuance of 
such differences in the following brief synopsis of perceptions of the 
twelve technologies, presented here in descending order of their support. 
Urbcm rail transport--Thepublic-at-large strongly 
supports this technology, although somewhat less in '74
 
than in '72. Certain that it will produce benefits, the
 
later cross-section sample perceived them as having less
 
personal implications than the earlier sample did.
 
The potential public supports this technology to
 
about the same degree as the larger group, but was much
 
more enthusiastic about it initially than they were in
 
1974 They continued to think of the consequences of
 
rail transport as more important to individual experi­
ence than did the larger group
 
Solar energy from orbiting sate lites--There was 
very strong support from the public-at-large, acceler­
ating over the two-year interim between surveys. There
 
also emerged an increased certainty of this technology's
 
beneficial results, with an increased estimate of person­
al consequences in those results
 
The potential public's perceptions were virtually
 
the same as the larger sample's
 
Organ transplants--This medical procedure drew con­
tinued overall public support. Results were clearly per­
ceived as beneficial, but as affecting lives of "other
 
people" much more than "personal" experience.
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The potential public was increasingly supportive and
 
continued to think of consequences of transplants as more
 
likely to affect their own lives than did the larger group.
 
Nuclear generatton of energy--There was continued 
overall public support for this technology Its impact 
was perceived as certainly beneficial and as effecting 
significant changes in personal experience and in the 
lives of others
 
The potential public, while still supportive, was
 
less so than the general public
 
Cable televtsion--Modest and slightly declining sup­
port was shown by the general public, though by and large 
it perceived cable TV as likely to bring beneficial re­
sults. It was viewed as moderately changing social life,
 
but with decreasing estimates of its effect on "personal" 
experience
 
The potential public's perceptions agreed in general,
 
but showed more sharply reduced support 
Short take-off ond lZandtng arcraft (STOL)--This tech­
nology drew modest overall public support, with impacts 
seen as equivocal and as clearly more significant for 
"others." 
The potential public was even less supportive and less
 
certain of beneficial results than they had been in 1972. 
AnttbaUllsttc missiles (ABM)--ThLs technology drew 
only weak overall public support There was great un­
certainty about whether impacts, seen to affect everybody 
moderately, would be beneficial or not
 
The potential public was just barely supportive, per­
ceiving impacts as certainly being both beneficial and 
harmful; by 1974 they leaned toward greater certainty of 
harm. 
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Supersonic transport (SST)--Overall opinion conflicted 
about this technology, the public-at-large became increas­
ingly skeptical of it, though still barely supportive in
 
1974. Uncertainty prevailed as to whether its effects
 
would be, on balance, beneficial or harmful. Those effects,
 
always perceived as modest, were estimated as increased for
 
personal experience in 1974 
The potential public's earlier uncertainty congealed 
in 1974 into mild opposition As with the larger group, 
uncertainty marked their perceptions of consequences, though 
the potential public leaned toward seeing them as harmful. 
They viewed impacts as stronger and more widely shared than 
did the larger group. 
Behavior alterng drugs--Earlier public uncertainty 
had by 1974 hardened into opposition The impacts of these 
drugs, though not perceived as "personally significant," 
were seen as harmful overall
 
The potential public concurred on all counts here 
InterpZanetary traveZ--Developments in this area were 
barely opposed by public-at-large, though in 1974 they saw 
more benefits in it than in '72 "Personal" impacts were 
perceived as very slight. 
Counter to the overall sample, the potential public
 
became modestly supportive, even though having expressed
 
mild opposition in 1972 They increased their estimate of
 
the certainty of this technology's beneficial consequences
 
to a relatively high degree in 1974, although seeing conse­
quences as affecting "others" more than themselves
 
Genettc engineervng--Increasingly opposed by the
 
public-at-large, this technology's effects were perceived
 
as certainly harmful although not likely to be felt person­
ally
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The potential public had by 1974 become strongly op­
posed to this technology
 
Data banks--The public-at-large opposed this tech­
nology more than any other Its impacts were seen as per­
vasive--both "personally" and for "others"--and as over­
whelmingly harmful.
 
The potential public was very strongly opposed to
 
this development, with an increasing sense of certainty
 
about harmful consequences which would have important ef­
fects for themselves personally as well as for others
 
NOTES
 
We were urged to this stance, in part, by the results of a pre­
liminary probe of public attitudes toward technology included by the
 
Field Research Corporation in their CalafornnaPoll of February, 1971. 
Two open-ended questions in that survey concerned technology: 1) "Con­
sidering developments in science and technology that have occurred during
 
recent years, are there any in particular that you feel have been especial­
ly helpful to the people of this country? What have been the organiza­
tions or institutions responsible for doing this kind of research?" (2)
 
"Are there any recent developments in science and technology that you
 
feel, on balance, have not been helpful, or even have been harmful, to
 
the people of this country What organizations or institutions do you
 
see as mainly responsible for doing this kind of research?" Thus, re­
spondents were asked to name, without any prompting from interviewers,
 
whatever technologies they believed to be helpful and harmful. Two re­
sults from this survey of 1,000 respondents caused us to re-evaluate the
 
wording of questions that had been used. First, over 30% of the sample
 
could not name even one technology which was "helpful" and 50% could not
 
name a "harmful" technology. Furthermore, 60% could not name an insti­
tution and/or organization which was responsible for the development of
 
substantive technologies. Thus, questions about technology framed at a
 
relatively high level of semantic abstraction seemed to have limited
 
salience. A second result intensified our attention to the wording of
 
questions. While the responses of those who named "harmful and helpful"
 
technologies did distribute over a considerably varied population, no 
systematic relationships were discernible between respondents' judgments
 
of "helpful" or "harmful" technologies and any of the standard socio­
economic or demographic factors. Though some underlying factors were 
clearly influential, they did notpoint to the usual SES variables For 
a more detailed discussion of this preliminary venture in assessing the 
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public's attitudes toward technology, see Daniel Metlay, "Publlc Atti­
tudes Toward Technology," in Todd R. La Porte, et al., A Perspective in 
the Assessment of Large-Scale Technology- The Case of the STOL Aircraft 
Transport System. Progress Report to Ames Research Center, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. (Institute of Governmental Stud­
ies, University of California, Berkeley, November, 1971), pp. 91-102. 
2 Technologies are placed in Figure 6-2 based on our subjective 
estimates, assignments represent only informal evaluations and the 
usual compromises made when attempting to optimize several criteria 
simultaneously. 
3The wording and sequence of questions about each technology was
 
as follows: "If a development like [the one described above] were to be
 
put into operation, how much would it change your own life"' "How much
 
do you think it would change life for most people ' "How sure do you
 
feel that this development would have drawbacks or bad results ' If the 
respondent was "absolutely" or "quite" sure, he was then asked, "What do 
you see as the most important benefit, or good thing (drawback, or bad 
thing) that might result if such a development were actually to take 
place? After respondents answered the above question, they were asked 
about each of sax technologies, (see note 4 below) : "How much would you 
like to see or how strongly would you be opposed to [the technology de­
scribed as in Figure 6-1 above.]" 
4Because questions about a total of twelve technologies generated 
from five different question sets would, along with numerous other items 
in the surveys, probably exceed respondent tolerance, each respondent 
was questioned on only six specific technologies. One of these six was 
common to all respondents; the other five were derived from random sort­
ing of the remaining eleven technologies. For the 1972 survey, the 
"whole-sample technology" was the STOL aircraft transport; for 1974 it 
was nuclear generation of energy. The 1972 choice was due to the fact 
that NASA had supported the survey partly because of its interest in 
public responses to STOL innovations. The 1974 choice was due to the 
obvious importance to public policy of nuclear energy generation. 
5See Chapter VII and VIII for a more detailed discussion of these
 
developments.
 
6Ranges of variation of these "generalizations of impact" within 
the 4 point margin were from just over 25% for the total sample in 1972 
to 35% for the potential public in 1974. Impact variables range from 5
 
to 5, with 5 meaning percent agreement on considerable impact, and 1 
meaning percent agreement on no impact.
 
7See note 3 for exact wording.
 
8In the cross section, mean support declined for eight of the twelve 
technologies. One of these changes was statistically significant at p < 
.05. In the potential public mean support also declined for eight of the 
140 
technologies. Five of these changes were significant. Using the signs 
test, the distributions coded +, 0, and - were 2, 2, and 8 respectively 
for both the cross-section and potential public samples. Though the 
test is not rigorous, it does gi-ve an indication of the direction of 
change. 
9The potential public also lost confidence in both behavior alter­
ing drugs and the ABM, shifting from being weakly supportive of them in 
1972 to modestly opposed in 1974.
 
CHAPTER VII
 
CERTAINTIES AND SUBSTANCE. CORRELATES OF SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION
 
Both the public-at-large and the potential public--the group with­
in it likely to contain the most vocal advocates or adversaries of tech­
nology--exhibit a strong and persistent propensity to view some technolo­
gies more than others as affecting people's lives. These publics also
 
clearly judge some technologies to be quite certainly beneficial and
 
others to be almost as certainly harmful. Perhaps in part as a conse­
quence of these variations, our respondents also varied quite markedly
 
in their support for or opposition to various technologies. It will be
 
the business of this chapter to explore the substance behind these cer­
tainties--the personal characteristics and philosophies which may account
 
for the evident differences in the public's evaluations of future-oriented
 
technologies In Chapter VIII special notice will be taken of the energy
 
technologies, along with data related to the recent "energy crisis." A
 
very striking anomaly--the case of manned interplanetary travel--is also
 
noted in that context
 
PRIMARY ATTITUDES AND DEGREES OF SUPPORT
 
In the discussion which follows, the "impact" variables and the
 
"certainty" variables encompassing two primary behavioral dimensions
 
which we have posited as likely to be important in shaping responses to
 
future technological development will be joined by a third attitudinal
 
dimension the degree to which the public judges to be beneficial vari­
ous widely implemented and generally familiar technologies This "evalu­
ation" variable is based on the present-technology-evaluation index
 
treated in Chapter IV above. We reasoned that one's overall evaluation
 
of the consequences of past and present technological development would
 
be likely to color his judgments about technology's future impacts and
 
social consequences and would be an important factor influencing his
 
support for or opposition to new technological possibilities
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It is also sensible to suppose that a person's judgments about how
 
much a new technology may affect himself and/or others would have some
 
bearing on his support or opposition to implementing the technology
 
Likewise, how certain beneficial or harmful results of the technology is 
judged to be is likely to sway a person's support for or opposition to a
 
proposed technology
 
Each of these five attitudinal variables was correlated with the 
degree to which the cross-section samples and the respective potential 
public subsamples supported or opposed the twelve technologies Table 
7-1 presents the array of Pearson's product moment correlations (r) for 
both surveys, TECH I, 1972, and TECH I, 1974. Initial scanning of the 
data reveals an uneven relationship between the three main attitudinal 
dimensions, "impact," "certainty," and "evaluation," and the degree of 
support for these various technologies; but each variable is clearly re­
lated to support for or opposition to many of them. The firmest con­
clusion from these data is that respondents' subjective sense of the 
certainty of future beneficial and harmful results is the factor most 
strongly and consistently associated by far with their support or oppo­
sition. That association is remarkably high and quite significant sta­
tistically for almost every technology. 
The relatively high correlations summarized in Table 7-1 suggest
 
that a single conceptual structure underlies the formation of judgments
 
about supporting or opposing future-oriented technologies. From these
 
correlations a causal model was developed for which the dependent vari­
able is the expressions of support for or opposition to each of the
 
twelve technologies Depicted in Figure 7-1, the model we constructed
 
is based in part on the logic of relationships outlined above and in
 
part on initial review of the correlation matrix Estimates for the di­
rect influence of the primary attitudes upon expressions of support for 
or opposition to each of the twelve technologies are presented in Table 7-2
 
along with the total percentages of the variance explained by these re­
lationships (R2 ) Table E-2 in Appendix E summarizes the indirect influ­
ence of these primary attitudes upon the support for the technologies 
mediated through each other along the pathways indicated in Figure 7-1. 
143 
TABLE 7-1 
CORRELATES OF THE PRIMARY ATTITUDES TO SUPPORT OF 
FUTURE-ORIENTED TECHNOLOGIES+ 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74) 
PRESENT TECH. IMPACT ON: CERTAINTY: 
TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION SELF OTHERS HELPFUL HARMFUL 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74
 
Urban *a .18 .19 .11 .21 .15 .31 .53 -.30 -.29
 
Rail -.10 .31 .28 .24 .25 .21 .42 .64 -.24 -.31
 
Solar .19 .11 .29 .24' .36 .31 .61 .45 -.40 -.22
 
Energy .24 .17 .34 .35 .42 .45 .67 .45 -.41 -.32
 
Organ .12 .13 .32 .25 .34 .31 .57 .47 -.40 -.26
 
Transplant .19 .24 .37 .20 .45 .31 .58 .53 -.41 -.16
 
Nuclear .26 .33 * * * .10 .20 .62 -.27 -.52 
Energy .45 .43 * * * * .54 .66 -.54 -.65 
Cable TV * * .42 .63 .29 .32 .56 .55 -.37 -.47 
* .32 .46 .63 ..35 * .63 .50 -. 40 -.53 
STOL .25 .24 .19 .35 .22 .28 .49 .60 -.43 -.58
 
.35 .46 .18 .53 .29 .13 .56 .67 -.50 -.72
 
ABM .33 .32 .23 * .16 .13 .62 .65 -.61 -.70 
.49 .41 .30 * .25 * .77 .65 -. 76 -.77 
SST .22 .29 .23 .18 .26 .11 .60 .55 -.42 -.45
 
.25 .37 .18 .29 .21 .31 .70 .73 -.54 -.73
 
Brain .26 .17 .14 * .23 .17 .55 .57 -.47 -.50 
Drugs .38 .24 * .19 .25 * .62 .62 -.52 -.47 
Space .26 .28 .33 .42 .32 .42 .55 .61 -.40 -.26
 
Travel .28 .49 .48 .41 .35 .49 .64 .67 -.34 -.40
 
Genetic * .18 .16 * * * .60 .54 -. 55 -.55 
Engineering .21 * .19 * * * .72 .67 -.55 -.46 
Data Banks .27 .16 .18 .18 .10 .17 .54 .52 -.56 -.56
 
.49 .13 .16 .21 .10 .28 .71 .57 -.53 -.52
 
aTop row data for total sample; lower row for potential publics. 
*,r= < .10. 
+See Appendix E for the matrix of correlations of the primary attitudes among 
themselves. 
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FIGURE 7-1
 
A CAUSAL MODEL OF EVALUATIONS OF FUTURE-ORIENTED TECHNOLOGIES
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One way of evaluating this model is to consider how much of the
 
variation in the dependent variables--support for each of the twelve
 
future-oriented technologies--can be accounted for by the independent
 
variables of the model. This will assist us in understanding the rela­
tive effects of the various factors which were included within the model 2
 
22 accounted for by the model is ind-The amount of varaton or varance 
cated by the R2 figures in Table 7-2 which are based on a measure of
 
Multiple Correlation Coefficients, R, for the regression of the independ­
ent variables on the dependent variable support for the technology R2
 
then represents the percent of variation accounted for by the sum total
 
of the variables in the model. Table 7-3 summarizes the distribution of
 
R2 
over the 12 technologies examined in 1972 and 1974 for the cross­
section samples and the potential public
 
At least in terms of these twelve technologies, the model holds up ex­
traordinarily well For only one case, the support of urban rail trans­
port in 1972--the most intensely supported of the technologies--does the
 
TABLE 7-2
 
RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF FACTORS IN DECISIONS TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE
 
SELECTED FUTURE-ORIENTED TECHNOLOGIES
 
(standardized regression coefficients-beta weights, 
cross-section sample and potential public, '72, '74) 
DIRECT RELATIONS TO SUPPORTh 
Present Tech. Certainty of Impact on 2 
Tech. Evaluation Benefit Harm Self Others R2(%) 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 
Urban .0 1*a 12* .18 .56 -.22 -.07 -.08* .02* -.03* .12* 14.1% 32.1
 
Rail -.O1* .32 .33 67 - 12* -.04* .13* .05* .12* .06* 20.2 51.5
 
Solar .12 .02* .49 .37 - 21 .06* .04* .06* -.09* -.17 44.8 22.2 
Energy 19 .13* .57 .32* - 31 -.33 .14* 01* .09* - 26* 56.4 36.7 
Organ .18 - 06* .42 .38 - 19 -.18 .08* .02* -.12 -.23 38.6 30.7 
Transplant .14* .28 .36 .40 -.19 -.31 .10* .07* -.17* -.20* 42.9 41 1 
Nuclear .11 .13 .38 .46 -.29 -.27 .05* .07* .02* -.06* 35.7 46.9 
Energy 17* .14 32 42 - 31 -.41 .04* -. 0l* .08* -.05* 42.4 60.1 
Cable TV .02* - 01* .40 .18 -.18 -.30 -.16 -.40 -.02* -.05* 36.2 50.8 
.00* -.03* .45 .11* -.19 -.37 -.08* -.45 -.10" -.09* 43.1 52.6 
STOL .13 .00* 34 .37 -.27 -.38 .06* -.19 .06* - 05* 34.0 51.9 
.16 .00* .34 .38 - 27 -.40 -.05* -.32 -.07* .14* 41.3 72.6 
ABM .14 .07* 38 .37 -. 39 -.46 -.13 .10* .10* -.14* 53.2 59.5 
.12 .10* .43 .22* -.43 -.65 -.05* .11* 00* .21* 73.0 62 1 
SST .09 .14* .47 .46 -.23 -.24 .05* .02* -.07* .12* 42.5 39.4 
.08 .05* .55 .44 -.26 -.48 .06* .11* -. 1i* .32 55.5 70.0
 
Brain .12 .05* .36 .40 -. 33 -.38 -.04* -.03 -.14 -.15 41 8 45.5
 
Drugs .28 .04* .37 .49 -.29 -.34 .05* .01* -.22 -.13* 54.1 48.0
 
Space .07* .16 .37 43 -.25 -.09* -.12 -.12* -.11 -.13* 39.6 44.0
 
Travel .15 .24 .44 .45 -.22 -.08* - 22 -.01* -.16 -.24 56 1 56.4
 
Genetic -.05* .05* .41 .38 -. 34 -.45 -.10 -.i0* -.07* .01* 44 1 45.7
 
Engin. .07* -.08* .57 .56 -.23 -.27 -.04* -. 1* .02* -. 1i* 55.7 50.4
 
Data .14 .05* .37 31 -.36 -.41 .09* .10* -.02* -.13* 45.8 39.5
 
Banks .23 .02* .54 .44 - 30 -.34 .10* .05* -.19 -.02* 65.4 41.1
 
* 
Regression coefficient not significant at p < .05, i.e., sigma beta < 5 beta weight. 
ToP figure for cross-section sample, lower for potential public.
See Table in Appendix D for regression coefficients for Indirect Relations to Support.
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TABLE 7-3
 
DISTRIBUTION OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY MODEL OF SUPPORT FOR
 
FUTURE-ORIENTED TECHNOLOGIES
 
2 
PERCENT OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED R 
< 30% 
30.0-
39.0 
40.0­
49.9 > 50.0 Range 
Cross-Section 
Potential Public 
8.4(2) 
4.2(1) 
37.5(9) 
4.2(1) 
41.7(10) 
16.7(4) 
12.5(3) 
75.0(18) 
14.1-59.5 
20.2-73.0 
variance explained drop below 30%. In most cases, the R2 is above 40%; 
for the potential public almost two-thirds of the cases were above 50%. 
These figures are quite high and represent a very strong case for the 
power of the model to predict support for or opposition to future-oriented 
3 
technologies. The summary in Table 7-3 also suggests that the model's
 
greatest predictive utility is for attitudes of the potential public,
 
those most likely to become involved in technological politics On the
 
basis of the available level of analysis what conclusions are justified?
 
First, people's certainty of benefit and certainty of harm clearly
 
account the most for the degree of their support for a future-oriented 
technology. Second, the certainty of benefit was generally more impor­
tant than certainty of harm; only seven times was this weight reversed-­
in 24 out of 48 possible cases certainty of benefit was clearly more im­
portant. But although the predictive value of certainty of harm ran 
second to certainty of benefit's, in only 8 out of a possible 48 instances
 
was certainty of harm outweighed by any factor other than certainty of 
benefit. 4 Third, the pattern of contribution of the other predictive 
factors showed more variation The impact variables were by and large 
of quite'modest importance, although when they did count highly, some 
interesting differentiations were evident, especially in the data for the 
1974 potential public (see Table 7-2). In that year for both the cross­
section and for the potential public data, the estimated effect of Cable
 
TV on personal experience became the most important contributor to attl­
tudes of opposition. And, for the potential public, the impact upon
 
one's own experience rose in 1974 to become nearly as important as the 
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certainty of harm in shaping attitudes toward the STOL aircraft technolo­
gy. Also for the potential public in 1974, the impact of SST and space
 
travel technologies upon "other's'" lives became quite significant--in oppo­
site directions, those who estimated considerable change in the lives
 
of others were, in 1974, favorably disposed to the SST and opposed to
 
space travel ( 32 and -.24 respectively). Finally, while the evaluation
 
of presently implemented technologies contributed somewhat to specific
 
attitudes toward most of the technologies, it rarely was on a par with
 
either of the two certainty variables.
 
This pattern of coefficients strongly suggests that the power of 
the model of support for future-oriented technologies rests heavily on
 
people's estimates of the probability of benefits and harms resulting
 
from a new technology's implementation. In addition, evaluations of
 
present technologies and estimates of the degree to which a new technolo­
gy would affect one's personal experience or that of others came to bear
 
selectively on evaluation of some technologies and not others. Further
 
work is required to establish what the social properties of technologies
 
are which evoke different patterns of associations with these other var­
ables in judgments of support or opposition
 
THE SUBSTANCE OF CERTAINTIES 
The degree to which individuals were certain about future benefit
 
or harm consistently and strongly influenced their support or opposition
 
to new technologies. Were those expressions of certainty based on vague 
feelings orwere particular substantive concerns behind them9 People who
 
said they were "absolutely sure" or "quite sure" of a technology's bene­
ficial or of its harmful consequences were asked to indicate what they 
felt would be certainly beneficial or certainly harmful if it were put 
into operation * In a sense responses to these questions indicate the 
hopes and fears which people associated with each technology. 
It was not sensible to search for their hopes or fears of those who were 
not sure or who thought that there would be neglibible effect Presuma­
bly, there would be few, if any, connected with the technology 
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Expectations for future consequences, we now know, are very impor­
tant to an individual's judgments favoring or opposing technical develop­
ment, beliefs about what will result from technological developments form 
the underlying reasons for the public's attitudes of support or concern. 
As they are displayed in Table 7-4, hopes and fears about future technolo­
gy obviously vary widely, and they have changed considerably in some inter­
esting respects.
 
As might be expected, those who believed that benefits were certain
 
to result from a technological development conceived of them in terms of
 
its ostensible purposes, that is, consistent with our understanding of
 
technology as improved capacity outlined in Chapter I, in terms of the
 
technology's intended, direct results. For example, the nuclear and
 
solar energy technologies were seen as providing needed new and more de­
pendable supplies of energy for less cost and as possibly allowing conser­
vation of petroleum resources Similarly, the biological technologies
 
were seen as promoting the health of their recipients Interestingly,
 
the information processing technologies drew hopes for improved efficien­
cy in whatever it was they processed ("through-put" in the jargon of
 
systems analysis).
 
In contrast to the way the technologies' benefits were perceived-­
in direct, functional terms--fears about them were expressed in terms of
 
the unintended harms which might occur indirectZy as the result of their
 
implementation. These concerns often related to a technology's polluting
 
effects--as with nuclear energy or the STOL and SST aircraft--and to fears
 
about incursion on political rights--a possible consequence of cable TV,
 
large data banks, brain drugs, and genetic engineering Also, many tech­
nologies simply seemed too dangerous. Less often they seemed too costly
 
At least one important implication stems from this difference be­
tween direct benefits and indirect harms perceived by the public. It is
 
likely that the acceptance by the public of a new technology requires at
 
minimum their acquiescence to both its direct and indirect effects
 
Therefore, in the planning for the development of technological imple­
mentation, consideration of longer term, indirect effects should receive
 
as much attention as is currently devoted to the direct benefits of new
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TABLE 7-4
 
THE SUBSTANCE OF HOPES AND FEARS FOR TWELVE TECHNOLOGIES 
(percentages, cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74)
 
BENEFITS 1972 19741 HARMS 1972 1974
 
-- I-­
--III--

URBAN RAILS 
Better, more 63 79 Too costly 25a 21 
efficient 57 70 32 34 
Reduce pollution 60 55 Too dangerous 16 23 
72 60 9 19 
Reduce traffic, 56 50 (n) (58) (22) 
parking 62 43 (17) (11) 
Safer 20 19 [H < 20%: taxes, crowding, too 
12 10 fast, fewer ]obs]b 
Reduce gas usage 1 29 
3 29 
(n) (330) (101) 
(120) (47) 
[B < 20% 3obs] 
--II--
SOLAR ENE RGY 
Unlimited supply 43 44 Too costly 32 62 
43 39 60 61 
Reduce pollution 38 36 Too dangerous 21 21 
40 44 5 39 
Cheap source 26 32 Impractical 14 17 
22 27 34 0 
Conserve resources 18 21 (n) (37) (12) 
22 32 (11) (4) 
Prevent shortage 16 33 [H < 20%. Don't like it; fewer 
22 17 jobs] 
(n) (248) (85) 
(77) (35) 
[B < 20% -- ] 
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 
Prolong life 32 47 Too dangerous 40 40 
39 59 (rejection) 30 42 
Saves lives 35 41 Determine death 14 38 
30 39 8 21 
Fights disease 26 19 Not moral to do 28 17 
31 11 47 8 
Replacement 19 20 (n) (88) (30) 
8 16 (30) (12) 
Enables fuller 9 19 [H < 20%: more population, too 
lives 12 16 costly] 
(n) (257) (79)
 
(81) (27)
 
[B < 20% advances medicine] 
aTop figure for cross-section; lower figure for potential public;
 
b(n) number indicating certainty.
 
Residue of responses less than 20% of total.
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TABLE 7-4, continued
 
BENEFITS 1972 1974 HARMS 1972 1974
 
--Iv--

NUCLEAR ENERGY 
Need more power 54 69 Too dangerous 41 68 
61 61 40 61 
No air pollution 40 30 Waste disposal 14 28 
48 40 11 43 
Cheaper source 29 35 Pollution 28 16 
27 43 31 17 
Conserve resources 19 26 Thermal pollution 15 15 
29 41 22 11 
(n) (250) (198) (n) (90) (65) 
(79) (75) (29) (33) 
[B < 20%. safe enough, jobs] [H < 20%: too costly] 
-- V--
CABLE TV
 
Good for education 45 57 Used for persuasion 15 49
 
45 69 20 70
 
Greater choice 26 21 Too costly 49 29
 
20 25 45 33
 
More programs 15 32 Too much junk now 31 33
 
17 39 21 17
 
More entertainment 17 14 (n) (72) (24)
 
25 17 (33) (12)
 
(n) (220) (65) [H < 20%: electric power
 
(76) (29) problems]
 
[B < 20%: educate children, widen
 
experience, better quality]
 
-- VI--
STOL
 
Faster travel 40 48 Noise pollution 39 26
 
38 45 41 30
 
Saves space 16 27 Pollution 34 35
 
17 33 27 50
 
Convenience to 21 26 Too dangerous 20 21
 
airport 26 28 10 16
 
Convenience, to 20 23 Too crowded now 15 22
 
places 24 25 18 16
 
(n) (551) (88) (n) (233) (35) 
(177) (32) (77) (18)
 
[B < 20%: cost, for emergencies, [H < 20%: too much space, cost,
 
for business, jobs, less noise, too fast now]
 
promote understanding]
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TABLE 7-4, continued
 
BENEFITS 1972 1974 [HARMS 1972 1974
 
--VII--

A B M
 
Added protection 31 32 Violence wrong 24 37
 
35 43 32 31
 
Deter aggression 19 32 Continue arms race 18 27
 
17 37 19 30
 
Lessen tensions 21 20 Leads to war 19 29
 
17 17 12 26
 
Intercept missiles 19 18 Too costly 20 13
 
9 9 20 9
 
(n) (214) (69) (n) (114) (42) 
(60) (19) (51) (23) 
[B < 20%- saves lives, need for [H < 20%: potential for error] 
defense, 3obsJ 
--VIII--

SST 
Saves tine 70 67 Noise pollution 39 47 
58 55 62 46 
Promote under- 22 13 Pollution 33 48 
standing 37 35 44 57 
Good for travellers 3 19 Life too fast now 21 28 
9 14 24 33 
(n) (213) (57) Too dangerous 21 32
 
(55) (17) 9 17 
[B < 20%: more travel, 3obs, (n) (118) (38)
 
trade, save money, good for (47) (16)
 
emergencies] [H < 20% cost, skyjack, need
 
for airports, too much fuel]
 
--Ix--

BRAIN DRUGS
 
Rehabilitate 57 75 Misuses of power 19 50
 
mentally ill 61 78 28 68
 
Reduce mental 26 10 Not moral to do 10 32
 
illness 28 68 12 31
 
Reduce Crime 16 33 Side effects 27 16
 
21 8 16 0
 
(n) (161) (41) Loss of self 8 23
 
(55) (14) control 8 28
 
[B < 20%: fewer in institutions, Has to be 20 4
 
aid problem children] controlled 29 8
 
(n) (139) (47)
 
(49) (21)
 
[H < 20% dependency, drugs not
 
the answer, don't know enough]
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TABLE 7-4, continued
 
BENEFITS 1972 1974 HARMS 1972 1974 
-- X--
SPACE TRAVEL 
Advance science 58 62 Cut funds elsewhere 32 40 
51 46 50 53 
Relieve population 
pressures 
Technological 
advance 
(n) 
[B < 20%. medical ad
resources, colonize] 
25 
19 
17 
21 
(116) 
(37) 
vances, 
26 
25 
21 
22 
(42) 
(26) 
new 
Too costly 
Too dangerous 
God didn't mean 
to 
(n) 
us 
22 
25 
17 
14 
20 
5 
(118) 
(28) 
21 
14 
22 
33 
0 
0 
(22) 
(7) 
[H < 20%: taxes, benefit only a
 
few] 
-- XI--
GENETIC ENGINEERING
 
Improve future 31 29 Wrong, bad for 39 46
 
generations 31 46 people 21 45
 
Produce better 9 27 Can't control it 32 43
 
life 13 9 40 39
 
Prevent inherited 20 25 Make people robots 12 26
 
disease 23 24 15 33
 
Improve people, 22 22 Selective breeding 10 22
 
babies 13 44 17 24 
(n) (112) (27) (n) (157) (67) 
(32) (9) (63) (33) 
[B < 20%: prevent retardation, [H < 20%: unpredictable, could 
birth defects] make things worse, infringe on 
freedom]
 
--XII--

DATA BANKS
 
Better, up to date 39 52 Invasion of privacy 45 58 
services 52 75 36 66 
Saves time, easy 34 50 Fear of misuse 21 43 
21 13 30 32 
Help law enforcement 20 26 Too much control 31 23 
19 0 40 26 
Help locate people 9 31 Infringement of 9 16 
12 0 rights 13 3 
Good for people to 4 18 (n) (191) (85) 
have 2 43 (80) (38) 
(n) (99) (29) [H < 20%: dehumanizes, mistakes
 
(25) (8) held against people, technology
 
(B < 20%: better and more up-to- -s unreliable]
 
date information]
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technological capacities Of particular interest are those forecasts ex­
pressed by a goodly portion of each group, concerning which sharp changes 
occurred between 1972 and 1974 Grouping the technologies by type of ca­
pacity, we see that the transport technologies--urban rails, STOL, and
 
the SST aircraft--were all thought by over half of the hopeful to improve
 
the efficiency of travel, at the same time, the possibility that urban
 
rail transit would result in reduced pollution was enthusiastically ex­
pressed Noise pollution and more general air pollution were significant
 
aspects of opposition to the SST and increased by the time of the second
 
survey. Over 20% of those anticipating benefits from the SST expected
 
it to improve international understanding A relatively sharp decline
 
in the percentages of those believing that noise pollution would result
 
from the STOL aircraft also occurred
 
These changes, along with other indications related to other tech­
nologies, suggest that the public is aware of and digesting new infor­
mation about the potential consequences of technical innovations. Clear­
ly this was the case with responses to solar and nuclear energy technolo­
gies With regard to their benefits, expectations for their help in
 
satisfying our need for power and preventing shortages increased con­
siderably At the same time, very sharp increases were evident in the 
percentage of people expecting solar energy to be too costly and nuclear 
power development to be too dangerous and too problematic with respect 
to the growing volume of radioactive wastes Such changes signal apublic 
awareness of impending critical energy shortages tempered by concern over 
some of the proposed solutions--a consciousness of the more subtle eco­
-nomic and environmental problems inherent in those solutions, subjects
 
beginning to be aired in the popular press.4 Together with the constant
 
concern over the dangers of both proposed energy technologies, such qualms 
may account for the declining degree of certainty of benefit perceived 
for the two technologies by the potential public, as reported in the last
 
chapter.
 
Expectations for the biological technologies show a divergence simi­
lar to that for the transport technologies Organ transplants were re­
ceived warmly, with sharp increases in anticipated benefits for saving 
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and prolonging life, though there was also greatly increased concern
 
about problems in determining the moment of death for purposes of remov­
ing the organ to be transplanted Behavior altering drugs and genetic
 
engineering, in contrast much less enthusiastically received, drew con­
siderable opposition on the basis of greatly increased apprehension about 
the misuse of power over people inherent in such procedures For both 
these technologies general moral concern and the issue of the individual's
 
threatened loss of control over his own life increased There were no
 
expected benefits from genetic engineering which drew the interest of more than 
35% of those certain of the technology's benefits, a very large increase, up 
to 75%, however, expected benefits from rehabilitating the mentally ill
 
through the use of behavior altering drugs. Notably, there was a hint
 
of concern for "law and order" in a doubling to 33% of those who expected 
the use of brain drugs to reduce crime 
The two information dispensing and processing technologies--cable 
TV and large computerized data banks--were received quite differently 
An increasing percentage of people noted the improved educational and 
programming possibilities of cable TV At the same time there was a
 
startling threefold increase to 45% of those worried about the problem 
of persuasion through the "tube " Whether this reaction was triggered 
by all the Watergate publicity is impossible to determine, but it repre­
sents a rapidly growing concern about incursions on political freedom 
enabled by technical development Computerized data banks evoked such 
concern with a vengeance Most hostilely received of all twelve tech­
nologies, virtually every anxious response was related to issues of in­
vasion of privacy and misuse of information While there were some who
 
valued the improved efficiency of the computer, especially from among
 
the potential publics, there was overwhelming and increasing concern for
 
its misuse
 
Finally, the two technologies related to international prestige and 
military defense--space travel and the ABM--evoked rather predictable 
reactions Space travel was seen by over half of the hopeful as con­
tributing to scientific knowledge Those who were skeptical worried 
that the enormous costs of further efforts in space technology would 
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result in cutbacks in funds for other programs Interestingly, the pro­
portion who were morally offended by the enterprise declined from about
 
20% in 1972 to none at all in 1974. The ABM, on the other hand, was met
 
* 	with more resistance than in 1972 because of increased agreement that 
the very act of violence is wrong This response rose to include over a 
third of the sample. All of the attractions of the ABM were involved 
with its uses to deter aggression and provide protection, though such re­
sults were not mentionedby more than 30% of those "certain" of its benefits. 
The hopes and fears specified in Table 7-4 suggest a public con­
cerned with many aspects of technology's use, and they reflect a multi­
plicity of values important to the public. In Figure 7-2, these have
 
been aggregated into ten areas of social concern, which are arrayed in
 
terms of the number of specific benefits (coded +) or harms (coded -) 
that respondents attributed to each technology Benefits and harms per­
ceived for some technologies distribute across several of these value 
areas at once* for example, benefits attributed to urban rails include 
the values of supply and conservation, technical efficiency, environ­
mental conditions, and the safety factor; harms attributed to it included 
the safety factor and excessive cost Conversely, several specific bene­
fits or harms are subsumed by a single value area- for example, nuclear 
energy was perceived to contribute positively in three separate ways to­
the assurance of adequate supplies and conservation and to bring with it 
two harmful and one hopeful environmental effects 
Some of these more general value concerns, such as the protection
 
of the environment, are strongly evident here and reinforce the more
 
general discussion of these values in Chapter V. Others lifted up there,
 
such as the importance of employment and taxes, are not directly evident
 
in these data, though they can be inferred from other responses such as
 
those expressing concern for too costly development. The changes just
 
noted add force to other data signifying a public watchful and aware of 
new information concerning the effects of various technologies Given 
the clear relationship found between people's subjective certainty about 
a proposed technology's consequences and their support for or opposition 
to it, concurrent with the relatively large proportions of people wncertain 
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I FIGURE 7-2 
DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF EXPECTED BENEFICIAL AND HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES 
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about either technology's good or its bad effects, programs of public
 
information about the desirable vs undesirable aspects of new technolo­
gies are surely indicated. But what can be said about the relationship
 
of more standard socioeconomic and political characteristics to attitudes
 
toward these technologies? Can systematic relationships be found that
 
would give us a clue about the more general social context of citizen re­
sponses ? We now turn to this consideration
 
CONTEXTS OF RESPONSES TO FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES
 
Richer meanings in the whole samples' and potential publics' more­
or-less-dLrected responses concerning the twelve future technologies are
 
yielded by consideration of the larger context within which those re­
sponses were made. Some pertinent indicators within that context will 
be explored in the following sections of this chapter the perceived im­
portance of various socially defined values, more comprehensive public 
judgments about the social implications of technological development, and
 
information derived from the more standard indicators provided by the po­
lLtical, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of our respond­
ents Attention to these contexts affords a glimpse into cognitive as­
sociations held by members of the California public for different tech­
nologies.
 
Individuals, we argue, often have more or less definite ideas about
 
what effects the implementation of particular technologies will have upon 
the conditions they wish to experience or to avoid Those conditions in 
turn are associated with the more general values people hold. That is, 
a reasonably high correlation coefficient (r) between a particular value 
or a belief about how a technology affects people and the support for or 
opposition to it may be interpreted as an indication that people tend to
 
believe this technology will have a significant influence on producing or 
inhibiting that condition. For example, people who value environmental
 
preservation will tend to favor solar energy generation more than those
 
who do not, because solar energy is non-polluting Furthermore, liberal
 
Democrats more than conservative Republicans will disproportionately
 
favor technologies which advance social values such as redistributing
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costs and benefits within society. The same kind of expectation holds 
for the support for or opposition to a technology and the degree of
 
agreement that it "complicates life," for example, or that it leads to
 
too much "technological dependency", a relatively high correlation would
 
reflect the belief that development of the technology in question would
 
produce such an effect, in turn reflecting opposition to that technology.
 
An absence of association or correlation would suggest, in this way of
 
reasoning, that a particular technology was not connected in people's
 
minds with affecting the value in question--an outcome which could be 
logically expected to hold for Cable TV and the need for controlling 
air pollution levels, for example.
 
Relating fairly complex matters such as technology to particular 
social effects and political values require relatively sophisticated
 
causal reasoning We did not expect such reasoning to be dramatically
 
evident within either the 1972 or 1974 cross-section samples, but thought 
it likely to be characteristic of members of the potential publics. Rela­
tively high educational attainment and familiarity with technological
 
processes can clearly contribute to the formation of an organized and
 
systematic set of notions about the effects of technologies. This proved
 
5 
to be the case Our subsequent discussion, therefore, draws mainly from
 
the associations derived from the potential publics' responses. As we
 
shall see, these responses are characterized by considerable variation 
and reveal some interesting changes and continuities.
 
SOCIAL VALUES AND SUPPORT FOR FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES
 
Our interpretation of the relationship between social values and
 
support for future technologies is based on the following reasoning
 
Individuals have some conception of what conditions represent the at­
tainment of values they prefer. Also, they have come to expect those
 
conditions to be sensitive to the implementation of new technologies
 
Thus, if they believe that a particular technology is likely to advance
 
conditions conducive to the attainment of their value preferences, they
 
can be expected to support that technology. 
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The broad social and political values discussed in Chapter V in 
terms of the importance respondents accorded them as social priorities 
relate in particular ways to support for or opposition to future-oriented 
technologies. In Table 7-5, those values are reordered in terms of the 
degrees to which future technological developments are likely to enhance 
the conditions they represent or be detrimental to them The values so 
considered are the enjoyment of life, employment, U.S. prestige, the 
individual's right to privacy, the condition of the poor, taxes, and en­
vironmental conditions. Positive correlation coefficients (r) indicate 
the degree to which each of the twelve technologies is supported by those 
favoring each social value The correlation for the potential public, 
the most widely ranging, is the basis for the table. In preparing the 
table, the ranked weight of the values was reversed from that assigned 
to them earlier (see Table 5-1 , page 94), so that the most preferred 
value was numbered 7, the least preferred numbered 1. Thus a positive 
correlation in Table 7-5 indicates correspondence between strong support 
for the technology and strong preference for the particular value. 
The emergent patterns of correlations between values and support 
give evidence of a remarkable variety in the degrees to which the po­
tential publics associated different value conditions with particular
 
technologies At one extreme, urban rails and cable TV were associated
 
with only one of the seven social values respondents were asked to rank-­
urban rails negatively with taxes (that is, those concerned about taxes
 
tended to oppose urban rails) and cable television positively with em­
ployment (those concerned about employment levels tended to support cable
 
TV) At the other extreme, the STOL aircraft technology was associated
 
in 1974 with all but one of the social values in question--U S inter­
national prestige, the value of least interest to the California public
 
Some interesting combinations are evident in the correlations re­
corded in Table 7-5, some, first of all, because of their absence or
 
paucity Those in the potential publLc who highly valued the improvement
 
of the condition of the poor as a social goal associated no technology
 
positively with that goal in 1972 And those among them who ranked en­
joyment of life as highly important in that year positively associated
 
TABLE 7-5
 
RANKED VALUES AND SUPPORT FOR TECHNOLOGIESa 
(Pearson's r, potential public, '72, '74)
 
TECHNOLOGY ENHANCES TECHNOLOGY DETRIMENTAL TO 
En3oyment U.S. Condition of 
 Environmental
 
Technologies of Life Employment Prestige Privacyb Poor People Taxes Conditions
 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 1974 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 
Urban Rail 
 * -. 21 
Solar Energy 
.21 * 
- 33 ** 35 
Organ Transplant * -. 26 * -. 15 * 31 
Nuclear Energy 15 * 
-. 20 -.18 -. 15 
Cable TV * .17 
STOL * .29 * .34 .21 * -. 39 * .47 -.18 -.54 
ABM .20 .34 .27 .34 -.45 -.26 * * .33 * -. 20 
SST 
.28 
-.36 -.34 
Brain Drugs * .33 -. 19 * -. 27 
Space Travel 16 -. 30 28 * 25 * -. 39 -.21 * 
Genetic Engin. * -. 18 * .27 
-.22 * .22 * 
Data Banks * .16 .25 * 
- 42 * .16 
asee Chapter V for a full discussion of value ranking. 
bAsked once only, 1974. 
r < .15; blank slots indicate r's < .15 for both years. 
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with that value only one technology--nuclear energy--and that at the bare 
minimum of statistical significance (r = 15). Only two were positively 
associated in 1972 with a high valuation of U S prestige--solar energy
 
and the ABM The picture changed somewhat in 1974 with respect to both
 
positive and negative association between technology and the value-goal
 
of enjoyment of life. A positive correlation appears with the STOL air­
craft and, minimally, with data banks; a negative correlation with organ
 
transplants emerges. The only sustained positive association was elicited
 
by the ABM. In both 1972 and 1974 this technology was positively corre­
lated with employment and with U.S. prestige (That is, those in the po­
tential public who ranked employment and U.S prestige as important social
 
goals tended also to support the ABM)
 
A second notable combination of correlations is related to high
 
valuation of employment. Those who ranked employment as important as­
sociated only three technologies positively with it both years--in 1972
 
space travel, data banks, and the ABM, common also to 1974; in 1972 the
 
two other positive correlations were cable TV and STOL. Whether or not
 
it is actually true that developments in urban rail transit, nuclear
 
generation of energy, and the SST can contribute to higher levels of em­
ployment, the potential public did not make a strong connection here.
 
The third pattern of preference centers around technology's effects
 
upon the environment Not surprisingly, there was a sharp increase in
 
the association between the importance of environmental effects and oppo­
sition to STOL aircraft, and a quite consistent negative association with 
SST development in this regard. These associations are consistent over 
time and represent an established relationship The magnitudes of the 
correlations could speculatively be interpreted to mean that there is an 
increasing recognition that STOL aircraft would be detrimental to the en­
vironment and a persistent conviction that the SST poses this threat.
 
Other combinations of support for technologies and a high valuation of
 
environmental conditions produced puzzling results. There were strong
 
positive associations between high importance accorded this social value
 
and support for organ transplants, conversely there was a strong negative
 
association between that concern and solar energy (the technology most
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favored in 1974) and behavior altering drugs Again unaccountably, the 
importance of environmental conditions was related to opposition to space 
travel in 1972, while in 1974, this relationship disappeared. The associ­
ations for organ transplants and behavior altering drugs, not important 
in 1972, were relatively strong in 1974 These emerging associations
 
suggest that those concerned about technology's effects on the environ­
ment may have general underlying attitudes toward nature which lead them
 
to view dissimilar technologies in much the same way. Attitudes toward 
space travel technologies seem to have undergone a change in the direc­
tion of much reduced concern about the environmental effect of such de­
velopments, but further data is necessary to establish this conclusively
 
These data suggest opposition to development of a number of tech­
nologies on the basis of certain of these values. An aversion to data
 
banks, nuclear power, the ABM and to behavior altering drugs was related
 
to their potential effects on the right to privacy The connection with 
data banks and brain drugs is of course clear, but how the invasion of 
privacy issue is perceived to relate to nuclear energy and the ABM is not, 
though one can speculate. Those who value privacy are averse to things 
that intrude upon the individual conduct of life, whether the intrusions 
are in the form of information surveillance or of the everconscious threat 
of global nuclear destruction. Support for solar energy by those valuing 
this nation's international prestige disappeared in 1974, though they 
had supported it two years earlier. This change appears a bit odd until 
one considers what that technology actually is--the collection by satel­
lite of solar energy to be beamed to earth somehow It is possible that
 
reactions to it have been colored by an increased sensitivity to the
 
overwhelming difficulties of that technical task and to the danger to
 
populations were such a device to malfunction
 
Finally perhaps the most important pattern to be noted in Table 7-5 
is the increased number of associations in 1974 between these values and 
various technologies. There were more significant associations in 1974 
than in 1972 for every value. This tendency to associate technology with 
social values was particularly evident in correlations between technolo­
gies and environmental conditions This pattern corroborates a point 
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made in Chapter V above--that the public includes a wide range of values 
in its evaluation of technologies It seems plausible as well to infer 
that this range of values is expanding for specific technologies. 
Thoughtful review of Table 7-5 will be useful to those interested
 
in achieving or sustaining support for particular technologies. Search­
ing for corresponding relationships between support and value ranking
 
there reported and the expectations for benefits and harms summarized 
above in Table 7-4 is instructive, for often there is a clear connection 
between the two sets of data The best fits were for those values and 
fears related to a technology's effects on the environment and on taxes. 
But more interestingly, the fears expressed in conjunction with those 
benefits and harms often emerge from values quite different from those 
arrayed in Table 7-4. For example, the importance of effects on employ­
ment of STOL, the ABM, space travel, and genetic engineering, not evi­
dent in the open-ended responses summarized in Figure 7-2 above, emerged 
in addition to those particular fears What seems to be happening is 
that the public tends to associate the direct effects they expect from
 
a technology with relatively immediate, often astonishingly innovative
 
improvements, such as the twelve capacities spelled out in Figure 6-1,
 
page 119 above. At the same time, they associate a technology's more
 
indirect, negative effects with general values like enjoyment of life,
 
employment levels, the environment, etc , listed in Table 7-4 Thus,
 
specific hopes and fears seem to be underglrded by association with
 
social values of larger dimension
 
SUPPORT FOR TECHNOLOGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF ATTITUDES 
TOWARD SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY IN GENERAL 
Individuals' beliefs about the more general effects of scientific
 
work and its technological applications is another consideration in the
 
cognitive context of their perceptions and judgments about particular
 
technologies Table 7-6 displays the relationships between support for
 
the twelve technologies and those beliefs as measured by the scales con­
structed to weigh the potential public's attitudes toward a number of 
TABLE 7-6 
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GENERAL OUTCOMES OF TECHNOLOGY AND SUPPORT FOR FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES a 
(Pearson's r; potential public, '72; '74)
 
TECHNOLOGY BENEFICENT TECHNOLOGY PERNICIOUS
 
Standard Value of
 
of Living Tech- Scien- Techno- Technology 
Depends nology's tific Ac- Regulate Outcome logical Leads to
 
Outcome of on Tech- Social tivities Technolo- of Tech- Impea- Material­
tive ismc Technologies Science nology Utilityc Scale gy Scale nology 
'72 '74 '72 '74 1974 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 1972 1974 
Urban Rail * 
Solar Energy -.25 -.27 * 
Organ Transplant .24 * .30 -.27 -.25 -.19 
Nuclear Energy * .32 -.28 * -.40 -. 27 -.15 -.24 
Cable TV * 
STOL .25 .19 * .23 -.30 -. 20 * -.20 
ABM * .32 * .37 .21 * 26 -. 30 -. 29 -.36 -.45 
SST -.26 -. 37 * 
Brain Drugs .20 -.19 .21 * 
Space Travel .25 * -. 24 * -.25 * * 
Genetic Engin. .18 .25 .21 * .23 * * 
Data Banks .22 * * -.20 -. 31 * -. 33 
aSee Chapter IV for a full discussion of the responses from which the scales weighing these attitudes 
bwere derived.
 bAsked only once, 1972.
CAsked only once, 1974.
 
r < .15; blank slots indicate r < .15 both years.
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spinoff social effects of technical development. These scales were con­
structed and discussed in Chapter IV The most optimistic assertion
 
6 
weighed by these scales is that "technology makes life better", the po­
tential public's degree of agreement that it does comprised the Outcome­
of-Science index, which we have used here to tally against support for
 
the individual technologies. The correlations so discovered are indi­
cated in the left-most column of Table 7-6, that is, under the most
 
"beneficent" point on the implied spectrum of how the potential public 
views technology's socLal effects. At the other extreme, the potential 
public's degree of agreement with the pessimistic assertion that man has
 
become entrapped in a debilitating materialism is weighed against support
 
for or opposition to the technologies. The resulting correlations are
 
indicated in the farthest column to the right--the "pernicious" end of 
the range of attitudes about technology's social effects Two summary 
scales, compiled from responses concerning whether or not scientific and 
technological work should be controlled--the Value-of-Scientific-Activity 
scale and the Regulate Technology scale--occupy the mid-range of Table 
7-6.
 
Associations between the potential public's agreement with the as­
sertions on which the scales weighing its attitudes toward technology's
 
social effects are based and its support for or opposition to a par­
ticular future-oriented technology, then, would provide evidence for 
measuring its estimates about the contribution of that technology to 
various conditions projected in those attitudes Several patterns can 
be seen in Table 7-6 which bear generally on these relationships.
 
Some technologies more than others are perceived to be associated
 
with the beneficial aspects of technology The likelihood of support or
 
opposition for several--urban rail transport, solar energy, cable TV,
 
and the SST--was not disproportionately influenced by beliefs in the 
positive outcomes of science translated through technology, concerns 
about technology's relation to the standard of living, or its social 
utility Only for the ABM did agreement with these three perceptions 
of a technology's effects seem to especially influence sup­
port for the technology Comparison of the data from two surveys seems 
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to suggest tentatively that our future-oriented technologies in 1974
 
were less strongly associated with these three attitudes than they were 
in 1972. One puzzling question emerges here what are the properties
 
of various technologies which prompt in the potential public perceptions 
of them that may be associated with preferences for or agreements with
 
these three particular consequences of technological development7
 
The data also show that judgments about the less positive "outcomes
 
of technology" are the most consistently associated with various of our
 
twelve technologies. Those who supported the development of a number of 
technologies disagreed with assertions of the three items in the outcomes­
of-technology scale that technology overly complicates life, is prone to make 
us too dependent upon machines or stimulates a desire to "go back to nature" 
There was some indication that, for four of the seven technologies, this 
scale was a bit less effective in 1974 than in 1972 as a predictor of 
support This development could be interpreted as an indication of a 
beginning decline in anxiety toward technology-in-general, with an in­
creased propensity to focus upon specific technologies in a more dis­
criminating way. Perhaps the most obvious example of this tendency was 
that support for or opposition to the ABM was related to the most fac­
tors--some quite highly, such as the association of opposition with the 
belief in general that "technology leads to materialism." 
A third pattern emerges from the data concerning the summary scales
 
of "Regulate Technology" and the "Value of Scientific Activities"--both 
concerned with the legitimate exercise of control Few future-oriented 
technologies wer disproportionately associated with agreement that tech­
nology should be more closely regulated This lack of association may 
be a reflection of the quite even division in this regard within our 
samples. However, attitudes concerning the intrinsrc worth of scien­
tific activities and the appropriate degree of regulation that should be 
applied to them were associated with support for or opposition to half 
of our future-oriented technologies. Organ transplants, the technology 
most consistently perceived, was highly supported, especially by those 
who disagreed that science activities should be controlled Change was 
registered for each of the other five technologies In three cases-­
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for nuclear energy development, the ABM, and the development of behavior 
altering drugs--support from the potential public was Zess associated 
with belief in unregulated scientific research in 1974 than it had been 
in 1972 This was especially the case for developments in "brain drugs" 
for which a strong reversal of association was evident The data for 
two of the most opposed technologies in 1972--data banks and space trav­
el--are interesting and reflect again people's apparent propensity to 
discriminate between technologLes. Data banks, for which support sharply 
decreased from 1972 to 1974, were less strongly opposed in 1974 by those 
who disagreed that science activities should be regulated. Speculative­
ly, it appears that in the face of extreme opposition to technical de­
velopments a general belief in the importance of unencumbered inquiry 
acts as a moderating element For space travel technology another 
pattern developed This technology was the only one for which there 
was significantly increased support in 1974 compared to 1972 In this
 
case, a belief in the importance of regulating scientific activities be­
came insignificant as a predictor of support for the technology 
Finally, there appears to be a hint of polarization in attitudes 
toward the ABM within the potential public This group may contain one
 
faction that favors the ABM's development because of a general optimism 
about the benefits of science, technology's contributions to our living
 
standards and'its social utility But another, probably larger, faction 
tends on the other hand to worry about the complicating broader effects 
of increased technological dependency and the potential for increased
 
materialism that might accompany that dependency 
POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS OF
 
SUPPORT FOR FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES
 
A relatively detailed picture of the cognitive associations the
 
potential public makes with regard to our twelve technologies is, as we
 
have just attempted to demonstrate, provided by analyzing the relation­
ships between its support for specific technologies and its beliefs about
 
the consequences they portend for particular social values But more fa­
miliar to political research is analysis focused on the political, socio­
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economic, and demographic characteristics of a given sample of the public
 
These characteristics are conventionally treated as "long range" surro­
gates predicting likely political activity. Are there informative pat­
terns of relationships within our data between these more traditional
 
indicators and support for or opposition to future-oriented technologies ?
 
The logic and method underlying our next analytical effort is much 
the same as for our last. We will now identify correlations between tra­
ditional sociopolitical indicators and support for a specific technology
 
Reasonably high correlation coefficients (r) indicate that a connection
 
exists in people's minds between the consequences of implementing a tech­
nology and the conditions which they, as caucasians or members of a racial 
minority, older or younger, wealthy or poor, male or female, or liberal 
or conservative, associate differentially with things they value or ab­
jure The pattern of such correlations, again drawing from data provided 
by the potential public samples, is summarized in Table 7-7 It shows 
that people holding particular political beliefs or having specific socio­
economic characteristics vary considerably in their perceptions of par­
ticular technologies as salient. Whatever the particular cognitive organ­
ization distinctively associated with differences in sex, race, and income
 
level, they produced only a limited degree of discrimination in the sup­
port for or opposition to the twelve future-oriented technologies They
 
correlated strongly with only four of them, and a person's sex was more
 
consistently associated with support than either race or income was. In
 
general, women tended to be less enthusiastic than men in 1974 about space 
travel and urban rail transit, while men in 1972 g4ve relatively strong 
support to the nuclear generation of power and opposed to the SST Other 
technologies did not evoke responses particularly related to one's gender
 
Racial minorities were even more opposed than caucasians to genetic engi­
neering, one of the most negatively received technologies The strength
 
of that relationship indicates that minorities must see considerable threat 
from the potentials of such manipulation A person's income level tended 
to be less important in 1974 than in 1972 in predicting support for three 
technologies--nuclear and solar energy technologies and the SST--all of 
which are related to large industrial development Only solar energy 
TABLE 7- 7
 
POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND SUPPORT FOR FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES 
a
 
(Pearson's r; potential public, '72; '74)
 
POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
 
Party Ideology Party/ 
(Democrat- (Liberal- Ideology
 
Technologies Republican) Conservative) Scale Education Income Race Sex Age 
'72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 
Urban Rail .22 * * -. 25 * -. 23 
Solar Energy .22 * .23 * * .22 
Organ Transpl. 
Nuclear Energy -.21 * * -.25 - 25 -.24 .24 * -.26 -.22 * 
Cable TV .19 .26 * -- 34 
STOL * - 38 * -.23 * -.32 
ABM .27 * -.47 -.41 -.43 -.38 * -.40 .47 .38 
SST * .30 * .25 .30 * 
Brain Drugs * -.20 -.20 -.21 * -.22 
Space Travel * -.32 -.22 -.33 
Genetic Engan. -.23 * .33 .25 
Data Banks -.31 * -.25 * * .37 .24 * 
aSee Appendix C for comparative distribution of political and socioeconomic characteristics among the 
,samples. 
r < .15; blank slots indicate r < .15 for both years. 
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and the SST seemed to attract disproportionate support in 1974 from those
 
with higher incomes. Put the other way around, only those two technolo­
gies seemed to pooier citizens to be specifically disadvantageous.
 
Rather more interesting were the 1974 data related to age and edu­
cation. There were clear indications in the 1974 data that seniority and 
higher levels of educational attainment became more important than they 
had been in discriminating supporters from opponents Both characteris­
tics came to point toward generally more negative views on technological
 
development In 1974 older people were much more likely than the young
 
to be opposed to urban rail transit and cable television This negativ­
ism extended to space travel as well but was reversed strongly in the
 
support shown by older people for the ABM These associations may be
 
partially explained by the apparent aversion of older, more conservative
 
citizens to technologies which threaten to raise taxes (urban rails) and
 
by their concern for protection and maintenance of international political 
power (the ABM)
 
The more highly educated differed sharply from older people in 
their reception of the ABM, which correlated highly with both education 
and age Unlike older citizens, the more highly educated opposed the de­
velopment of the ABM, and they tended in 1974 to oppose the use of be­
havior altering drugs and STOL aircraft development.
 
But do those results in this emerging collage of data have much 
significance ? If nothing else, the glimpse they provide of quite differ­
ential perceptions and evaluations of the technologies certainly has in­
trinsic interest the older generations in effect run counter to the 
general tendencies of the whole sample in their opposition to urban rail 
transit and, to a lesser degree, in their support of the ABM and data 
banks The more wealthy made a similar departure from the mainstream of 
opinion in their support for the SST Whether these cross-cutting trends 
presage political conflict is difficult to determine, for, aside from the
 
counter-tendencies just noted, associations between support and/or oppo­
sition and the five socioeconomic characteristics were consonant with the
 
overall trends in the overall evaluation of the twelve technologies.
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More indicative of political controversy over these technologies
 
are the several quite conclusive associations of political party identi­
fication and political ideology with support or opposition, though only
 
about half of the technologies drew differential attitudes on the basis 
of political party or ideology. Solar energy, organ transplants, the 
SST, space travel, and genetic engineering in 1972 and again in 1974 ap­
parently were perceived quite similarly by Democrats and Republicans,
 
liberals and conservatives. By 1974, urban rail transport and data banks
 
had become politically "neuter" as well, although, as our discussion has 
just pointed out, support for these same technologies was associated with
 
other socioeconomic characteristics Party preference plays only a small
 
role in predicting support for any of these technologies, on the other
 
hand, self-identified liberal or conservative ideological orientations
 
take on clear importance And, for those technologies about which 
the potential public is relatively closely divided, these loyalties seem
 
to have become somewhat more significant in distinguishing support from 
opposition. The magnitude of correlation between these indicators and 
support/opposition increased or remained high. Increased correlation 
was especially apparent between ideological leanings and opposition to 
STOL aircraft development, to the ABM, and to brain drugs In each of 
these three cases, adherence to liberal political ideology was apparently 
a pervasive factor prompting opposition. The reverse was the case for
 
cable TV. liberal convictions tended to encourage support for this tech­
nology
 
The data suggest then that political ideology and, to a lesser ex­
tent, party identification have a bearing on support for or opposition
 
to development of some technologies Perhaps the most sensible interpre­
tation here is that the social consequences of those technologies are in­
creasingly being perceived as stimulating conditions already part of the
 
differential preference patterns held either by political liberals or by
 
political conservatives For example, the development of urban mass
 
transit and the widespread diffusion of cable television have socLal
 
consequences, or enable certain activities, valued more by politically
 
liberal citizens than by political conservatives Conversely, STOL
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aircraft, antiballistic missiles, data banks in 1972, and nuclear power
 
in 1974 were perceived by conservatives as enabling certain outcomes far
 
less objectionable to them than they were to liberals.
 
To conclude this discussion of some of the specific attitudes and
 
patterns of attitudes toward future-oriented technology, we turn to the
 
most anomalous one detected--the dramatic increase in support among the
 
potential for the technologies of interplanetary space travel
 
I 
INTERPLANETARY SPACECRAFT A SYMBOL OF BASIC RESEARCH 
One of the most evident findings from the data coming out of the 
surveys is the general, pervasive decline between 1972 and 1974 of over­
all support for most of the technologies included in the survey. Almost
 
without exception for the cross-section samples and the potential public,
 
both the certainty of beneficial as against harmful consequences of these 
technologies and of public support for them declined or remained at about 
the same level.8 The single instance of significantly increased support 
for a technology was the enhanced attractiveness to the potential public 
of developments in manned interplanetary space exploration
 
In the face of the general downward trend, support among the po­
tential public as measured by mean scores for a space technology to en­
able travel to other planets increased from -.19, a bit below the point
 
of exactly balancing support or opposition, to 69, up 88 points or about
 
9 
15% on the six point scale This was the greatest overall change in
 
level of support for any technology, challenged only by an overall de­
cline of 77 for behavior altering drugs This increase in support
 
lifted the relative position of space travel technology from its initial
 
low of 10th place to 7th place just below STOL aircraft development
 
Paralleling this increase in general support for space travel tech­
nology, it was perceived by the potential public in 1974 to be much more 
certain to produce benefits than it was in 1972.10 The only technology 
for which the ratio of Helpful to Harmful results increased (from 1 28 
to 3 25), its relative standing rose from 7th to 3rd place for this 
measure In similar fashion, the rat-o of mean degree of certainty of 
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beneficial to harmful consequences also increased, from 1.01, at the 
break even point, to 1.26 (see Table 6-3, p. 126), raising the technolo­
gy's relative standing from 9th to 4th place. The magnitude of change,
 
as measured by these indicators, is most unusual and runs counter to 
the tendencies for every other technology analyzed in the survey. Both 
in direction and in degree of movement, the change is arresting, particu­
larly in view of the wide difference between the potential public com­
pared to the cross-section as a whole. Space travel technology is one 
of three technologies for which the opinions of the potential public were
 
significantly different from those of the rest of the sample in 1974, and 
the only one which evoked a difference in support. The rest of the sample 
did not support it (see Table 6-1, p 123) Do other data afford some 
clues to what may account for this anomaly' 
First, several factors may be discounted as partial explanations 
for increased support either because they remained much the same as in 
1972 or because they would lead us to expect increased opposition to
 
space travel technologies. The negative relationships of age to support
 
remained relatively constant A number of other factors were associated 
with decreased support These were increased fears that this technolo­
gy was too dangerous, opposition to the technology associated with con­
cern for effects on employment and on increased taxes, and increased dis­
affection with the technology from women respondents. But positively re­
lated factors seemed to overwhelm these which tended toward opposition
 
Analysis based on regression techniques of the contribution of our
 
"primary variable" in accounting for the variations in the support for 
space travel technologies provides a clue to understanding the context 
of increased support for the technology in 1974. From comparing the re­
gression coefficients for 1972 to those of 1974, it is evident that the 
power of the perceived vmpact of space travel technologies upon one's 
own experience and the certainty with which a person eapects harmful re­
sults both dropped off as predictors of opposition. Each variable regis­
tered in 1972 a beta weight of - 22, the estimate for 1974 fell below 
the level of statistical significance. The remaining factor still re­
lated to opposition, the negative association of space travel's tmpaot 
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upon the experiences of others, however, rose sharply in importance from 
a -.16 to -.24.
 
In the face of these adjustments in the factors stimulating oppo­
sition, what changes were evident in those prompting support ? There were 
important increases in both the influence of evaluattons of presently 
implemented technologies (from 15 in 1972 to 24 in 1974) although the 
influence of a person's expectations for certain benefits remained about 
constant--a high .44 in 1972 and .45 in 1974. Everything suggests that 
the sharp increase in the potential public's support for space travel 
technologies was strongly affected by an increased sense of the positive
 
results to be gained by such a venture, with a somewhat diminished sense 
of its harmful consequences. What might be the substance of these feel­
ings 7 
The only beneficial consequences believed by an increased propor­
tion of our respondents to be certainly likely was the contribution to
 
learntng and scientftc nformatzon. This rose from about 50 to 60 per­
cent of those certain of benefits. (Consistent with this increase was
 
the much more positive association of support with higher levels of edu­
cation (r = .06 in 1972 and 37 in 1974)) There was also a modest in­
crease to 25% for beneficial advances in technology At the same time, 
there was a sharp decline, from 50 to 33 percent, in the percentage of 
the potential public who worried about the opportunity costs of space 
developments. These specific indications were paralleled by a decline 
in the feeling that technology complicates life, from r = .25 to r = 04. 
These data evoke the following interpretation: that the potential 
public, a good deal more than the whole sample, had become in 1974 more 
certain that space travel would return beneficial scientific knowledge, 
and perhaps advances in technology, which would affect other people's 
lives more than their own. They had a growing sense that this technology 
would not contribute overly to life's difficulties and that it should be 
supported as part of the nation's basic research effort At the same
 
time, the potential public did not believe as strongly as they had that
 
funds spent on space projects would prevent other worthwhile programs
 
from being taken up. Nor was their concern about the effects of
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these developments on tax levels or employment enough to vitiate their 
interests in scientific activities of this sort. It should be noted that
 
neither of the politicalpreference indicators was related to support for or 
opposition to space travel technology In this sense, perhaps, NASA has 
remained politically neuter in the minds of the potential public and the 
public-at-large 
Attitudes toward space travel developments run counter to the general 
impression that there has been a decline in enthusiasm for space-oriented 
technological adventures It is possible that this decline has run its 
course, at least for those who are most likely to be involved in techno­
logical politics. 
SUMMARY TOWARD A POLICY INTERPRETATION
 
The data presented in this chapter add force to a major conclusion
 
already reached. that there is a remarkable variation in attitudes associ­
ated with the public's support for different new technologies. People's 
reactions differentially depend on how certain they believe a technology's 
benefits and harms will be, on how great they believe its effects will be 
upon themselves and on others, and on how they evaluate presently imple­
mented technologies. The most telling predictor of support of a future 
technology is certainty of its benefteial consequences. 
The hopes and fears people expressed about twelve future technolo­
gies covered a wide range of concerns, particularly evident in the bene­
fits they believed certain to result Hopes for benefits were most often
 
expressed in terms of the particular improved instrumental capacity--the
 
technology's directly intended consequence. Fears about harms, on the
 
other hand, were most often expressed in terms of unintended, indirect 
consequences for social or political values, such as for the economy, the
 
environment, and for political rights Support for or opposition to the 
twelve technologies expressed in the context of those broad social atti­
tudes is consonant with the more specific expectations about effects re­
ported on pages 7 to 16 of this chapter. The importance of employment 
effects, the quality of life, the condition of the poor, the environment, 
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the right to privacy, tax levels, and the United States' international
 
prestige were quite differentially associated with support/oppositlon to
 
the technologies.
 
Also variously associated with support for one technology oranother
 
were beliefs about the broad social effects of science and technology-­
the improvement of general living conditions by science and the adverse
 
complications created by technology. Some technologies and not others
 
were associated positively with beliefs that technology made life better
 
Significantly, many of the technologies which, in 1972, were negatively
 
associated with complicating life (i e , were opposed because of that as­
sociation) were not so perceived in 1974 General anxiety toward aZZ
 
technologies appeared to decrease as a more focused concern on the nega­
tive impacts of parttcuZar technologies emerged. This qualified confi­
dence was paralleled by an increase ("recovery," perhaps) of confidence
 
in scientific activities. Together, these changes add another bit of
 
evidence that the public distinguished scientific from technological ac­
tivities.
 
Demographic and political correlates of support/opposition show a
 
pattern that runs directly counter to some of the more common assertions
 
about public attitudes toward technology that have found their way into
 
the popular literature. There we are told, for example, that liberals,
 
the poor, the uneducated, and the young hold antitechnological biases
 
It should be clear by now that such generalizations ignore the complex
 
patterns of relationships found in the groups which do correlate with
 
that attitude Earlier, in Chapter IV, we presented evidence which showed
 
that liberals evaluate presently implemented technologies differently than 
do conservatives and that the rich and poor do not view the fruits of 
technology in the same way. But we found no evidence that age or educa­
tion made any difference in the way our respondents evaluated present
 
' 
technologies That pattern holds true for their perceptions of future
 
technologies. When we examine the correlates to support/opposition, the
 
fallacy of certain popular generalizations is quite apparent relation­
ships often take other directions than those which the more stereotype­
based arguments would lead us to expect Liberals, the young, and the
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uneducated give more approval to somre technologies than do conservatives, 
older people, and the more highly educated. More interestingly perhaps, 
there is some evidence of increasing polarization over time for the di­
mensions of age, education, and political ideology. These variables
 
were increasingly important in 1974 in explaining perceptions about
 
future technical developments.
 
Important implications attach to findings demonstrating that cer­
tain of those developments are differentially perceived and that public
 
attitudes toward them have become more coherent and polarized The co­
hesion of opinion around political ideology and, to a lesser extent, po­
litical party, portend growing political controversy over technology
 
Significantly, proponents may not have to seek allies or create new coa­
litions. They may simply have to turn to former allies in other politi­
cal battles. Needless to say, such a result can only intensify the mi­
lieu of technological politics.
 
These data have another message for the policy maker and for the
 
advocates of any technical development. They echo a point made in Chap­
ter V- that the public is concerned about the wider range of social 
values in its consideration of future technological developments But it 
seems clear, on the basis of our analysis, that these values are not 
equally relevant to each of the future-oriented technologies Some of 
them, like urban rails and cable TV, may be so familiar as to fall almost 
outside the bounds of perception as a debatable issue. Others, such as 
the STOL aircraft, nuclear generation of energy, the ABM, and the SST, 
are apparently the object of contradictory values concerns for employ­
ment join uneasily with concerns for the environment. Policy makers 
would mis' the point, we think, if they discount the significance of 
these attitudes on the grounds that such contradiction bespeaks a con­
fused public which neither understands nor cares much about technological 
development. The overall pattern of data suggests that, quite the 
contrary, the public is watchful and, while it may not have a very so­
phisticated understanding of the technicalities of technological develop­
ment, it is quite concerned about the consequences of that development 
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For the advocate of technology, either in government or outside it,
 
the data suggest, again, the importance of comprehensible, well balanced 
programs informing the public about those consequences The potential 
public clearly evinces differentiated judgments, and they have come to 
conclusions about the effects of technologies on a range of important po­
litical goals Concerns for the effects of certain technologies on priva­
cy and on the environment were quite evident Cable TV was seen to en­
hance one's privacy; ABM's, STOL aircraft, nuclear generation of energy, 
and data banks to invade it. Other data suggest that the individual's 
right to privacy is a keenly important value And judgments were modi­
fied between 1972 and 1974 for example, the potential public in 1974 
did not associate improved employment with genetic engineering and space
 
travel as they had two years earlier
 
Whatever the premises for the public's judgments, the data indicate
 
associations were being made Very likely these associations were not
 
all made entirely objectively, perhaps they were even made intuitively;
 
but even if in fact an association is not sensible, it is being made
 
If the public's belief is actually unfounded that an association exists 
between the development of a technology and the difficulty of maintaining 
or achieving a valued condition, it behooves that technology's advocates 
to show, if they can, that such anxieties are needless. That effort must 
include believable descriptions of the likely effects of the new tech­
nology in terms of the second order consequences resulting from the par­
ticular way industry or government would produce and distribute it With­
out such a credible balance, we can expect an intensification of the mis­
trust and cynicism reflected in the data and discussed in Chapter V about 
the erosion public of confidence in decision makers charged with public 
policies about technological developments
 
NOTES
 
1 These variables were discussed at length in Chapter VI: the first 
includes the degree of change perceived by the respondent as likely to oc­
cur in his own life and the lives of ethers; the second, the degree of 
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certainty with which the respondent perceives that the results of a 
technological development will be beneficial or will be harmful. 
2In addition, path analysis can often test the correctness of some 
of the linkages asserted in the model. See Appendix E for further dis­
cussion of this procedure. 
3These multiple r's were all significant beyond the .01 level of 
confidence; most beyond the .001 level of confidence. Confidence limits 
were determined by converting to z scores and then calculating the stan­
dard error in z(cr ) based on the equation o = Vn--m-l, where n is thez
 
number of cases and m the number of variables
 
4In Chapter VIII, special attention is given to the energy-specific 
technologies and to aspects of the energy crisis. 
50f the 263 individual correlations reported below in Tables 7-5,
 
6 and 7, only 62 or 33.6% were from the cross-section samples. This
 
represents a ratio of one cross-section correlation for about every two
 
from the the potential public data.
 
6This opinion marker was derived from responses to items on the 
survey questionnaire probing confidence in science, such as "DO you 
agree or disagree that if scientists are given enough money and left 
alone, they can be counted on to discover things that will make our 
lives better?"
 
7The correlation between age and self-identified political con­
servatism for these samples was .25 in 1972 and . 32 in 1974. 
8As indicated in Table 6-1, p 
123, using an F test to determine
 
statistical difference, only brain drugs for the total cross section and
 
for the potential public, urban rail, nuclear power, cable TV, brain
 
drugs, space travel, and genetic engineering drew significantly different
 
responses between 1972 and 1974.
 
9Another indication of the significance of this change is that there 
was a statistically significant difference in 1974 between support by the
 
potential public and the rest of the sample. 
1 0 This change must be interpreted cautiously because of the rela­
tively small sample of the potential public in 1974, particularly with 
respect to computing the Helpful to Harmful ratio. Over 40% of the
 
samples were uncertain about both Benefit or Harm and these are not in­
cluded in this measure.
 
CHAPTER VIII
 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND THE ENERGY CRISIS AN UNEXPECTED DEPTH OF CONCERN
 
The public's attitudes toward technology form a reasonably con­
sistent pattern characterized by enthusiasms for the benefits of past
 
technological development. As for future-oriented technologies, there
 
are indications of an increasing propensity on the part of the public
 
to distinguish between them on the basis of their expected consequences
 
Further, there is evidence that the public relates technology's conse­
quences to the enhancement of some important social values and not to
 
others, as well as to conditions associated with various political
 
preferences.
 
Within this overall climate of opinion, attitudes toward the
 
energy technologies, which have been and are likely to be in the future
 
subjected to more than the usual amount of public debate, exhibit sever­
al unusual properties This chapter explores public attitudes concern­
ing two energy technologies, along with a number of issues generated in
 
part by the "energy crisis" of 1973-74.
 
The oil embargo clamped on the industrialized nations of the world
 
in 1973 by the oil producing countries of the Middle East was, for the
 
American people, an abrupt and rude lesson in international dependence,
 
and it sent a shock wave of apprehension and anxiety through the country
 
This crisis precipitated the first national experience of the widespread 
negative consequences of technological dependence to be felt by the whole
 
population For the first time, people became acquainted with the prob­
lens facing a "high technology" society dependent on vast quantities of
 
energy" primarily the difficulties of having continued access to rela­
tively cheap oil. The issues embedded in this problem, while
 
in the making for years, were thrust on the public with considerable
 
force What, then, were people's concerns? What were their beliefs
 
about the energy situation facing this nation, and about the issues which
 
had become associated wLth energy technologies? Did the crisis prompt
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changes in the public's perceptions of energy producing technologies ?
 
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CRISIS OF 1973-1974
 
Technologies associated with the production of energy, unlike space
 
technologies with their boom-and-bust quality, have to varying degrees
 
been the object of continually growing interest since World War II The
 
quest for unlimited atomic energy has been a public policy issue since
 
that time, with advocates of other energy producing technologies more
 
recently clamoring for a like share of public attention and largesse.
 
Two energy technologies were included in the 1972 survey as representing
 
areas which might become important focal points for public policy regard­
ing technological development--generation of electricity by nuclear power
 
plants and the satellite collection of solar energy to be transmitted to
 
earth for generating electricity. The events of the so-called energy
 
crisis of 1973 accelerated public interest in both these potentials and 
added an incentive for us to attempt a "follow up" survey. Fortunately,
 
we were able to carry out the TECH II survey, analysis of which enabled
 
us to gain some insight into the reactions of the public to the energy
 
crisis, as well as to monitor responses to those energy technologies
 
which had been included in the TECH I survey.
 
In the discussion that follows we shall emphasize any changes evi­
dent in the public's attitudes toward the two technologies which might
 
be tied in part to the energy crisis We will also be concerned with
 
understanding the larger context of attitude patterns shaped by that 
emergency We assume that the great outpouring of information that ac­
companied the events of the 1973-74 fuel shortages has had a significant 
impact on the public's perceptions and its information about energy pro­
ducing technologies and the sociopolitical context within which they 
might be developed The spotlight of concern over the nation's shrink­
ing energy supplies and its dependence upon foreign sources for oil 
glared into virtually every American household. Changes in public atti­
tudes toward the energy producing technologies included in this survey, 
then, signal changes in the public's perceptions and evaluations of the 
issues surrounding those technologies. 
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In terms of overall public support for the two energy technolo­
gies, the 1974 cross-section as a whole responded in much the same way as 
their counterparts had in 1972. There was a small, but statistically
 
insignificant, increase in support for both technologies (see Table 6-1, 
p. 123). But this was not mirrored by the potential public combined 
with the sharp drop in its enthusiasm for urban rail transit, an increase 
of 45 lifted solar energy technology to the top of the list of support 
by the potential public in 1974. But that group evinced nearly as sharp 
a decline in support for the nuclear generation of energy as they did for 
urban rail transit--some .58 points Ihile the potential public's sup­
port for nuclear energy was still well above their advocacy of most of 
the other technologies, its relative standing fell from second to fourth 
place.1
 
The attitude pattern for each of the two technologies differed
 
slightly with respect to reported certainties of their beneficial and/or
 
their harmful consequences. For attitudes toward nuclear energy, little
 
change occurred in either the Helpful.Harmful ratio or the ratio of mean 
certainties as computed either for the whole cross-section or for the po­
tential public (see Table 6-1). Thus the potential public remained con­
sistently somewhat less certain of the benefit of nuclear power than the
 
sample as a whole. Solar energy, however, was perceived by a modestly
 
increased proportion of the whole sample to be certainly beneficial.
 
Here again we see the potential publLc's response varying somewhat from 
the larger pattern a small decline from 7.25 to 7.00 is evident in the 
H H ratio. This decline indicates that fewer people were either "abso­
lutely" or "quite" certain that solar energy technology would result in 
benefits Even so, this technology had the highest Helpful to Harmful
 
ratio in 1974, due again to the decline in certainties about urban rail
 
transit. The mean degree of certainty ratio, however, increased from
 
1.55 to 1 99, indicating that of those who were certain of solar energy's
 
benefits, more were absolutely certain
 
A plausible interpretation of these data is that, for the general
 
public, both solar and nuclear energy producing technologies maintained
 
their intrinsic attractiveness in the face of the general decline in
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enthusiasm for technological development And, as can also be inferred
 
from Table 6-1, they came to recognize by 1974 that solar energy would
 
affect people's lives more than they had believed it would in 1972,
 
Given the popular discussions of energy matters stimulated by the 1973-4
 
energy crisis, such an outcome is quite consistent. But for the poten­
tial public's attitude a somewhat different interpretation is called for. 
This group had always been less sure than the general public about the 
certainty of benefits from nuclear energy, and, even in the face of the 
energy crisis, their support for this form of energy production dropped 
significantly by 1974 Solar energy, on the other hand, drew from a 
substantial portion of the potential public much more certain estimates
 
of benefit, although overall the intensification of this conviction for 
some was muted by a softening of it for others
 
Solar and nuclear energy technologies have been touted by their 
advocates as important to the solution of the nation's energy problems 
Were the public to become overwhelmingly convinced by these advocates, 
we would expect that certainties of benefits and/or harmful consequences 
would be less important statistically in predicting support or opposi­
tion Put in generic behavioral terms, when most people are convinced
 
that some particular course of action is a good thing, many are certain
 
of benefits compared to few certain of harm. That is, in a statistical 
sense, the distribution is so greatly skewed it is likely to lead to sub­
stantial error. However, if the consensus is not so clear cut that these
 
technologies are solutions with unmixed blessings, then perceived cer­
tainty of their benefits or harm§ would remain or increase in importance 
in determining decisions to support or oppose them. The distributions 
would not be greatly skewed as in the case of a high consensus and would 
be more suitable for analytical purposes Keeping this reasoning in 
mind, consider the data in Table 8-1, A. The decline in the correlations 
between support for solar energy and certainty of its benefit/harm show 
that this technology was increasingly perceived as an important and de­
sirable thing. Such was not the case, however, for the public's reaction
 
to nuclear energy Cross-section respondents' certainty of benefit
 
rose dramatically by .42 correlation points to r = .62 in importance in
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TABLE 8-1
 
CERTAINTIES AND SUBSTANCE FOR SOLAR AND NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
 
(cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74) 
A. CORRELATION OF ., 
CERTAINTY/SUPPORT 

(Pearson's r)
 
Benefit 

Harm 

SUBSTANCE OF CERTAINTIESt
B. 

(by percent)
 
Benefits
 
Conserve resources 

Assure supply 

Reduce pollution 

Harm 
Dangerous 

Too costly 

Cause pollutionb 

Impracticalb 

Waste disposalb 

SOLAR ENERGY NUCLEAR ENERGY 
'72 '74 '72 '74 
.6 1a .45 .20 .62 
.67 .45 .54 .66 
-.40 -.22 -.27 -.52 
-.41 - 32 -.54 -.72 
18%a 21% 19% 26% 
22 37 29 36 
55 70 54 69 
60 60 61 62 
38 36 39 30 
40 49 48 40 
21% 21% 41% 68% 
* 31 40 59 
32 62 * * 
60 69 * * 
- - 40 30 
50 25 
14 14 - -
34 21 
- - 14 28 
11 42 
aNumbers in top row for cross-section samples; bottom row for potential 
public. 
tCorrelations from Table 7-1; Substance from Table 7-4. 
bThis harmful consequence perceived for only one of the two technologies. 
*Less than 20% responing. 
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predicting support or opposition. There was a similar though smaller 
increase in correlations related to the certainty of harm The increase
 
for the potential public was only slight, for the "certainty" variable 
had already been highly correlated with its support for or opposition to
 
nuclear energy in 1972 These patterns suggest that the energy crisis
 
which stimulated increased information about solar and nuclear energy,
 
coming from both advocates and opponents, resulted in a widening enthusi­
asm for solar energy and a deepening hesitancy about the use of nuclear2 
power. Do other data corroborate this inference9 
The most straightforward reinforcement of this argument is found 
in the hopes and fears volunteered by people certain of beneficial and/or 
harmful consequences of these technologies Already set in their broader 
context in Chapter VII, these data are recapitulated in Table 8-1,B. The 
increased percentages of people, especially in the cross-section sample,
 
who hoped for assurance of adequate energy supplies seems a clear indi­
cation of the influence of the energy crisis and oil embargo on responses 
about certainty of benefit/harm. Interestingly, the promise of reduced
 
pollution which people associated with these technologies remained more
 
or less constant over the two years separating the surveys
 
That information from the debates over the technologies was being
 
digested by the public is also indicated by the changes in the number of 
people perceiving certain harms. The perceived danger of the technolo­
gies, especially of nuclear power plants, was increasingly evident and
 
was paralleled by a greatly increased apprehension about the problems of
 
nuclear waste disposal An incre-ased percentage of the whole sample be­
lieved solar energy would be too costly, though that concern did not
 
enter into their worries about the development of nuclear power. Finally,
 
less concern was evident about the polluting effects of nuclear energy
 
generation and about the impracticality of solar potentials.
 
These data suggest that learning had taken place regarding the pe­
culiar aspects of each energy technology and that its effects were mixed,
 
especially in terms of differing perceptions of likely harmful conse­
quences Like variations are echoed in more generalized perceptions of
 
the problems related to developing these technologies and in aspects of
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the public's responses to the energy crisis. 
In the 1974 TECH II survey, a number of questions asked specifical­
ly addressed aspects of the energy crisis and some of the issues related 
to it These questions tapped the kinds of concerns people had about 
energy matters, opinions as to whether or not the shortages were genuine, 
whether the oil companies were responsible for them and should be regu­
lated, whether nuclear power plants were safe enough, and finallypeople's 
preferences between adequate energy supplies, with the high level of em­
ployment it insures, and continued efforts to improve the quality of the 
environment. Data related to these inquiries will be discussed at some
 
length in the following section of this chapter Suffice it now simply 
to report in Table 8-2 the salient relationships between them and the de­
gree of support for the two energy producing technologies.
 
Notable associations between attitudes on those issues and support
 
for the energy technologies were evident mainly in the potential public's
 
responses, and they form an interesting pattern which suggests a dis­
tinction between perceptions of the relatively established nuclear power
 
plants and the untried, rather esoteric process of satellite collection
 
of solar energy. Agreement that recent energy shortages were genuine 
was minimally associated with support for solar energy It was as if 
support for the new untied solar technology increased in proportion to 
perception of the situation as serious enough to'warrant the risk. Sup­
port for nuclear power plants, on the other hand, was much more related 
to judgments about the safety of the enterprise and to the importance of 
assured energy supplies and high employment levels even if this meant en­
vironmental degradation
 
Not surprisingly, agreement that nuclear power plants were "safe
 
enough" was strongly associated with support for them Less dramatical­
ly related to support for this technology was the conviction that energy 
supplies and high levels of employment took priority over safeguarding 
environmental quality On the other hand, the potential public's modest
 
opposition to nuclear development was apparently somewhat related to its 
tendency to agree that the oil companies were, in part, to blame for the 
"crisis" and should be more closely regulated by the government. 3 Thus, 
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TABLE 8-2 
CORRELATES OF SUPPORT FOR SOLAR AND NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public, '72; '74)
 
ITEM SOLAR ENERGY NUCLEAR ENERGY 
'72 '74 '72 '74 
b *a b ,Energy shortage genuine. 
.15 * 
Nuclear power plants safe enough. * .53 
* .55 
oil companies responsible and * * 
should be regulated. * -.14 
Energy, employment more important * .26 
than environment. * .32 
Outcome of science. * * * * 
* .18 * .32 
Outcome of technology. -.27 -.25 -.27 -.15
 
-.25 -.27 -.40 -.27
 
Value of scientific activities. -.25 * * * 
• * -.28 * 
aTop number for cross-section sample; lower, for potential public.
bSpace blank indicates question is not asked in TECH I, 1972. 
Cfased on scale of items described below.
 
r < .20. 
questions related more closely to the consequences of the development of 
nuclear energy, rather than the conditions behind its initial development,
 
were more important in differentiating support from opposition Also,
 
indirect evidence indicates that these two technologies evoked a differ­
ent perception after the energy crisis had occurred. The last three
 
items on Table 8-2 (data already presented for the potential public in
 
Table 7-5) remind us that support for nuclear energy technology in 1974
 
was related to a decline in the belief that the outcomes of technologi­
cal activity complicate live or create too much dependence and to less
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optimism about the value of unrestrained scientific research activity.
 
But there was some indication from the potential public that nuclear
 
power was associated with the general opinion that the outcomes of
 
science are positive. These changes suggest that the events of the
 
energy crisis urged a reevaluation, at least, of the consequences of
 
energy technologies. Perhaps, on reflection, they seemed less to compli­
cate life; for some, given contemporary events, even capable of reducing 
its complications. Changes in the data from 1972 to 1974 also suggest
 
that, at least for the potential public, the development of nuclearpower 
might require more regulation of science activities than had seemed sensi­
ble to that politically more aware group in 1972. To the extent these
 
inferences are valid, to that extent the energy crisis prompted quite a 
complex set of responses from the public. 
THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC RESPONSES TO THE ENERGY CRISIS
 
The rest of this chapter explores aspects of the broader attitude 
context of the public's reactions to the oil embargo and the energy
 
crisis of 1973-74 The kinds of individual concerns or worry invoked by 
the crisis are explored first, followed by a discussion of attitudes 
about the genuineness of the energy crisis and the place of the oil 
companies in creating it, the issue of the safety of nuclear power plants, 
and the tension between the production of energy and maintaining high em­
ployment levels and continued improvement of the environment. Finally,
 
since the national government has had such a visible role in attempting
 
to cope with the energy situation, we examine the degree to which the
 
public has confidence in its government leaders and examine the corre­
lates to such judgments 
THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC CONCERN
 
It is clear from Table 8-3 that in 1974 relatively few people were
 
really concerned about the short term, "temporarily" inconveniencing
 
consequences of fuel shortages.4 Only about a fifth of the cross-section
 
sample and the potential public noted the irritations of waiting in 
service station lines or the discomforts of reduced home heating. And 
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a TABLE 8-3 
CONCERNS ABOUT THE ENERGY CRISIS 
(cross-section sample and potential public, 1974)
 
A CONCERN CROSS-SECTION POTENTIAL PUBLIC 
(n=314) (n=137) 
1. 	Waiting in line for gas 20.7% 18.5%
 
2. 	Reducing heat in home 18.1 11.3
 
3. 	Being laid off from work 29.0 28.1
 
4. 	Lowering air pollution
 
standards 41.2 53.9
 
5. 	Running out of gas before
 
the end of the century 37.1 40.7
 
6. 	 People not recognizing the
 
problem and continuing their
 
wasteful habits 	 70.1 71.8
 
NUMBER OF CONCERNS 
B CROSS- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X SD n 
SECTION: 5.2% 29.2 34.1 17.8 7.7 2.0 4.1 2.16 1.34 314 
POTENTIAL 
PUBLIC: 2.7 27.4 34.9 18.9 11.2 3.8 1.1 2.24 1.22 122 
just a few more were worried about unemployment Rather, the threat of 
backsliding on environmental quality, the longer range worries of fuel 
depletion, and continued individual energy wasteful behavior were more 
on the public's mind This concern for the longer range outcome was es­
pecially evident in the 70% of the whole sample and the 72% of the po­
tential public who were quite disturbed that others would not recognize
 
the situation as serious enough to warrant changes in their energy use
 
habits. Such large proportions of respondents voicing this concern 
about their fellows may in and of itself be an indication that pros­
pects are good for conservation efforts in individual energy consumption 
patterns * Prospects for change in individual consumer behavior would,
 
*It should be remembered, of course, that these responses were made in
 
mid-1974 and may have changed or intensified in the past year and a half 
as a consequence of the increased and sustained attention to energy re­
lated issues.
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of course, be enhanced by a general conviction on the part of the public 
that the energy crisis was actually genuine and indicative of a long term 
problem. To what degree was the crisis believed in 1974 to be genuine?
 
From the data summarized in Table 8-4, there appears to have been 
mixed judgments on this matter. As a group, our respondents agreed both 
that "the energy shortage is genuine and will be with us for a long time" 
and that "the energy shortage has been mainly created by the oil compa­
nies in order to make greater profits." Agreement with the first as­
sertion is consistent with the large proportions who worried about waste­
ful behavior and with the third of the sample worried about running out
 
of petroleum by the end of the century * The second, more cynical, be­
lief ran parallel to an assertion with which about two-thirds of the
 
sample agreed, namely that "government is run by a few large interests
 
5
 
looking out for themselves."
 
To what' degree are the two responses contradictory? If the energy 
shortage was genuine and a long term problem,can it also have been con­
trived by the oil companies ? The high proportions of the sample agree­
ing with both assertions obviously suggest that many people felt that al­
though the oil companies had to a significant degree exacerbated the 
problem of recent shortages, the overall energy situation was in fact a 
complex, longer term problem. But to some degree the two assertions in 
question also represented the opposed 3udgments of two different groups. 
Significant portions of our respondents held one belief, which, as is 
more to be expected, made another belief less credible positive re­
sponses to one of these assertions correlated negatively with positive 
responses to the other--r = - 27 for the potential public (see Table 8-5 
on page 196). 
Over 87% of the sample agreed that "we need stricter government
 
control over the petroleum industry to prevent future shortages " The 
correlation between this belief and agreement that the oil companies
 
were mainly responsible for the "crisis" was reasonably high r = .32 for
 
the cross-section, .58 forthepotentialpublic. Increasedregulation as a
 
'For the potential public, there was an r = 31 between belief in a genu­
ine shortage and noting a concern about wasteful behavior. 
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means of assuring fuel supplies was somewhat more favorable to liberals 
than to conservatives; correlation between liberal ideology and favoring 
increased regulation was r = .22 for the public-at-large and .36 for the 
potential public Data related to agreement that the oil companies were 
mainly responsible for the fuel problem and that control over them should 
be increased were combined to form the "Oil Companies and Energy Crisis 
Table 8-4 6Scale" noted in 
ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ENERGY CRISIS 
The context of the public's response to the energy crisis includes
 
in part its collective judgments about the promise of the energy tech­
nologies in solving overall energy problems and the priorities the pub­
lic feels committed to in pursuing a solution. In addition, there is
 
the matter of underlying public confidence in the government's veracity
 
in informing its citizens and its dependability in representing them as 
the search for improved energy conditions continues. 
Two questions, combined in a "Nuclear Safety Scale" probed the de­
gree to which the public believed that nuclear power stations were safe 
7 
enough to continue developing As Table 8-4 suggests there was moder­
ately widespread agreement throughout the sample that nuclear power
 
stations were, indeed, safe enough This judgment is consistent with 
the relatively high level of support for the nuclear generation of power 
reported in the previous chapters.
 
Questions directly related to the difficult business of tradeoffs
 
in finding solutions to our energy problems were combined in an "Energy/ 
Employment Over Environment Scale " The first question concerned the 
priority that should be given to assuring energy supplies, even though 
the expansion of coal burning, steam generators, and of course nuclear 
power stations, might further erode the quality of the environment. The 
other question concerned the potential reduction of industrial jobs if en­
vironmental standards were rigorously imposed on the development of energy po­
8 
tentials Overall, our respondents were almost evenly divided on these
 
matters, with a significant portion of the sample agreeing that the pro­
tection of the environment should be given a higher priority than either
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providing dependable energy supplies or maintaining high employment
 
levels. While the strength of agreement dropped for the item which in­
cluded potential job loss, the overall resolve to continue improvement
 
of the quality of air and water was striking. This response suggests
 
the degree to which the public has become committed to the reduction of
 
pollution and other environmentally damaging activities and is quite
 
consistent with other data reported in Chapters VI and VII on the per­
* 
ceived importance of environmental effects.
 
Finally, an attempt was made to determine the level of public trust
 
in government leaders and elected officials Questions were put which
 
baldly asked people if they thought their government leaders always tell
 
them the truth and if most elected officials can be counted on to work 
9
 
for the things which people really believe in As Table 8-4 indicates, 
overwhelming distrust of government leaders, elected or not, was evident, 
this low confidence follows the trend reported by many recent polls that 
have charted such disenchantment with the country's leaders.
 
Thus far, our analysis of the context of responses to the energy
 
crisis can be summed up as follows both the public-at-large and the
 
potential public for technological politics appear to be quite concerned
 
about the longer term problems of energy resources They believed the
 
shortages experienced in 1973-74 to have been genuine and to signal long
 
term problems At the same time, they held the oil companies, in their
 
pursuit of profits, responsible for making the situation worse in the
 
short run, and they tended to opt for more strict controls on them to
 
prevent future shortages Both nuclear and solar energy technologies
 
continued to be seen favorably, with a good deal of confidence expressed
 
that nuclear power plants are safe enough for continued development.
 
Solar energy was perceived even more hopefully in 1974 after the crisis.
 
The public was nearly equally divided in terms of priorities on the issue
 
of whether or not environemntal quality should be placed ahead of ex­
panded energy generating capacity and high employment levels Over 45%
 
'For the potential public, there was an r = .47 between asserting en­
vironmental priorities and noting a concern for I'lowering air pollution
 
standards " 
TABLE 8-4 
0 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ENERGY RESPONSE CONTEXT FACTOR (cross-section sample and potential public, 1974) 
#V STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
1 2 
AGREE/ 
DISAGREE 
3 4 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
5 
MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION N 
Energy shortage 
genuine 
15.9%a 
12.7 
17.1% 
16.7 
6.8% 
3.0 
36.5% 
38.4 
23.7% 
29.2 
3.35 
3.55 
1.42 
1.40 
298 
120 
Oil firm andb 
energy crisis 
scale 
12.2 
17.4 
19.0 
16.1 
-
-
33.4 
33.3 
35.4 
33.2 
2.92 
2.82 
1.02 
1.08 
310 
121 
Nuclear safety 
scale 
12.2 
15.8 
17.7 
16.6 
22.8 
17.7 
20.7 
21.6 
26.7 
28.3 
3.32 
3.30 
1.36 
1.44 
303 
118 
Energy/employ-
ment: environ-
ment scalec 
20.4 
27.3 
20.8 
22.0 
19.0 
16.2 
28.4 
17.7 
11.4 
16.8 
2.90 
2.75 
1.33 
1.46 
287 
115 
Trust in govern-
ment scale 
32.4 
27.5 
21.4 
23.3 
18.3 
15.3 
18.5 
20.8 
9.4 
13.0 
2.51 
2.68 
1.36 
1.41 
314 
122 
aTop figure for cross-section sample; 
bonly four point scale. 
lower for potential public. 
CIndicates agreement that energy expansion and keeping 
trolling pollution. 
3obs should have priority over con­
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TABLE 8-5 
CONTEXT OF THE ENERGY CRISIS, 1973-1974 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public 1974)
 
ENERGY/EMPLOY-
ENERGY SHORT- OIL COMPANIES/ NUCLEAR MENT OVER EN-
ITEM AGE GENUINE ENERGY CRISIS SAFETY SCALE VIRONMENT 
Energy 
Shortage 
Genuine
 
Oil Firm -.21 -­
and Energy -.27 
Crisis 
Nuclear , -. 18 --
Safety , -. 22 --
Scale 
Energy/Em­
ployment 
over En-
* 
* 
-.19 
-.41 
.28 
.44 
-­
-­
vironment 
Trust 
Government 
Officials 
Scale 
.29 
.30 
* 
-.24 
* 
.30 
* 
.28 
aTop figure for cross-section; lower for potential public. 
r < .20. 
government control over them It was as if these people shied away from
 
making too much of the oil companies as "fall guys" in the crisis--per­
haps because they saw a certain amount of scape-goating in hasty attri­
butions of cause and felt it to be counter productive to making real 
progress toward creative solutions to the energy problem. Also evident 
is a moderate correlation, for both the whole cross-section and the po­
tential public, between the conviction that nuclear power plants are safe 
enough and that pollution control should take precedence over energy de­
velopment. This relationship is consistent with the positive association 
between support for nuclear energy technology and the Energy/Employment 
vs. Environment Scale discussed earlier (see Table 8-2). 
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of the potential public hold strongly to environmental priorities even in 
the face of energy needs. All this is to be considered in the context of 
the widespread and fairly intense distrust of government just reported 
Within that mass of attitudes are there points of reinforcement 
or contradiction9 Table 8-5 presents the matrix of correlations among
 
the five scale variables discussed thus far The pattern which emerges
 
presents some interesting combinations and suggests, again, that atti­
tudes of the potential public are more integrated than those of the
 
larger group. Consistent relationships occurred between the degree to
 
which the potential public distrusted governmental leaders and the sever­
al energy crisis response indicators. The implications of these relation­
ships are important because of the highly visible and assertive role the 
government has attempted to play in dealing with the many aspects of the 
energy crisis The more trust there was toward government leaders, the
 
more tendency there was to believe that the energy crisis was genuine,
 
that nuclear power stations are safe enough, that environmental priori­
ties should be maintained in the face of energy needs, and that the oil
 
companies were not largely to blame for fuel shortages and should not be
 
held in check. But recall that over half the sample was not disposed to
 
trust or have confidence in governmental officials. Then, the force of
 
these associations runs in the other direction. Those who distrust govern­
mental officials tended to agree that the energy crisis was not genuine
 
and that oil companies were to blame, that nuclear power plants are not
 
safe enough and that energy supply and employment should take priority
 
over protecting the quality of the environment. 
The inverse relationship between believing the energy crisis genu­
ine and attributing responsibility to the oil companies has already been
 
noted There is a similar relationship between perceptions of the oil
 
companies' responsibility and bothbelief in safe nuclear power and in the 
priority of environmental quality over energy development. That is, those
 
who believed nuclear power plants were safe enough and those who deemed
 
environmental needs equal to or ahead of energy and employment matters
 
tended to see the oil companies in a more favorable light with respect
 
to their part in the energy crisis and to be dubious about increasing
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The data then present a pattern of moderate association between
 
support for the development of nuclear technology and concern for en­
vironmental quality in the responses of those uneasy about overreacting 
to the oil companies' activities before and during the energy crisis. 
At the same time there is sufficient distrust of government to increase 
the difficulty for both advocates of nuclear power and of improved en­
vironmental standards alike in working through the established organs 
of government to gather public support for their programs. Do other 
data further enrich our understanding of the context of public response 
to the energy crisis? 
POLITICAL CORRELATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ENERGY CRISIS 
Associations of responses to the issues surrounding the energy
 
crisis and development of energy technologies as potential solutions
 
with people's political attitudes weave an increasingly intricate pat­
tern of meaning Their understanding of those technologies is linked
 
to the beliefs they hold and the judgments they make Table 8-6 summa­
rizes these associations between three main issues* and the perceptions 
of the two energy producing technologies and of the antiballistic missile 
system (ABM) The ABM data is included because this technology seems to
 
be moderately associated by the public with nuclear energy, perhaps on 
the grounds of their mutual radioactivity 10 
Responses to solar energy technology differed characteristically 
from responses to nuclear energy technology insofar as association with 
judgments about the oil companies' responsibility for the oil crisis is 
concerned those few who were certain that harmful consequences would 
result from solar energy development tended to agree that the oil compa­
nies had intensified the crisis But those who estimated considerable 
impact upon themselves or others as a consequence of solar technology
 
were dubious about the oil companies' role in creating the shortages.
 
These respondents in the potential public also tended to support both
 
* 
Associations between the variables and the "energy shortage is genuine"
 
item were limited to support of solar energy already reported.
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TABLE 8-6
 
PERCEPTIONS OF ENERGY-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES AND
 
THE CONTEXT OF THE ENERGY CRISIS
 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public, 1974)
 
ATTITUDES TOWARD 
TECHNOLOGY 
OIL COMPANIES 
ENERGY CRISIS 
& 
NUCLEAR SAFETY 
ENERGY/EMPLOYMENT 
OVER ENVIRONMENT 
Solar Energy 
Impacts of Self -. 34a 
-.26 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Impacts of Others -.35 
-.23 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Cert. of Harm 
Nuclear Energy 
* 
.29 
* 
* * 
* 
Support * 
-.21 
.53 
.54 
.26 
.29 
Impact of Self -.21 * * 
Cert. of Benefit * 
• 
.48 
.50 
* 
.32 
Cert. of Harm * -.51 -.36 
* -.54 -.40 
ABM 
Support * .29 
.53 
* 
.38 
Impacts of Self * 
• 
* 
.25 
* 
* 
-Impacts of Others * 
* 
* 
.22 
* 
* 
Cert. of Benefit * 
• 
.22 
.42 
* 
* 
Cert. of Harm .21 
.32 
-.29 
-.45 
-. 30 
-.44 
Atomic Bomb Beneficial * 
* 
.31 
.34 
.24 
.42 
aTop figure for cross-section sample, lower for potential public. 
r < .20. 
199 
nuclear energy development and the ABM, those who opposed these develop­
ments tended to blame the oil companies for the energy crisis. Again,
 
those certain of harm from the ABM also believed the oil companies culpa­
ble It was as if indirect hostility to industrial technology encompassed 
-both space and weapons development More speculatively, the bits of data 
relating impact on self and on others with less certainty about the oil
 
companies' adverse role may reflect a kind of feeling that "if big busi­
ness is involved, we hope it won't be harmful to us " 
In terms of the other issues concerning nuclear power plant safety 
and the tradeoff between environmental integrty and energy-and-employ­
ment, similar patterns emerged for the ABM and nuclear energy technolo­
gies Those who believed that nuclear power plant developments were safe
 
enough also tended to strongly support nuclear energy development and the
 
ABM In part this relationship was due apparently to consistent tenden­
cies associating confidence in nuclear plant safety and certainty of
 
benefits for both technologies. Of course, the obverse was also the
 
case; those who were certain of harmful results from either the ABM or
 
nuclear power generation did not have much confidence in plant safety
 
And the potential public evinced moderate association between plant
 
safety and estimates of the ABM's strong impact on themselves and 
others
 
A less extensive pattern was found in the data regarding the trade­
off between energy and employment and environmental quality. In this
 
case those who rated energy and employment over pursuit of environmental
 
quality were in favor of the development of nuclear energy and the ABM 
And, as might we expect, those certain of harm resulting from the two
 
technologies disagreed that energy development should be placed above
 
continued efforts to improve the environment.
 
A relatively close association between both aspects of nuclear de­
velopment--that designed for peaceful energy production and that geared
 
to military use--seems to exist in the public mind. The relatively high
 
associations between judgments on nuclear power plants and the ABM and
 
positive evaluation of the consequences of the atomic bomb would ap­
pear to characterize a kind of atomic era syndrome.
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Our discussion of the context of public responses to the energy
 
crisis concludes with an examination of the associations between the atti­
tudes toward various issues related to the crisis and more general atti­
tudes toward technology and political values and characteristics The po­
tential public again provides distinctive clusters of associations around 
the four issue areas used for analytic purposes here genuineness of the 
energy crisis, oil company responsibility, nuclear safety, and the energy/
 
employment-environment trade-off. As shown in Table 8-7, the two general
 
attitudes regarding the regulation of technology and the belief that the
 
outcomes of technology complicate life and induce too much dependence on
 
technology were consistently related to those issue areas Those in the
 
potential public who felt more regulation of technology was sensible
 
tended to question whether the energy shortages of 1973-74 were genuine 
and to believe that nuclear power stations were safe enough. This sug­
gests a tendency to believe that the regulation of technology would not
 
ultimately cripple the development of nuclear energy and therefore could
 
improve the energy resource situation At the same time, those in the
 
general public who felt that technology complicated life did not agree
 
that nuclear power plants were safe enough, their counterparts in the 
potential public tended to believe that the oil companies exacerbated
 
the crisis. To contrast the positive associations between the Regula­
tion-of-Technology scale and Nuclear Safety scale and the Energy/Environ­
ment scale with the negative associations between these latter scales
 
and the Outcomes-of-Technology scale hints at the possibility of a di­
vision within our samples We do see a politically oriented division
 
emerging when political characteristics and social and political values 
are considered.
 
The three political orientation variables reported in Table 8-7 
indicate important differences between responses to these issues by con­
servatives and liberals and by Republicans and Democrats. It is clear 
there was a consistent division of opinion in liberals and 'Democrats, es­
pecially those in the potential public, who tended to believe both that 
the energy crisis was genuine in the long run and that oil companies were 
responsible for its short term intensity They also judged that nuclear 
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TABLE 8-7 
POLITICAL AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE ENERGY CRISIS, 1974
 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public, 1974)
 
ENERGY/EMPLOY-
ENERGY SHORT- OIL COMPANIES/ NUCLEAR MENT OVER EN-
INDICATOR AGE GENUINE ENERGY CRISIS SAFETY SCALE VIRONMENT 
* (.21) b Regulate *a 
technology -. 25 * .25 * 
scale 
Outcome of * * -. 24 * 
technology * .20 -. 34 * 
Political * .27 * * 
party * .38 * * 
Party * * -. 30 * 
ideology * .36 -. 34 -. 34 
Party/ .33 .37 -.21 -.22
 
ideology .24 .43 -.27 -.52
 
typology
 
aTop figure for cross section; lower for potential public.

b 
r is for the Regulate Science Scale. 
r < .20. 
power stations were not safe enough and held that increased energy sup­
plies and employment should not necessarily be put ahead of improving
 
the environment More conservative (and Republican) citizens, conversely, 
were not sure the energy crisis was a long term problem, nor that the 
oil companies were to blame or should be regulated. On the other hand, 
they were more confident that nuclear power stations were safe enough 
and that energy needs should be allowed to take precedence over environ­
mental quality 
These associations were reasonably strong, especially in regard to
 
the policy matters of the trade-offs between energy and employment and 
the environment. They signal a relatively high degree of partisan differ­
ence in 1974 over this issue The character of this division is shown,
 
in part, by the strong correlations between agreement that energy should
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have a higher priority than environmental concerns and various social/ 
political values already discussed in previous chapters. Table 8-8 
shows the relationship between these sociopolitical values and opinions
 
about energy and environmental priorities, political ideology, and the
 
party/ideology typology established for previous analytic contexts. It 
is clear from these data that a relatively sharp division existed be­
tween those who believed effect on employment and taxes should be a 
major consideration in decision making about technology and those who 
are very concerned about the environmental problems. 12 Again, we see 
the quite systematic distribution within the potential public. Combined 
with the relatively high correlations between ranking environmental con­
cerns highly and liberal political commitments compared to the concerns 
of those with conservative political persuasions, there is an obvious
 
pattern of partial polarization To what degree this has increased, re­
mained the same, or decreased as a consequence of recent discussions 
about the environment is, of course, impossible to determine, though the 
question is one of the most intriguing to emerge from these data. 
TABLE 8-8 
ENERGY VS. ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES AND 
SOCIOPOLITICAL VALUES AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
(Pearson's r; cross-section sample and potential public, 1974) 
b ENERGY/EMPLOYMENT POLITICAL PARTY/IDEOLOGYVALUES OVER ENVIRONMENT IDEOLOGY TYPOLOGY 
Employment .23 * * 
21 a * -. 24 
Environment -.37 .34 * 
-. 23 * .28 
Taxes .24 * * 
.46 -.26 

bTop figures for cross section; lower for potential public. 
See discussion in Chapter V.
*r < .20. 
-.27 
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SUMMARY
 
The public's experience during the oil embargo and energy crisis
 
of 1973-74 evoked a complex set of reactions to the issues surrounding,
 
the fuel shortage and apparently stimulated significant changes in the
 
public's evaluation of two important energy producing technologies--solar
 
energy collected by satellite and the nuclear generation of electricity.
 
Both the public-at-large and the potential public expressed strong con­
cerns about the long term seriousness of the energy situation and tended 
to believe that the energy crisis was genuine and signalled long term
 
problems. At the same time, there was considerable feeling that the oil
 
companies, in their pursuit of profits, acted so as to exacerbate the
 
problems in the short term. Stricter government controls over the pe­
troleum industry appeared to be desirable to a majority of our respond­
ents. Both of the energy producing technologies continued to be seen
 
favorably in 1974. Solar energy was perceived more hopefully in 1974
 
after the fuel shortages, nuclear energy, while still drawing strong sup­
port, was seen as more problematical than in 1972. There was a good deal
 
of confidence, in 1974, that nuclear power plants were safe enough to be
 
built, although there was a greatly increased concern about the problems
 
of disposing of radioactive wastes and the overall danger posed by nuclear
 
reactor developments
 
The public was nearly equally divided in its consideration of the 
tradeoff between assuring adequate energy supplies and maintaining em­
ployment level, on the one hand, and continuing to protect the quality 
of the nation's air and water on the other Other 45% of the potential 
public held strongly that environmental priorities should prevail over 
energy supply needs--even in the face of the clear demonstration -that 
supplies might be sharply reduced
 
This division was reinforced by the belief, on the part of those
 
who held priorities of energy over improvement of the environment, that
 
nuclear power plants are safe enough and that the oil companies were not
 
particularly culpable in circumstances attending the energy crisis This
 
belief tended to be reversed for the environmentally minded. Underlying
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these attitudes, sufficient distrust of governmental officials (related
 
to these issues) reduced the effectiveness for both the advocates of
 
nuclear power and of environmental quality improvement, of turning to
 
government in mobilizing support for their programs.
 
Finally, a degree of partisan and ideological identification is
 
detectable in responses to some of the issues concerning the energy 
issue. This is mainly evident with regard to self-identified liberal or 
conservative pursuasions. Thus, these issues may be emerging as politi­
cized ones; conservatives more than liberals favor high energy availa­
bility and employment levels over environmental protection, and more 
conservatives than liberals are reasonably sure that nuclear power de­
velopments are safe enough to continue expansion. On the other hand, 
conservatives were less sure than liberals that the energy crisis was 
genuine and that the oil companies should be blamed or subject to 
stricter regulation With only one slice in time represented by the 
data from this part of the survey, it is impossible to say with high 
confidence that such apparently emerging trends are evidence of an 
ideological polarization. But it seems a distinct possibility This
 
question raises many other intriguing ones for further investigation.
 
NOTES
 
iThis decline was one of four statistically significant decreases
 
in support between 1972 and 1974.
 
2Regression analysis yields results consistent with this interpre­
tation. See Table 7-2, page
 
3This instance of distrust of the oil companies may be due in part
 
to a fairly strong association with liberal political ideology, typical­
ly anti-big business. See Table 8-7, page 201 below.
 
4 The particulars of people's energy concerns listed in Table 8-3 
were framed as follows in the 1974 questionnaire: "During the last few 
months people have started to think about energy and the part it plays 
in their lives. Some people are not concerned about the situation; 
others are. Which of these things really concern you?..." Compare J.R. 
Murray, et al., "Evolution of Public Response to the Energy Crisis," 
Sclence 184 (April 19, 1974), 257-263.
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5Correlations between these items was r = .36 and .41 for the 
cross-section samples and the potential public respectively.
 
6Correlations of the first of these items with the scale were r 
= 
.78 for the cross section and .87 for the potential public; correlations 
of the second item were .87, for the cross section and potential public
 
both.
 
7Exact wording was "Do you agree or disagree that atomic power 
plants are safe enough so that one need not worry about them exploding 
or leaking radiation"' and "Do you agree or disagree that even if atomic 
power plants are not 100% safe, they are safe enough for us to go ahead 
and build them?" Correlation of the first question with the Nuclear 
Safety Scale was r = .89 for the cross section and .90 for the potential 
public. 
8Both questions were in a modulated forced-choice format. Respond­
ents were asked to indicate how closely their own opinion was to one or
 
the other of two mutually contradictory statements. Exact wording of
 
the questions was (1) "We should not allow our growing need for energy
 
to cause any slowdown in controlling pollution and improving the quality
 
of the air and water" OR "If it comes to a choice, our need for energy 
has to come ahead of an all-out emphasis on the quality of air and water." 
(2) "We must produce enough energy to keep the factories going and people
 
on the job even if it means more pollution of the air and water" OR "We
 
should not allow any further pollution, even if some people lose their
 
3obs as a result of the energy shortage." Correlations of the Energy/
 
Pollution item with the Energy/Environment Scale were r = .79 for the
 
cross section and .84 for the potential public; correlations of the
 
Energy/Employment/Pollution item with that scale were r = -.77 for the
 
cross section and -. 86 for the potential public. 
9Exact wording was ()--(forced-choice format)--"Our government
 
leaders usually tell us the truth" OR "Most of the things that our gov­
ernment leaders say cannot be believed"; (2)-- (agree/disagree format)-­
"Do you agree or disagree that most elected officials can be counted on
 
to work for things which you really believe in?" The correlations be­
tween responses to (1) and the Trust-Zn-Government Scale were r = .76
 
for the cross section and .79 for the potential public; to (2), they
 
were r = -.65 for the cross section and -.67 for the potential public. 
10Correlations between support for the ABM and nuclear energy in 
1972 were r = .27 for the cross-section samples and .25 for the potential
 
public; in 1974 they were r = .20 for the cross section and .35 for the
 
potential public 
llItem used in Present Technology Evaluation Index, discussed in 
Chapter III.
 
1 2Correlations between high rankings of tax and employment concerns
 
were r = .22 for the cross section and .36 for the potential public;
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between high rankings of environmental and employment concerns they were 
r = -. 27 and -. 42 respectively. The correlation between high ranking of 
environmental and tax concerns was r = -. 27 for the cross section.
 
PART FOUR
 
A WARY PUBLIC AND THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY
 
In the final section of this report, we will draw together 
the many premises, findings, and inferences from preceding chap­
ters and from them attempt to frame a coherent statement (albeit 
an incomplete one) of how such evidence bears on the major issue 
of the political control of technology. In Chapter IX we return 
to a theme briefly outlined near the beginning of this book two
 
opposed perspectives on the future control of technological de­
velopment. One of these, typically American, voices an optimis­
tic confidence in incremental decision making, the other is cast
 
in the much more sombre tones of European pessimism. Together, 
these two perspectives capture the extremes of thought currently
 
dominant in addressing the challenge with which a technological
 
society confronts its political decision making processes. So
 
that an empirical test of the assumptions underlying these view­
points may be made, key elements within each of them are reca­
pitulated and extended. Chapter X concludes the study by gather­
ing together the major findings to emerge from the TECH I and
 
TECH II surveys and discussing some research and policy implica­
tions which we believe derive empirically from those results
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CHAPTER IX
 
THE POLITICS AND BEHAVIOR OF TECHNOLOGICAL DISSENT
 
Technological innovations have almost always been met with enthusi­
astic acceptance in the United States For the last century and a half, 
an "ideology" asserting that technological development holds the key to 
progress has flourished.1 Both foreign and domestic observers have often 
sought out the roots of this ideology and commented upon the profound 
commitment of the American people to it. For example, even as early 
as 1830 Alexis de Tocqueville was struck by the preoccupation of the men 
of democracy with "practical applications of science " He noted that for 
those people, "every new method which leads by a shorter road to wealth, 
every machine which spares labor, every instrument which diminishes the 
cost of production, every discovery which facilitates pleasures or aug­
ments them, seems to be the grandest effort of the human intellect .2
 
Encountering virtually no resistance, new technological systems
 
were implemented which have affected practically every portion of so­
ciety Historians have documented, for example, how a system of slavery

3
 
was made "economical" as a consequence of the cotton gin, we have seen
 
how the primary capacities of the railroads enabled the pioneers to push

4
 
back the wilderness, how automobiles have increased personal mobility

5
 
and transformed cities, and how large data processing systems have organ­
ized and analyzed masses of information at rates heretofore unimagined.
6
 
Undesirable consequences have often accompanied such technological
 
feats, although until recently the benefit of such developments by far
 
seemed to outweigh the untoward results they also prompted But with
 
growing frequency during the last ten years concerns have arisen about
 
the increasingly evident negative impacts of technological systems on the
 
environment, on public safety and health, and on the overall quality of
 
life. Such consequences of technical developments were probably entirely
 
unanticipated at the time they were innovated They are unfortunate sur­
prises with which society must cope, long after substantial societal
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investments and adjustments exacted by the particular technology have
 
been made
 
One reason why these unpleasant surprises come along is simply the
 
7 
limitation of man's vision. But (as we argued in Chapter I) another,
 
equally basic, reason for undesirable outcomes is the increase in organ­
ized social complexity which technology stimulates. 8 Previously disjunct
 
sectors of society have merged into new networks of interaction, prompted,
 
among other things, by the new capacities they provide and by the im­
mense infrastructures necessary for their successful application This
 
increased systemic complexity reduces the possibility for accurately an­
ticipating the consequences of social action Cause and effect reason­
ing is often confounded even in the short term by the actualities of
 
highly complex systems. Long term predictions are subject to even great­
er error One can only assume that a proliferation of unforeseen tech­
nology-induced negative consequences will follow in the wake of future
 
9
 
efforts to prevent other such consequences.
 
How then should we proceed? Neither resignation nor a neo-Luddite
 
shut-down are attractive options The key may be in finding a suitable
 
10 
point of balance between the relatively probable and the uncertain,
 
for even small shifts in the degree to which uncertainty is discounted
 
can have important consequences for policy outcomes. But how successful
 
can we hope to be in preventing technology's unanticipated consequences?
 
And what kinds of attitudes on the part of the public would be likely to
 
foster any such success ?
 
Among the many commentaries on the problem of the future impacts
 
of technological development two of the most comprehensive arguments
 
stand out as representing extremes of opposed thought on the subject.
 
The first relies heavily on the case made by pluralist-incrementalists-­
that through constant monitoring and readjustment of policy, mistakes
 
can be caught and corrected in time. The second theory, to the contrary,
 
holds that a self-moving, automatic acceptance of the "one best way" so
 
conditions decision makers to discount the uncertain and the unquanti­
fiable that society is inevitably condemned to harmful technological sur­
prises, whose amelioration must be bought at the price of successive
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harmful surprises. The two theories make diametrically opposite
 
predictions about the outcomes of technological decision making. This
 
chapter explores these predictions in detail, distilling from them a
 
firm set of fundamental propositions which can be tested and the future
 
implications of which assessed.
 
TWO PERSPECTIVES
 
The case for incremental policy making as determined by pluralist
 
interactions has been argued by numerous students of American politics
 
'No interesting works have succinctly adapted these arguments to techno­
logical decision making. A report on technology assessment prepared by
 
a panel selected by the National Academy of Science for the House of
 
Representatives argues that all possible means of reducing the costs
 
(negative consequences) of errors should be explored beforehand in as-'
 
sessing the impact of technology and making choices as to how we imple­
12 
ment new possibilities We should, for example, favor technologies
 
which allow maximum room for future incremental maneuvering to correct
 
any deviations from the desired course of events "The reversibility of
 
an action should be counted as a major benefit, its irreversibility, a
 
major cost ,13
 
The most innovative proposal made by the NAS panel is its recom­
mendation that decision making about technology be brought directly into 
the political process They suggest that debate range over the follow­
ing issues (1) whether the costs of uncertainty prompted by the effects 
of a new technology--delays and loss of profit for backers of the inno­
vation, "negative externalities" for the public--should be paid by its
 
proponents rather than by the larger society; (2) the necessity of de­
vising alternative modes of implementing technologies, so as to circum­
vent the negative effects inherent in any one. The report recommends
 
that these and similar issues be considered in a political forum which
 
includes strong constituencies representing varied values and that an
 
independent study of all issues be undertaken, to make available to that
 
forum information from which it can draw its factual premises
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Paul Goodman, whose political philosophy often seems at odds with
 
that of the NAS panel members, reaches much the same conclusions in his
 
prescriptions for a more humane technology. In addition to endorsing
 
the same reversibility criterion, Goodman calls for prudence and humili­
ty on the part of technologists, cautioning them not to oversell tech­
nology and to resist the temptation to apply every new technical device
 
without a second thought. Much as the NAS panel does, he recommends as
 
a practical matter adhering to the criterion of reversibility. Acknowl­
edging that at its root his "bias is pluralistic," Goodman argues that in­
creased knowledge, coupled with active participation by affected groups,
 
offers the best hope for achieving a humane technology.
14
 
A very different perspective, one rooted deeply in the European
 
tradition, is taken by Jacques Ellul He argues that man's absorption
 
of technique advances inexorably, moved by an internal logic not amena­
ble to human control, a logic that pushes aside vital human values like
 
sponaneity and freedom.15 Ellul's theories have evoked widespread 
andintense interest among intellectuals. In William Kuhns' words, they 
are "a trenchant statement, the boldest yet to interpret the growth and
 
significance of technology as a whole." 16 Certainly, Ellul does weave
 
an apparently consistent logic, bolstered at virtually every turn by his­
torical and contemporary illustrations of his point. While any summary
 
of his argument fails to capture adequately its nuances and thematic in­
tensity, his basic position can be reconstructed.
 
Two fundamental claims about the characteristics of technology lead
 
Ellul to his pessimistic conclusions. The first is what he terms "the
 
automatism of technical choice," the absolutism of the one-best-wj
 
"When everything has been measured and calculated mathematically so that
 
the method that has been decided upon is satisfactory from the rational 
point of view, and when, from the practical point of view, the method is
 
manifestly the most efficient of all those hitherto employed or those in
 
competition with it, then the technical movement becomes self-directing ",17
 
No human choice can really exist when it is preceded by a fundamental be­
lief in the desirability of the most efficient, "one best" way. "The
 
human being is no longer in any sense the agent of choice. Let no one
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say that man is the agent of technical progress and thus it is he who
 
chooses among possible techniques. In reality he neither is nor does
 
anything of the sort. He is a device for recording effects and results 
obtained by various techniques. He does not make a choice of complex, 
and, in some ways, human motives He can decide only in favor of the
 
technique that gives the maximum efficiency."
18
 
In addition to automatism, Ellul posits a second deterministic
 
quality of technique. its self-augmentation--by which technology is
 
implemented without decisive intervention of man The key element in
 
this characteristic is man's notion of a "technological fix." Tech­
nology is viewed as posing, in its development, primarily technical
 
problems which can be resolved simply by additional doses of technolo­
gy. Recall the example of the spiral of technology's self-augmenta­
tion which, in Chapter I, we used to illustrate the "technological
 
fix" Convenient and "efficient" garbage disposal units are invented,
 
their products pollute rivers The rivers are purified by the addition
 
of bacteria, these bacteria kill the fish, etc., so the rivers must be
 
reoxygenated by other technical means. .The process is a dead-end of
 
new negative effects generated by technical attempts to quell previous
 
ones
 
Ellul is not sanguine about any escape ever from this continuous
 
spiral of technical application, the creation of problems, and further 
application of technique He believes that while some things may change, 
it is unlikely that mankind will ever be able to extricate itself from 
the vortex That conviction is not based upon the premise that the 
world is made up of naive cost benefit analysts nor even that it is im­
possible to satisfice or even maximize several values/conditions simul­
taneously. Rather, an assumption of human analytical inadequacy under­
lies Ellul's dire prediction. On its face, that assumption is also
 
made by the NAS panel and Goodman, they too acknowledge the impossi­
bility of foreseeing all the consequences of technical actions For
 
Ellul, however, this human inadequacy forecloses the choice of "ends
 
A technical solution can never be devised by man, for surprses will
 
always follow in its wake
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Moreover, the possibility of reversing a technique does not mean
 
that its problems can be avoided Of course, it is possible, Ellul al­
lows, to abandon a technique when it proves to have deleterious effects.
 
But he believes that "by the time a technique is modified in the light
 
of those effects, the evil has already been done. When it is proposed 
to 'choose' between effects, it is always too late It is doubtless 
still possible to modify any given element, but only at the price of 
[added] secondary repercussions." 19 But more importantly, even if a 
technique were modified, it would be as a consequence of some new tech­
nical "advance " The sociology of technological implementation--charac­
terized by demands for solutions to the rapidly evolving and immediate 
problems as well as by the urgency for industry to recoup expenses and 
make technology "pay off"--would seem to necessitate this process. We 
then come back to the cycle of implementatation and "correction" de­
scribed above, which perpetually compounds the initial technology-in­
duced problem. 
In the Ellullan world, man does not choose; he calculates. Man
 
does not weigh the benefits of technology's primary capacity; he in­
variably "takes advantage" of them In so doing he activates succes­
sive generations of technological problems and becomes hopelessly en­
trapped in the morass of technique This principle of self-augmenta­
tion leads to "the autonomy of technique the complete separation of 
the goals from the mechanism, the limitation of the problem to the 
means, and the refusal to interfere any way with efficiency." 
2 0 
In two senses does the autonomy of technique render human autono­
my and free will inoperative. First, the notion of the one-best-way 
implies that modern man cannot choose his means any more than, given 
his analytical inadequacy, he can choose his ends. Second, and even
 
more ominous, man cannot be responsible. The rationality of calcula­
tion requires that all the input and output factors, including the 
human element, be predictable As Ellul puts it, "The combination of 
man and technique is a happy one only if man has no responsibility " 
Responsibility would oblige him to make choices, the outcomes of which 
are unpredictable and would subject him "to motivations which invalidate 
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the mathematical precision of the machinery . .technique requires pre­
dictability and no less, exactness of prediction It is necessary, then, 
that technique prevail over the human being For technique is a matter 
of life and death Technique must reduce man to a technical animal, the 
king of the slaves of technique Human caprice crumbles before this ne­
cessity, there can be no human autonomy in the face of technical autono­
my."'21  In short, the technological phenomenon requires that human be­
havior become standardized. Man can no longer be allowed spontaneity 
and diversity of behavior--these things generate noise in the system. 
Ellul's theory of how the "one best way" is calculated assumes the
 
same constraints common to any decision making. the absence of a long­
term orientation, values which cannot be quantified, the immediacy of
 
problems to be solved, and the urgency of economic considerations In
 
the Ellulian scheme, however, the decision maker must of necessity simply 
discount the uncertain, the long-range, and the unquantifiable as the
 
only rational way to proceed. Not out of malevolence, therefore, but
 
because of "rational efficiency," Ellul's decision maker cannot include
 
moral considerations in his decision making.
 
A BASIS FOR TESTING THESE OPPOSED THEORIES
 
The empirical content of the two theories just discussed overlaps 
at some points and conflicts at others Both focus on the impossibility 
of fully anticipating consequences of technology which can change looked­
for benefits into negative surprises. Yet the two theories make dramati­
cally different, mutually contradictory predictions. The NAS/Goodman
 
perspective leads us to expect generally continuous progress predicated
 
on thoughtful action, constant monitoring and, when necessary, retrench­
ment, mitigation and amelioration Ellul's conceptualization posits a
 
dynamic immune to any such error-correcting mechanisms. Each school of 
thought proffers illustrative evidence which makes an apparently prima
 
facia case for its validity
 
These theories hold implications for the behavior both of policy
 
makers and of citizens The NAS/Goodman perspective signals that we
 
need to increase our attention to decision making processes only enough so
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as to assure the representation of all those groups which might be sub­
stantially affected by the implementation of particular technologies.
 
The Ellulian perspective, on the other hand, counsels a much more radi­
cal course of action: alteration of basic perspectives guiding insti­
tutional decision processes which determine what value preferences will
 
be served by the results of technological development It behooves us
 
therefore to take stock of what data can be marshalled to establish 
more clearly which, if either, perspective catches more of the situ­
ation actually prevailing How might we begin to disconfirm the pre­
dictions of either one?
 
The divergence in their predictions is linked to different views 
of how people relate to technology and how they reach decisions with re­
spect to its implementation. To the extent that people behave as calcu­
lators and discount important intangible factors in their search for the 
one-best-way, the chance obviously increases that the "technological phe­
nomenon" will develop. Conversely, if people include these intangible
 
factors in their assessment about technology, they lessen that chance-­
even though the precise connection between these factors and outcomes is
 
not understood.
 
We will derive a set of propositions from Ellul's work by which
 
the credibility of his theory can be tested. If these propositions are 
disconfirmed, our confidence in the NAS/Goodman perspective, by infer­
ence, is increased The crucial propositions are listed below; the way 
they will be made operational is described as we proceed with the test­
ing. 
1 People's value preferences are biased toward those
 
which are easily calculable or which are immediately associ­
ated with a technology's primary capacity.
 
2. People are unaware of and unconcerned with the un­
certain effects of technology
 
3. Assessments of potential technological developments
 
are determined by considerations associated with techhology's
 
primary capacity, factors which can be easily quantified, and
 
by a short-term perspective.
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4 
 Decisions on how to implement technology are
 
heavily weighted in favor of considerations associated
 
with technology's primary capacity, quantifiable values,
 
and short-term perspectives.
 
These four human behavioral conditions must prevail in order for
 
Ellul's theory to be viable, and, if they do prevail, so do severe con­
straints against any workable pluralist-incrementalist monitoring system
 
Conversely, if these hypotheses are disconfirmed, evidence would be pro­
vided that the necessary conditions for viable pluralist-incrementalist
 
action are at least possible in the scheme of things However, though
 
the two theories are mutually exclusive in their predictions, they do
 
not exhaust the set of theoretical possibilities. The disconfirmation
 
of one does not necessarily assure the validity of the other, although
 
it may increase our confidence in the other.
 
One method of testing these propositions is to look at actual poli­
cy makers and at the members of elite groups trying to influence them.
 
Applicable values, concerns, and perspectives could then be examined and
 
the relative importance assessed of various factors entering into the
 
ultimate decision reached. Such an approach would be entirely appropri­
ate since most decisions are made by elites Methodological difficulties
 
in obtaining reliable measurements for most of those factors as they re­
late to our four propositions, however, force us to use another method
 
The approach we employ here is to examine the attitudes of the
 
mass public. Ellul himself asserts that one possible disconfirmation of
 
his theories would have its source in those attitudes; he allows of
 
three conditions which would refute his thesis (1) an act of God, (2)
 
a general nuclear war which would eliminate most modern techniques; and
 
(3) a change in human consciousness Specifically, he holds that "if an
 
increasing number of people become fully aware of the threat the techno­
logical world poses to man's personal and spiritual life, and if they de­
termine to assert their freedoms by upsetting the course of the evolution,
 
my forecast will be invalidated .,22 The data we use for testing the op­
posed theories on technological outcomes may well presage that awareness.
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The cognitive and emotive structure of the people's attitudes is
 
the critical element in our test. A study of those attitudes is, in
 
part, an appropriate way to proceed. Any examination of public atti­
tudes is, of course, subject to the criticism that public opinion bears
 
a dubious relationship to decision maker behavior, the essential element
 
here. A careful look at the climate of opinion evoked by California's
 
recent Clean Envii nment Initiative will, at a later point, provide us
 
a way around that difficulty
 
A test of the Ellulian perspective In operationalizing the be­
havioral premises derived from our analysis of Ellul's perspective, we
 
must resolve the problem of identifying those values, considerations,
 
or factors which would be highly d&scounted in decision making of the
 
type Ellul predicts. Is it possible to partition cleanly those values
 
which belong to the set of conditions figuring in the Ellulian "calcula­
bles" from those which do not ? Ellul is not specific about the contents
 
of those two sets, nor is it likely that he could be, given the temporal
 
shifts which inevitably take place between the two, shifts which Ellul
 
recognizes. Fifty years ago, for example, the environmental consequences
 
of technology were unrecognized, and even if recognized they were heavily
 
discounted. Today environmental values are not only recognized but are
 
by law mandated to be weighted seriously in decision making. Even though
 
we cannot unambiguously make the partitioning, we can array items from
 
the TECH I and TECH II surveys along a continuous dimension marked off
 
by the ideal types. There may, of course, be some disagreement over the
 
ordering or over the proximity of the items to either end point, hence,
 
one source of potential measurement error.
 
Ellul's writings do, however, offer some guidance in distinguish-

Ing between various premises behind decision making as either "calculable"
 
or "qualitative." Here, we shall use the label "Type IP to refer to de­
cision making criteria based on calculable values and "Type II" to refer
 
to criteria embodying qualitative values Ellul would probably agree
 
that those who view technology as a prerequisite for improving the stand­
ard of living give greater weight to Type I, calculable, values in issues
 
bearing on technical development. Those who tend to be concerned with
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man's over-dependence on technology, who reject the idea of a "techno­
logical fix," and who tend to be alienated by technology's mechanistic
 
influence on human life use, on the other hand, more complex unquantifi­
able premises in assessing technology, those incorporating qualitative,
 
Type II, values.
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, various dimensions along a re­
lated scale of values were tapped by a number of "agree-disagree" items 
in our surveys. One asked whether the standard of living would decline 
if there were less technological development. Other relevant questions, 
discussed in Chapter III, are (1) whether people need not worry about
 
the harmful effects of technology because new inventions will always
 
come along to solve problems, (2)whether people are 'too dependent on
 
machines, (3) whether technology has made life too complicated, and (4) 
whether it would be nice if we could stop building so many machines and 
go back to nature 
Table 3-2 in Chapter III displayed the marginal distributions of' 
agreement/disagreement with these items and showed that Californians do 
not hold a monolithic set of attitudes toward the consequences of techno­
logical development. Though a solid majority do see technology as an im­
portant factor in their economic well being and agreed that the standard 
of living is dependent on technological development, another overwhelm­
ing majority expressed concern in both 1972 and 1974 about the dependen­
cies which technology may generate. Since these majorities obviously
 
overlap, ambivalence in individual attitudes toward technology is an im­
portant fact Also, eight out of ten people in 1972 rejected the idea
 
of a technological fix. Such responses run counter to the Ellulian
 
thesis of a population so enamored with the primary capacity of tech­
nology that they are blind to its negative side effects.
 
That countering tendency was further reinforced by the value rank­
ings (already discussed in Chapter V) derived from other questions asked
 
in the surveys. If Ellul's behavioral premises are correct, we would ex­
pect to find a bias toward Type I values, such as employment, enjoyment
 
of life, taxes, and the U.S image abroad. Significantly, of the four
 
values thought to be extremely important, two--the effect on employment
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and taxes--were closer to Type I, and two--the effect on the environment 
and on the poor--closer to Type II values Nor do the mean scores show
 
any bias toward Type I values; moreover, the large standard deviations
 
of each ranking further emphasize the absence of any public consensus 
that calculable values should prevail in technological decision making. 
The final set of indicators of the public's value preferences em­
ployed here to test Ellul's premises measures public confidence in the
 
groups and institutions which hold decisive power to choose the ways
 
technology is implemented. It will be recalled that the data presented
 
in Chapter V clearly shows that the public is highly unsatisfied with
 
the influence exercised by both government and business. Moreover, the
 
data clearly indicate public disapproval over the individual citizen
 
being accorded so little access to these decision making processes. The
 
technologist, on the other hand, was seen as exercising a great deal of
 
power, quite legitimately.
 
The importance of these findings for the present context can be 
appreciated if we consider what is present in the term "decision" as it 
is used here. Recalling the important distinction noted in Chapter V, 
the act so called can encompass two different facets of judgment, one 
based on factual premises, the other on vaZuational premises.2 3 Because 
the technologist is an expert in understanding the factual premises of 
a decision, he is perceived as exercising legitimate power in making it. 
Governmental and business leaders, on the other hand, can legitimate 
their control of technological decision making only in valuational terms 
They are not perceived as doing so. 
Assuming that the public's distrust does stem from disagreement
 
over values, what is the substance of that disagreement? A number of
 
opinion studies have documented the public's association of business
 
and government with the calculable kind of values--efficiency, profits,
 
cost-per-kill and so forth That public disagreement with the value
 
premises embraced by those two institutions is so much in evidence sure­
ly tends to disconfirm Ellul's fundamental hypothesis of "the one best
 
way." Indeed, that the public is aware of, attaches importance to, and 
wishes a range of values--economic, social, and psychological--to be
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seriously weighed when the implementation of technology hangs in the
 
balance seriously erodes the validity of Ellul's assumptions implicit
 
in the first two propositions listed above.
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CALCULABLE VALUES IN
 
ASSESSING TECHNOLOGIES
 
The critical difference between the Ellulian outlook and that held
 
by the NAS panel and Paul Goodman lies in their opposing views of how
 
people's responses to technology are internalized. The rational man, in
 
Ellul's deterministic scheme, proceeds by discounting the long term or 
uncertain consequences of technique. In contrast, the meliorist position 
assumed by the NAS panel and Goodman posits not only awareness of those 
kinds of values but the actual inclusion of them in assessing technology 
and in reaching decisions about its implementation. If it can be demon­
strated that certain variables derivable from endorsement of "Qualitative-
Type II" values are causally predictive of individual assessments and 
are weighted in decision making, the third and fourth Ellulian proposi­
tions (see pp. 216-217) will also be disconfirmed. We will now undertake 
such a demonstration. 
The Evaluation-of-Present-Technology Scale discussed in Chapter IV
 
becomes the dependent variable in our test The independent variables
 
for the test are a set of five agree/disagree questions (see Chapter III),
 
the rankings of the value items (see Chapter V), and (also discussed in
 
Chapter V) the difference between perceived actual influence and the 
degree of desired involvement of decision makers in technological de-

Cisions We also employed two other independent variables age and
 
party/ideological identification We cannot, a priori, assert the value
 
content of those variables. Some popular commentaries have suggested
 
that the values of youth are less materialist and show more concern with
 
the long term and with the possible psychological consequences of tech­
nological development Our data is certainly consistent with those
 
views, but we cannot positively assert them Nor for similar reasons
 
can we establish the value content of party/ideology Our data does
 
accord with some impressionistic writings which allege the value content
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of a Democratic/liberal position to be closer to the "Qualitative-Type 
II" value orientation, however. 
Now that the variables are defined which we will use to test the
 
weight of "Type II" values in decision making, how they will be used to
 
carry out the test appropriately comes into question. If a particular
 
value condition carries weight in the decision making or assessment
 
process, we would expect to find some covariation between it and the out­
comes of the assessment or the decision. Put another way, if the impor­
tance an individual gives to a particular value is wnreZated to his evalu­
ation of technology, then it is logical to assert that that value carries
 
no significant weight in this decision making. The stronger the covari­
24 
ation, the more central is the value However, covariation is not al­
ways due to a causal relationship. The correlation may be due to a 
common antecedent; that is, it may be spurious Thus, merely examining 
correlation coefficients may be misleading. 
The technique of causal modeling is designed to estimate the magni­
tude of such correlations, that is, the direct and indirect contributions
25 
of a premise to an outcome. We attempted such a model, but numerous
 
reciprocal relationships among the independent variables which could not 
be theoretically eliminated made for an underidentified model and pre­
vented the estimation of weights to be accorded the various factors.
 
While we could make some assumptions which would identify the model, too
 
many were required to achieve enough overidentification to allow for a
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reasonable test of its adequacy Therefore, we simply regressed all 
the independent variables on the dependent variable 27 Although this 
method gives only the direct influence and not the indirect, it seems to 
offer the best compromise 
Table 9-1 on page 225 contains in the first column the results of 
that regression analysis for the entire sample. First the unstandardized 
coefficients (b's) and then the standardized coefficients (betas) are 
listed (Both are presented because both will be compared with other 
estimates 28) ForEllul's thesis to be borne out by this portion of our 
test, significantly higher estimates must appear for Type I values We find 
that of the seven factors given weight in assessing technology for which an 
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unambiguous assignment can be made either to Type I or to Type II values,
 
only three of them are of the Type I variety. This evidence pointing to­
ward disconfirmation is reinforced by the size of the estimates for the 
qualitative or "Type II" values: Their greater size indicates that for 
our sample Type II values have the most profound effect on technology 
assessment. Moreover, comparing beta weights, the influence of the
 
"back to nature" variable is more than twsce as large as that for any
 
Type I value. Finally, the remaining four variables, whose assignment
 
is ambiguous, are more likely to be closer to the Type II extreme than
 
to the Type I end of the value continuum. Thus, our data for the public's
 
assessment of presently implemented technological developments contra­
dicts Ellul's assumption of a populace mesmerized by technique. Longer
 
term qualitative values are given at least as much weight as the shorter
 
term calculable types, if not more.
 
Throughout this present study, we have called those people most
 
likely to become involved in activities calculated to prompt policy
 
action on technology-related matters the "potential public" for techno­
logical politics. Does this segment of the population fit Ellul's mold
 
any better? The estimates for the potential public appearing in column
 
2 on Table 9-1 parallel closely those obtained for the entire sample 
Looking at the b's, a somewhat stronger emphasis on calculable-Type I 
variables holds among this smaller group. It is interesting to note, 
for example, that for the potential public the impact of the economic 
considerations, 1 e , concern with-the standard of living, was almost 
double that of the complete sample Nevertheless, qualitative-Type II 
value elements--rejection of a technological fix and desire to return to
 
nature--still have the strongest influence. Thus, the temper of this po­
litically involved segment of the population simply does not square with
 
Ellul's depiction of a public which has internalized a short term quanti­
fiable approach to assessing technology
 
Ellul sLngles out technicians as being more likely than nontech­
nicians to be caught up in that approach which, in turn, leads to the
 
"technological phenomenon." As a further test of his contentions we
 
split the sample into two groups, one of which is comprised of people
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holding technical jobs or engaged in a technology-intensive industry.
 
If they could be demonstrated to weigh calculable-Type I values highly, 
to the exclusion of long range values, they would approximate the 
markedly technologically oriented group which Ellul cites as catalysts 
in the technological phenomenon. Regressions were run for the two sub­
groups within the potential public. The results are presented in columns 
3 and S of Table 9-1. 
The two patterns of estimates display some clear differences. 
Qualitative-Type II criteria take on considerably more importance in 
influencing the assessments made by the segment of the public not categor­
ized as "technicians " This is particularly true for educated nontech­
nicians (column 6) The strength of their association with the "back to 
nature" variable is the strongest of any group considered. Likewise, the 
"technological fix" variable is highly influential for them. Finally,
 
the effect of distrust of government and business leadership, which we 
link to qualitative-Type II values, ismost strongly manifested by this
 
portion of the sample It is important to remember that the 1972 data
 
was collected before the Watergate scandals and before the publicity 
associated with energy shortages had done their part in eroding public 
confidence in government and business 
The picture for the technicians is quite different, and the tend­
encies displayed by them are particularly pronounced among the "Ed-Tech"
 
grouping shown in column 4 Type II values often do not appear at all.
 
The standard of living consideration is nearly 50% stronger than in the
 
potential public as a whole and over twice as strong as in the entire
 
sample. Clearly, by separating out the technicians from the nontech­
nicians some support is lent the Ellulian scheme while there is a mix
 
of Type I and Type II considerations in the two groups, the emphases are
 
quite different among "technicians" and accord with Ellul's predictions
 
Our findings regarding the public assessment of technology can be 
summarized simply We found that the entire sample applied a mixture of 
both calculable-Type I and qualitative-Type II criteria to their judg­
ments, and that the latter seem to predominate' For that part of the 
sample most likely to be involved in any widespread political controversy 
TABLE 9-1 
WHAT VALUES BEST EXPLAIN ASSESSMENTS OF PRESENT TECHNOLOGY
 
(Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients)
 
Potential Ed Ed
 
Values Type Sample Public Tech Tech Non Tech Non Tech
 
I b S b 5 b b S b S b S 
Standard of living I .37 .09 .62 .14 .69 .17 .86 .21 .33 .08 
 * * 
En3oyable life I .24 .09 * * * * .53 .18 * * * * 
Employment I .28 .08 .49 .13 * * * * * * * * 
Taxes I * * * * * * * * * * * * 
U.S. image I * * * * .38 .13 .68 .22 * * * * 
Leisure time I * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Solutions via technology II -.60 -.14 -.53 -.27 * * * * -.64 -.15 -.89 -.18 
Overdependence on machine II -.30 -.07 * * * * * * -.42 -.10 * * 
Technology complicates 
life II -.59 -.15 * * -.76 -.18 -.77 -.18 -.55 -.14 -.70 -.15 
Back to nature II -.74 -.19 -2.11 -.25 -1.11 -.27 -.99 -.24 -.58 -.15 -1.30 -.28 
Pollution II * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Hurt poor II * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Distrust business II** -.26 -.13 * * * * * * -.34 -.17 -.44 -.22 
Distrust government I1** -.28 -.16 -.42 -.22 * * * * -.30 -.17 -.62 -.31 
Public excluded II** * * * * -.27 -.19 * * * * * * 
Age t -.27 -.15 * * * * * * -.28 -.16 * * 
Party/ideology t -.49 -.17 -.43 -.15 * * * * -.47.10 * * 
N2 751 255 189 102 567 168
 
R .26 .41 .36 .47 .25 .43

*Not significant at p < 0 05. 
**Probably closer to Type II. 
hIndetermmnate type.
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over technology, that is, for the "potential public," we also found a 
mixture of the two types, but a more balanced mixture. Neither set of 
fLndings lends any support to Ellul's conception of the way indLviduals 
internalize criteria for judging technology. OnZy if we isolate a group 
of "Technicians" do we find any of Ellul's premises operating In sharp 
contrast to the rest of the respondents, this group (about 10% of the 
sample) is predominantly oriented toward "one best way," calculable-Type 
I values.
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF ENTANGIBLE, QUALITATIVE CRITERIA
 
IN TECHNOLOGICAL DECISION MAKING
 
A study of attitudes does not provide a sufficient test of Ellul's 
theories, the behavioral component must also be addressed Thus it was 
fortunate for our purposes that the survey we have relied on was con­
ducted three weeks after the June, 1972, primary election in California. 
For, with the exception of the Presidential nomination contest between 
George McGovern and Hubert Humphrey, the most controversial part of the 
ballot was the Clean Environment Initiative, or Proposition 9 This 
measure offered Californians a rare opportunity to make a set of criti­
cal decisions about the way technology would be implemented for years to 
come. The choice was clearly put to them in terms of which should carry 
more weight, calculable Type I values associated with technology's pri­
mary capacity or qualitative Type (IIvalues, which may be threatened by 
its potential negative secondary consequences The initiative contained 
five major sections dealing with a number of the sources of concern about 
the environment Among its many provisions were the following 
(1) Composition of Motor Fuels. The Act speci­
fied that five days after passage, the sulfur content
 
in diesel fuel had to be reduced by nearly 90%, it
 
also called for a more rapid elimination of lead from
 
gasoline than required by Federal law and a total ban
 
on lead by January 1, 1976.
 
(2) Stationary Sources of Pollution The Act
 
required industries operating under variances to
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shut down during smog alerts, these industries would
 
also have to install emission control devices within
 
a specified time In order to discourage repeated
 
violations, fines were authorized at the rate of
 
0 4% of a violator's gross income per day from the
 
time of conviction to the time of compliance 75%
 
of the fine would be returned upon completion of the
 
installation program
 
(3) Pesticides The Act outlawed the use of
 
chlorinated hydrocarbons such as DDT.
 
(4) Nuclear Power Plants. The Act prohibited
 
the construction of nuclear reactors for five years.
 
(5) Developments in the Petroleum Industry. 
The Act banned new-offshore and coastal drilling, 
prohibited the renewal of old leases, and required
 
that under hazardous conditions those sites already
 
in production cease operating until dangers had been
 
removed.
 
Newspaper and television editorials were unanimously against the 
measure The Los Angeles Times, with the largest circulation in the
 
state, commented that "[The Initiative] is being touted as a comprehen­
save assault on pollution. It is in fact a slapdash and deceptive meas­
ure which, if enacted, would probably increase air pollution, disrupt
 
control procedures, and cost the people of California untold millions in
 
unnecessary expense and penalties." 29 The San Francisco ChronicZe, the
 
Bay Area's major newspaper, concurred "The Environmental Initiative..
 
has been judged in appraisals as a prime example of overkill. . Preser­
vation of a clean environment is indisputably laudable but in posing as
 
its champion, Proposition 9 is dangerously misleading ,,30 
The central point of the opposition clearly was that the values of 
technology's primary capacity far outweigh any damage to other values 
brought about by its second order consequence, in this case environmental
 
disturbances. A memorandum to the Standard Oil Company from Whitaker and 
Baxter, the public relations firm in charge of the campaign, set out 
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opposition strategy a year before the election "This truly is an issue
 
the people must decide and it must truly be a people's campaign to de­
termine how much people are willing to endure in the loss of jobs, higher
 
prices, and less of the niceties of life to enhance the environment. 
Obviously, there must be a balance between a pastoral society and an in­
dustrialized service society."
 
The effectiveness of the opposition's campaign was truly phenome­
nal As of the first of May, only 27% of those sampled by the Field Re­
search Corporation's California Poll had even heard of the Proposition. 
At that time, nearly 60% of those who had heard of it expressed support 
for the measure, and another 10% was undecided. Whien informed by the 
Field interviewer of the contents of the Initiative, those who had not 
heard of it came out in favor of it by a margin of greater than three
 
to one. Combined, these groups numbered 64.2% in favor, 21.5% opposed, 
and 14 3% undecided 
Yet, four weeks later, after the campaign had been mounted, the 
proportion of the population familiar with the measure had risen three­
fold to 88% Of those who had made up their minds about it (approxi­
mately one-half of the total), feelings were running nearly two to one 
against the proposal. While those who had not decided or who had not
 
heard of the Initiative tended to look on it somewhat favorably, a pro­
jection of the total vote was made as follows In favor 35%, Opposed
 
47%, Undecided: 18%. 31 The final vote actually turned out to be 35.2%
 
in favor and 64 8% opposed.
 
It is tempting to view the two to one rejection of the Initiative
 
as confirming the accuracy of Ellul's darkest forecasts, but we hold 
that it would be entirely wrong to do so. First, the conflict between 
the two types of values inherent in the issue was obscured by irrele­
vant, "contaminating" factors Legal ambiguities of the proposition it­
self compromised support The full consequences of many of its pro­
visions did not appear to be well thought out Little consideration was 
given, for example, to how enough low sulfur diesel fuel could be ob­
tained to operate California trucks, buses, and trains In addition,
 
the simultaneous restriction on fossLl fuel production and atomic
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reactors seemed contradictory at best, and perhaps potentially disastrous
 
in the face of an ever-growing energy shortage. Even the environmental­
ly partisan Sierra Club refused to endorse the measure, an action widely
 
interpreted as tacit opposition. For their part, proponents of the meas­
ure were, by the end of the campaign, arguing more and more for the "sym­
bolic necessity" of passage There is evidence that people's votes were
 
in fact influenced not only by the primary questions involved but by pe­
ripheral issues raised differentially by both supporters and opponents
 
When our sample was asked why they had voted as they did, 25% of those
 
who voted against it stated that they did so because the measure was
 
poorly written or not well thought out Over 20% of those who voted in 
favor of the proposition did so for "symbolic" reasons. 
When we consider that Ellul's "technological phenomenon" thesis
 
has to do with a state of mind--with people having become so seduced by
 
the primary benefits of technique that these become the sole criterion
 
of their choice, nothing else mattering to them--and not with issues of
 
whether or not to implement particular technologies, we see again that 
the mere fact of this measure's defeat lends that thesis but spurious 
support Accordingly, the test of the validity of Ellul's thesis should 
be constructed to fit his fourth proposition, that decisions on imple­
menting technology are biased by the attractiveness of "calculables"-­
primary capacity, the quantifiable, and the short term. We must, in 
other words, examine the voting in the same way we examined our survey 
respondents' assessments of presently implemented technology to discover 
the criteria for choice
 
We carried out a set of regressions using the vote (scored zero
 
for "yes" and one for "no") as the dependent variable, the various
 
values/considerations employed in the last section were again used as
 
the independent variables. The results are presented in Table 9-2. Con­
sider first the estimates for the regression using the complete sample.
 
In terms of the particular factors involved, these findings dis­
play a marked similarity to those appearing in Table 9-1. The standard­
of-living variables, the sense that technology has made life too compli­
cated, distrust of business, party/ideology, and age all are relevant
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criteria in the assessment of technology and in the vote on the Clean En­
vironment Initiative. The presence of environmental considerations is
 
to be expected given the nature of the controversy. The lack of influ­
ence of employment considerations is somewhat surprising particularly in
 
light of the emphasis made by the opposition during the campaign. This
 
result may suggest that a convincing case was not made that increased
 
unemployment would result from passage of Proposition 9. Both the con­
cern for the standard of living and concern with a technology-induced 
complicated life held roughly the same importance in influencing the vote 
as these factors did in assessing technology Distrust of government and 
technological fix variables were not factors in the decision, whereas the 
impact of age and party ideology had about the same influence as theyhad 
on evaluations of present technology The conclusions we can draw from
 
this investigation accord overall with our survey findings As did 
those, voting behavior on Proposition 9 displayed a mixture of value 
emphases, a condition incongruent with Ellul's theory. 
When the subgroups are partitioned out for reexamination, we dis­
cover few differences between the potential public and entire sample 
Consider however, the differences between the nontechnicians and the 
technicians. For the former group, the following factors retain explana­
tory power the extent to which it mistrusts business leaders, party/ 
ideology, age, and the view that life is complicated by technology The 
strength of the first factor may be due to the "symbolic" character of 
the vote It is possible that age may be a surrogate for a set of value 
considerations explicitly measured here If we are to take seriously
 
comments made at the time of the election, the values of the young tended
 
more towards our qualitative-Type II variety than did the values of the
 
older generation But in any event we cannot find any indication that 
the major group we have subcategorized as "nontechnicians" fits the 
Ellulian mold. 
Turning to the "technicians," who from previous analysis seem to 
fit the role of Ellulian man most closely, we find something of a sur­
prise. Of the four variables which can be relatively unambiguously 
identified as being of either calculable-Type I or qualitative-Type II 
TABLE 9-2
 
FACTORS EXPLAINING THE VOTE ON PROPOSITION 9
 
(Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients)
 
Potential Ed Ed
 
Tech Tech Non Tech Non Tech
Values 	 Type Sample Public 

I b 8 b S b S b 8 b 8 b S 
Standard of living I .05 .14 .04 .12 * * .07 .20 * * * * 
En3oyable life I * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Employment I * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Taxes I * * * * * * * * * * * * 
U.S. image I * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Leisure time I * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Solutions via technology II * * * * -.09 -.20 * * * 	 * * * 
* * *Overdependence on machine II * * -.06 -.15 * * -.13 -.33 * 
Technology complicates 
-.09 -.24 * * -.05 -.13 -.06 -.15 life II -.06 -.17 -.05 -.15 
Back to nature * * * * * * -.08 -.24 * * * * 
Pollution II -.04 -.12 * * -.06 -.23 -.06 -.20 * * * * 
Hurt poor II * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Distrust business II -.02 -.10 * * * * * * -.02 -.13 -.03 -.18 
Distrust government II * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Public excluded II * * * * -. 02 -.19 -04 -. 32 * * * * 
t -.03 -.17 -.05 -.26 -.03 -. 16 * * -. 03 -.18 -.06 -.35Age 
Party/ideology t -05 -.21 -.04 -.19 * * * * -. 05 -. 21 * * 
N 458 208 116 83 350 139 
R2 	 .20 .37 .37 .41 .15 .23 
*Statistically significant at p < 0.05.
 
**Probably closer to Type II.
 
tlndetermnate type. 
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values and which appear to have carried weight in determining the vote,
 
only one is of the "calculable" variety The sense of alienation as evi­
dent in feelings of overdependence on technology are more strongly evi­
dent here than in any other group. The environmental factor also emerges.
 
That it does may be due to the greater technical knowledge held by this
 
group, perhaps to their awareness that although atomic power plants do 
not pollute the air, they can thermally upset the ecosystem of the body 
of water used to cool the reactor Moreover, the problems of radiation 
leakage and disposal of nuclear waste materials which endanger the en­
vironment have never been adequately solved Thus, the only Type I cri­
teria observed is the one dealing with the standard of living But even 
that estimate is only a fraction of the magnitude of the estimate used 
to explain assessments by technicians of present technologies. It would 
seem then that the technician cannot be labelled as archetypal Ellulian 
man any more than any other individual can. 
Our interpretation of the vote on Proposition 9 is consistent with 
interpretations given to another example of mass decision making with re­
spect to technology, the referenda on the introduction of fluorides into 
a community's drinking water The primary benefit of implementing this 
technology--reduction of dental cavities--appears incontestable and free 
of primary costs Tooth decay is a widespread, painful, and expensive 
affliction. Scientific studies have demonstrated rather conclusively 
that a significant reduction of decay comes about when one part per mil­
lion of fluoride is added to water Finally, not only is that particu­
lar implementation alternative effective, it is also the least expensive 
method available. In short, the introduction of fluorides into community 
water would seem to be the ideal instance in which to observe the oper­
ation of Ellul's "technological phenomenon " 
Yet in 60% of the referenda voters defeated the proposal to intro­
duce fluorides. For the same reasons we posited in the case of Propo­
sition 9, however, this outcome cannot in and of itself be taken as de­
finitive We need to examine the basis of those votes Though inter­
views with anti-fluoridation activists reveal that the concern about
 
"sapping vital essences" is not limited to Dr Strangelove's General, no
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evidence can be brought to bear which makes this attitude decisive for 
the general public. Just what is found is subject to some dispute. 
Methodological flaws have weakened the persuasiveness of some studies. 
Other work offers explanations which are admittedly untested and specu­
lative. Two studies do stand out, and while they provide essentially 
different hypotheses, both tend to offer further disconfirmation of 
Ellul's theory 
William Gamson suggests that a pervading sense of helplessness and
 
alienation explains the vote. Acknowledging that "one has every reason
 
to be skeptical at a marriage of Marx and tooth aches," he does advance
 
some plausible arguments about why the wedding might take place. Using
 
an index to measure the sense of helplessness, he claims that it enables
 
him to discriminate well between pro- and anti-fluoridationists 32 While
 
his sample and methodology leave something to be desired, Gamson's study
 
is still the best using public opinion data
 
Harvey Sapolsky questions Gamson's conclusions, primarily on method­
ological grounds, he claims they are based on a spurious artsfact.3 3 
His alternative explanation, for which only impressionistic evidence is
 
brought to bear, holds that by active campaigning the opponents of fluori­
dation have managed to obscure the scientific issues and thus confuse
 
the public In such circumstances, "the public, believing the fluori­
dation controversy to be a conflict among scientific experts, seeks the
 
safest course Unable to decide between what appear to be two contend­
ing scientific positions, the voters opt to avoid voluntarily inviting
 
any potential health risks by voting against the fluoridation proposals."
34
 
Note that both Gamson's and Sapolsky's explanations have at their 
core considerations which the Ellulian man would find irrational For 
him, alienation, a psychological factor, would hardly seem to be a worthy 
contender against the effectiveness of the .primary capacity, nor would 
he fLnd it reasonable to give any weLght to the long term or to the prob­
lematical. Yet it appears that it has been a combination of these quali­
tative factors that defeated the fluoride referenda 
Evidence derived from public decision making about technology mani­
fested in voting behavior on Proposition 9 and on the fluoridation issue
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reinforces our earlier assertions. We cannot establish any consistent
 
evidence which tends to support the Ellulian hypothesis on the way people
 
enter into making decisions about how technology should be implemented
 
IT our reconstruction of the Ellulian theory is correct, testing that
 
theory against decision making on the technological issues is appropri­
ate, and if our operationalization of measures is likewise adequate, we
 
must seriously think about abandoning the Ellulian construct In the
 
next section, we shall deal more explicitly with the support the same
 
data provide for the NAS/Goodman scheme
 
SUPPORT FOR NAS/GOODMAN THEORY?
 
The thrust of the findings in the previous sections is to discount
 
the gloomy argument of pessimists, exemplified by Ellul, that we have
 
lost the possibility ofchoice in our continuing development of technolo­
gy. To the contrary, it is apparently realistic to expect the public to
 
make critical choices, balancing calculable-Type I and qualitative-Type
 
II values, the core of the NAS/Goodman perspective is embedded in such
 
an expectation. But another essential element of their theory calls for
 
increased politicization and committed advocacy in making decisions with
 
respect to the implementation of technology How likely is that to come
 
about?
 
One major obstacle which would tend to retard the development of
 
that debate is the dearth of information on technology possessed by the
 
general public The issues are often complex; highly technical consider­
ations must be brought to bear. In such a situation, the danger is that
 
the public would either react blindly, or, as Sapolsky sees it, become
 
confused and possibly paralyzed What people may need in order to act
 
intelligently is a way, low in information costs, for them to locate and
 
organize themselves on various sides of a technological controversy
 
Our data suggest that precisely that means is emerging in the po­
litical process, in much the same manner that any number of other issue
 
areas are politicized. We have already seen how the party/ideology vari­
able organized assessments of present technologies as well as the vote
 
on Proposition 9. It is also a strong force in explaining feelings of
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technological alienation, distrust for business and governmental leaders,
 
and the importance of environmental criteria in decision making. Thus,
 
in a real sense, the dimension of that political variable is at least
 
partially congruent with the calculable-qualitative value continuum
 
To the extent that that is the case, the organizational means to
 
carry out the advocacy envisioned by the NAS panel and by Goodman may be
 
present The problem of coalition formation to press for the consider­
ation of values affected by technology is therefore less formidable than 
would be the case if those opinions were randomly distributed across the
 
population Thus, because this issue area has engendered much the same
 
alignments as the more traditional welfare issues have, we may find that
 
an equitable bargaining situation can emerge--one in which no group is
 
permanently disadvantaged.
 
One test of this hypothesis would be to examine the formation of
 
cleavages as a technological controversy develops over time. We have
 
data to do this from our study of the Clean Environment Initiative We
 
shall first examine data from the Californta Poll taken during the first
 
part of May, 1972. As we mentioned, that study indicated a strong margin
 
of support for the Initiative
 
That early support was not a function of any particular demographic 
or political attributes If we were to cross-tabulate the respondent's 
intended vote with his geographic location, occupation, religion, race, 
sex, income, or education, we would not find any statistical association 
Political variables, too, turn out to be unsatisfactory predictors of 
his intended vote Neither a person's party nor his choice of candidate 
in the Democratic primary shows any statistical relationship. Only a 
person's self-proclaimed political ideology seems to differentiate--al­
belt weakly--those inclined to support the measure as liberals from those 
tending to oppose it as conservatives, but even these associations are 
rather weak The overall lack of association between the intended vote 
and this wide range of political and demographic variables was observed 
when the entire sample was examined, it was also observed when only those 
who had heard of the measure were included, when only those who intended 
to vote in the prtmary election were taken into consideration, and when 
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only those who had heard of the Propos~ttonand intended to vote in the 
primary were included. Table 9-3 illustrates the heterogeneous nature 
of the support given the Clean Environment Initiative by the entire 
sample in early May.
 
One month later, the electorate having been bombarded by increas­
ing quantities of information/propaganda, the character of the cleavages
 
had changed dramatically. In particular, whereas in May age, party
 
identified, candidate choice in the Democratic Presidential Primary
 
Election, and political ideology were at best only marginal predictors
 
of an individual's intended vote on Proposition 9, by June these vari­
ables configured definite patterns of support/opposition. These are pre­
sented in Table 9-4. In short, party, ideology, and choice of political
 
figures emerged as organizing symbols for the controversy which pitted
 
to some degree calculable-Type I values against the qualitative-Type II
 
variety.
 
Significantly, these same patterns are found in eltte decision
 
making with respect to technology The Congressional debate and voting
 
on such issues as the SST, ABM, Alaska pipeline, and the recent attempts
 
to postpone or eliminate air pollution requirements because of the energy
 
crisis have been largely organized along a partisan-ideological dimension.
 
In short, technology has emerged as a political issue with the lines of
 
cleavage being similar to those of other issue areas (We make no claim
 
as to whether the political distinctions made on the mass level proceed
 
from those made at the elite level or vice versa, or whether the simi­
larities are serendipitous.) Needless to say, many other factors beyond
 
the ones the survey could examine must be operative in order for the
 
theories behind the NAS/Goodman arguments to be accepted, factors po­
tential in outcomes inconsistent with their predictions
 
Over the next decade we will have ample opportunity to test the
 
conflicting claims of the Ellul and the NAS/Goodman theories. Two laws,
 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and that establishing the
 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) virtually codify the
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perspective in the latter theory NEPA has already provided environ­
mental groups and other intervenors a legal basis for challenging the
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procedural integrity of many agencies' actions There have been delays
 
in the implementation of such large scale technologies as dams, free­
ways, and atomic power plants. Although the law has not been interpre­
ted as requiring substantive alternations in the weights given the rela­
tively certain outcomes as opposed to the more problematical ones, the
 
threat of delay has proved a resource for effecting substantial changes 
in the way technologies have been implemented. OTA has been caught up
 
in a number of minor political imbroglios for the past two years and has
 
not had much of an impact Nevertheless, in controversies involving
 
both of these laws, the cleavages have been quite similar to the ones
 
considered above. 
These political developments may provide a means of resolving the 
dilemma, expressed by many writers, between technology and democracy 
Harvey Sapolsky poses the question well in his discussion of the fluori­
dation controversy* "What is the citizen's role in a society that seeks
 
to be both scientifically [technologically] advanced and democratic ?
 
Science does not advance by a show of hands and democracy cannot exist
 
without citizen participation ",36 Sapolsky concludes that direct in­
volvement in policy making is inappropriate. "Administrative agencies
 
and legislators are more able to rationally consider questions of safety
 
and efficacy. Nor would the value aspects of fluoridation be ignored if
 
the decision were to be restricted to administrative agencies or legis­
latures ..37 To the extent that our analysis of cleavage patterns is 
correct, it is likely that the elite debate will, in fact, be controlled 
by the same concepts of "rationality" that the general public holds and 
values In such an instance, the dangers of Jacques Ellul's "techno­
logical phenomenon" recede 
The negative findings of this chapter are, in fact, heartening,
 
little or no evidence emerged suggesting that the beliefs or behavior
 
of the public at large presage a blind--but rational--obedience to the
 
technological imperative. However, the absence of a consistent bias to­
ward "the one best way" is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition
 
for ensuring humane and sensitive implementation of technology. It
 
simply indicates that Ellul's technological phenomenon is not inevitable,
 
HOW DOES INTENDED VOTE ON 
TABLE 9-3 
PROPOSITION NINE VARY BY SELECTED VARIABLES' 
(May 1972) 
DEFINITELY 
YES 
PROBABLY 
YES 
PROBABLY 
NO 
DEFINITELY 
NO DK* N 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Republican 
Democrat 
34.5% 
38.7 
23.2% 
26.8 
12.9% 
10.7 
13.2% 
10.1 
16.1% 
12.7 
310 
466 
Gamma 0.023 
FIRST CHOICE AS DEMO-
CRATIC PRESIDENTIAL 
NOMINEE 
McGovern 
Humphrey 
Kennedy 
Muskie 
Wallace 
46.4% 
34.6 
37.0 
55.9 
50.0 
2X =54 
p < 
28.2% 
24.0 
28.7 
26.5 
10.7 
df = 44 
.20 
9.1% 
12.5 
8 3 
2.9 
14.3 
7.5% 
11.5 
12.0 
5.9 
14.3 
9.1% 
17.5 
13.9 
8.8 
10.7 
110 
104 
108 
34 
28 
SELF-IDENTIFIED 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
Strong Conservative 
Moderately Conservative 
Middle-of-the-road 
Moderately Liberal 
Strong Liberal 
32.3% 
35.7 
41.0 
41.7 
55.7 
17.2% 
24.5 
24.5 
33.0 
31.8 
14.0% 
13.9 
8.7 
9.6 
3.4 
23.7% 
12.3 
8.7 
8.7 
3.4 
12.9% 
13.6 
17.0 
7.0 
5.7 
93 
359 
229 
230 
88 
Gamma = -.213 
*DK's were excluded when statistics were computed. 
TABLE 9-4
 
HOW DID THE ACTUAL VOTE ON PROPOSITION NINE VARY BY SELECTED VARIABLES?
 
(June 1972) 
VOTED VOTED 
FOR AGAINST N
 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
 
Republican 23.4% 76.6% 190 
Democratic 46.7 53.3 291
 
Gamma = -.471 
CANDIDATE VOTED FOR 
IN DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY 
McGovern 66.1% 33.9% 132
 
Wallace 48.0 52.0 20
 
Humphrey 35.4 64.6 74 
2 
X2 = 18.5 df = 2 
p < 0.001
 
SELF-IDENTIFIED
 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
 
Strong Conservative 36.8% 63.2% 52
 
Moderately Conservative 35.0 65.0 150
 
Middle-of-the-road 36.4 64.6 67
 
Moderately Liberal 50.7 49.3 112
 
Strong Liberal 85.0 15.0 49
 
Gamma = -. 363 
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that a pluralist incremental strategy may work--not that it wztZj. The
 
problem of the social control of technology after all is much broader
 
than simply the conflict between two perspectives.
 
Simply put, the issue is one of the extent to which it is possible
 
to design technological systems so as to ensure that years after they
 
are first introduced their effects remain congruent with our goals and
 
values. As to the conditions that bear on this possibility, recall that
 
in Chapter I we noted that one consequence of technological development
 
is an increase in organized social complexity which in turn complicates
 
decision making and reduces chances for making the "right" choice. Ellul 
correctly argues that when decision makers (and by extension the public)
 
are confronted with these difficulties they tend to adopt rules of thumb
 
to simplify their selection process But, fortunately, he incorrectly
 
characterizes the nature of that simplification. In the United States
 
of the 1970's, the easy rationale of the technological imperative does
 
not automatically provide the mode of simplification. People are aware
 
that other modes exist
 
Hopefully, data from this study will do more than cast doubts on 
the dire predictions of a theory Depending on the validity with which 
they are interpreted, they may also provide hints as to the direction 
actual future efforts should take to bring about for the common weal the 
socially responsible implementation of technology. 
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CHAPTER X 
PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY
 
Our interest in gaining a better understanding of the public's 
attitudes toward advanced technological development is informed by two 
convictions First, that technological development, particularly that 
prompted by public programs, plays a significant role in shaping the 
character of everyday experience Second, that the public's attitude 
toward these forces affecting our lives contributes importantly to the 
boundaries within which public policy is fashioned and carried out 
On both counts the texture and substance of attitudes toward presently 
implemented technologLes and their apparent consequences, and toward 
technologies which may be implemented in the future, call for attention. 
Public perceptions of important aspects of contemporary life are intrin­
sically interesting; such perceptions take on additional significance 
when they become the basis for citizens' judgments about the quality 
and legitimacy of public policy. 
Cast within an organizing perspective stressing the social charac­
ter of technology, this study has focused predominantly upon a series of
 
informal hypotheses describing the public's attitudes toward technology
 
distinctions perceived between science and technology, technology per­
ceived as a stimulus for social change, perceptions of technology's
 
beneficial or detrimental consequences, and perceptions of the extent
 
that specific technologies will impact upon individual and social ex­
perience Also addressed have been two opposed prognoses of future
 
technological development--in simplified terms, public acquiescence to
 
the "autonomy of technique" or public participation in processes of re­
sponsibly implementing technology In this concluding chapter we shall
 
review these hypotheses in light of the evidence we have available,
 
explore some of the policy implications of that evidence, and indicate
 
the directions which future research might fruitfully take.
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SURVEY FINDINGS AND EMERGENT HYPOTHESES 
We shall restate here some of the informal hypotheses which in­
itially provided our point of departure, pointing to evidence from the
 
analysis of survey data which tends toward their confirmation, disconfir­
mation, or modification Necessary refinements of our original formu­
lations are presented when indicated by the data Unless otherwise noted, 
all the findings reported here are consistent over time and represent a 
stgnvficant finding, that is, significant correlations appeared in both 
TECH I and TECH II survey data (see discussion in Chapter II). The first 
hypothesis states our basic initial assumption* 
(1) Technology is perceived by the public as part of social
 
experience, instrumental in triggering changes in society
 
and stimulating conditions that account in part for experi­
ences which some people value and others seek to avoid
 
There is no doubt about the validity of this assertion. Technology, and
 
with it science, emerged among the most frequently expressed sources of
 
* 
change in people's lives (IV) Furthermore, the public clearly links 
both technology generally and particular technical systems with conditions 
they believe are beneficial and/or harmful. This association was made 
by all segments of the public toward presently implemented technologies 
(IV) as well as toward future-oriented ones (VI and VII) The public, 
collectively and individually, can therefore be said to regard technolo­
gy and science as important factors in modern life, as making strong de­
terminations on social and personal experience; and, as we shall see be­
low, the public takes considerable interest in the activities of both 
While these reactions should not be surprising, their relative intensity 
is, and it suggests that we should expect evidence of a citizenry re­
sponsibly aware of the effects of technological development on their
 
lives
 
If technology and science are seen as significant aspects of social
 
experience, are they then perceived as the same activity ? We postulated
 
Roman numeral in parentheses indicate the preceding chapter in which
 
the evidence is presented.
 
247 
that. 
(2) The public perceives a distinction between the activi­
ties of "science" and those of "technology" and infers a 
crucial difference in the degree of restraint that should
 
be imposed on each activity--less for "science" than for
 
"

"technology 
There is strong evidence that the public, systematically and consistent­
ly, does make a distinction between activities which can be character­
ized as scientific and those that are considered technological (III).
 
There is considerable agreement about the high intrinsic value of scien­
tific activities and the belief that the work of scientists should not 
be controlled Technological activities, on the other hand, are per­
ceived warily by sizeable portions of the public; a larger proportion 
than not accepted as legitimate the control of technological activities, 
and many wished it to be increased The value placed on scientific ac­
tivities is strongly a function of education. The degree to which a 
person has been exposed to scientific thought clearly affects his or her 
evaluation of the activity This contrasts with the somewhat divided 
sentiments toward technological development which were distributed quite 
broadly in the population and have not yet become associated with par­
ticular socioeconomic positions or political ideologies. The evidence,
 
then, squarely contradicts assertions that the public views science and
 
technology as indistinguishable activities (see Chapter III) 
This finding has significant implications for representations, by 
scientists or by technologists, to the legislature and to the public 
concerning the relationship of scientific activities to technological 
development These advocates may come to experience less automatic sup­
port for the conduct of scientific activities While at present there 
appears to be a relatively firm distinction in the public's mind between 
science and technology, especially with regard to the greater legitimacy 
of unrestrained scientific inquiry, support for it could diminish if its 
distinction from "technology" becomes blurred 
Are the consequences of technologies already implemented collec­
tively perceived by the public to be positive or negative? The original
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unqualified formulation of our hypothesis proved to be too general 
The public perceives past and presently implemented tech­
nology as beneficial and useful in the solution of social
 
problems.
 
The data forced the following modification of this assertion 
(3) The public perceives most past and presently imple­
mented technologies as beneficial and technology as use­
ful in the solution of some social problems. 
Responses to eight familiar technologies made it clear that the public 
consistently judged their results to be quite positive overall (IV) 
The only technology which a majority did not see as "making life better" 
was the atomic bomb. Positive evaluations of presently implemented tech­
nologies were distributed across all segments of the population, with 
only income or political ideology and positive evaluation associated at 
all disproportionately Those respondents who were more affluent or who 
identified themselves as politically conservative were likely to be more 
favorably disposed to technological development than poorer or strongly 
liberal citizens 
Responses also indicate that technology is perceived as useful for 
solving some but not all social problems (IV) The public saw technology 
as contributing positively to the solution of about half of the social 
problems they were asked to consider. But note that significant minori­
ties felt that technology would very likely exacerbate several problem 
areas--unemployment, the cost of living, and the invasion of privacy
 
Again in part a function of personal political ideology and income,
 
judgments vary on the utilitarian aspects of technology
 
The fact that the public tempers its enthusiasm for technologies 
by its rather modest estimation of their utility in solving social prob­
lems tends to disconfirm predictions of public acquiescence to unbridled 
technical development For it certainly casts doubt on the validity of 
the assertion of wholesale public acceptance of a "technological fix"-­
blind faith that technical solutions will invariably be available to un
do problems which prior technological developments have prompted (III). 
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Evaluations of technologies, both present and future ones, are
 
likely to be made in terms of goals which people believe it important
 
to achieve What is the value context the public would place as a con­
tingency on decisions regarding technological development? Because we
 
had only a limited sense of what to expect in this regard in 1972, we
 
did not then advance a hypothesis Analysis of TECH I data, however,
 
enabled us to derive a general hypothesis which we subsequently tested
 
with TECH II data
 
(4) The public imposes a wide range of social values upon
 
decisions to be made about technology.
 
The 1974 data clearly supported this assertion, confirming earlier analy­
sis. Four of the seven social values which respondents were asked to
 
rate were very strongly endorsed as decision criteria effects on em­
ployment, pollution, taxes, and enjoyment of life. Over 50% of the re­
spondents indicated in absolute terms that a technology's effects on
 
these conditions were "extremely important", and, in terms of mean rank­
ing accorded these values, they clustered very closely together At
 
least two values, control of pollution and maintenance of high employ­
ment levels, it has been argued, are incompatible; that is, protection
 
of the environment would necessitate a decline in employment levels.
 
Whether this is the case or not, the data suggest that the public is at 
least skeptical that this "trade-off" is unavoidable and that it sees en­
hancement of both employment and the environment as important criteria 
of technical devevelopment. Significantly, neither enhancement of U.S. 
international prestige nor increasing leisure time sparked much interest 
as values to be taken into account when decisions are made about techno­
logical development These results were highly stable over the two
 
surveys and were distributed quite generally among the population. 
To be realized, values must be pursued by decision makers and 
instituted in policy. What evidence is available that ourpublic has the 
confidence that decision makers involved in the development of technolo­
gy policy will actually represent their values? Given the prevailing
 
climate of general distrust of all large institutions and increasing
 
criticism that the technical informational demands of this decision area
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exceed the capacity of policy makers, we asserted the following hypothe­
sis
 
(5) The public is suspiciqus of leaders involved in decisions
 
concerning technological policies and feels illegitimately
 
excluded from a process in which it seeks to participate.
 
Among the most striking and perhaps disquieting findings to come out of 
the TECH I and TECH II surveys was the degree to which they confirmed 
this hypothesis. 
From our samples' responses to situations in six areas of techno­
logical decision making, a consistent pattern emerged of distrust of
 
both governmental and business leaders (V, VII) and dissatisfaction over 
the perceived illegitimate exclusion of the public from decision making
 
concerning technology-related policies (V). Top government leaders drew
 
little support as decision makers- while they were perceived to be in­
fluential in all six of the decision areas asked about, in only two was
 
their authority seen as warranted. These two were decisions about space
 
travel and about the military uses of space--areas in which there is a 
virtual government monopoly over development and operations The re­
sults of this portion of the survey marked even more severe public criti­
cism of the role of business leaders They were seen to be influential
 
in four of the six areas, but they were not welcomed in any of them Of
 
great significance, too, are results showing that the public saw itself 
as the party most entitled to participate in decisions on technology
 
policy but as the least influential in actuality. 
Attitudes toward familiar and currently operating technologies are
 
generally positive, moderated somewhat by harsher judgments of some tech­
nologies and by apparent distrust of leaders claiming to represent the
 
values which people feel should carry weight in decisions about techno­
logical development. Does this mixture of optimism and concern carry 
over to future-oriented technology as well ? 
Attitudes regarding technological developments not yet in operation
 
or ones unfamiliar to most people are generated somewhat differently than are 
attitudes toward common or well known technologies. Attitudes about the 
latter can be based on actual experience with various technologies and/or 
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on witnessing the consequences they trigger. But opinions about future
 
technologies must be formed without experiential information on conse­
quences, evaluations of such technologies must rely on speculation about
 
probable future consequences. Therefore, we surmised that.
 
(6) The public, in considering future technological develop­
ment, supports or opposes particular technologies to the degree 
it is certain of beneficial or harmful results from their 
implementation. As these certainties vary, so varies the
 
degree to which the public is likely to support specific
 
technologies.
 
This expectation of the public's position was strongly borne out. People's
 
certainty of beneficial consequences and certainty of harmful consequences
 
were highly associated with their support for or opposition to particular 
technologies (VI, VII) But it is also notable that between a quarter
 
and a third of our samples were certain netther of beneficial nor of
 
harmful effects from most of the future-oriented technologies The
 
implications of these data for public educational strategy are obvious. 
Other less powerful indicators bore out our sixth hypothesis as well-­
the degree of impact the new technology was expected to have on personal 
and social experience and the degree to which present technologies were 
collectively judged to be beneficial Thus certainty of benefit, certain­
ty of harm, degree of impact on individual experience, degree of impact 
on general experience, and strength of the judgment that current techni­
cal development is generally beneficial were the five variables provid­
ing the basis for a predictive model of support or opposition to future 
technologies (VII and Appendix E ). 
In probing for attitudes toward new technologies, we had only
 
limited notions about what to expect. Again, suggestive patterns dis­
cerned in the TECH I survey data served as bases for assumptions to be
 
tested by results from the TECH II survey. These follow as hypotheses
 
7 through 12 below 
(7) Estimates by the public of the consequences of various
 
future-oriented technologies and collective support for or
 
opposition to them vary greatly (VI).
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Collective expressions of support or opposition did indeed vary greatly, 
the variance is especially evident in the contrast between the great en­
thusiasm for urban rail transit and solar energy and the sharp opposition 
to centralized data banks and genetic engineering This finding tends to 
counter the popular stereotype, implicitly encouraged by public opinion 
literature, of the populace as unable or unwilling to engage with com­
plex issues of public policy and to differentiate among those issues.
 
Less final evidence indicates that there was a general weakening of en­
thusiasm for technologies between 1972 and 1974--especially, among the
 
technologies probed, for genetic engineering and data banks (VI) 
(8) The public collectively perceives the impact of future­
oriented technologies as more likely to be greater for other
 
people than for themselves (VI) 
This was the case, for both the whole sample and potential public, for 
every future-oriented technology asked about in both TECH I and TECH II 
surveys. The degree of difference in estimated impact upon individual 
experience compared to the impact upon others also varied considerably. 
This variation in estimating the relative effects of technologies upon 
one's self and upon others suggests a capacity on the part of the public 
not only to discriminate in their evaluation of technologies, but in
 
their understanding of the social consequences of technical development
 
Those people who were certain of potential benefits and/or harmful
 
consequences resulting from implementing various technologies expressed
 
a wide range of hopes and fears, characterized by a particularly inter­
esting distinguishing feature
 
(9) Varying across a wide range of concerns, the hoped for
 
benefits from implementing future-oriented technologies are 
mainly associated with the direct, instrumental capacities
 
of the technologies, the feared harmful consequences, how­
ever, are associated with the longer term, indirect effects
 
of these technologies (VII)
 
From technological development the public, in fact, hoped for the bene­
fits of assured supplies of services and products, increased efficiency
 
of services and production, improved knowledge and enhanced education.
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Feared technological consequences included skyrocketing prices, encroach­
ment on political freedom, violation of moral codes and technological
 
saturation. Hopes and fears were mixed with regard to the contributions
 
of technological development to environmental quality and safety factors,
 
some technological consequences improving these condition, others eroding 
them. 
Factors providing some predictive indications of whether respond­
ents would support or oppose proposed technological innovations were 
more applicable to the potential public than to either the total sample 
or any other subdivision within it And there was a considerable,vari­
ation in the degree to which the potential public perceived specific
 
future-oriented technologies to enhance or threaten social values that
 
they believed important Their attitudes toward the general consequences
 
of technological development also varied, as did the relationship between
 
self-identified ideology and their support of new technologies
 
(10) Social values perceived bf the potential public to be
 
enhanced by various technologies tend to be the same as the 
specific benefits it mentioned as expected from their imple­
mentation, on the other hand, the social values it perceives 
to be threatened by various technologies tend to run comple­
mentary to specific harmful consequences foreseen from their 
implementation (VIII). 
This finding, together with the evidence that a wide range of social
 
values was perceived as optimal for use in technological decisions, con­
firms that the range of concerns about the harmful effects of technolo­
gies is quite broad--of wider scope than expectations for benefits from 
specific technologies 
(11) Among those in the potential public, the development
 
of some future-oriented technologies has become politicized-­
associated with self-identified political ideology (VII)
 
That association seems to have been borne out particularly with respect
 
to technologies about which there was closely divided support--nuclear
 
energy, cable TV, the ABM, and behavior altering drugs Political party 
and ideological preference was related to support for five of the twelve 
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technologies with all but cable TV drawing more support from conserva­
tives than liberals
 
Finally, changes in the importance of some factors cannot be con­
clusively demonstrated because they require evidence beyond that pro­
vided by the two surveys. Therefore, the last hypothesis is more,tenta­
tive than the foregoing: 
(12) Within the potential public, generalized anxiety con­
corning technology has been declining, though concern is 
more sharply focused on specific technologies, and approv­
al for unrestrained scientific research has lessened (VII) 
Two instances bolster this argument--the changing attitudes of the po­
tential public toward space travel technology and the more general public 
responses to the energy crisis of 1973-74 and to the two energy producing 
technologies which drew considerable notice during that period Contrary 
to numerous indications of a declining enthusiasm for technological de­
velopment between 1972 and 1974, the potential public evidenced signifi­
cantly increased support for space travel technology (VII) This find­
ing marks perhaps the most anomalous change in the data related to sup­
port for future technologies and runs counter to the more or less per­
vasive sense that interest in space exploration has run its course This
 
change was evident throughout the potential public, with no dispropor­
tionate associations related to educational level or political prefer­
ences Significantly, this widespread distribution of increased inter­
est in space probes can be related to their use as tools in basic scien­
tific research and thus suggests a continuing acceptance to the public
 
of that activity 
The complexity of public attitudes toward technology is also well
 
illustrated in responses to the energy crisis and to the two energy pro­
ducing potentials--nuclear and solar technologies (VIII) In 1974 the 
public perceived the energy crisis prompted by the oil embargo to signal 
serious, long term problems. At the same time there was considerable 
agreement that the oil companies had contributed to the short term prob­
lems and that they probably should be subject to more rigorous regulation 
by the government For their part, both solar energy collection by 
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satellite and the nuclear generation of electricity, quite favorably
 
viewed two years earlier, continued to receive strong support in 1974, 
notwithstanding the general softening of support for most of the other 
technologies focused on in the survey The public accepted the claim 
that nuclear plants were safe enough to operate, although concern 
about radioactive waste and the overall danger of nuclear reactors in­
creased substantially. This dual endorsement and wariness rmay be in­
terpreted as evidence that the public's recognition of the crucial need 
for finding new energy sources is tempered by an abiding concern for the 
protection of the environment
 
The importance to the public of environmental priorities persisted 
in 1974, almost equally matched by concern for maintaining employment 
levels Over 45% of the potential public held strongly that improvement
 
of the quality of air and water should have priority over energy supply
 
needs.
 
Detectable in public responses to issues surrounding the energy 
crisis was an underlying element of political and ideological identifi­
cation Conservatives more than lilberals favored energy and employment
 
priorities over protection of the environment and were more likely to be
 
sure that nuclear plants were safe enough to operate For their part, 
liberals were notably more prone to believe that the oil crisis was genu­
ine and long term, that the oil companies were suspect, and that they 
should be regulated Ironically, such a high degree of mistrust of gov­
ernment officials surrounds these attitudes that it might even extend to 
government advocacy of the very goals the public rates as meriting the 
highest priority--assurance of energy supplies and environmental quality. 
Out of all the fragments of public opinion just gathered we can 
piece together a picture of the public mind and compare it to the ones 
implicit in the two opposed perspectives on the future of technological 
development which we have discussed at key points throughout this book 
How does that picture bear on the viability of the proposals made by the 
NAS scholars and Paul Goodman? How does it jibe with the dire predic­
tions of Jacques Ellul? The reader will recall that the pluralistic per­
spective of NAS/Goodman suggested a public trusting its leaders, both 
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political and technical, to represent in technological decision making
 
the wide range of values held by the public to be important. Well with­
in the American political tradition, this optimistic position leads us
 
to expect the politics of technology to take on the familiar dynamics of
 
issue-oriented, party organized debate and conflict resolution Ellul's
 
perspective, on the other hand, would lead us to expect a paralyzed pub­
lic will, dazzled by the wonders of the "technical phenomenon," and mute­
ly subject to a technological imperative in which the only decision cri­
terion operating is the "one best way"--the most efficient technical way. 
The findings reported here do not allow us to accept either per­
spective as entirely adequate, though they do offer strong evidence of 
the fallacy of Ellul's fear that an autonomous technical efficiency prin­
ciple will dominate over other values Our society is not comprised of
 
the kind of people whose wills can be swept away by the technical phenome­
non. Yet neither can it be said that the pluralists' optimism is well
 
founded While there is ample evidence that a sufficient basis exists
 
for competition among those representing different interests and values 
to be served by technological development, the public has little confl­
dence that the institutional leaders responsible for representing those 
different values will do so. In a sense, people are saying that no sim­
plistic criterion will do--neither the "one best way" of technicians nor 
the simplifying techniques of politicians in reducing uncertainty And 
they add the disquieting assertion that the institutions of this society 
in the way they now function will not do either. These institutions do
 
not win confidence because of their failure to incorporate into public 
policy more complex and desired combinations of social and psychological 
values Thus, in belying the pessimistic Ellulian description of a tech­
nological society, the American public provides a necessary condition 
for the development of a lively and positive politics of technology 
Still, it does not assure it. The leaders of our institutions have a
 
long road to travel before they will win the confidence of the public
 
And until they do the politics of technology will, we speculate, be
 
hampered by public skepticism, and many of the programs put forward by 
political and technical leaders suspiciously rejected.
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SIGNALS TO SCIENTISTS, TECHNOLOGISTS AND POLICY MAKERS
 
The pattern reported throughout this study of a discerning public 
discriminating and uneasy about technological development marks a notable
 
change from the era immediately following World War II, when Don Price
 
could describe the combined communities of science and technology as the
 
"established dissenters ,11 This Scientific Estate then paralleled, in
 
its full support from the state, without accountability to it, the po­
sition of the Church of England in its prime The decline of uncritical
 
support and acceptance of technological development signals the end of
 
an era of faith and implies a number of interesting, perhaps radical,
 
changes in the offing for scientists, technologists, policy makers, and
 
planners.
 
The science statesman's dilemma. On its face, the fact that the
 
public seems to distinguish scientific activities from technological
 
ones, according virtually unrestrained latitude to the conduct of scien­
tific research, should be gratifying to both scientists and to the states­
men of science The public has in effect affirmed a version of academic
 
freedom Yet on second thought the statesmen of science may find such a
 
distinction to be a mixed blessing As the advocates of a perpetually
 
elite status forbasicresearch, they will realize the extent to which
 
their past representations to legislators and executive leaders have
 
blended scientific activities with technological ones. For scientific
 
research has been richly supported, even within the past several years,
 
primarily on the grounds that it clearly contributes to technological
 
development Now, in view of a climate of increasing public wariness
 
about such development, a wariness fostering its greater regulation, 
scientists may find it necessary to argue for the dissociation of their
 
work from applied technology in order to escape increased control over
 
their own activities. Yet in doing so they could create another problem
 
for themselves, for that disclaimer is contradictory to their petition­
ing support in the name of their contribution to technological develop­
ment The dilemma is clear to maintain freedom from political control
 
by pressing the distinction between science and technology, scientists
 
risk a decline in support for the very work for which the freedom is
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sought. This predicament suggests that an important corner has been or 
about to be turned in the relationship between the public and research 
scientists. It forebodes an end to an unquestioning public willingness
 
to provide very high levels of support for continued basic research.
 
This change is already quite apparent in the halls of Congress, and it
 
means that scientists, individually and through their associations, may 
be required to justify their work to a public increasingly concerned 
about the harmful consequences of technology and therefore likely to 
trace them back to the doorsteps of scientists themselves But what 
about the more direct agent of technological consequences7 The results
 
of this study also hold disquieting implications for the technologist
 
Extraordinary demands on technologists. The challenge for tech­
nologists--engineers, chemists, physicians, arthitects, and other ap­
pliers of science--stems from people's increased propensity, especially 
those among the potential public for technological politics, to make 
strong judgments conducive to support of some technologies and to oppo­
sition to others. This propensity, in conjunction with the wide range
 
of values upon which these judgments seem to be made, could determine in 
part the character of technical work to be done in the future. In view
 
of the social and economic qualities of the values the public believes
 
to be important in evaluating the worth of a given technological develop­
ment, a much clearer understanding is called for of the social and eco­
nomic consequences of various technical designs and implementing organi­
zations. 
Yet some of the values expressed are--on the surface at least-­
incompatible, that is, one apparently cannot be achieved without sacri­
ficing the other From our data, however, we sense that large portions
 
of the public remain unconvinced that such tradeoffs are unavoidable and 
insist rather that technologists invent new technologies which satisfy 
all important values. Such an insistence poses a very stiff challenge 
to the technical designer and manager, for, in a sense, it means that 
the social consequences of physical technologies must be better known 
and taken into account in the design process itself The alternative is 
for technologists to convince the public that a good deal of what seems 
259 
socially valuable cannot be assured or enhanced by technical inventive­
ness--a notion which runs counter to the ideology surrounding techno­
logical creativity in our era
 
Another implication for technologists, in part already visited 
upon them through the environmental impact review process, is a likely 
increase in the political intensity of many kinds of technological de­
velopments As technological projects become the object of criticism, 
the technologist is subject to increased involvement in political con­
flict. Technologies about which there is divided opinion, for example, 
the SST, the ABM and, with increasing likelihood, nuclear power develop­
ment, have and will become the focus of intense debate Technologists 
will be drawn into the controversy both as advocates for their preferred 
technical designs and as advisers to proponents or opponents If the 
trend continues toward more partisan political identification with one 
side or the other of a conflict about the advisability of implementing 
a new technology, a good deal of the tension and pressure familiar in
 
other politicized issues is likely to characterize the politics of tech­
nology as well
 
Technical experts--technologists and scientists--have apparently
 
avoided the onus of distrust and skepticism which the public casts upon 
industrial and political leaders It is to the credit of the technical 
and scientific communities that they have maintained the public's trust 
in matters of public policy Yet a second look at the situation signals 
potential difficulties for them Technical experts are viewed as exer­
cising legitimate involvement in decisions about technology probably be­
cause of their obvious contribution of factual judgments. Political and
 
industrial leaders who historically have represented social values, the 
other major component of all policy decisions, on the other hand, receive 
little approval from the public Should the distrust of those usually 
expected to contribute social judgment and purpose to public programs 
deepen, technical experts could be pressed both to represent social values 
and to contribute factual information and judgment. And, if technical 
experts take up this duty, they will confront the very complex and 
difficult matter of compromise and trade-off that inevitably accompanLes
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decision making. There is no reason to suppose that they are any better
 
than other leaders in dealing with such conflict-ridden situations, so
 
they risk suffering the same decline in the regard of the public as 
other leaders have experienced 
Policy makers and technological politics The implications of
 
this study's findings for policy makers and planners, as for scientists
 
and technologists, point toward more serious accounting of the social
 
aspects of technology and toward increased political intensity surround­
ing technological programs. It seems apparent that the public, while
 
probably not well informed about the technical complexities of various
 
technological innovations, has nevertheless formed stable and definite 
opinions about their potential utility and benefit. These opinions form 
persistent patterns associated with both socioeconomic and political 
ideological characteristics, important traditional predictors of politi­
cal behavior. Our findings suggest then that policy makers will be seri­
ously misjudging the public's mind if they presume it to be unconcerned, 
transient, or irrational about technology 
The public apparently responds to technological matters in terms
 
of experience with the social consequences of implementing technology 
rather than simply to the improved physical capacities this implementa­
tion provides. Both the variation and stability of attitudes suggest 
that these perceptions are similar to generalized responses people make 
to other social experience. As this social, experiential context of 
technology becomes more ingrained in the public's perception we can ex­
pect an increasing portion of the public to associate various technolo­
gies with differential benefits to the affluent or to the poor, to those
 
who give precedence to personal freedom and privacy or those who favor
 
a modulated, quiescent social order, to those who have established privi­
lege or who seek it. 
Several implications for pollcy makers and planners stem from this 
situation It is likely that in the future technological issues will in­
creasingly become identified with partisan politics The tendency al­
ready visible in the potential public for technological politics to per­
ceive some technologies in this light is a precursor to such a development 
261 
Thus, matters of technology policy, once almost completely outside the
 
scope of partisan debate, are likely to join with other types of issues 
as a major source of political threat or opportunity for contending po­
litical factions An additional element of political uncertainty is, in 
effect, becoming apparent in the American's political culture. This is 
already the case for issues surrounding the environmental consequences 
of technological development. It is likely to become so for the social 
aspects of energy production and use, of advances in biological technolo­
gies, of the capacities of high powered computer systems, and of the sup­
port of research and development in general
 
A second implication of perceiving technology as part of social ex­
perience is most relevant to technology assessors and policy planners. 
If technologies are seen as prompting differential benefits, then a very 
close look at the social consequences of alternative ways of implementing 
the same technical opportunity is in order. One design and its mode of 
implementation may affect the young more significantly than older citi­
zens, another may produce more harmful effects for the poor than the 
relatively well-to-do, yet another mode of technological development may 
disproportionately increase the disruption of suburban comnunities as 
contrasted to rural populations The possibility of various design al­
ternatives having different social effects and thus being experienced 
differently by consumers and citizens should be thoroughly explored 
The varied pattern of public responses in evaluating the likely
 
consequences of future-oriented technologies suggests still another im­
portant implication for policy makers. The most significant predictor 
of support for or opposition to a proposed technological development is 
the degree to which an individual is certain that benefits and/or harm­
ful consequences will result from implementing the new technology Yet
 
substantial portions of the public--generally over 25%--were neither 
certain that benefits would result nor certain that harmful consequences 
would result from virtually every new technology they were asked to con­
sider Thus, in instances where opinion is divided about the desira­
bility of governmental support for a technology, it is clear that edu­
cational or propaganda efforts directed toward such doubly uncertain
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citizens could sway the final outcome for it one way or the other. The 
apparently large number of "the undecided" surely argues for the develop­
ment of public information and education programs addressed to increased 
understanding of science and technology Our data also convey an im­
plicit warning to the designers of such information programs The pub­
lic no longer expects only benefits to follow from new technical develop­
ments, rather, the strong sense that harmful consequences may attend them 
seems to outweigh optimistic expectations. Thus, any efforts by propo­
nents of new technologies to persuade the public of the intrinsic good­
ness of all technical innovation are likely to be rejected, and if edu­
cational efforts do not explicitly address the question of the possible
 
harmful consequences of a given technological development along with its
 
touted benefits, there seems little chance that either governmental or 
industrial leaders will recover much legitimacy in the minds of the
 
general public in matters of technology policy.
 
Finally, it is clear that the public expects a much wider range of 
values to be taken into account in the evaluation and regulation of 
technological developments than now is used In effect, the adequacy of 
the "one best way"--the simplistic efficiency dominated criterion tra­
ditional to engineering--does not weigh very strongly with the public
 
The decline of confidence in this technical criterion signals a much
 
more complex and troublesome world for the technologists, the technical 
managers and policy makers responsible for the implementation and regu­
lation of technology It poses the challenge of developing a conception
 
of technology in which the actual social effects of technical development 
are held accountable to a wide range of social values Public decisions
 
about that development can then be more responsibly made This challenge 
is perhaps the most stringent to be faced in the next decade. 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
 
This study of the public's perceptions and judgments of advanced
 
technological development has been predominantly an exploration of new
 
ground. Some relationships have been firmly established, others more
 
tentatively advanced. In effect, we have engaged in two reconnoltres-­
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the second, TECH II, confirming and advancing the first, TECH I. Our 
explorations have led to some unexpected terrain where modest surprises 
were encountered; we have now come on somewhat higher ground, in dim 
view of new paths promising further insight. Thus, as in most research, 
the answers to many of the questions first posed have generated another 
round of questions, more detailed and refined. 
First, there are questions whose answers would give greater pre­
cision to those already derived The experience reported in this book 
behind us, we know more firmly what can be done methodologically both to 
increase the accuracy of findings and to make refinements that would ex­
tend their narrow context and thus augment their meaning Next, further 
questions which could not have been confidently posed previously are re­
quired in order to probe the reasons behind the remarkable variation evi­
dent in public perceptions of technology What are the experiences and/ 
or information people draw upon in making estimates of the impacts of
 
technology upon their lives7 How do they relate their beliefs about 
what changes a technology is likely to stimulate with the social values 
they believe to be important7 (Procedures related to further investi­
gation of variations in responses will be treated more specifically be­
low, under "Extensions.") Finally, the implications of our findings for 
technologists and decision makers have stimulated an expanding, more
 
broadly wrought set of exploratory questions. These are questions about
 
the relationship of the design of technological systems and various modes 
of implementation to the variety of social and political experiences pro­
voked by them. This set of questions, perhaps, will be the most fruit­
ful new pathways to firmer understanding of the social character of tech­
nology 
Refinements Because of the high costs of such work, many studies
 
of public attitudes take place within a locale less extensive than the
 
population which ideally would be surveyed, and most surveys are taken 
only once rather than being repeated over time. These practices place 
limits on the findings so derived In the case of TECH I and TEE II, the 
"public" was actually the adult population of California We have argued 
that the findings derived from the California sample can be safely 
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generalized to the United States and that the very scant findings from2 
relevant national surveys are closely parallel to ours. Yet for greater 
confidence in the applicability of this analysis, a more careful test of 
the representativeness of the data for the United States would be useful.
 
Such a test could include a subset of our questions in national surveys 
to test the possibility of significant differences between our California 
sample and samples from the overall U.S population or particular geo­
graphic regions. It is possible, for instance, that attitudes in the 
northeastern states are much more in accord with those in the west than,
 
say, are those held by midwesteners or southerners. Whether our find­
ings in this country would be similar to attitudes in other nations is 
not at all clear. There is some reason to expect that they would not be.
 
Some cross-cultural work could be done to discover, for example, the de­
gree to which a country's level of economic development accounts for vari­
ations in public perceptions of technology's benefits and harms, of scien­
tific as contrasted to technological activities, and of the importance of 
various social values that might be used in decisions about national poli­
cies bearing on technical development
 
Perhaps as important as increasing our confidence that findings from 
the largest, most "technological" state in our country are by and large 
representative of attitudes across the land is the task of increasing our
 
confidence in both the firm stability of attitudes and in the nature of 
the changes in perceptions and judgments detected between 1972 and 1974.
 
The remarkable degree of stability in attitudes, both within the panel 
sample interviewed in 1972 and 1974 and between the two analogous cross­
section samples from each year suggests that members of the public have 
come to form apparently firm opinions about advanced technologies and 
their consequences Statistically significant relationships between 
various factors in each of two surveys greatly increases our confidence 
that such relationships appearing in one are not the product of random 
fluctuation, but rather indicative of well ingrained impressions in the 
public mind. Such impressions may or may not have been formed on the 
basis of accurate information Additional or different information may 
prompt changes Certainly there were enough instances of change to 
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indicate that such opinions were not set in concrete, and the degree of
 
change taking place within the public is as important a feature of its
 
attitudes toward technology as is stability Here our two surveys only
 
whet the appetite. The particular changes in perceptions and evalua­
tions of technologies and their consequences are intriguing, some are
 
puzzling, and all are indicated by relationships either emerging or dis­
appearing between 1972 and 1974 But the possibility of statistically
 
induced random error accounting for such disappearance or emergence must 
moderate our confidence that real changes have been discovered. Thus, a 
third survey is requisite to improve the precision of these findings and
 
our 	confidence in them. If the attitudes which the public expressed in 
1974, as contrasted to 1972, are evident again in the near future, then
 
the change we suspected and advanced speculatively can be asserted with 
extreme confidence 
A number of findings are of particular interest in this regard. 
To what degree will the following relationships change or remain stable7 
1 The public's apparently increasing tendency to discrimi­
nate some technologies and their consequences from others
 
2 The apparent distinctions in public judgments about sci­
entific activities
 
3 The apparent increasing opposition in general to vari­
ous future-oriented technologies.
 
4 	 The public's perception of business leaders' influence
 
in decision making about technological policies as
 
illegitimate, its lack of confidence in governmental
 
leaders' role in formulating those policies, and its
 
apparent frustration at being excluded from them.
 
S. 	The intensity of public feeling about the importance
 
of many social values to be applied to the evaluation
 
of technological programs.
 
Several important additional questions of stability or change also 
arise which concern primarily the potential public This group from 
which it is most likely that leaders in technological politics will 
emerge exhibited several significant properties To what degree will
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these characteristics remain stable or evolve into others
 
6 	 The apparent tendency for the potential public to as­
sociate support for or opposition to technologies
 
with various self-identified political ideological
 
positions and to respond to these technologies in
 
part in terms of differences in age, education and 
income.
 
7. 	 The apparently greater degree of those in the po­
tential public than others to evince cognitive
 
organization of attitude toward technologies, their 
consequences and the more general effects of techno­
logical development upon our society. 
Among other refinements that would increase the precision of this
 
study is providing respondents the opportunity more fully to indicate the 
character of social values which they believe ought to be important in 
technological decision making This could be done by giving them a
 
chance to nominate values which, from their own point of view, would be 
more than or equally important to those we included in the questionnaires.
 
Also, refinements could be introduced with regard to the kinds of trade­
offs respondents choose to make, such as between the degree of environ­
mental clean-up and specific dollar increases in prices or taxes 
The last refinement we will propose here falls between more finely
 
tuning the existing study and extending it to specify a variety of po­
tential consequences stemming from encouraging or inhibiting particular 
technological developments This refinement would provide respondents 
with hypothetical contingencies to which to react Analysis would then 
be required of particular changes in attitude of those individuals who 
were interviewed both in 1972 and 1974 They evinced surprisingly little 
change between these years, and we were able to use data attesting to 
this fact to argue the high degree of stability of public attitudes to­
ward technologies. What little indication of change we detected was
 
insufficient for us to draw any conclusions from. It is quite possible
 
that another survey, say in 1976, would, after a four-year period, 
reveal the substance and drift of these changes and afford a better 
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understanding of individual, as contrasted to group, shifts in percep­
tions of technologies and their consequences. The properties of slowly
 
emerging changes could be monitored and contrasted to more abrupt shifts. 
As with the other refinements proposed, this one would require the col­
lection of rdther different data than were gathered in the TECH I and 
TECH II surveys upon which our analysis now rests. To these we now turn. 
Extensions The unanswered questions noted at the outset of this
 
final section logically extend the scope of the undertaking. They are 
primarily questions prompted by the wide range of variation and intensi­
ty in judgments which in the public's mind implicitly relate technology's 
consequences to social values and political preferences. To account for
 
this variation more systematically than could be attempted in our two
 
surveys, the following kinds of information are probably required at
 
minimum
 
(1)Background information about respondents which would 
provide a basis for estimating their degree of acquaintance
 
with various technologies and their consequences--such as, 
for example, the technical content of their work-related and 
leisure time activities, as well as their exposure to infor­
mation about technology and its processes. 
(2) The make-up of respondents' causality beliefs about
 
the social and economic effects of technological development;
 
that is, what sorts of changes they believe are likely if a 
particular technical process, say fluoridation of water sup­
plies, is carried out; and, more importantly, the reason they
 
infer as to why such changes are likely to occur. 
(3) Conditions identified by respondents as evidence that 
values they hold as important would be enhanced or threatened 
by particular technological developments For example, when
 
respondents say that technology will be useful in solving un­
employment or conserving resources, what specific conditions 
do they have in mind 7 
(4) Beliefs of respondents about the present character of
 
the involvement of, for example, technical experts as contrasted 
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to business leaders in the actual process of implementing
 
a technology. 
It is likely that such efforts as just outlined to uncover personal be­
lief systems will be difficult and may result in the discovery of in­
choate and uninformed expectations. But this was what we expected at 
the outset of our present work and proved not to be the case. Thus it 
is possible to suppose that such attempts will prove worthwhile. 
Explorations It now seems clear that the public is highly aware 
of both the positive and harmful consequences occasioned by the improved 
capacities to act in the world which technology has provided and which 
it promises to provide. The wide range of support for and opposition to 
future-oriented technologies evinced by the public and its very apparent 
distrust of the personnel and policies behind technological implementation 
clearly point to that keen awareness Its signals to technologists and 
policy makers have already been discussed, and we conclude this briefing 
on unanswered questions by noting some of their research inplications.
 
Two areas of research possibilities follow from the public's in­
creasing tendency to make judgments about technology's "impacts" on the 
basis of social values which they hold to be important These areas cen­
ter around the relationships between varieties of personal and/or social 
experience and (1) the deszgn of technologies and (2) the mode of their 
inrplemntation. In neither area does much background material exist, 
but each has considerable potential--not only for social science studies
 
of technology-and-social-change, but also for directly relevant contri­
bution to public policy issues 
If, on the basis of technology's impact on social experience, we
 
were to attempt to impose social technical and economic criteria, we 
would be at a loss for how to do so Yet it is clear that the design of 
technologies, especially those requiring large scale operations, has a 
decided effect on individual and group experience. The way a new build­
ing is designed affects the character of friendship patterns, the par­
ticular design of an auto assembly plant affects the feeling of partici­
pation (or alienation) experienced by its operators and workers, the
 
placement of a new railroad almost always shapes the character of com­
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munity development. While many illustrations can be provided, little if 
any systematic knowledge about the sociat properties of various techno­
logical designs is readily at hand The challenge is both conceptual 
and methodological. And much work is likely to be required before we 
can with confidence affirm the design of a technological system in terms 
of its contribution to social values held important by the public 
The other area of research suggested by our work concerns the re­
lationship between various alternative modes of implementing and regulat­
ing new or improved technologies and the character of social change and 
personal experience which might be affected by the different choices. 
The objectives of research exploring these relationships would be, first,
 
to discover more precisely the degree to which an elected mode of imple­
mentation enables successful, socially responsible diffusion of a techno­
logical development, and second, to establish means of determining how
 
regulation patterns imposed on a technology shape the character of suc­
cessive technological designs. Such information is absolutely essential 
for the confident affirmation of particular technological proposals or 
their rejection and for modifying the implementation process of opera­
tional technologies.
 
It now seems clear that the rationale behind technological develop­
ment can no longer be simply technical possibility and economic feasi­
bility. The relationships of alternative technological designs and imple­
mentation modes to various social values must be established These are
 
minimum requisites for pointing technological development in a socially
 
responsible direction
 
NOTES
 
Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1965). 
2 
A Harris Poll conducted in early 1975 concerning nuclear energy 
developments is an especially corroborative instance.
 
APPENDIX,A 
PROCEDURES FOR 1974 CALIFORNIA SURVEY OF 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TECHNOLOGY 
(Provided by Field Research Corporation) 
San Francisco, California 
The survey consisted of two segments (1) a reinterview panel of 
respondents who had first been interviewed in 1972; and (2) a cross­
section sample of the adult general public (18 years of age and older) 
Both the original 1972 survey, and the 1974 cross-section segment 
were based on FRC's Master Sample of California This design defines 
the universe to be sampled as consisting of all adults 18 years and old­
er who reside in residential dwelling units Not included in this uni­
verse definition are persons residing in hotels or other transient quart­
ers, persons with no clearly defined places of residence, migrant work­
ers, drifters, inmates of institutions, or military personnel residing
 
in government quarters As a practical matter, urban or rural ghettos
 
and high-rise apartment houses with limited access tend to be underrepre­
sented in samples, although they are included in the definition of the
 
ideal universe
 
SAMPLING PROCEDURES 
In constructing this statewide sample, the counties of the state 
were arrayed in geographic order in accordance with the ten state sta­
tistical areas established by the State Office of Planning The current 
population of each Census County Division from the 1970 Census was list­
ed, and random selection of CCD's was made with probability of selection 
in proportion to size The random choices were made by systematic sam­
pling, with random starts, in order to insure representative geographical 
distribution The result is a master sample of pryimary aanpl-ng wnts 
(PSU's) consisting of distinct geographic population units (CCD's), each
 
PSU designating the general locus of starting points for one or more
 
interviewing clusters 
Specific locations for a Cluster, or Clusters, within a given PSU 
are determined by random selection of residential addresses from the cur­
rent telephone directory within which the PSU is contained. This selec­
tion is made from the total telephone directory which contains the PSU. 
In effect, therefore, the PSU location has been used to designate a tele­
phone drecetor as the frame for selection of interviewing Cluster start­
ing points
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Within the designated directories, the desired number of Cluster 
starting points are selected A cluster starting point is a residential
 
address drawn from the directory by use of random designation of page,
 
column, and listing. Only residential telephone addresses are drawn 
The selected "key address" designates the starting point for a 
cluster of dwellings which provide interviews for the survey Procedures 
for the formation -of dwelling unit clusters are such that the inclusion 
of a given residence in the sample does not depend on whether it has a 
telephone The probability of a cluster's initial selection does, how­
ever, depend on the ratio of telephone homes to total homes in the area, 
a circumstance which is taken care of by a telephone density weighting 
procedure 
To form a Cluster, the interviewer lists a pre-designated number
 
of occupied residences encountered on a pre-designated route around the 
block from the "key address " Vacancies, transient quarters, and the 
institutions are excluded from the listing The interviewer calls on 
each of the dwellings listed in the Cluster The standard procedure for 
general public opinion surveys is to select respondents by a method which 
provides an age-sex distribution in the sample which usually closely 
matches the census age-sex distribution of the adult population. For 
certain surveys, screening questions may be asked to locate registered 
voters or persons with other particular characteristics of relevance for 
the purpose of the survey A weighting procedure is used to "fine tune" 
the final sample on key population parameters (e g , age, sex, political 
party) where these are known from independent sources 
CALL-BACK AND REINTERVIEW SCREENING PROCEDURES 
Call-backs to those in the independent cross-section samples are
 
made on households where no one was found at home on the first call Up 
to three call-backs were made before the interviewer gave up trying to
 
reach someone Similar call-back procedures were used with the panel
 
sample of respondents to be reinterviewed in 1974 In the event that
 
the respondent interviewed in 1972 was not at home, his or her name was
 
looked up on the local telephone book If the name was listed in the
 
same town, further calls were made there. If not, the call-back pro­
cedure was ended
 
Additional screening procedures are used for reinterviewed panel
 
samples This procedure is demonstrated in the interview guide facsimile
 
below. It is intended to assure the interviewer that the respondent is
 
being interviewed for the second time
 
SCREENING PROCEDURE SHEET 
Hello, my name is I'm with Field Research Corporation, a national public opinion survey
 
company We're making a survey of opinion and my instructions call for me to interview a person
 
here by the name of (SEE ABOVE) Is that person at home right now?
 
YES NO 
May I speak with ? When would be the best time to come back to interview 
GO TO INTRODUCTION . 
(Day/Date) (Time of day) 
NO ONE HERE BY THAT NAME 
Well, a (man) (woman) by that name was interviewed here two years ago 
Do you happen to know where that person can be found today 
YES NO 
WRITE NEW INFO IN SPACE ABOVE THEN THANK RESPONDENT AND TERMINATE 
THANK RESPONDENT AND TERMINATE 
INTRODUCTION WHEN PERSON NAMED ABOVE IS REACHED,
 
My name is I'm with Field Research Corporation, a national public opinion survey company 
We're making a follow-up survey to one that we made in this area about two years ago Do you happen 
to recall being interviewed about how people's lives are affected by new developments in science and 
technology? 
YES, MAYBE, NOT SURE NO 
Well, 3ust to be sure, our records show that Well, our records show that a (man) (woman) between 
the (man) (woman) interviewed was between age and was interviewed here Would you have 
and __ years of age. Would you have fit in fit in this category two years ago 7 
this category two years ago9 
YES. - Good. Now to continue--GO TO INTERVIEW.YES - Good Let's go on with the interview and you 
----- ---------------------- 7 recognize some of the questions as we comeO INTERVIEWmay 
NO -1Is there any other tman)(wonan here who to them. GO TO INTERVIEW 
does fit this age category ? ----------------------------------------------
YES---- LOCAT .....I......E..NO there any other (man)(woman) here who has a-*Is 
YES -ILOCATE AND INTERVIEW similar name who fits this age category?NO -J- Well perhps-there is an error in our YES-LOCATE AND INTERVIEW[.............
 
records. Let's go on with the survey NO__ Well, perhaps there is an error in our records. 
and I'll report the correton to my Let's go on with the survey and I'll report the 
office. GD TO INTERVIEW correction to my office GO TO INTERVIEW 
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The 1974 Population Sample
 
The survey sample for 1974 emerged as follows from attempted
 
contacts with the gross sample 
Cross-section Sample Total Interviews Attempted 802 
Interview completed 316 
Interview not completed: 486 
No adult at home (after callbacks) 
Communication problem 
Illness 
Inaccessible (doorman, dog, etc.) 
Refused, too busy 
Terminated after starting 
160 
43 
19 
1-2 
246 
6 
Reinterview Panel Total Reinterviews Attempted 980
 
Second interview completed 472
 
Second interview not completed. 508
 
Moved (no forwarding address, 
dwelling demolished) 218 
Deceased 35 
Illness 25 
Not at home (after callbacks) - 154 
Refused, too busy 76 
Total 1974 sample 788
 
APPENDIX B
 
SUMMARY OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 1972-1974
 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TECHNOLOGY
 
Unless otherwise noted, questions listed below were asked of re­
spondents in both years, 1972 and 1974. Questions are listed in the 
original order in which they were asked 
la First of all, how long have you lived in this state, altogether? 
lb How long have you lived in this city or town? 
Length of time in-­
la lb 
State City/Town 
LESS THAN ONE YEAR 
1-2 9 YEARS 
3-4 9 YEARS 
5-9 9 YEARS 
10 YEARS OR LONGER 
2a. 	 Now, I'd like to talk about how much things are changing in the
 
world today. things that affect how people make their livings, how
 
life 	styles are changing, and things like that I'd like you to
 
think for a minute about changes that have taken place in the lives
 
of the people of this country since the 1940's--say the period since 
the end of World War II up to the present day About how much do
 
you think things have changed for the average person? Quite a bit
 
or not very much? (1972 only)
 
QUITE A BIT . . 1 
NOT VERY MUCH 2 
DON'T KNOW . . 3 
2b 	 In your opinion, what are some of the things that you believe have 
changed the most in the life of the average citizen of this country-­
things such as social and political movements, our way of life, sci­
ence 	 and technology, or developments in business and industry? 
(PROBE TRY TO GET THE RESPONDENT TO MENTION AT LEAST TWO CHANGES) 
(1972 only)
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2b 	 (cont ' d) 
CHANGE
 
CHANGE
 
3 	 For each of the changes listed below, the respondent is to answer
 
how much of a change for the better or worse it has made in life in
 
general, using the following scale 
Very Quite Quite Very 
much a bit Slightly In be- Slightly a bit much 
worse worse worse tween better better better 
a The development of household appliances like washers, dryers, 
dishwashing machines 
b 	 The development of automotive vehicles like cars, buses, trucks, 
etc
 
c 	 The development of factories that produce things by automation. 
d 	 The development of very powerful weapons like the atomic bomb.
 
e 	 The growth of the civil rights movement in this country (1972 
only)
 
f 	 The development of high speed computers. (1974 only)
 
g 	 The development of the space program, sending men to the moon, 
sending space probes to other planets, etc. (1972 only) 
h. 	 The ability to understand and predict human motivations and be­
havior 
I 	 The development of birth control pills (1974 only)
 
j The change in the moral attitudes of people in this country 
(1972 only) 
k. 	The development of television (1974 only)
 
4a 	 Here are some issues (see List No 1) which have been mentioned in
 
press and on television recently Naturally, some people are more
 
interested in some issues than in others Which of these issues
 
are the ones that you often think or talk about these days7 (1974
 
only)
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4a 	 (cont' d) 
List No 1 
1 	 Reducing the crime rate 
2. 	Solving the energy crisis
 
3 	 Providing jobs for all
 
people who want work 
4. 	Reducing the cost of living 
5 	 Protecting the environment
 
6 	 Providing mass rapid transit 
7 	 Protecting individual's
 
private records from misuse
 
8 	 Eliminating drug addiction
 
9 	 Improving the quality of
 
education
 
10 	 Controlling population
 
growth
 
4b 	 For each of the above issues the respondent is then asked to indi­
cate whether he feels the increased use of technology, that is, the 
application of scientific ideas to designing machines in other in­
ventions, will have any effect or not, using the following scale 
Will make Will make
 
this easier No this harder Can' t
 
to do difference to do say
 
(INTERVIEWER REPEAT FOR ALL TEN ISSUES.)
 
S 	 For each of the technological concepts noted on List No 2, the 
following questions were asked (Each respondent was asked to
 
answer 6 concepts, see Chapter II for discussion) 
a 	 Suppose that a development like the one described were to be put 
into operation If it were to come into being, would it change 
your own life; very much, quite a bit, slightly, not very much, 
or not at all 9
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Sa (cont'd) 
Change, very much 
quite a bit 
slightly 
not very much 
not at all 
don't know 
. . . 1 
. 2 
3 
. 4 
. 5 
0 
b 	 Regardless of the possible effects on your own life, do you think 
it would change life for the average person very much, quite a 
bit, slightly, not very much, or not all ? 
Change, very much . 1 
quite a bit 2 
slightly 3 
not very much 4 
not at all 5 
don't know 0 
c 	 How sure do you feel that this development would have beneficial 
7
results ? Are you absolutely sure, quite sure, or not too sure

Absolutely sure 1 
Quite sure 2 
Not too sure 3 
Don't know 4 
None 5 
(If Absolutely sure or Quite sure--ask Question c.l)
 
c 1 	 What do you see as the most important benefits, or 
good things, that might result if such a development
 
were actually to take place ? (PROBE ANY OTHERS ? ) 
d How sure do you feel that this development would have drawbacks
 
or bad results ? Are you absolutely sure, quite sure, or not too
 
9
sure

Absolutely sure 1 
Quite sure 2 
Not too sure 3 
Don't know . 4 
None .... 	 S 
(If Absolutely sure or Quite sure--ask' Question d 1)
 
d 1 	 What do you see as the most important drawbacks, or 
bad things, that might result if such a development 
were actually to take place ? (PROBE ANY OTHERS ?)
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List No 2 
1 	 High speed trains or monorails covering metropolitan areas
 
to transport large numbers of people quickly from one part
 
of the area to another.
 
2 	 Altering people's inherited genes to change certain of
 
their characteristics which they will pass on to their
 
children so that the mental and physical capabilities of
 
future generations can be improved
 
3. 	Space ships which can take people to other planets in the
 
Solar System, such as Mars or Venus.
 
4 	 Large passenger airplanes travelling at very high speeds
 
(several times the speed of sound) to transport people
 
across the country or to other parts of the world in a few 
hours.
 
5. 	Power produced from satellites orbiting the earth which
 
collect energy from the Sun and send it back to Earth, 
where it is converted into electrical power
 
6. 	 Surgical procedures to transplant different body organs
 
from one human being to another so that people's diseased
 
or injured organs could be replaced
 
7 	 An expanded number of television channels carried into the 
home by cable so that in addition to regular TV shows from 
networks, more programs for special interest groups could
 
be 	made available
 
8 Passenger airplanes that travel at high speeds and which 
can 	 also land and take off in very short spaces so that 
they 	can transport people closer to the places they want
 
to go 
9 	 Power plants that use atomic energy to produce electricity.
 
10 	 Altering brain responses with special drugs so that the be­
havior of people who have mental disorders can be improved 
or controlled 
11. 	 Storing large masses of information about the character­
istics and behavior of the public on computers so that 
government and business administrators can quickly get 
up-to-date, factual information on which to base their 
decisions. 
12 	 Missiles which can intercept and destroy enemy rockets
 
launched against this country before they get near enough 
to cause serious damage
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6 	 Now, I'd like you to take all of these cards (HAND RESPONDENT 6
 
CONCEPT CARDS, from List No 2) and tell me whether they are things 
you would like to see, or whether they are things you would be op­
posed to. (Each respondent was asked to consider 6 technological
 
concepts See Chapter II)
 
a. 	FOR EACH ONE THE RESPONDENT WOULD LIKE TO SEE, ASK How strongly
 
do you favor this one--very strongly, somewhat strongly, or just
 
slightly9
 
b 	 FOR EACH "OPPOSED TO" ASK. How strongly do you oppose this one-­
very strongly, somewhat strongly, or -just slightly ?
 
OPPOSED TO 	 LIKE TO SEE
 
Very Somewhat Neither like Somewhat Very
 
Strongly Strongly Slightly to see nor Slightly Strongly Strongly
I opposed to
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
7 	 For each of the statements listed below, the respondent is to answer
 
using the following scale
 
Neither
 
Strongly Somewhat agree nor Somewhat Strongly Don't
 
agree agree disagree disagree disagree know
 
a 	 The standard of living would decline if there were less techno­
logical development
 
b. 	People who try to think in a scientific manner cannot appreciate
 
most of life's beauties (1974 only)
 
c 	 The only way to make sure that what scientists learn will not
 
cause a lot of harm is to stop them from studying things unless
 
they are clearly important and beneficial
 
d. 	There probably aren't any real solutions to some of our serious
 
social problems. (1974 only)
 
e 	 The energy shortage has been mainly created by the oil companies
 
in order to make greater profits (1974 only)
 
f 	 Atomic power plants are safe enough so that I don't worry about
 
them exploding or leaking radiation (1974 only)
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7 (cont' d)
 
g 	 Basically all scientific discoveries are good, it is just how
 
some people use them that causes all the trouble
 
h. 	No one should attempt to regulate which inventions are produced
 
because it interferes with the individual's right to decide what
 
he wants to buy
 
i 	 The government is run by a few big special interest groups look­
ing out for themselves. (1974 only) 
j 	 It would be nice if we would stop building so many machines and 
go back to nature
 
k If they are given money and left alone, scientists can be counted
 
on to discover things that will make all our lives better.
 
1 	 Any attempt to control which inventions are widely produced or
 
made available will make our lives worse.
 
m 	 We need stricter government control over the petroleum industry 
to prevent future energy shortages. (1974 only)
 
n People shouldn't worry about harmful effects of technology be­
cause new inventions will always come along to solve the prob­
lems (1972 only)
 
8 	 For each of the technological concepts noted on List No 3, the
 
following questions will be asked. 
a 	 Which one or two of the people or groups on this [decision maker]
 
list [included below] do you think actually has the most say 
about how things like that are used or dealt with? (RECORD BE-
LOW UNDER PROPER TECHNOLOGY) 
b 	 Which one or two has the least say? 
c. 	In order to represent the public interest, which one or two of
 
the people or groups on this list do you feel should have the 
most say about how things like that are used or dealt with9 
d In order to represent the public interest, which one or two 
should have the least say?
 
(INTERVIEWER REPEAT FOR EACH TECHNOLOGY CARD) 
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8 (cont' d) 
Decision Maker List
 
1 Technical experts 5 The courts 
2 Business leaders 6 Organized consumer groups 
3 Top government leaders 7 Individual people/the public 
4 Congressmen 8 No one 
List No 3 
1 	 Our demands for power such as electricity are growing so fast 
that we may not be able to produce as much of it as we may 
want. In terms of deciding how thislimited power is to be
 
used 
2 	 Too great a use of automobiles may cause congestion in the 
cities and increase pollution. In terms of deciding how a 
public system of mass rapid transit which would reduce prob­
lems caused by cars would be put into use. 
3 	 Medical science has given us the ability to predict the sex, 
some of the physical characteristics, and to alter the genes 
of infants before their birth In terms of deciding if such 
information is to be put to use 
4 	 Space stations manned by military personnel who can aim
 
rockets and missiles at targets on earth can be designed
 
In deciding whether they should be built ..
 
S 	 Large amounts of information about the characteristics of
 
the public can be collected, stored and analyzed by com­
puters In deciding how this information should be used
 
6 	 Rockets to take astronauts and scientists to other planets 
such as Mars can be designed In deciding whether we should 
build these- space ships 
9. 	 For each of the pairs of statements listed below, the respondent is 
to choose the statement that comes closest to his own opinion, even 
though he might not completely agree with it For the statement 
that is chosen, he is to answer whether he agrees strongly or moder­
ately, and is scored on the following scale _ (1974 only)
 
STATEMENT A-I r STATEMENT A-2 
Agree I Agree Don' t Agree Agree 
Strongly Moderately Know Moderately Strongly
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9. 	 (cont ' d) 
a 1 Studying most things logically and scientifically can help
 
people understand them better, although many things may 
never be fully understood
 
or
 
a 2 	Trying to be scientific and logical is not much help in 
understanding how the world really works 
b 1 	We ought to increase dur control over how inventions and
 
other technologies are used
 
or
 
b.2 	The way we control how inventions and other technologies 
are used now is just about right 
c 1 	 In times like these, we really shouldn't hold it against 
our public leaders if they don't have solutions to some of
 
the serious problems in our society 
or 
c 2 	In times like these, if our public leaders don't have 
solutions for almost all of society's serious problems we 
should get leaders who do 
d.1 	 We should not allow our growing need for energy to cause 
any slowdown at all in controlling pollution and improving 
the quality of the air and water
 
or 
d.2 	 If it comes to a choice, our need for energy has to come 
ahead of an all-out emphasis on the quality of the air and 
water 
e 1 	The material things that technology has provided have freed
 
us to find more satisfying lives 
or 
e 2 	The material things that technology has produced trap us 
and prevent us from finding satisfying lives 
f 1 	 We must produce enough energy to keep the factories going 
and people on the job even if it means more pollution of
 
the air and water 
or 
f.2 	 We should not allow any further air and water pollution even
 
if some people lose their jobs as a result of an energy
 
shortage 
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9 (cont'd)
 
g 1 Our government leaders usually tell us the truth
 
or
 
g 2 Most of the things that our government leaders say
 
cannot be believed
 
10. 	 During the last few months, people have started to think about
 
energy and the part it plays in their lives. Some people are
 
concerned about the situation, some others are not Which of the
 
following things really concerns you? (1974 only) 
a Having to wait in line for gas
 
b Having to reduce the amount of heat in your home
 
c Being laid off from work 
d Having to lower air pollution standards 
e The possibility that 
end of the century 
we may run out of oil and gas before the 
f People not recognizing that this 
tinuing their wasteful habits 
is a serious problem and con­
g None of the above 
lla 	 People have different ideas of what should or should not-be im­
portant in deciding whether'technologies such as the inventions
 
which we've been talking about should or should not be developed
 
In general, when you are deciding whether a given technology is 
a good thing or a bad thing, which of these phrases best describes
 
how much importance you give to such factors as
 
llb 	 Often it is impossible to give equal importance to all of the
 
factors Could you please arrange these cards in order placing
 
the most important factor first and the next most important 
second and so on down to the least important which would be 
seventh.
 
[See next page for choice of wording of subjective factors for 
lla , and their importance rankings for llb I 
aWhat it may do to make 
Extremely 
Important 
Question lla 
Somewhat Slightly 
Important Important 
Not at all 
Important 
Don't 
Know 
Question lilb 
Rank in 
Importance 
life better and more 
enjoyable for the 
average person 1 2 3 4 0 
b What it may do to in­
crease or decrease 
employment 1. 2 3. 4 0 
c What it 
crease 
taxes 
may do to in­
or decrease 
. 1 2 3. . . 4 0 
d What it may do to help 
or hurt the good image 
the United States has 
in the world 2 3 . .. . 4 . 0 
e. What it may do to in­
crease or decrease 
pollution. 1 ... 2. .. 3 4 0 
f. What it may do to help 
or hurt poor people 1 2. ... . 3. . . . 4 0 
g What it may do to in­
crease or decrease the 
amount of free time 
people have (1972 only) 1 2 . . . 3 . 4 0 
h How it affects the indi­
vLdual's rights to 
privacy (1974 only) 1. . . 2.. 3 4 0 to 
uI 
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12 For each of the statements listed below, the respondent is to answer
 
using the following scale 
Neither
 
Strongly Somewhat agree nor Somewhat Strongly Don't 
agree agree disagree disagree disagree know 
a Unless scientists are allowed to study things that don't appear
 
important or beneficial now, a lot of beneficial things probably 
won't ever be discovered
 
b 	 Relying only on scientific and logical thinking to solve socie­
ty's problems can only make things more complicated (1974 only)
 
c 	 Most elected officials can be counted on to work for things I 
really believe in. (1974 only)
 
d We must make certain that scientists are not allowed to study 
certain 	things in the first place because they may cause a lot
 
of harm 
e 	 People have become too dependent on machines.
 
f 	 We could solve more of society's problems if we did not place
 
so many controls on the way inventions are used and produced
 
(1974 only)
 
g 	 No one should attempt to regulate which inventions are produced 
because they do not know how to do it 
h 	 Most of the time I just don't seem to have much control over my
 
life 	 (1974 only) 
I 	 Technology has made life too complicated
 
j The energy shortage is genuine and will be with us a long time.
 
(1974 only)
 
k. 	Even if atomic power plants are not 100% safe, they're safe 
enough for us to go ahead and build them (1974 only) 
13 [Somewhat different wording for this question and its answers were
 
used in 1972 and 1974 Different versions are noted below]
 
(1972) 	What actions would you be likely to take if you felt strongly
 
about some particular technological development?
 
(1974) 	Which, if any, of the political activities on this list have
 
you done in the past few years? (See List No 4)
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List 	No. 4 
(Combined for 1972 and 1974)
 
a. Been eligible to vote .........('74 only)
 
b Become active in a club or organization
 
involved in the issue ............. ('72 only)
 
c 
 Support your position in discussion ...... ('72 only)
 
d. 	Contribute to (a political candidate or
 
to any other political causes) that
 
support your point of view .............. .
 
e 	 Been a volunteer work during a political
 
campaign f.. ..... ........ ('74 only)
 
f. 	 Attended meetings (of your city or town 
council) or lectures . 
g. Put a bumper sticker (supporting a po­
- litical candidate or issue) on your car 
h Attended a public hearing of some govern­
ment agency, such as a school board .. ...('74 only) 
i Written a letter to the editor of a news­
paper or magazine about some public issue. ('74 only) 
j Write to congressman or legislator .... ('72 only) 
k Circulate petitions about it ('72 only) 
1 Worked with others in your community to 
try to solve some community problem......... ('74 only)
 
m Gone to see some governmental official
 
in person about some problem....... .. .('74 only)
 
n Actively worked against a candidate who
 
supported the opposite side on an issue
 
concerning the technology .......... ('72 only)
 
o Attended a protest (rally or demonstration)
 
meeting . .........
 
p Picketed or taken part in a boycott over 
some political issue.. ...... .('74 only) 
q Voted (in a primary election) for a 
candidate because of it.........* 
None of these . .. 
*Parentheses indicate the wording used in 1974. 
Now, 	 just a few more questions for classification purposes 
14. 	 First, in politics today, do you consider youself a Republican, a
 
Democrat, or as a 
What other party7 
member of some other party? (If other party) 
Republican . . . 1 
Democrat .... 2 
Other Party . . 
(specify) 
Declined to state party . . . 0 
No answer . . . y 
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15 Do you consider yourself more as a conservative or more as a liber­
al? 
 (If Conservative or Liberal, ask): Do you consider yourself
 
to be Strongly (conservative) (liberal) or just moderately (con­
servative) (liberal)7
 
Strongly Conservative .1 
Moderately Conservative .2 
Neither, Middle of the road 3 
Moderately Liberal . . 4 
Strongly 	Liberal . . . .5 
Don't know, No opinion 	 . . y 
16 In the primary this past June, did you happen to vote, or did some­
thing come up which kept you from voting? (1972 only)
 
Voted . - .1
 
Did not vote. 2
 
Not registered to vote 	 3
 
Don't know. 	 y 
17 a 	 How did you vote on Proposition 9--for it, against it, or did
 
you not vote on it7 (1972 only)
 
Voted for it. 1 
Voted against it 2 
Did not vote on it 3 
Don't know y 
(If "voted for it" or "voted against it," ask question 17b) 
b 	 Why did you vote as you did on Proposition 9? 
(INTERVIEWER GET ONE OR TWO REASONS WHY THE RESPONDENT VOTED 
AS HE DID ON PROPOSITION 9) 
18 Ask, for the chief earner in the family 
a 	 Are you/is the chief earner employed by someone, or is he in 
bu~iness for himself9 
b. What 	 kind of work do you/does the chief earner do ?-
Type of work 	 Industry 
19 How 	 much does your (WHEN THE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE CHIEF EARNER, 
USE CHIEF EARNER'S) job depend on future advances in Technology7
 
Very much .. . . . 1 
Somewhat 2 
Not very much . . 3 
Not at all 4
 
Don't know. y
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20 	 (Standard questions concerning education of respondent, age, income,
 
sex, ethnic/racial category, etc.)
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
1972 
1974 
1972 
TECH I 
TECH II 
MICHIGAN ELECTION 
STUDY 
1970 
1970 
U.S. CENSUS 
CALIFORNIA 
U.S. CENSUS: 
TOTAL U.S. 
1972 TECH I 
1974 TECH II 
1972 MICHIGAN ELECTION 
STUDY 
1970 
1970 
U.S. CENSUS. 
CALIFORNIA 
U.S. CENSUS: 
TOTAL U.S. 
APPENDIX C 
OF THE 1972 AND 1974 CALIFORNIA SAMPLES 
(compared) 
TABLE C-I 
RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS
 
WHITE 
82:1 
86.1 
88.6 
NON-WHITE 
17.9 
13.9 
11.4 
N 
966 
312 
2705 
90.4 
89.2 
9.6 
10.8 
TABLE C-2 
SEX 
MALE 
47.4 
48.5 
43.2 
FEMALE 
52.6 
51.5 
56.8 
N 
976 
312 
2705 
48 1 
47.3 
51.9 
52.7 
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TABLE C-3 
AGE (IN YEARS) M 
18-20 21-24 
 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60+ N
 
1972 	TECH I 5.8 12.3 15.6 8.2 6.1 8 2 10.1 7.7 6 4 19.5 976 
1974 	TECH Ii 
 6.0 12 2 15.1 10.9 5.8 5.8 8.9 9.1 
 6.7 19.3 313
 
1972 MICHIGAN ELECTION 5.2 9.6 
 12.7 8.8 8.1 8.5 9.1 
 7.5 7.1 23.4 2683
 
STUDY
 
1970 U.S. CENSUS.
 
a
CALIFORNIA - 13.6 11.5 9.7 9.2 9.6 9.9 8.6 7.4 27.9 ­
1970 U.S. CENSUS:a 
TOTAL 	U.S. - 12.8 10.6 9.1 8.9 9.5 9.6 8.8 7.9 22.8 ­
alS- and 19-year-olds are not included in the census figures. 20-year-olds are counted within the
 
21- to 24-year-old category.
 
TABLE 	 C-4 
EDUCATION
 
8th Grade 9th-llth 12th 1-2 yrs. 3 yrs. Completeda Advanced b 
or Less Grade Grade College College College Degree N 
1972 	 TECH I 9.6 13.8 29.6 22.6 6.6 10.2 7.6 974
 
1974 	TECH II 5.4 9.7 33.0 24.9 6.2 14.5 6.3 314 
1972 	MICHICAN ELECTION 21.8 17.5 25.3 
 19.5 
 4.1 2228
 
STUDY
 
1970 	 U.S. CENSUS: 
CALIFORNIA 17.8 17.0 33.8 15.4 3.3 6.8 5.9 
1970 	 U.S. CENSUS.
 
TOTAL 	 U.S. 25.5 18.8 32.4 10.3 2.6 6.2 4.2aFor census figures, this category is: "4 years of college." 
bFor census figures, this category is: "5 years of college or more." 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE C-5
 
OCCUPATIONa
 
Professional Clerical Skilled 
 Farm and
 
and and 
 Workers Service Unskilled
 
Technical Managers Sales Craftsmen Operatives Workers Workers N
 
1972 	TECH I 25.4 12.2 19 1 25.6 5.7 8.6 3.3 
 774
 
1974 TECH II 
 32.4 10 9 14.6 18 7 11.9 6.8 4.7 248
 
1972 MICHIGAN ELECTION 16.1 11.8 20.9 13.8 
 17.3 13.5 6.6 1905
 
STUDY
 
1970 	 U.S. CENSUE.
 
CALIFORNIA 17.4 9.3 27.7 12.9' 13.7 12.6 6.4 ­
1970 	 U.S CENSUS-

TOTAL U.S 14.8 8.3 
 25.2 13.6 17 6 12.8 7.7
apeople coded as retired, unemployed, or students are not included
 
bCensus figures include all individuals 16 years of age and older.
 
TABLE C-6
 
INCOME (OF CHIEF EARNER)
 
Less Than $3,000- $5,000- $7,000- $10,000- $15,000-a $20,OOOb
 
$3,000 4,999 6,999 9,999 14,999 19,999 and Over N
 
1972 TECH I 10.9 
 10.4 12.4 18.8 28.2 11.5 7.7 912 
1974 	 TECH II 7.5 8.2 
 6 1 12.4 35.5 14.8 15.5 291
 
1972 MICHIGAN ELECTION 12.3 12.3 
 12 1 18.4 23.4 11.1 10.2 2612
 
STUDY
 
1970 U.S. CENSUS- I
 
c
CALIFORNIA 15.2 
 10 3 10.9 17.5 23.9 17.0 5.2 ­
1970 	U.S. CENSUS.
 
cTOTAL U.S. 17.3 11.1 12.0 18.9 23 0 12.7 4.0 ­
,aFor census figures, this category is: "$15,000-24,999." N) 
bFor census figures, this category is- "$25,000 and over."
 
CCensus figures are for "household income." 
TABLE C-7 
PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION 
1972 TECH I 
1974 TECH II 
1972 MICHIGAN ELECTION STUDY 
aIncludes: "Independent," "No 
Republican 
33.0 
22.0 
23.4 
Preference" and 
Decline to Statea 
10.9 
23.4 
36.3 
"Other" for Michigan data. 
Democrat 
56 1 
54.6 
40.3 
N 
929 
312 
2702 
TABLE C 8 
IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATIONa 
1972 
1974 
TECH I 
TECH II 
STRONGLY 
LIBERAL 
9.9 
11.7 
MODERATELY 
LIBERAL 
27.5 
30.0 
NEITHER; MIDDLE 
OF THE ROAD 
17.5 
17.7 
MODERATELY 
CONSERVATIVE 
34.5 
30.6 
STRONGLY 
CONSERVATIVE 
10.7 
10.0 
N 
894 
301 
1972 MICHIGAN 
ELECTION STUDY 2.1 23.8 37.4 35.0 1.7 1548 
aFor Michigan study categories were- Extremely Liberal, Liberal = 1, Slightly Liberal = Moderate = 3; Slightly Conservative = 3; Conservative, Extremely Conservative = 5. 
2; 
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TABLE C-9
 
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS BETWEEN SELECTED SUBGROUPS
 
GROUPS 
COMPARED AGE SEX RACE INCOME EDUC. OCCUP. 
PARTY 
IDENT. 
IDE-
OLOGY 
I. Technician 
72 XS 
F-test* Panela 
vs. non
7 94* 
2.31 
-techni
1.82 
0.00 
cian: 
0.00 
2.20 
4.82* 
3.33 
1.85 
2.31 
57.99* 
11.65* 
0.49 
0.98 
3.86* 
-.67 
74 XS 3.35 0.20 2 18 4.28 1.96 8.31" 1 48 0.86 
72 XS -.160 -.043 .001 .141 .003 -.125 .027 .008 
Tau-b Panel 
74 XS 
-.160 
-.125 
.004 
.026 
-.097 
-.085 
.193 
-.169 
.010 
.022 
-.132 
-.050 
.074 
.084 
.089 
.045 
II. 	Educated technicians vs. rest of sample: 
72 XS 4.79* 7.58* 0 83 5.83* 10.18* 18.19* 0.14 1.43 
F-test 	Panel 2.25 0.25 0.47 1.91 4.54* 5.36* 0.17 1.33
 
74 XS 3.68* 0.75 0.20 4.91* 3.85* 2.18 7.84* 0.75
 
72 XS -.073 -.088 - 029 .157 .192 -.206 -.013 030 
Tau-b Panel - 126 .024 -.065 .175 .206 -.250 .041 .136 
74 XS .06 -.05 -.03 .23 .18 -.08 -.18 -.05 
III. 	Educated non-technicians vs. rest of sample:
 
72 XS 4.67* 10.71 5.53* 4.81* 274.65* 12.22* 2.26 6.03*
 
F-test 	Panel 0.85 5.58 1.29 3.29 67.11 9.09 5.40 1.85 
74 XS 1 42 1 80 1.80 2.63 62.18* 14.54* 1.30 3.19* 
72 XS -.000 -.105 -.076 .143 .555 - 247 -.067 .047 
Tau-b Panel .002 -.086 -.064 .135 .586 -.259 -.139 -.043 
74 XS .01 -.08 -.08 .18 .58 -.39 -.08 .17 
IV. Educated technicians vs. educated non-technicians.
 
72 XS 5.24* 0.00 0.76 0.58 41.80* 41.80* 0.53 1.08
 
F-test 	Panel 1.60 2.84 0.04 0 42 9.53* 3.94* 2.43 1.09 
74 XS 1.95 0.06 0.32 2.30 14.73* 8.45 2.06 1.95 
72 XS -.109 -.002 .048 .041 -.576 .033 .054 -.020 
Tau-b Panel .071 .068 .092 -.221 -.668 .378 .104 .034 
74 xs 06 -.02 -.05 -.05 .51 -.39 .12 .21 
V. Potential public vs. rest of sample: 
72 XS 6.99* 22.66* 6.89* 12.99* 246.88* 30.14* 2.11 4.45* 
F-test 	Panel 2.26 2.60 2.18 6.62* 67.99* 16.90" 2.87 2.46
 
74 XS 3.05 3.34 2.22 7 95* 56.39* 9.48* 7.84* 1.62
 
72 XS -.053 -.152 -.084 .234 .602 -.360 -.065 .061
 
Tau-b Panel -.093 - 055 -.103 .247 .649 -.413 -.088 .065
 
74 XS -.04 -.11 -.09 .34 .63 -.38 -.21 .10
 
aDemographic characteristics of the panel are based on the responses 
given in 1972. 
Asterisked numbers in F-test results indicate statistical significance 
at p < .05 
APPENDIX D
 
SUPPLEMENTARY STATISTICAL AND TECHNICAL PROCEDURES
 
D-l METHOD FOR SELECTING THE POTENTIAL PUBLIC 
Throughout this research report, we have provided data for two sets 
of people a sample representing the entire cross section of California 
adults and a smaller group which we termed the "potential public " That 
latter set was isolated in an attempt to find a group of people who would 
most likely hold consistent and logically connected attitudes about a sub­
ject area which, for most people, lacked salience The potential public, 
then, is anal gous to Converse's "issue public" and Devine's "attentive
 
public "i Moreover, we believed that in the event that a technological
 
controversy bursts forth on the public agenda, the potential public would
 
disproportionately become actively involved Thus, the attitudes of the
 
potential public are important because they may be precursors to more
 
widely held beliefs and values and because they will very likely determine
 
the dialogue in any public debate
 
The potential public was isolated using three variables which we 
felt were rough indicators of previous interest and involvement in tech­
nical and political affairs The first variable was based on the degree 
to which the respondent was involved in a technical vocation The re­
spondent's job category and occupattonal envronment were both determined 
and coded using the standard U S Census Bureau classifications. These 
two factors were then trichotomized into a typology representing job types 
or settings as high, moderate, or low technical nature (see below) The 
score given each category appears in their respective boxes
 
Degree of Technical Content in Job Category
 
Low Moderate High
 
Low 1 2 3
 
Degree of Tech­
nical Content Moderate 2 3 4
 
in Job Setting
 
High 3 4 5
 
See note 8, p. 42.
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The second variable used to select the potential public was educa­
fton. It was calculated by means of a seven-point indicator running from 
"less than 6th grade" to "advanced degree " The final variable measured 
pol~itical participation- a respondent was categorized according to whether 
he had voted in a primary, was register d but did not vote, or was not 
registered to vote.
 
The three variables were combined to produce an eleven-point "scale " 
That index is, of course, rather ad hoc, but we were simply looking for a 
rough way to select out the subset of the sample we were interested in We
 
experimented with other more elaborate methods but found none whlich seemed
 
to offer better results than the "simplistic" one ultimately selected
 
Using the index thereby constructed we arbitrarily chose those re­
spondents with scores of seven and above for inclusion in the potential 
public. Interestingly, although as we expected we observed greater sn
ternal conststeney of belief among the potential public, we found that 
the distributton of attitudes mirrored that of the general public quite 
closely 
299 
D-2 ADDITIONAL PANEL DATA 
TABLE D-2 
STABILITY OF RESPONSES FROM PANEL 'SAMPLE 
(percentage of respondents in 1974 within one category of 1972 responses) 
Technology 
IMPACT 
Self 
ON. 
Others 
CERTAINTY 
Benefit 
OF: 
Harm 
Support/ 
Opposition 
Urban rail 71 .2%a 83.3 91.6 84.8 70.2 
77.1 89.2 97.4 88.7 79.5 
Solar energy 69.5 76.0 89.0 89.3 60.3 
78.0 73.8 90.5 88.4 61.2 
Organ transplants 70.3 80.7 92.8 89.0 65.7 
71.9 82.1 94.5 88.7 61.0 
Nuclear energy 69.1 71.7 90.3 89.0 65.4 
71.8 77.6 88.7 86.3 68.4 
Cable TV 70.3 78 5 81.0 88.5 57.1 
63.6 67.1 84.7 90.3 51.9 
STOL 70.0 72.3 87.0 84.2 75.9 
76.0 79.7 90.3 75.4 76.4 
ABM 65.3 72.4 89.8 85.7 62.9 
56.5 73.5 94.3 83.0 61.5 
SST 77.7 72.1 89.3 90.6 60.8 
81.1 74.0 87.7 89.7 63.5 
Brain drugs 72.2 69.7 89.6 83.0 53.5 
70.0 73.8 95.7 81.8 62.7 
Space travel 77.6 67.0 93.6 86.2 62.8 
80.3 66.2 91.7 84.5 68.9 
Genetic 72.3 71.9 88.2 87.3 59.3 
engineering 71.4 82.8 86.9 83.3 63.8 
Data banks 68.7 81.2 91.8 82.0 51.4 
68.9 84.3 95.9 86.4 57.3 
aTop figure for cross-section sample; lower for potential public.
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D-3 ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL PROCEDURES RUN ON SUPPORT VARIABLES
 
TABLE D-3a
 
PEARSON' S R COEFFICIENTS FOR PERSONAL IMPACT VERSUS SOCIETAL IMPACT
 
AS INDICATED 
CONCEPT 

Urban rail 

Solar energy 

Organ transplants 

Nuclear energy 

Cable TV 

STOL 

ABM 

SST 

Brain drugs 

Space travel 

Genetic engineering 

Data banks 

BY SUPPORT 
1972 

XSEC 

.539 

.693 

.526 

.773 

.524 

.472 

.828 

.437 

.477 

.621 

.497 

.635 

FOR THE TWELVE FUTURE 
SAMPLE 
1972 1974 1974 
PP XSEC XPP 
.541 .365 .357 
.601 .709 .658 
.570 .575 .455 
.782 .719 .746 
.606 .443 .160 
.492 .418 .331 
.836 .773 .805 
.494 .599 .718 
.435 .408 .394 
.558 .618 .691 
.448 .438 .291 
.667 .568 .567 
TECHNOLOGIES 
1974 1974 
PANEL PPP 
.255 .280 
.672 .737 
.515 .468 
.719 .770 
.593 .566 
.479 .666 
.810 .867 
.408 .428 
.444 .356 
.532 .545 
.337 .324 
.599 .639 
TABLE D-3b
 
SAMPLE SIZE AND PEARSON'S R FOR RELATION BETWEEN
 
CERTAINTY OF BENEFIT AND CERTAINTY OF HARM 
P CROSS POTENTIAL CROSS POTENTIAL PANEL POTEN­
10 SECTION PUBLIC SECTION PUBLIC PANEL TIAL PUBLIC 
1972 1972 1974 1974 1974 1974 
CONCEPT N r N r N r N r N r N r 
Urban rail 360 -.374 123 -.319 132 -.392 66 -.298 185 -.252 66 -.198 
Solar energy 316 -.287 90 -.241 98 -.339 39 -.160 163 -.229 61 -.105 
Organ transpl. 352 -.404 115 - 409 107 -.237 42 -.362 177 -.222 66 -.251 
Nuclear power 332 -.369 107 -.463 260 -.462 115 -.446 378 -.265 134 -.241 
Cable TV 372 -.402 122 -.423 121 -.283 45 -.302 187 -.455 68 - 525 
STOL 788 -.352 246 -.496 122 -.476 59 -.489 181 - 415 64 -.405 
ABM 361 - 465 121 -.639 118 -.567 53 -.610 172 -.336 60 -.271 
SST 372 -.352 112 -.492 117 -.397 45 -.560 188 - 452 68 -.340 
Brain drugs 345 -.378 114 -.422 130 -.344 69 -.414 181 - 421 64 -.462 
Space travel 363 -.337 105 -.174 117 -.234 53 -.209 185 -.355 68 -.245 
Genetic engin. 355 -.527 109 -.525 132 - 324 64 -.379 198 -.502 62 -.455 
Data banks 351 -.399 120 -.363 128 - 520 60 -.524 188 -.448 72 - 383 
U4 
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D-4 FURTHER NOTES ON MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 
Interval Techniques on Ordinal Data Three statistical methods
 
were used to analyze the survey data in this study Pearson's correla­
tion coefficient, multiple regression analysis, and factor analysis.
 
Each of those techniques assumes that the data is of the interval type.
 
We would be hard put to verify such an assumption, the best that can be 
said for our survey data--and for virtually everyone else's--is that it
 
is ordinal
 
The significance of using interval techniques on ordinal data has 
been a point controversy for a long time, it seems clear that there is 
little chance of resolution of the issue in the near term Some scholars, 
lLke Richard Grether and Seymour Lipset, hold that using interval tech­
niques on ordinal data is entirely inappropriate and may induce distor­
tions not only on estimates of the size of parameters but on their di­
rection as well Other practitioners, e g Tufte, insist that most data, 
even if strictly ordinal, can be used in interval level techniques be­
cause those methods are highly robust 
We gave considerable and careful thought to this issue. As indi­
cated, we opted for the use of interval level methods We did so for a 
number of reasons. First, we conceived of this study as an exploratory 
one As such, we recognized that the measurement problems of treating a 
virtually uncharted sub3ect area would probably dwarf any errors induced 
by using inappropriate techniques. Second, the interval level techniques 
used are familiar to more readers than other more esoteric methods would 
be This factor was important because we wished to avoid overwhelming 
the substantive thrust of the arguments with explanations of unfamiliar 
techniques
 
In the final analysis, however, those reasons would lose all validl­
ty if the degree of error made by using interval level methods on ordinal
 
data was large To insure that it was not, we employed other non-interval
 
methods to check our substantive points For instance, in addition to the
 
Pearson's product moment coefficient we also calculated gamma and tau-b
 
In general we found that the size of the Pearson parameter was greater 
than tau-b and less than gamma We never found an instance where the sign 
of the association (if significantly different from zero) was different 
in any of the three cases Because of those findings, because precision 
of estimation was not our goal, and because we could not find a solid 
reason to choose between gamma and tau-b, we felt comfortable in report­
ing the Pearson correlation
 
We also employed other techniques to carry out the multivariate 
analysis reported in Chapter VII In addition to performing regressions
 
to estimate the effects of the five independent variables upon the sup­
port for future technology dependent variable, two other non-interval
 
methods were employed as a check The first was multiple classification
 
analysis--essentially a dummy variable regression program. Here the de­
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pendent variable must be interval, but the independent variables can be 
ordinal or even nominal The second method was the automatic inter­
action detector program In this technique the quality of data required 
is the same as in the multiple classification analysis, but the assump­
tion of additivity, implicit in regression, does not have to be made. 
In both cases the results lead to interpretations quite congruent with 
those inferred from the regression analysis We therefore felt comfort­
able in reporting the more familiar interval technique
 
We did not carry out alternative methods to the factor analysis, 
in part because of our confidence that using interval techniques data 
did not produce major distortions Also, we employed the factor analy­
sis only to demonstrate the multiple dimensionality of the respondents'
 
attitude structure, not, for instance, to provide weights for scale con­
struction We felt it unlikely that the dimensionality would be affected
 
by the employment of a non-interval technique 
Tie Use of Weighted Variables Despite the best efforts of the 
Field Research Corporation to select a representative sample of the 
California adult population, it is often impossible to interview a cross 
section whose demographic characteristics mirror it precisely Males 
tend to be underrepresented, as do the poor and the elderly. An attempt
 
can be made to compensate for such disparaties by assigning "weights"
 
whereby attitudes of respondents belonging to an underrepresented group
 
count "more" than they would otherwise But such efforts at weighting 
are based on some implicit assumptions which might not be valid In 
particular, they assume that some relationship obtains between the demo­
graphic variables weighted and the attitudes expressed by the respond­
ents Notwithstanding such problems, weighting has become a common 
practice in survey research, and we have employed it here.
 
In this study we have weighted the respondents along three lines-­
age, sex, and geographic location--in order to bring our sample up to 
the population estimates for California Some initial work was done to
 
determine the extent to which such weighting produced results substan­
tively different from what would be the case were weighting not employed. 
Generally the differences were small, i e , well within the range of 
sampling error 
APPENDIX E
 
NOTES AND TECHNICAL ADDENDA TO CAUSAL MODEL OF SUPPORT FOR TECHNOLOGY
 
TESTS OF liE MODEL'S ADEQUACY
 
OVERIDENTIFICATION AS A TEST
 
A causal model which is recursive, 1 e , does not contain any re­
ciprocal interdependencies, can always be identified, that is, its pa­
rameters can always be estimated Often the model contains equations
 
which are overidentified This means that more information is available
 
than is needed simply to determine what the estimates of the coefficients 
are That additional information can be used to test the model's ade­
quacy 
For the model hypothesized below (from Figure 7-1), there is little 
additional information available to be employed in such a test, however.
 
A CAUSAL MODEL OF EVALUATIONS OF FUTURE-ORIENTED TECHNOLOGIES
 
e2 
e5
 
CERTAINTY
 
OF BENEFIT
 
44 5 MA1
 
EVALUATIONS P2 10 EVALUATION OF 
OF PRESENT FUTURE-ORIENTED 
TECHNOLOGIES TCNLG 
P3 / 6 SOCIAL- p1 3 
CERTAINTY 
e 3 e 4 
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The only predictions the additional information allows us to make is that 
there will be no path between the present technology variable and the 
variables measuring personal and social impact When regressions were 
carried out searching for such a path, none was found for any technology 
in either year Thus, in the limited test which could be made using the 
model's overidentification, the results confirmed the model's adequacy
 
STABILITY AS A TEST OF THE MODEL'S ADEQUACY
 
A second way to determine the validity of the causal model is to
 
use stability over time to measure it If we assume that the causal re­
lationships are stable over time, we can use the 1972 study to generate
 
the model and the 1974 study to test it Substantial differences would
 
suggest the model's inadequacy In the table below, the number of stable
 
estimates (maximum of twelve) are given for each path and for both the 
entire cross section and the potential public Because the size of the
 
1974 sample was smaller than the 1972 sample, the former will be more
 
likely to yield statistically insignificant estimates. This artifact
 
will tend to overestimate the degree of instability. Therefore, the
 
table also contains the number of estimates which are substantively
 
stable even if the 1974 parameter was statistically insignificant
 
TABLE E-la 
STABLE PATH COEFFICIENTS
 
(maximum = 12)
 
PATH CROSS-SECTION SAMPLE POTENTIAL PUBLIC 
P 1 10/12 9/12 
P 2 4/6 3/8 
P3 6/6 5/7 
11/11 9/10
P4 
P5 9/11 4/7 
P6 11/12 8/9 
P7 9/11 4/6 
P8 7/9 8/8 
P 9 i12/12 9/9 
P1 0  11/12 9/9 
P1l 9/9 11/11 
8/11 9/9
P1 2  

P1 3  10/11 10/10
 
As can be seen from Table E-la, the estimates for the potential
 
public are more unstable than those for the entire cross section This
 
difference may very well be due to the larger sample size available in 
the latter instance. With the exception of paths p2 and p3 of the model,
 
which are suspect, a strong case can be made for its adequacy.
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THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE MODEL YIELDS STATISTICALLY
 
SIGNIFICANT PATH COEFFICIENTS
 
A somewhat different question must also be addressed. how often 
is each path statistically significant? Each path coefficient was esti­
mated a total of four times. for the entire sample and for the potential 
public in both 1972 and 1974 Those estimates could have been either sta­
tistically significant or insignificant If they were insignificant all 
four times, then we can infer that the particular path is non-existent 
If, at the other extreme, the path produced significant estimates all 
four times, then considerably more confidence in its existence 'is justi­
fiable A given path could be significant for any one technology from 
zero times to four times. Table E-lb indicates how many times and for 
how many of the twelve technologies each path represented in the model 
was a viable parameter of causal influence. 
TABLE E-lb
 
NUMBER OF TECHNOLOGIES POSSESSING VARYING NUMBERS OF 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT PATH ESTIMATES 
------------- NUMBER------------
PATH 0 1 2 3 4 
P1 3 2 1 1 5 
P2 2 1 7 2 0 
P3 0 3 5 1 3 
P4 0 0 0 3 9 
P5 2 0 4 5 1 
P6 3 4 1 2 2 
P7 0 1 0 4 7 
P8 5 4 3 0 0 
P9 0 0 0 3 9 
PI0 0 0 0 2 10 
P1l 0 0 2 1 9 
P1 2  7 2 2 1 0 
P1 3  6 2 3 1 0 
As can be readily seen from Table E-lb, four paths, p2 p8 . pII3 ,P1 2 ' 
are statistcally significant fewer than 50% of the time The remaining 
nine paths are significant at least 58% of the time 
RESULTS OF REGRESSING SUPPORT/OPPOSITION FACTORS 
The actual standardized regression coefficients for the model are 
presented in Table E-2 Figures indicate the influence of the upper 
variable on those variables beneath it 
TABLE E-2 
RELATED TO DECISIONOF FACTORSRELATIVE INFLUENCE 
TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE SELECTED FUTURE-ORIENTED TECHNOLOGIES
 
(standardized regression coefficients for cross sections and potential publics)
 
Present Technology Certainty of
 
Certainty of Harm Benefit Certainty of Harm Self
 
Tech- Benefit Harm Self Others Self Others Others
 
nologies '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74 '72 '74
 
Urban .05* 06 *a 04* 17 -. 38 -. 38 42 .34 .32 .40 .06* .06* -.05* -. 01* .41 23 
rails .19 00* .12*-.31 -.34 -. 35 .45 .44 40 .26 .04* .04* .08* -.149 .37 28 
Solar -.07 -.16* 15 .02* - 28 -. 34 .32 .43 .20 .15* -.05* - 01 -.03* - 06* .62 .64 
energy -.14* -.12* .16*-..311 -.26 -. 221 .41 .52 .38 .181 .04* .10* -.16 .06 .44 .68 
Organ - 02* -.05* .18 .06* -.40 -. 23 .34 .37 .23 .08* - 02* .02* 04* .04* .45 .55 
transpl. -.l1* -. 13* 13*-.36 - 39 -.091 .37 .30 37 .17' - 04* .28* .04* .13 .44 .40 
Nuclear -.21 -.27 18 .21 - 33 -.41 .38 .29 .09 .11 .27 .26 .14 01* 73 .70 
-energy -.44 - 36 .35 .30 -. 31 - 49 .32 20 .00* .16 .19* .22 .06* .069 .78 .77 
Cable TV -. 0l* .08* .04* .10* - 40 -.29 .53 .60 .28 .28 .02* -.11* .16 .13* .40 .30* 
-. 12* 21* .03* .40 -.42 - 43 .66 .50 .23 .161 .09 -.18* .21 .12 .50 .00 
STOL -.14 -. 30 20 .16 -.32 -. 43 .30 .20 .16 .24 .07* -. 04* -.02* 06* .43 .37 
-.29 -.38 .20 .21 -. 44 -.47 .46 17' .22 221 27 -.24* -.09* .11 .43 .32 
ABM -.25 -. 23 13 .26 -.43 - 51 .36 .18 .05* .02* .05* .08* .03* -.02* 81 .77 
.00* .09 16* .04* 00* 02' .84 77
-.41 -.36 17 .35 -.57 -.60 .35 .021 

SST -.19 -.29 .12 .00* -.33 -.48 .39 .48 .21 .34 .15 .16 .00* .18 .38 .47
 
- 23 -.41 .37 -. 07 - 48 -.61 .42 .41 .12* .14 .17* - 04* .09* -.030 .45 .71
 
Brain -. 22 -.19 .09* .i0* -.36 -.40 .22 07* .20 .24 .18 .24 .08* .15* .44 .38
 
drugs -. 22 -. 33 .10 .121 - 40 -. 29 .17*-.16 .27 .220 .21 .26 .03* .19A 41 .42
 
Space - 25 -. 24 .25 .14* - 28 -. 33 39 .46 .17 .23 .12 -.10* .07 .06* .56 52
 
travel -.16* -.29 39 .10 .11* -. 37 .43 .40 .07* .16 .08* .l7* 15* .29 .53 63
 
Genetic -.l0* -.ii* .10 .01* -.52 -.20 .32 .30 .17 .11* 17 .30 .10* .30 .46 37
 
engin. -.17* -.19* .11*-.13' -.51 -.40 .45 .16 .03* .34 .27 .19 .00* .47 .44 .18*
 
Data -. 14 -.07* .14 .19 -.38 -. 32 .19 .00* .09* .01* .38 .28 .09* 29 .61 .48
 
banks -. 34 -.24* .19 191 -. 31 -.46 .11*-.21"-.03*-.221 .42 .09* .13* 17" 61 .48
 
aTop figure for cross section, lower for potential public
 
Indicates regression coefficient not significant at p < .05; i.e., sigma beta > 5 of beta weight.
 
APPENDIX F 
BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PRIOR LITERATURE ON
 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TECHNOLOGY
 
Over the past twenty years, questions similar to the ones asked in 
our study were included in a number of public opinion polls Sometimes 
the wording of these questions was remarkably like that used in our own 
surveys, other times the wording was different, but the underlying con­
cept being measured was the same. We have gathered together nine other 
studies and selected from them a set of questions which deal with the 
issues examined in this report In general, we have found an impressive 
degree of congruity between the work of others and our own To be sure, 
we found some differences in the precise distributions. But the extent 
of those differences, which in any case usually appear minor, is even 
further diminished when one considers that deviations are induced simply 
when questions are worded in slightly different ways. Thus, while we 
cannot make any claims about the stability over time of the results of 
these additional studies, they do seem to affirm that the California 
population's attitudes do not depart markedly from those of people in 
the rest of the country Moreover, differences in verbal presentation 
between our study and the others are not particularly crucial, efforts
 
to measure the same underlying concept or issue generally yield much the 
same results 
The nine studies to be reviewed here are
 
(1) Science Writers' study, done by the University of Michi­
gan Survey Research Center, published as The Pubic Im­
pact of Science in the Mass Medza, 1958 1919 persons 
were chosen using a national sample. 
(2) Irene Taviss study, done by Harvard Program on Techno­
logy and Science, published in Technology and Culture, 
1972 201 persons from three communities near Boston
 
(3) American Federation of Information Processing Societies 
(AFIPS) study, done by Lieberman Research, Inc , New 
York, published as A Nattonal Survey of the Public's 
Attttudes Toward Computers, 1971 1001 telephone inter­
views with a national sample 
(4) 	 National Science Board study, done by Opinion Research 
Corporation, published as Attvtudes of the U.S. Public 
Toward Science and Technology, 1972 2,209-person 
national sample 
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(5) A Etzioni and Clyde Nunn's study, based on Michigan 
SRC data and Harris Polls, published as "The Public
 
Appreciation of Science in Contemporary America" in
 
Daedalus (Summer, 1974): national samples 
(6) Ebasco Services study, done by the Louis Harris Corp­
oration, published as A Survey of Public and Leader
ship Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power Development in the 
Un-ted States, 1975 1,537-person national sample 
(7) Gallup Poll, Oct 9-13, 1970. national sample.
 
(8) Opinion Research Corpoyataon study, September, 1965
 
national sample 
(9) A French study, done by the Center for the Study of
 
French Contemporary Political Life, published as "Re­
search on the Attitudes of Public Opinion Concerning 
Scientific Research," (Mimeo, 1973). 1200-person 
national sample. 
Items selected from the above are grouped here so as to parallel the order
 
in which similar items were discussed in the present report.
 
I GENERALIZED ATTITUDES TOWARD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (We had consulted 
the Taviss work in writing our questionnaire. Four items in particular 
were used by both of us, and the distributions are quite similar to the 
ones we report in Chapters III and V. The Michigan SRC study employed a 
set of questions, responses to which demonstrate the same rather strong 
commitment to the value of scientific activity as our data reveal While 
the Etzioni and Nunn data would seem to suggest a greater degree of disen­
chantment with scientific work in 1964 than in 1957, the National Science 
Board study clearly indicates that the disenchantment has receded--perhaps 
to below the 1957 level The French study provides evidence of somewhat 
more negative attitudes toward scientific research ) 
1. Taviss study % Responding 
Item Agree Not Sure Disagree (N) 
People today have become too 
dependent upon machines 78.1 S.5 16.4 (201) 
It would be nice if we would 
stop building so many factories 
and go back to nature 35 8 10 0 54 2 (201) 
Technology has made life too 
complicated 32 3 10.4 57 2 (201) 
If there were less technological 
development, do you think that the 
standard of living would decline7 60 2 8 5 31 3 (201) 
311 
2 Michigan SRC study.
 
Number
 
Don't of
 
Agree Disagree know NA, Total Cases 
Science is making our lives
 
healthier, easier and more
 
comfortable 94 3 2 1 100% (1919) 
One of the best things about 
science is that it is the 
main reason for our rapid 
progress 89 6 4 1 100% (1919) 
One trouble with science is 
that it makes our way of
 
life change too fast. 43 51 5 1 100% (1919) 
The growth of science means 
that a few people could con­
trol our lives 32 60 7 1 100% (1919)
 
One of the bad effects of
 
science is that it breaks
 
down people's ideas of right
 
and wrong 23 67 8 2 100% (1919)
 
Science will solve our social
 
problems like crime and mental
 
illness 47 45 6 2 100% (1919)
 
3 EtzionL and Nunn study 
Percent Agieeing
 
Item 1957 1958 1964
 
Science makes our way of life change too fast 43% 47% 57% 
Science breaks down people's ideas of right 
and wrong 23 25 42 
The growth of science means a few people 
could control us 32 40 --
Number of respondents 1919 1547 923 
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4. National Science Board study
 
Do you feel that science and technology change things too fast, too 
'slowly, or just about right7
 
NUMBER OF JUST 
INTERVIEWS TOO TOO ABOUT NO 
UNWTD WTD FAST SLOWLY RIGHT OPINION 
'Total U S Public 2209 8221 22 16 51 11 
Men 1053 3969 23 19 49 9
 
Women 1156 4252 22 12 53 13
 
18 - 29 years of age 592 2130 26 15 51 8 
30 - 39 410 1315 17 19 55 9 
40 - 49 396 1579 20 18 51 11 
so - 59 318 1290 24 11 55 10 
60 years or over 493 1908 23 14 45 18 
Less than high school complete 738 3532 22 14 48 16
 
High school complete 757 2888 23 14 56 7
 
Some college 704 1775 23 19 50 8
 
Professional 341 969 21 18 54 7 
Managerial 247 805 23 17 56 4 
Clerical, Sales 210 707 21 20 50 9 
Craftsman, Foreman 388 1408 19 16 56 9 
Other manual, Service 486 2087 25 14 50 11 
Farmer, Farm laborer 88 326 35 12 39 14 
Non-Metro--Rural 257 987 34 11 44 11
 
Urban 397 1801 20 11 56 13
 
Metro--50,000 - 999,999 736 2504 23 15 54 8
 
1,000,000 or over 819 2930 19 19 48 14
 
Northeast 548 1962 19 21 49 11 
North Central 653 2294 24 15 53 8 
,South 643 2578 23 12 50 15 
West 365 1388 24 14 53 9 
Under $5,000 family income 378 2347 22 13 48 17
 
$5,000 - $6,999 276 963 27 11 48 14
 
$7,000 - $9,999 498 1523 24 19 47 10
 
'$10,000 - $14,999 494 1788 23 13 58 6
 
$15,000 or over 506 1398 16 21 56 7
 
.White 2009 7261 22 15 53 10 
Nonwhite 191 933 21 1 40 24 
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5. French study
 
The development of scientific knowledge makes men better.
 
Completely Mainly Mainly Completely 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't know 
10 28 30 18 14 
Technological progress increases unemployment. 
Completely Mainly Mainly Completely
 
Agree Agree Disagree Dis agree Don't know
 
32 37 17 10 4
 
Even if certain scientific studies risk compromising moral principles
 
(for example, test-tube babies, brain operations), one must neverthe­
less continue this kind of research.
 
,Completely Mainly Mainly Completely
 
Agree Agree Disagree Dis agree Don't know
 
27 29 15 21 8
 
Technological progress creates such an artificial life style that it 
endangers the life of the next generation.
 
Completely Mainly Mainly Completely
 
Agree Agree Disagree Dis agree Don't know
 
33 34 19 9 5 
II* CONTROL OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. (The National Science Board 
survey reinforces our argument that the public does not want to see 
any decrease in the amount of control exercised over technological 
innovations More people would rather it be increased rather than
 
diminished.) 
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National Science Board survey
 
Do you feel that the degree of contr Z that society has over science 
and technology should be increased, decreased, or remain as it is now? 
NUMBER OF REMAIN
 
INTERVIEWS AS IT NO
 
UNWTD WTD INCREASED DECREASED IS OPINION
 
Total U S Public 2209 8221 28 7 48 17
 
Men 1053 3969 29 9 49 13
 
Women 1156 4252 27 5 47 21
 
18 - 29 years of age 592 2130 29 8 48 15
 
30 - 39 410 1315 27 8 52 13
 
40 - 49 396 1579 25 10 45 20
 
50 - 59 318 1290 31 7 45 17
 
60 years or over 493 1908 28 4 47 21
 
Less than high school
 
complete 738 3532 25 6 45 24
 
High school complete 757 2888 30 7 Si 12
 
Some college 704 1775 31 10 46 13
 
Professional 341 969 26 11 51 12
 
Managerial 247 805 27 9 52 12
 
Clerical, Sales 210 707 29 7 so 14
 
Craftsman, Foreman 388 1408 30 8 47 15
 
Other manual, Service 486 2087 28 8 46 18
 
Farmer, Farm Laborer 88 326 32 3 48 17
 
Non-Metro--Rural 257 987 32 8 42 18
 
Urban 397 1801 22 5 52 21
 
Nletro--50,000 - 999,999 736 2504 29 8 52 11
 
1,000,000 or over 819 2930 29 7 44 20
 
Northeast 548 1962 29 6 48 17
 
North Central 653 2294 27 7 51 15
 
South 643 2578 27 8 42 23
 
West 365 1388 28 10 51 10
 
Under $5,000 family income 378 2347 27 6 43 24
 
$5,000 - $6,999 276 963 31 7 43 19
 
$7,000 - $9,999 498 1523 29 7 46 18
 
$10,000 - $14,999 494 1788 31 7 51 11
 
$15,000 or over 506 1398 23 10 57 10
 
White 2009 7261 28 7 50 15
 
Nonwhite 191 933 27 7 31 35
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III EVALUATIONS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. (Four American studies re­
inforce our point that evaluations of science and of technology are high­
ly skewed in the positive direction. The somewhat more positive finding
 
of those works compared to our own is due to differences in question
 
format They asked about technology and science as global entities while
 
we asked about particular presently implemented technological systems.
 
The French study is interesting as well It repeats our finding that
 
science is distinguished from technology and that the former is more
 
highly valued than the latter.)
 
1. Michigan SRC study
 
The Net Impact of Science on Society
 
The world is better off due to science 83%
 
The world is better off, qualified 5
 
Both better off and worse off, about fifty-fifty 3
 
The world is worse off, qualified 	 1 
The world is worse off due to science 2
 
Don't know 5
 
Not ascertained 1
 
100%
 
N = (1919) 
2. 	Taviss study
 
% Responding
 
Item Agreea Not Sure Disagreeb (N) 
Technology does more good than 
harm. 76 1 12.4 11 5 (201) 
3 AFIPS study.
 
Attitude Towards Effect of Inventions and Technology on Life
 
in the Past 25 Years 
Total (1,001)
 
Life is better 85%
 
Life is much better 56
 
Life is somewhat batter 29
 
Life is the same 	 2
 
Life is worse 8
 
Life is much worse
 
Life is somewhat worse S
 
Don't know, no answer S
 
Total 100%
 
Based on the questions "All in all, what effect do you think inventions
 
and technology have had on life in the past 25 years--have they made life
 
better, worse or haven't they affected us one way or the other? Would
 
you say much or somewhat (better/worse)?"
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4 National Science Board study
 
Do you feel that science and technology have changed life for the better
 
?or for the worse 
NUMBER OF NEITHER/ 
INTERVIEWS NO NO 
UNWTD WTD BETTER WORSE BOTH EFFECT OPINION 
Total U.S. Public 2209 8221 70 8 11 2 9 
Men 1053 3969 73 8 11 2 6 
Women 1156 4252 68 8 12 2 10 
18 - 29 years of age S92 2130 70 11 12 1 6 
30 - 39 410 1315 74 6 11 3 6 
40 - 49 396 1579 73 8 11 1 7 
50 - 59 318 1290 74 6 8 3 9 
60 years or over 493 1908 63 7 14 2 14 
Less than high school 
complete 738 3532 64 10 10 2 14 
High school complete 757 2888 73 7 13 2 5 
Some college 704 1775 78 8 11 1 2 
Professional 341 969 78 6 11 1 4 
Managerial 247 805 74 6 5 2 3 
Clerical, Sales 210 707 72 6 13 3 6 
Craftsman, Foreman 388 1408 74 9 11 1 5 
Other manual, Service 486 2087 66 10 13 2 9 
Farmer, Farm Laborer 88 326 65 13 9 5 8 
Non-Metro--Rural 257 987 66 12 12 2 8 
Urban 397 1801 70 7 10 1 12 
Metro--50,000 - 999,999 736 2504 72 9 13 2 4 
1,000,000 or over 819 2930 70 7 11 2 10 
Northeast 548 1962 72 6 12 2 8 
North Central 653 2294 71 7 13 3 6 
South 643 2578 65 9 10 2 14 
West 365 1388 76 11 9 1 3 
Under $5,000 family income 378 2347 63 10 11 2 14 
$5,000 - $6,999 276 963 60 8 17 2 13 
$7,000 - $9,999 
$10,000 - $14,999 
498 
494 
1523 
1788 
70 
76 
7 
8 
12 
13 
4 
* 
7 
3 
$15,000 or over 506 1398 83 5 6 3 3 
White 2009 7261 , 72 8 12 2 6 
Nonwhite 191 933 55 - 10 10 * 25 
5 
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French study-
In a general way do you think that science brings to man more of
 
good than bad, or more bad than good, or about the same of good and 
bad? 
-More good than bad------------------- 56 
-More bad than good-------------------­ 5 
-About the same of each --------------- 38 
-Don't know---------------------------- 2 
In a general way do you think that technical progress brings to man 
more good than bad or more bad than good or about as much good as 
bad9 
-More good than bad------------------- 43 
-More bad than good------------------- 10 
-About the same----------------------- 45 
-Don't know---------------------------
IV SOCIAL UTILITY OF TECHNOLOGY (The National Science Board's 
study recapitulates our finding that the public sees the possibility
 
of widespread but nearly universal use of technology in solving social
 
problems.)
 
2 
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National Science Board study:
 
For the most part, do you feel that science and technology will eventu­
ally solve most problems such as pol-lution, disease, drug abuse and 
crime, some of these problems, or few if any of these problems? 
NUMBER OF FEW 
INTERVIEWS IF NO 
UNWTD WTD MOST SOME ANY OPINION 
Total U S. Public 2209 8221 30 47 16 7
 
Men 1053 3969 34 45 16 5 
Women 1156 4252 26 49 16 9
 
18 - 29 years of age 592 2130 27 52 16 5
 
30 - 39 410 1315 32 52 13 3 
40 - 49 396 1579' 30 51 15 4 
50 - 59 318 1290 34 40 19 7 
60 years or over 493 1908 29 40 18 13 
Less than high school complete 738 3532 29 41 18 12 
High school complete 757 2888 28 53 15 4 
Some college 704 1775 34 49 14 3 
Professional 341 969 31 48 19 2 
Managerial 247 805 39 46 14 1 
Clerical, Sales 210 707 27 57 12 4 
Craftsman, Foreman 388 1408 31 50 14 5 
Other manual, Service 486 2087 30 46 17 7 
Farmer, Farm Laborer 88 326 20 44 28 8 
Non-Metro--Rural 257 987 27 42 24 7 
Urban 397 1801 30 42 19 9 
Metro--S0,000 - 999,999 736 2504 29 51 15 5 
1,000,000 or over 819 2930 32 48 13 7 
Northeast 548 1962 30 56 9 5
 
North Central 653 2294 29 50 17 4 
South 643 2578 27 41 20 12
 
West 365 1388 37 40 19 4
 
Under $5,000 family income 378 2347 30 40 16 14
 
$5,000 - $6,999 276 963 22 53 19 6
 
$7,000 - $9,999 498 1523 31 46 17 6
 
$10,000 - $14,999 494 1788 32 so 15 3
 
$15,000 or over 506 1398 33 50 16 1
 
White 2009 7261 31 48 16 5
 
Nonwhite 191 933 25 39 14 22
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V CONCERN ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT. (The Gallup and Harris questions con­
firm the importance of the environment as a value for the America public-­
a finding which supports our own work Interestingly, the ORC data do 
indicate that a substantial number of individuals express a willingness
 
to "put their money where their mouth is.")
 
1 Gallup survey.
 
When people around here go to vote on November 3rd for a candidate for 
Congress, how important w2ll pollution be in their thtnking? Do you 
think tt -vs extremely nmportant, fairly important, or not so important9 
1970 October 9-13 Extremely Fairly Not So Don't 
Important Important Important Know 
National total 58% 30% 9% 3% 
By size of community: 
1,000,000 and over 72 24 4 -
500,000-999,999 54 40 4 2 
50,000-499,999 62 27 20 1 
2,500-49,999 60 27 10 3 
Under 2,500, rural 47 34 13 6 
By geographic region 
East 61 31 6 2 
Midwest 59 29 10 2 
South 51 30 12 7 
West 64 30 5 1 
2 Harris survey
 
What are the two or three top problems facing people such as yourself
 
that you would like to see the new Congress do something about9 Any­
thing else?
 
1971 January 4
 
State of the economy 63%
 
Control of air and water pollution 41
 
War in Vietnam 31
 
Taxes and spending 31
 
Crime 28
 
Drugs 18
 
Student unrest 15
 
Education 11
 
Increase Social Security 9
 
Racial problems 8
 
National health insurance 7
 
Housing 6
 
Farm problems 5
 
Labor problems 4
 
Cut foreign aid 4
 
Abolish the draft 4
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3 ORC survey
 
If tt would cost each family an extra $100 a year sn taxes to have water/
 
air pollution greatly reduced, would you bie willing to accept this ex­
pense9 IF NO How much would you be-wtlling~to pay?
 
1965 September Willing to Pay:
 
Less than 
Water pollution* $100 $100 -Not Willtng_ 
National total 29% 8% 63% 
By size of community
 
1,000,000 and over 30 ,10 60
 
100,000-999,999 27 9 64
 
2,500-99,999 31 6 63
 
Small towns, rural 29 19 61
 
By geographic region-

Northeast 29 9 62
 
Midwest 29 9 62
 
South 32 8 60
 
West 21 9 70
 
Air pollution
 
National total 21 9 70
 
By size of community
 
1,000,000 and over 19 14 67
 
100,000-999,999 27 3 70
 
2,500-99,999 23 8 69
 
Small towns, rural 16 9 75
 
By geographic region
 
Northeast 23 11 66 
Midwest 17 6 77 
South 21 8 71 
West 21 15 64 
VI DECISION MAKING WITH RESPECT TO TECHNOLOGY (The Taviss study of 
decision making with respect to technology supports several of our find­
in gs 
(1) The Congress, President are seen to be exercising de­
cision making power illegitimately, although not near­
ly to as great a degree as in our study. 
(2) Technical experts are seen as exercising considerable
 
power legitimately.
 
(3) 	The public feels that it is being excluded from power 
unfairly--although, again, the feeling is less intense 
than in California. 
Business leaders do not appear to have come out as poorly in the Taviss 
study as they did in our own. The Etzioni and Nunn data reinforce the 
finding that the public places a great deal of confidence in technical 
experts and scientists The French study offers a sharp contrast to the 
American findings The government is much more highly regarded while 
the public's actual role seems more acceptable.) 
1. Taviss study 
Technology and Decision-Making 
Decision 
Stop Pollution 
Who Does 
Who Should 
[ndi-
vidual 
9 5 
7 6 
Percent Responding 
Public Elected 
Opinion Direct Presi- State Local 
Poll Vote dent Congress Reps Reps Experts Military Industry 
4 2 5 8 8 4 26 8 9 0 3 7 20 5 -- 12.1 
4 1 9 1 11 2 18 8 6 6 3 1 20 3 -- 19 3 
(N) 
(190) 
(197) 
Trips to Mars 
Who Does 
Who Should 
S 
2 1 
2 0 
7 2 
2 0 
19 2 
30 5 
21 8 
18 
19 
8 
7 
.. 
S 
.. 
--
36 
24 
6 
9 
8 6 
4 7 
1 0 
--
(197) 
(193) 
Nuclear Power Plants 
Who Does 
Who Should 
5 
1 5 
3 6 
7 7 
6 2 
27 7 
10 8 
5 6 
16.5 
10.3 
8.2 
4.6 
7.7 
10 3 
18 0 
18 5 
12 9 
7 7 
15 5 
6 2 
(194) 
(195) 
Creating Data Bank 
Who Does 
Who Should 
3 8 
5.7 
4 3 
10 3 
7 0 
37 6 
18.4 
13 9 
49 7 
21 6 
2 7 
1 6 
.5 
--
7.6 
6 7 
2.2 
5 
3 8 
2 1 
(185) 
(194) 
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2 Etzioni and Nunn study
 
Percentage of the Public Indicating "A Great Deal" of Confidence 
in 16 Institutional Areas. 1966 vs. 1971-1973* 
Year of Poll Change 
Institution 1966 1971 1972 1973 1966-1973 
Medicine 72% 61% 48% 54% -18%
 
Scvence 56 32 37 37 -19
 
Education 61 37 33 37 -24
 
Finance 67 36 39 - -
Religion 41 27 30 35 -6 
Psychiatry 51 35 31 - -
U S Supreme Court 51 23 28 32 -19 
Military 62 27 35 32 -30 
'Retail businesses 48 24 28 - ­
,Federal executive branch 41 23 27 29 -12 
Major U S companies 55 27 27 29 -26 
Congress 42 19 21 23 -19
 
The'press 29 18 18 23 -5
 
Television 25 22 17 19 -6
 
Labor 22 14 15 15 -7 
Advertising 21 13 12 - ­
*Louls Harris and Associates for polls in 1966, 1971, 1972. National
 
Opinion Research Center, General Survey of the National Data Program for
 
the Social Sciences, 1973.
 
Public's Confidence in Those Who Run Science. 1966 vs. 1971-1973*
 
Year of Poll Change 
Confidence in Science 1966 1971 1972 1973 1966-1973 
Great deal 56% 32% 37% 37% -19%
 
Only some 25 47 39 47 +22
 
Hardly any or none 4 10 8 6 +2
 
Not sure 15 11 16 10 -5 
*Louis Harris and Associates for polls in 1966, 1971, and 1972. National 
Opinion Research Center, General Survey of the National Data Program for 
the Social Sciences, 1973. 
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3 French study
 
In your opinion in the following list who, in France, has the most influ­
ence on the orientation of scientific research and technology? 
1st 2nd
 
-the government 37 22 
-scientific researchers 33 22
 
-the military 6 10 
-the whole of the population 9 9 
-private enterprise 11 24 
-don't know 10 1*3 
And 2nd? 
And, in your opinion, who should have the most influence on the orienta­
tion of scientific and technological research? 
Ist 2nd
 
-the government 34 22
 
-the military 1 2
 
-the whole of the population 19 23
 
-private enterprise 4 15 
-don't know 7 3
 
And 2nd ? 
VII ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR POWER. (The Ebasco study demonstrates 
that the favorable opinion towards nuclear power found in California is 
also present nationally. Moreover, the national sample offers a quite 
similar set of advantages and disadvantages as did our California popu­
lation Finally, there seems to exist nationally a strong consensus 
that nuclear power plants are safe--such a finding is in complete accord 
with our data ) 
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EBASCO study,
 
FAVOR/OPPOSE THE BUILDING OF MORE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
 
IN THE UNITED STATES
 
Favor 

Total Public 63 
East 58 
Midwest 65 
South 64 
West 68 
Cities 64 
Suburbs 65 
Towns 63 
Rural 62 
18-29 years 64 
30-49 years 64 
50 years and over 63 
Some H.S. or less 57 
H S. grad/some college 66 
College grad 68 
Under $5,000 52 
$s,000-$9,999 61 
$10,000-$14,999 64 
$15,000 and over 71 
White 65 
Black 55 
Men 73 
Women 54 
Total Nucplant Neighbors 63 
Indian Point, N Y. 56 
Morris, Ill 58 
San Onofre, Calif 75 
Nucpower in Own Community 
Main energy source 64 
Not main energy source 69 
Oppose Not Sure 
19 18
 
23 19
 
18 17
 
15 21
 
18 14
 
21 15
 
18 17
 
19 18
 
16 22
 
22 14
 
20 16
 
15 22
 
15 28
 
20 14
 
23 9
 
20 28
 
17 22
 
20 16
 
19 10
 
19 16
 
17 28
 
16 11
 
21 25
 
23 14
 
28 16
 
25 17
 
17 8
 
25, 11 
20 11 
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TWO OR THREE MAIN ADVANTAGES 
OF NUCLEAR POWFR PLANTS 
Total 
Public 
0 
Cheap, produced more cheaply, less expensive to use 31 
Clean energy, less pollution than gas, oil, coal 25 
Unlimited supply, abundant source, reusable 21 
More powerful, efficient, high output of energy 12 
Make U S independent of foreign oil 11 
Alternative to gas, oil, coal 8 
We need energy, good source of energy 7 
Cheaper in the long run 7 
Helps save natural resources 5 
Would create jobs 4 
More reliable, dependable 2 
Favor, if safe, properly controlled 2 
Compact, self-contained, less storage space necessary 2 
It's available immediately 2 
Progress, modern, advanced technology 2 
It's safer, not dangerous 1 
Could be built anywhere * 
They'll solve waste disposal problems * 
Favor, if built away from populated areas 
Easy transportation of fuel 
All other answers 4 
None, no advantages 5 
No answer 1 
Don't know 20 
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TWO OR THREE MAIN DISADVANTAGES 
OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
 
Total
 
Public 
Unsafe, dangerous 23
 
Danger of radiation contamination, leaks, cracks in 
reactor 20
 
Danger of accidents, explosions, earthquakes 14
 
Thermal pollution, kills marine life 12
 
Problems with radioactive waste disposal 10
 
Pollution, damage to environment 9
 
Expensive, high cost 7 
Initial expense is high, financing problems 7 
Lack of technical knowledge, uncertainty of 
consequences 6 
Need stringent controls, safeguards 5
 
Public anxiety over safety, objections of 
environmental groups 4 
Danger of sabotage 2 
Sites not available 2 
Danger to workers in nuclear plants 1 
Puts people out of work 1 
Inefficient, breaks down 1 
Shortage, lack of plutonium 1 
Length of construction time 
Fuel getting into wrong hands, theft of plutonium -
Exempted by government from liability claims, 
insurance coverage
 
Human carelessness, error
 
All other answers S
 
None, no disadvantages 9
 
No answer 1
 
Don't know 27
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HOW SAFE ARE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
 
Some- Not 
Very what so Dangerous 
Safe 
. 
Safe 
. 
Safe 
q. 
(Volunteered)
% 
Not Sure
% 
Total Public 26 38 13 5 18 
East 26 36 16 6 16 
Midwest 22 45 12 6 15 
South 25 36 12 3 24 
West 32 38 9 6 15 
Some H S or less 19 34 14 4 29 
H S grad/some college 28 41 12 6 13 
College grad 35 41 10 8 6 
Men 38 35 10 5 12 
Women 15 42 15 5 23 
Favor more nucplants in U S 39 45 5 1 10 
Oppose more nucplants in-U.S 4 31 34 22 9 
Total Nucplant Neighbors 35 38 12 7 8 
Indian Point, N Y 25 44 16 9 6 
Morris, Ill 33 38 14 5 10 
San Onofre, Calif 48 32 S 7 8 
VIII ATTITUDES TOWARD COMPUTERS (In the AFIPS study, we discover
 
that most people have positive evaluations toward computers, that there
 
is concern about the use of computers to abridge individual liberties, 
and the government ought to be concerned about such problems All of 
those attitudes are completely consistent with findings made in our
 
study ) 
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AFIPS study 
Attitude Toward 
Effect of Computers on Life 
Total 
(1,001) 
Life is better 71% 
Life is much better 40 
Life is somewhat better 31 
Life is the same 5
 
Life is worse i5
 
Life is much worse 5
 
Life is somewhat worse 10
 
Don't know, no answer 9
 
Total 100%
 
Based on the questions "Overall, what effect do you think the use of
 
,computers has had on life--has it made life better, worse, or hasn't it 
affected us one way or the other 9 Would you say much or somewhat (better/ 
worse)?"
 
Beliefs about Computers 
Total
 
(1,001)
 
Don't know
 
Agree No answer-Disagree 
The development of large computerized 
information files will help make our 
government more effective 63% 8% 29% 
Safeguards are used by government to 
make sure that personal information 
stored in computers is accurate 53 19 28 
Because of computerized information 
files, too many people have infor­
mation about other people 58 9 33 
Computerized information files may be 
used to destroy individual freedom 53 7 40 
There is no way to find out if infor­
mation about you that is stored in a 
computer is accurate 42 14 44 
'Based on the question- "Now, I'm going to mention a few more things
 
people have said about the use of computers As before, tell me whether
 
you agree, disagree, or have no opinion about each statement "
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Concern about Information Being Kept about People
 
Total 
(1,001) 
Concerned about information being kept 62% 
Very concerned about information being kept 27 
Fairly concerned about information being kept 35 
Not concerned about information being kept 36 
Not too concerned about information being kept 26 
Not concerned at all about information being kept 10 
Don't know, no answer 2 
Total 100%
 
Based on the question "Nowadays, some organizations keep information
 
about millions of people How do you feel about this--are you very con­
cerned, fairly concerned, not too concerned or not concerned at all 9 '" 
Beliefs about What Types of Information 
Should Be Kept in a Computer File
 
Should 
Be 
Kept 
Total 
(1,001) 
Don't know 
No Answer 
Should 
Not Be 
Kept 
Police records 83% 3% 14% 
Medical records 81 2 17 
School records 77 3 20 
Tax records 76 2 22 
Credit ratings 75 3 22 
Employment records 74 2 24 
Salary records 54 3 43 
Political activity records 50 5 45 
The brands of products people buy 46 7 47 
Based on the question- "For each type of information about people that 
I mention, please tell me whether you believe this information should or 
should not be kept in a central computerized information file " 
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How Concerned Government Should Be
 
about Regulating the Use of Computers
 
Total 
(1,001) 
Government should be concerned 84% 
Government should be very concerned 60 
Government should be fairly concerned 24 
Government should not be concerned 12 
Government should not too concerned 7 
Government should be not concerned at all 5 
Don't know, no answer 4 
Total 100% 
Based on the question "How concerned do you think
 
the government should be about regulating the use of 
computers--very concerned, fairly concerned, not too 
concerned or not concerned at all7 " 
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